Surface Ships Need More Offensive Punch, Outlook

The fact that VLS require in-port, in calm water reloading is a stunning shortfall which needs refinement before someone else does. ...have to believe this is a cost issue not so much engineering. ..cant imagine how one survives as the 'porupine' w/o a quicker reload.

This is much less of an issue than it sounds like.

The amount of weapons the Navy has is roughly of the same magnitude as the amount of VLS cells they have, and that is probably more than what they'd need to fight any serious naval war. Underway replenishment is not a requirement for fighting a major war, because before you'd need to do it, you have either already won or lost all your ships. This is just the same calculus that said that you don't ever need more than 4 AShMs in any realistic situation against a peer opponent. Either you have sufficient numbers that you'll have taken out everything after firing 4 missiles, or the enemy has sufficient numbers that you get sunk before you get to fire more than 4 times. The Navy doubled that and made the requirement 8 just to be sure.

... It would have been useful for bombarding people in mud huts, though.
w/ the PLAN putting out ships like they have been and that situation potentially worsening..not sure whether replenishment underway would not be a good idea... likely the assessment is classified.
 
w/ the PLAN putting out ships like they have been and that situation potentially worsening..not sure whether replenishment underway would not be a good idea... likely the assessment is classified.

The amount of ships they have doesn't change the calculus. If they have more ships, the Navy also needs more ships, not a way to reload.
 
w/ the PLAN putting out ships like they have been and that situation potentially worsening..not sure whether replenishment underway would not be a good idea... likely the assessment is classified.

The amount of ships they have doesn't change the calculus. If they have more ships, the Navy also needs more ships, not a way to reload.

Yes, more ships would be preferred, but is unlikely, thus the capability need or more unmanned large VLS barges.
 
I'm starting to wonder about how the Navy teaches history to it's people. Or critical thinking. Or both. I mean, bad fleet architecture takes are not new, but his interpretation of PT boat history is divorced from reality.
 
IMHO our best tech overmatch is submarines. We should have SSGNs and SSN(X)s coming off the assembly line like sausages.

Unfortunately, we do not have the industrial capacity to do that.
Actually we do.

The main sub yard is set up for four ships at a time.

We are only building 2, set up so alternating so that one half done as the other starts or launch. Plus we are not building them as fast as we could, we are moving at half speed to keep things moving.

So we got a good bit of slake to take up, we can basically triple the launch rate if Congress increase the budget to pay for the added crew needed.

Which is thr biggest issue.

We got the manufacturing ability.

But not the needed manpower, or rather willing manpower.
 
IMHO our best tech overmatch is submarines. We should have SSGNs and SSN(X)s coming off the assembly line like sausages.
That may end up being a fallacy in its own right though. Look what has happened with the so-called 'Submarine Admirals' in the Russian Navy for example. (They make the USN 'Carrier Mafia' almost seem rational and saintly in comparison, to be fair.)
 
IMHO our best tech overmatch is submarines. We should have SSGNs and SSN(X)s coming off the assembly line like sausages.
That may end up being a fallacy in its own right though. Look what has happened with the so-called 'Submarine Admirals' in the Russian Navy for example. (They make the USN 'Carrier Mafia' almost seem rational and saintly in comparison, to be fair.)
Not to mention China is gearing up to turn out SSNs at an alarming rate. Likely SSBNs as well.
 
The US simply has to decide whether it wants to challenge China in shipbuilding or lose the Cold War against China. There really isn't another way, if China can mass battlegroups in Pacific, Indian Ocean, and South Atlantic - all within their shipbuilding capability, then the US will lose. There is no substitute for a larger budget and a more efficient economic basis of support - which means a nationally supported shipbuilding industry.

Questions of "Bring Back PT Boats" or "Re-think Shipbuilding" are simply beside the point. The first Cold War was won in-part by command of the seas enabling geopolitical and economic advantages. Similar dynamics will happen with the second.
 
Oh god, they name-dropped the Bartlett Plan. I wish BD wouldn't give that silliness any more play. Setting aside that getting the current public shipyards sorted should take priority, adding another needs to be done intelligently and that means on a coast not in friggin Ohio. If the purpose primarily is to ease the maintenance backlog, it should probably go on the West coast. If it's to support EB and NN in nuclear submarine construction, as well as backlog work, it definitely should go on the East coast.
 
