Royal Navy with F-8 Crusader instead of F-4 Phantom II

[Scott Kenny]

Was the design life of a new capital ship in the 50s? Because I have a feeling that it wasn't 30+ years and 20-25 years was more realistic. Therefore a refit that gives 15 years for 18m compared for 24m for a new ship for 20-25 years isn't a big deal. In any case to a cabinet minister and average voter 15 years is so far away as to not worth thinking about in any real sense, and 30+ years might as well be science fiction territory.

I'd guess ~24 or so years, based on boiler relining refits. 12 years on the first set of bricks, 6 years on the second, 4 years on the third set, plus refit time. After that you're at the point of not being worth relining the boilers because it only gets you another ~3 years at a time. And honestly, I'm not sure the 4-year relining is worth it.

When did the UK have good gas turbines worked out for naval propulsion? 1970?

 

[Rule of cool]

For the British once a ship gets beyond 15-20 years it's life is on the line. A ship with a 30 years design life is just as likey to last 25 years as 33 years. A major refit to last 15 years puts the future well out of the way that its good enough for the voters.

 

[bobtdwarf]

I'd guess ~24 or so years, based on boiler relining refits. 12 years on the first set of bricks, 6 years on the second, 4 years on the third set, plus refit time. After that you're at the point of not being worth relining the boilers because it only gets you another ~3 years at a time. And honestly, I'm not sure the 4-year relining is worth it.

When did the UK have good gas turbines worked out for naval propulsion? 1970?

mid to late 50's for gas turbines, sure they are metrovicks
but the Counties were COSAG ships

 

[BlackBat242]

Yes, oddly no reference to Hermes' future refit is mentioned at all. In the light of this minor panic that went all the way to the Flag Officer Aircraft Carriers and higher, its surprising that not long afterwards they proposed operating Phantom from Hermes given how marginal the ship was.

Do you have a source for the 45,000lb rating of the arrester gear? I was under the impression that the Mk 13 was only upgraded to 40,000lb in 1960. Even the later DAAG sets - including the DA.2 fitted to Eagle and Ark Royal were only rated at 40,000lb at 125kt.

Anyhow, as you say the F-8 should have safely been within Hermes original configuration.

I've found a letter from the Captain of Hermes in 1963 that makes interesting reading on Hermes' performance in the tropics.
Basically only 24-25kt on a good day.

Re-read the first part of the letter, specifically:



The 45,000 lb was from her 1964-66 refit to 1971 only, it was 35,000 lb before that.
I got the post-refit number from a source I cannot seem to find - likely something on an internet discussion board.

While such sources can be excellent (I have obtained copies of official documents and papers that way) it can also produce incorrect info - and appears to have in this case. I'll alter my records to indicate 40,000 lb.

 

[BlackBat242]

you would have to replace Ark and Eagle with them in the four carrier fleet. It is not going to cost much more for new with three times the projected hull life and Centaur is already in place to cover for Eagle... seems like the best time, and best time to rue-load HK's fantastic Verdun drawing as inspiration

Ummm... Eagle's large refit/modernization was from 30 Oct 1959 to 14 May 1964 - and was planned, programmed in the RN's firm authorizations, and funding programmed into the budget from well before that, so I doubt that that would be cancelled even if new carriers were authorized - especially since she was still in 90% axial-deck shape with only painted lines and a slight widening forming a minimal angle (see first photo below).

What I could see being done is to reduce the scope of the refit to primarily below-decks while adding only a moderate angle - as well as doing the same to Ark Royal in 1958-59 (when they historically removed the upper-hangar-only deck-edge lift and made similar changes to the lower hangar & aft lift as Eagle got in her large refit - see second photo below).

Eagle May 1956:


Ark Royal 1962-66:

 

[MadRat]

https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1675x1076/melbournelexingtoncvndeckcomparoed_31c2e3b4b1227dd8448894a4cac7c4f3715284a8.gif

Seems like the additional launch/recovery capacity and internal space would have been pretty useful even if you could not promise 20-25 years. Certainly keeps you in position for better jets and support aircraft. HMS Melbourne had Tracers and Skyhawks in their upgrade, so not much to squeeze out of the older UK carriers.