Oh god, they name-dropped the Bartlett Plan. I wish BD wouldn't give that silliness any more play. Setting aside that getting the current public shipyards sorted should take priority, adding another needs to be done intelligently and that means on a coast not in friggin Ohio. If the purpose primarily is to ease the maintenance backlog, it should probably go on the West coast. If it's to support EB and NN in nuclear submarine construction, as well as backlog work, it definitely should go on the East coast.
Why not make it near Bremerton much like Newport News is near Norfolk?
 
Oh god, they name-dropped the Bartlett Plan. I wish BD wouldn't give that silliness any more play. Setting aside that getting the current public shipyards sorted should take priority, adding another needs to be done intelligently and that means on a coast not in friggin Ohio. If the purpose primarily is to ease the maintenance backlog, it should probably go on the West coast. If it's to support EB and NN in nuclear submarine construction, as well as backlog work, it definitely should go on the East coast.
Why not make it near Bremerton much like Newport News is near Norfolk?
There has been a public yard there since 1891, PSNS. A second Puget Sound/PNW public yard would be workable, there's locations where it could be done, but I don't know how enthusiastic Congress would be about the idea. Astoria has potential but also a lot of issues...

The ideal West Coast location would be in Southern California, close to Third Fleet, the problem is getting land there. Buying out NASSCO doesnt seem likely unless they have some sort of disaster. Alameda's further North but would be an interesting site if the Navy hadn't gotten rid of it. There's also the argument that CA needs another major cargo port more urgently than a public shipyard.
 
Oh god, they name-dropped the Bartlett Plan. I wish BD wouldn't give that silliness any more play. Setting aside that getting the current public shipyards sorted should take priority, adding another needs to be done intelligently and that means on a coast not in friggin Ohio. If the purpose primarily is to ease the maintenance backlog, it should probably go on the West coast. If it's to support EB and NN in nuclear submarine construction, as well as backlog work, it definitely should go on the East coast.
Why not make it near Bremerton much like Newport News is near Norfolk?
There has been a public yard there since 1891, PSNS. A second Puget Sound/PNW public yard would be workable, there's locations where it could be done, but I don't know how enthusiastic Congress would be about the idea. Astoria has potential but also a lot of issues...

The ideal West Coast location would be in Southern California, close to Third Fleet, the problem is getting land there. Buying out NASSCO doesnt seem likely unless they have some sort of disaster. Alameda's further North but would be an interesting site if the Navy hadn't gotten rid of it. There's also the argument that CA needs another major cargo port more urgently than a public shipyard.
What about the Gulf coast? Ingalls is already down there but if we're building a yard from scratch (I'd hope that was the idea) make it one that can do everything Newport News can.
 
Oh god, they name-dropped the Bartlett Plan. I wish BD wouldn't give that silliness any more play. Setting aside that getting the current public shipyards sorted should take priority, adding another needs to be done intelligently and that means on a coast not in friggin Ohio. If the purpose primarily is to ease the maintenance backlog, it should probably go on the West coast. If it's to support EB and NN in nuclear submarine construction, as well as backlog work, it definitely should go on the East coast.
Why not make it near Bremerton much like Newport News is near Norfolk?
There has been a public yard there since 1891, PSNS. A second Puget Sound/PNW public yard would be workable, there's locations where it could be done, but I don't know how enthusiastic Congress would be about the idea. Astoria has potential but also a lot of issues...

The ideal West Coast location would be in Southern California, close to Third Fleet, the problem is getting land there. Buying out NASSCO doesnt seem likely unless they have some sort of disaster. Alameda's further North but would be an interesting site if the Navy hadn't gotten rid of it. There's also the argument that CA needs another major cargo port more urgently than a public shipyard.
What about the Gulf coast? Ingalls is already down there but if we're building a yard from scratch (I'd hope that was the idea) make it one that can do everything Newport News can.
There's a pretty healthy number of private yards on the Gulf Coast, it's a good place to build surface vessels. Its not a great place for another public Navy yard. The energy industry is very aggressive in hiring in the Gulf, and there's a plethora of commercial yards looking for experience, so keeping a public yard's civilian workforce up will be more of a pain. The geography is not great for a green field along much of the coast, there's already non-public yards or cargo/energy terminals on the best spots, and there's a lot of development, beaches, and nature preserves to deal with. It's a long haul from the Navy's bases on the coasts. It's not a great underwater environment for nuclear subs. And there's Hurricanes to worry about.
 
Oh god, they name-dropped the Bartlett Plan. I wish BD wouldn't give that silliness any more play. Setting aside that getting the current public shipyards sorted should take priority, adding another needs to be done intelligently and that means on a coast not in friggin Ohio. If the purpose primarily is to ease the maintenance backlog, it should probably go on the West coast. If it's to support EB and NN in nuclear submarine construction, as well as backlog work, it definitely should go on the East coast.
Why not make it near Bremerton much like Newport News is near Norfolk?
There has been a public yard there since 1891, PSNS. A second Puget Sound/PNW public yard would be workable, there's locations where it could be done, but I don't know how enthusiastic Congress would be about the idea. Astoria has potential but also a lot of issues...

The ideal West Coast location would be in Southern California, close to Third Fleet, the problem is getting land there. Buying out NASSCO doesnt seem likely unless they have some sort of disaster. Alameda's further North but would be an interesting site if the Navy hadn't gotten rid of it. There's also the argument that CA needs another major cargo port more urgently than a public shipyard.
What about the Gulf coast? Ingalls is already down there but if we're building a yard from scratch (I'd hope that was the idea) make it one that can do everything Newport News can.
There's a pretty healthy number of private yards on the Gulf Coast, it's a good place to build surface vessels. Its not a great place for another public Navy yard. The energy industry is very aggressive in hiring in the Gulf, and there's a plethora of commercial yards looking for experience, so keeping a public yard's civilian workforce up will be more of a pain. The geography is not great for a green field along much of the coast, there's already non-public yards or cargo/energy terminals on the best spots, and there's a lot of development, beaches, and nature preserves to deal with. It's a long haul from the Navy's bases on the coasts. It's not a great underwater environment for nuclear subs. And there's Hurricanes to worry about.
How 'bout expanding New York Shipbuilding / Port of Camden or Philadelphia Naval Shipyard?
 
w/ the PLAN putting out ships like they have been and that situation potentially worsening..not sure whether replenishment underway would not be a good idea... likely the assessment is classified.

The amount of ships they have doesn't change the calculus. If they have more ships, the Navy also needs more ships, not a way to reload.

Yes, more ships would be preferred, but is unlikely, thus the capability need or more unmanned large VLS barges.

Weaker navies do not defeat stronger ones and naval battles are typically Lanchesterian. VLS barges are a post-modern Jeune Ecole lol. The only good news is that the PRC is not the United States, nor the British Empire, and thus has no real desires to rule the world.

The US simply has to decide whether it wants to challenge China in shipbuilding or lose the Cold War against China.

This is a false dichotomy. There is no real choice that isn't at least somewhat morally reprehensible to the average American.

The US's macroeconomic outlook is too weak to support a major shipbuilding program. There's no getting around this: there aren't enough skilled tradesmen, and even if every young person in America were trained in a trade, no one has enough kids anymore for it to matter. Childrearing is expensive and only getting more so, so people avoid having kids as long as possible, at least until the increasingly razor thin wealth disparity is made up later and later in life, and more than likely by the time you're financially stable enough to buy a house, and have a family at the same time, you're in your mid to late 30's and if you're female that's well off the clock.

Conversely, the PRC is roughly where the United States was in 1930: a massive, surplus agrarian population of rice farming peasants to pull from, rapidly industrializing cities, and emphasis on production and heavy manufacturing for the rest of the world. There is no hope for the US to win an industrial war of attrition, because the PRC has already won, by virtue of having industrialized a century later than America.