 

[BlackBat242]

Melbourne, USS Enterprise & HMNZS Waikaito:



HMAS Melbourne & USS Kitty Hawk CV-63 Pearl Harbour 10 May 1978:



HMS Ark Royal & USS Nimitz Norfolk 8-1978:




And back to the first:

 

[zen]

The Medium Carrier has life from 1954-1957 in the six-carrier fleet. But from 1957 on you need to stack on more PODs to keep the concept alive.

The POD is some UK firm jumping on Vought's F8 as it wins the USN order and gaining the RN order.
At that point the RN is plugged into the F8 solution.
As F8 gains more capability, it's case strengthens rather than weakens.
Rapidly this pushes off NA.47 that was downgraded from F.155 capability to F.177 won by Saro, just so the RN could piggyback on RAF funding.
Now it's piggybacking on the USN.....
Which means the RN is more interested in something like a strap on rocket pack to the F8 to deliver NA.47.
Which will likely be ditched much like the rocket pack on Lightning.

F8 is ordered by USN 1953, prototype flies 1955, and IOC in 1957.
Potentially this gets F8 IOC well ahead on projected domestic only efforts, which was 1960 to 1962.

This all parallels the shift from 1952 CV to Medium Fleet Carrier.

 

[bobtdwarf]

Ummm... Eagle's large refit/modernization was from 30 Oct 1959 to 14 May 1964 - and was planned, programmed in the RN's firm authorizations, and funding programmed into the budget from well before that, so I doubt that that would be cancelled even if new carriers were authorized - especially since she was still in 90% axial-deck shape with only painted lines and a slight widening forming a minimal angle (see first photo below).

What I could see being done is to reduce the scope of the refit to primarily below-decks while adding only a moderate angle - as well as doing the same to Ark Royal in 1958-59 (when they historically removed the upper-hangar-only deck-edge lift and made similar changes to the lower hangar & aft lift as Eagle got in her large refit - see second photo below).

Eagle May 1956:
View attachment 746827

Ark Royal 1962-66:

View attachment 746828

Yeah a Centaur style refit for Eagle quick, dirty, cheap and nasty would get the job done.

And as always we have to make different choices... but doing new build instead at this time is the cleanest alter point. I figure overall it would save around 16 million pounds over doing the rebuilds and then building CVA01...

You are right it will require the RN juggling some procurement around which should be doable; they just to make the decision at some point during Vickies rebuild that for how much of a PITA this has been lets just not do it again

 

[Archibald]

Which means the RN is more interested in something like a strap on rocket pack to the F8 to deliver NA.47.
Which will likely be ditched much like the rocket pack on Lightning.

Waaaaait a minute. You british were in love with H2O2 / bleach / hydrogen peroxide, notably on the Saro interceptors. Well, so was Uncle Sam at the time, if only briefly... and for the Crusader.

LR40

LR40

www.astronautix.com

So the two experiences could be pooled.

 

[Archibald]

I said it on other threads : the Illustrious extended family family is a lost cause, with their different hangars (2-1-3) driving re-builders crazy - until only Victorious is worth rebuilding, all the others being gone.
What truly matters is
-to handle carefully four Centaurs
-two or even three Audacious.
That's seven carriers, a good basis to last all Cold War long.
Also careful use of the Colossus / Majestic for other carrier missions: ASW, commando carrier, training. Don't sacrifice Centaurs for the job, as done in the 1960's.
How about scrapping the Tigers and use Colossus / Majestic for the job, into the 1970's ? Heck, going further, put Harriers on their decks and turn them into escort cruisers.

 

[GK Dundas]

Sea Harrier was a big capability drop and success from its uniqueness lived in myth more than reality. CATOBAR capabilities would have thwarted the Falklands from the get-go. Argentina had realistic expectation of the Sea Harrier and dumb luck prevented more losses than it could have been for the attack version. Argentina over estimated their own capabilities if anything. But CATOBAR operatoons would have allowed the fleet to have much greater defensive umbrella that would have been foolhardy to challenge.