Now, it's true that China will peak earlier than America, due to demographic concerns caused by the one-child policy, but this is also not important. At the relative nadir and strength of the USN and PLAN, in 2040-2045, the United States and China will be demographically near identical, both roughly in their early 40's median age, except China will be three times bigger and only need to control the South China Sea, while the United States will keep trying to hold onto its global empire. Thus the PLAN will be able to simply demolish the US Navy with sheer numbers fairly easily.

What happens after that is somewhat unimportant.

Perhaps America could annex Mexico or something and absorb that population, which is fairly young and weakly educated, and it might help redress the issue of high cost of workers and the demographic shortfalls. On the other hand America would now own Mexico, which would be a net drain. The alternative is America launches a nuclear Pearl Harbor on the PRC, right now, and demolishes it utterly while eating the Chinese "minimum deterrent" for damage on the West Coast or whatever. Finally, it can choose to do nothing, attempt to slow down the inevitable Chinese economic rise, and hope it collapses in on itself spontaneously like Japan did in the 1990's.

These are the only real options: Attack now and face the consequences (nuclear destruction of at least one major city, possibly more); redress the population problem by forcibly bringing more people into the fold (forcibly annexation of neighboring Latin American states); or do nothing (ignore the problem and hope it goes away, prepare to evacuate the SCS to save the rest of the empire). America is currently choosing to do nothing because anything else would be less than morally acceptable to it.

It's entirely possible that the PRC could evaporate into a cloud of smoke and ash (figuratively but perhaps literally if a new Warlord Era occurs) in the next decade, Xi could pick a fight with the United States early and force the USN into action (in which case PRC loses) when the COFM is against the PLAN, or this could happen to America, but at the moment time is on the PRC's side. The US is choosing to ignore the problem mostly because it doesn't like to think of itself as an aggressive, hegemonic, expansionist empire, although that's effectively what it is.

It might also be that the US is attempting to goad China into attacking first through economic coercive strategy, which would be rather clever because it would whitewash America of the need to strike first (although it still requires the US Navy to survive the initial assault), but that implies the US has that level of coordination between its State, Defense, and Treasury departments. The only time we saw anything like that was under FDR, against Japan, and even Roosevelt didn't get to choose the time and place to fight, so it's a rather poor strategy.

It's also important to keep in mind that the PLAN is not the second coming of the IJN. While their goals are ostensibly similar (naval dominance over East Asia, America's traditional colonial playground), the PLAN is far less rigorous and far less experienced than the IJN in terms of employment of naval aviation. This might change in the coming decades, but it will be rather rapid. It would have to occur within a human generation at a time when naval ships require that long simply to be bent into steel. Not even the Chinese, with their impressive and expanding heavy ship industries, expect to have Type 004 CVBGs before the 2030's due to COVID. That's an awfully tight window given the PLA isn't exactly producing world class fighter pilots either, but rather, like the Saudis, hiring mercenary Westerners to fight for them.
 
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Oh god, they name-dropped the Bartlett Plan. I wish BD wouldn't give that silliness any more play. Setting aside that getting the current public shipyards sorted should take priority, adding another needs to be done intelligently and that means on a coast not in friggin Ohio. If the purpose primarily is to ease the maintenance backlog, it should probably go on the West coast. If it's to support EB and NN in nuclear submarine construction, as well as backlog work, it definitely should go on the East coast.
Why not make it near Bremerton much like Newport News is near Norfolk?
There has been a public yard there since 1891, PSNS. A second Puget Sound/PNW public yard would be workable, there's locations where it could be done, but I don't know how enthusiastic Congress would be about the idea. Astoria has potential but also a lot of issues...

The ideal West Coast location would be in Southern California, close to Third Fleet, the problem is getting land there. Buying out NASSCO doesnt seem likely unless they have some sort of disaster. Alameda's further North but would be an interesting site if the Navy hadn't gotten rid of it. There's also the argument that CA needs another major cargo port more urgently than a public shipyard.
What about the Gulf coast? Ingalls is already down there but if we're building a yard from scratch (I'd hope that was the idea) make it one that can do everything Newport News can.
There's a pretty healthy number of private yards on the Gulf Coast, it's a good place to build surface vessels. Its not a great place for another public Navy yard. The energy industry is very aggressive in hiring in the Gulf, and there's a plethora of commercial yards looking for experience, so keeping a public yard's civilian workforce up will be more of a pain. The geography is not great for a green field along much of the coast, there's already non-public yards or cargo/energy terminals on the best spots, and there's a lot of development, beaches, and nature preserves to deal with. It's a long haul from the Navy's bases on the coasts. It's not a great underwater environment for nuclear subs. And there's Hurricanes to worry about.
How 'bout expanding New York Shipbuilding / Port of Camden or Philadelphia Naval Shipyard?
While it still means only 2 yards in the Pacific, if the goal is to support the submarine program there's a lot to recommend the Mid Atlantic. Both the Philly and Camden yards have been repurposed and aren't necessarily available, though Philly Shipyard might be the most at-risk major yard in the US if the idea is to buy a failing private yard and convert it. But the best prospect for a brownfield redevelopment could be Sparrows Point next to Baltimore. They JUST leased the old shipyard footprint for a steel mill to build offshore wind turbine bases, but a new Public yard could be constructed elsewhere on the reclaimed land of the point and piggyback off the investments made in that project.
 
Would it be possible to buy back any of the former Mare Island NSY in California, or the former Charleston NSY in South Carolina?
Looking in Google Earth, the dry docks seem to still exist, which is more than you can say for a lot of places dry docks used to be.
 
Would it be possible to buy back any of the former Mare Island NSY in California, or the former Charleston NSY in South Carolina?
Looking in Google Earth, the dry docks seem to still exist, which is more than you can say for a lot of places dry docks used to be.
Can't speak for the Carolinas, but Mare Island is essentially a brownfield/ghost town with no discernible future... While former NAS Alameda is slowly being turned into a mixed-use real estate development, Mare Island is one of the few spot left in the Bay Area for heavy industry. I for one would welcome the Navy back into the North Bay!
 
Big issue with New York Shipbuilding Port Camden is that all the gear is no longer there.

And the land been sold off basically to become parts of the shipping facility.

So the government going to have get it back.

And Eminate Domaining means that you still got to pay the base land value to the current users.

Which basically means it be cheaper to go somewhere else and build a new yard.

Better off going to the West Coast around Portland and building a new yard there. There are several spots that the navy stake out in the 1910s that be good for yards that still empty.
 
Since they first showed that PowerPoint slide, I've seen people suggesting the Destroyer Payload Module was "just" some additional VLS which would swap an existing hull section and so would not increase the ship's length. Nice to have confirmation from the Deputy Program Manager that the DPM is, like the VPM, a full hull plug extension.
 
Since they first showed that PowerPoint slide, I've seen people suggesting the Destroyer Payload Module was "just" some additional VLS which would swap an existing hull section and so would not increase the ship's length. Nice to have confirmation from the Deputy Program Manager that the DPM is, like the VPM, a full hull plug extension.

I think the terminology got a bit confusing. The VPM is a hull plug that contains four Virginia Payload Tubes (VPTs). But the VPM VPTs are apparently not quite the same as the VPTs that replaced the VLS in earlier Virginias (6 Tomahawks vs 7 in a MAC), so some folks (like myself) used VPM to refer referred to the tube itself, not just the hull plug.

The idea of designing DDG(X) to accommodate a hull plug from the outset is interesting. This plan does seem to leave room for a VPM holding something other than a set of DPTs (or whatever they call the payload tubes in the Zumwalts). Maybe a block of proper oversized VLS. Or an AW/flag plot and staff accommodation space.

As with the Virginias, it seems likely that the plug would be added to new ships during construction, rather than retrofitting older ships. To me, this seems to be essentially placing a marker for building a follow-on batch of DDG(X) as CG(X), in capacity if not in name.
 
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The US simply has to decide whether it wants to challenge China in shipbuilding or lose the Cold War against China. There really isn't another way, if China can mass battlegroups in Pacific, Indian Ocean, and South Atlantic - all within their shipbuilding capability, then the US will lose. There is no substitute for a larger budget and a more efficient economic basis of support - which means a nationally supported shipbuilding industry.