The US offered the UK several opportunities at much better used carriers than were in service. The UK suffered from NIH.

While I think the Sea Harrier was a second rate aircraft flown by what were probably at the time the best Naval aviators in the world . Whose skills wrung every once of performance out of their airframes. And by and large were the Argentines superiors tactically speaking .
I doubt very much that the lack of rather the possession of a CATOBAR carrier played anything but the most minor of consideration in the Argentines decision trees .
I doubt anything would have prevented the the Falklands. The Argentine Government's ability for self delusion was the stuff of Legend.
The best example was during the Beagle channel crisis or rather just after. The RC Church had acted as mediator between Chile and Argentina.
When they ruled in favor of Chile the Argentine reaction was that obviously the Pope was a communist.

 

[Rule of cool]

doubt very much that the lack of rather the possession of a CATOBAR carrier played anything but the most minor of consideration in the Argentines decision trees .
I doubt anything would have prevented the the Falklands. The Argentine Government's ability for self delusion was the stuff of Legend.
The best example was during the Beagle channel crisis or rather just after. The RC Church had acted as mediator between Chile and Argentina.
When they ruled in favor of Chile the Argentine reaction was that obviously the Pope was a communist.

I agree, the pathetic response to the invasion of South Thule and the constant negotiation over the islands were far more important than how many carrier fighters there were in the RN and how fast they flew.

 

[bobtdwarf]

Oh the Falklands would happen no matter what... but with the RN having even F-8s on the low end... you have some spicy footage

 

[GK Dundas]

And of course Margaret Thatcher was a woman. For that reason alone how could the Argentinians or anyone at all take the UK seriously...

 

[GK Dundas]

I agree, the pathetic response to the invasion of South Thule and the constant negotiation over the islands were far more important than how many carrier fighters there were in the RN and how fast they flew.

The lukewarm response by the Brits only further convinced the regime to push forward.
They weren't the first to make that mistake , Belize roughly ten years earlier was much the same.

 

[Scott Kenny]

While I think the Sea Harrier was a second rate aircraft flown by what were probably at the time the best Naval aviators in the world . Whose skills wrung every once of performance out of their airframes. And by and large were the Argentines superiors tactically speaking .
I doubt very much that the lack of rather the possession of a CATOBAR carrier played anything but the most minor of consideration in the Argentines decision trees .
I doubt anything would have prevented the the Falklands. The Argentine Government's ability for self delusion was the stuff of Legend.
The best example was during the Beagle channel crisis or rather just after. The RC Church had acted as mediator between Chile and Argentina.
When they ruled in favor of Chile the Argentine reaction was that obviously the Pope was a communist.

It's not about the CATOBAR carrier preventing the Falklands War from happening.

It's about how a CATOBAR carrier means AEW and much better fighters defending the British fleet, plus Buccaneer strikes on the Argentine airbases instead of Black Buck raids. A completely different Falklands War.

 

[Rule of cool]

It's not about the CATOBAR carrier preventing the Falklands War from happening.

It's about how a CATOBAR carrier means AEW and much better fighters defending the British fleet, plus Buccaneer strikes on the Argentine airbases instead of Black Buck raids. A completely different Falklands War.

I think the prevention argument comes from what you're saying; a conventional carrier or 2 would be so powerful that the Argentines wouldn't start the war.

 

[Yellow Palace]

I think the prevention argument comes from what you're saying; a conventional carrier or 2 would be so powerful that the Argentines wouldn't start the war.

It's a very one-dimensional view of deterrence.

A UK that had chosen to maintain a significant out-of-area power projection capability - including carriers but also amphibious shipping, air power, and the commensurate logistical support - might have been capable of deterrence. But the softer elements of UK power were employed in a way that gave the Argentinian government confidence that an invasion would be accepted as a fait accompli.

When the Foreign Office is giving off strong signals of 'we don't care about the Falklands any more, and we're open to letting you have them', it's very hard to imagine the Argentinian government believing it would face armed opposition.

 

[GK Dundas]

It's a very one-dimensional view of deterrence.