Questions of "Bring Back PT Boats" or "Re-think Shipbuilding" are simply beside the point. The first Cold War was won in-part by command of the seas enabling geopolitical and economic advantages. Similar dynamics will happen with the second.
There is no need to "Win" this cold war, and if one wants to win there is no need for a large surface navy with offensive firepower to "beat the Chinese navy".

This is no longer the early 20 century where crossing a ocean require amazing feat of aeronautics, a few bases enables the projection of power across the battle space. If one is seeking to leverage technological overmatch, the project to work on is HGV bus on reusable rocketry, where one can alpha-strike a fleet off dual use launchers 12 time zones away. There are absurdly more good options for missile delivery options and ISR for kill chain if it only needs to work for a few hours and not cruise around the world for decades. From a killing the PLAN perspective, the right thing might be just cut the surface navy to nothing because it is insistent on burning the budget on constantly deploying and replace it with long range missiles that do not kill the budget in peace time to enable a real force build up. So time to dig deep in Guam and return the favor on ASBM spam.

The point of navy is keeping the lines of communication to Japan open and keep it in the war if one breaks out.

In a mature reusable rocketry/long range aircraft environment, the pacific is the new mediterranean.

--------------------
I think an additional piece of fun is buying/have base some small islands and do underwater long range strike setup. Why pay for a nuclear sub when you have weapons that covers the battle area that you can prepare beforehand? Just have underwater silos and enough defense to make attack difficult. A towable underwater missile pod is the technology that ought to be on the radar of everyone thinking about navies.
 
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The US simply has to decide whether it wants to challenge China in shipbuilding or lose the Cold War against China. There really isn't another way, if China can mass battlegroups in Pacific, Indian Ocean, and South Atlantic - all within their shipbuilding capability, then the US will lose. There is no substitute for a larger budget and a more efficient economic basis of support - which means a nationally supported shipbuilding industry.

Questions of "Bring Back PT Boats" or "Re-think Shipbuilding" are simply beside the point. The first Cold War was won in-part by command of the seas enabling geopolitical and economic advantages. Similar dynamics will happen with the second.
There is no need to "Win" this cold war, and if one wants to win there is no need for a large surface navy with offensive firepower to "beat the Chinese navy".

This is no longer the early 20 century where crossing a ocean require amazing feat of aeronautics, a few bases enables the projection of power across the battle space. If one is seeking to leverage technological overmatch, the project to work on is HGV bus on reusable rocketry, where one can alpha-strike a fleet off dual use launchers 12 time zones away. There are absurdly more good options for missile delivery options and ISR for kill chain if it only needs to work for a few hours and not cruise around the world for decades. From a killing the PLAN perspective, the right thing might be just cut the surface navy to nothing because it is insistent on burning the budget on constantly deploying and replace it with long range missiles that do not kill the budget in peace time to enable a real force build up. So time to dig deep in Guam and return the favor on ASBM spam.

The point of navy is keeping the lines of communication to Japan open and keep it in the war if one breaks out.

In a mature reusable rocketry/long range aircraft environment, the pacific is the new mediterranean.

--------------------
I think an additional piece of fun is buying/have base some small islands and do underwater long range strike setup. Why pay for a nuclear sub when you have weapons that covers the battle area that you can prepare beforehand? Just have underwater silos and enough defense to make attack difficult. A towable underwater missile pod is the technology that ought to be on the radar of everyone thinking about navies.

The missile-focused approach you advocate does nothing to establish 'presence' anywhere. It really repeats the Soviet strategy of the first Cold War and will have the same results. The long-term conflict between China and the US will be won with strategic / economic sphere, not in the tactical technology vs. technology sphere.

Being able to sink the PLAN in the Taiwan Strait does nothing to halt the gradual drift of Africa and South America towards China and away from the US.

Specific to your idea, the long-range ISR approach is very interesting, but really depends upon the outcome of the space-war and we simply do not know how that'll work. Also, HGV's are atrociously expensive and nobody seems able to afford more than a handful. The Conventional Prompt Strike (per Google) has a unit cost of $90 million.
 