A UK that had chosen to maintain a significant out-of-area power projection capability - including carriers but also amphibious shipping, air power, and the commensurate logistical support - might have been capable of deterrence. But the softer elements of UK power were employed in a way that gave the Argentinian government confidence that an invasion would be accepted as a fait accompli.

When the Foreign Office is giving off strong signals of 'we don't care about the Falklands any more, and we're open to letting you have them', it's very hard to imagine the Argentinian government believing it would face armed opposition.

When the British task force sailed from Gibraltar and Portsmouth. The Argentine Government refused to believe that the British were serious.
They continued in that mindset up to the day British troops marched into Port Stanley.
Both sides suffered from a delusion common to most Nations.
Neither believed the other was going to do what they said they were going to do.
Mixed messages don't help either.

 

[Rule of cool]

In their initial planning, before the scrap merchant incident, when it was assumed they'd invade in late 82 or early 83 the planners were specifically told not to plan for any defense. This attitude continued after the scrap merchant incident and through to the invasion itself, not that in the rush there would have been a lot of spare bandwidth to plan for defenses. It wasn't until after the British Task Force sailed was any attempt to plan for a defensive was undertaken, at which point they undertook quite an impressive airlift into Stanley airstrip, something like 20 transport planes per day into that tiny strip. Even then they didn't bring any 155mm guns until after the RN shore bombardment began and only bought 4 155mm guns.

Now maybe if the British had CVA01, 02 and Eagle in their inventory the Argentines would have made provision for defense in the planning.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I think the prevention argument comes from what you're saying; a conventional carrier or 2 would be so powerful that the Argentines wouldn't start the war.

Agree with YP's comment:

It's a very one-dimensional view of deterrence.

A UK that had chosen to maintain a significant out-of-area power projection capability - including carriers but also amphibious shipping, air power, and the commensurate logistical support - might have been capable of deterrence. But the softer elements of UK power were employed in a way that gave the Argentinian government confidence that an invasion would be accepted as a fait accompli.

When the Foreign Office is giving off strong signals of 'we don't care about the Falklands any more, and we're open to letting you have them', it's very hard to imagine the Argentinian government believing it would face armed opposition.

The Foreign Office made the Agentines think that the invasion would be accepted.

 

[BlackBat242]

I can see the conspiracy theory now...
scene: a back-room in the Foreign Ministry, after midnight - just the Foreign Minister and a Royal Navy Admiral.

FM: "So, how can I be of assistance to Her Majesty's Navy?"

Adm: "Nott's going to gut the Navy - we need an international crisis that only the RN can solve, so as to cut Nott's legs out from under."

FM: "I think I know just the trick... give me a few months."

Adm: "Thanks lots, old boy... see you around the Club."

 

[Archibald]

Argentina Junta and military had a Plan A: wait past June 1982 so that a) Nott would do more damage - HMS Invincible to Australia ! - and ) winter started, making an hypothetical british military answer much harder to pull out.

The Junta wanted well equiped troops entrenched during the winter, starting from July. They would have been much harder to kick out than OTL - which was already no picnic !

So why did OTL events happened, right off March 1982 and thus three months away from winter ? The answer relates to the Junta inner workings, from 1976 first, then from 1981.
Power was, on paper at least, equally shared between the respective heads of a) the Navy (Admiral Ayana, name from memory) b) the Army and c) the Air Force.
Except those criminals fought bitterly between them. Classic interservice rivalry between military branches - exacerbated in this case by political leadership of a murderous authoritarian regime.
Basically one of the three military branches decided not to wait to start the invasion - just to piss off the other two. I think it was Ayana's Navy, and they unleashed the scrap merchants on South Georgia without telling the other two, or hastening the move.
What is sure is that the Army and Air Force were indeed pissed but, much more importantly, none of the three was ready if the British picked the military option. Which was exactly what happened. The Army troops on the Falklands became mostly terrorized conscripts without heavy equipement. The Air Force plan to lengthen Port Stanley runway for fast jets went by the window. The British came with a vengeance and determined to finish the job before the end of June - they, too, knew the wheather in the South Atlantic...

And the rest, as they say, is History.