The US simply has to decide whether it wants to challenge China in shipbuilding or lose the Cold War against China. There really isn't another way, if China can mass battlegroups in Pacific, Indian Ocean, and South Atlantic - all within their shipbuilding capability, then the US will lose. There is no substitute for a larger budget and a more efficient economic basis of support - which means a nationally supported shipbuilding industry.

Questions of "Bring Back PT Boats" or "Re-think Shipbuilding" are simply beside the point. The first Cold War was won in-part by command of the seas enabling geopolitical and economic advantages. Similar dynamics will happen with the second.
There is no need to "Win" this cold war, and if one wants to win there is no need for a large surface navy with offensive firepower to "beat the Chinese navy".

This is no longer the early 20 century where crossing a ocean require amazing feat of aeronautics, a few bases enables the projection of power across the battle space. If one is seeking to leverage technological overmatch, the project to work on is HGV bus on reusable rocketry, where one can alpha-strike a fleet off dual use launchers 12 time zones away. There are absurdly more good options for missile delivery options and ISR for kill chain if it only needs to work for a few hours and not cruise around the world for decades. From a killing the PLAN perspective, the right thing might be just cut the surface navy to nothing because it is insistent on burning the budget on constantly deploying and replace it with long range missiles that do not kill the budget in peace time to enable a real force build up. So time to dig deep in Guam and return the favor on ASBM spam.

The point of navy is keeping the lines of communication to Japan open and keep it in the war if one breaks out.

In a mature reusable rocketry/long range aircraft environment, the pacific is the new mediterranean.

--------------------
I think an additional piece of fun is buying/have base some small islands and do underwater long range strike setup. Why pay for a nuclear sub when you have weapons that covers the battle area that you can prepare beforehand? Just have underwater silos and enough defense to make attack difficult. A towable underwater missile pod is the technology that ought to be on the radar of everyone thinking about navies.

The missile-focused approach you advocate does nothing to establish 'presence' anywhere. It really repeats the Soviet strategy of the first Cold War and will have the same results. The long-term conflict between China and the US will be won with strategic / economic sphere, not in the tactical technology vs. technology sphere.

Being able to sink the PLAN in the Taiwan Strait does nothing to halt the gradual drift of Africa and South America towards China and away from the US.

Specific to your idea, the long-range ISR approach is very interesting, but really depends upon the outcome of the space-war and we simply do not know how that'll work. Also, HGV's are atrociously expensive and nobody seems able to afford more than a handful. The Conventional Prompt Strike (per Google) has a unit cost of $90 million.
Let's retire our navy then since it's expensive and serves no purpose. :rolleyes:
 
Let's retire our navy then since it's expensive and serves no purpose. :rolleyes:

The surface navy serves a huge purpose and has to be expanded. Ships can "be" somewhere in a way that stand-off ISR cannot.
 
These people need to figure out how to get the unit cost down. (You know, by buying them at a higher rate so the cost goes down instead of buying them at the lowest rate possible.)
 
Regarding the KDDX:
1668797986630.png
Of particular note is the concept image revealed during the ceremony. The image appears to show a new ship that is very different from any vessel currently operated by the ROK Navy or designs for future ships released so far.

The image likely depicts a new design for the KDDX, given that it’s the only surface vessel program for which the design has not been finalized. The ROK Navy considers any information about KDDX highly sensitive, with several employees of Hyundai Heavy Industries brought to court for taking photos of blueprints. Also on display during the ceremony was the MDV-II, an unmanned mine neutralization system, the Austrian-made S-100 UAV, and a remotely operated vehicle.
 
Let's be honest, the USN has been suffering from Congress's penny-pinching for a while. Severely so. For example, they wanted more FFGs, or at least a replacement for the OHPs, but they never got any because, well, the USN wouldn't allow it for the budget until, suddenly, Congress discovered that it was far more expensive to send a DDG out on pirate-hunting missions than a smaller ship like the old OHPs... and since there wasn't a replacement for the OHPs on the outset, they basically had to go clean-sheet.

It's an old saying that whenever the USN wanted more smaller ships (be frigates in the Days of Sail, DDs for the age of steam, or FFGs in the missile age), Congress only relents when circumstances forced their hand.
 

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