Hermes had her Type 984 & CDS removed when she was converted to a commando carrier. The former was replaced by a Type 965 AKE-1 when she was converted to a commando carrier and CAAIS was fitted in her 1980-81 refit.

You british really took great pains castrating that poor Hermes. So that when it ended as the last, lone conventional carrier in the Falklands, its catapults and other gear would be gone and it could not carry Gannet AEW.

We French turned, too, old Arromanches into a swiss-knife carrier but kept the catapults for Alizés. And Fouga Zéphyr trainers too.
 
Ironically the technology to produce a fighter/striker compatible with a Hermes sized carrier and having a similar capability to F4 was emerging.
Looking back at the sixties the Gerry Anderson Puppet shows illustrate how the dreams of the 50s, big atomic airliners, jumping jets, baroque looking missiles and rockets staggered into the 60s.
By the end of the 70s VSTOL (except for the Harrier and Yak38 niches) had been abandoned. Concorde entered service as the first and last of her breed.
Carriers have long lives and the USS Enterprise (along with Bill Shatner and his version) survived long enough to participate in the Cuba blockade and see out the Cold War.
Even poor old Hermes was granted a new lease of life with the Indian Navy. The highly professional Indians gave her a worthy final service.
 
Well the purpose of the alt history section is to jump thru hoops to get alternate outcomes...
 
Only because Congress said "Phantom or Crusader, pick one!"

The USN really wanted to keep both, and did for a good while.

That's Congress' job; with the F4 state of the art in production, the F111B in active development and the VFAX on the drawing boards keeping a day gunfighter at the end of its development trajectory in production into 1965 is wasteful.
 
Well the purpose of the alt history section is to jump thru hoops to get alternate outcomes...

Granted, and if we're talking about the technical capability of a Crusader variant to operate from the mid 60s RN carriers that would be one thing. However this discussion long ago veered into how the F8 could meet the RN's requirements., and quite frankly it couldn't.

To go a bit circular, in another thread about the USS Midway's mid 60s refit to make her compatible with the F111B I asked if it was possible to give the Midway a less drastic refit to install a C13 catapult in the waist position for the F111B. The answer was you need 2 x C13s because if the single C13 was broken then F111Bs couldn't be launched. To bring this back to this thread, can a 103' BS4 catapult in the Hermes launch F8s in low wind-hot weather conditions if the 145' BS4A is broken? Indeed can the 145' BS4A launch a fully laden F8 in still conditions on a hot day?
 
That's Congress' job; with the F4 state of the art in production, the F111B in active development and the VFAX on the drawing boards keeping a day gunfighter at the end of its development trajectory in production into 1965 is wasteful.
It was not a day only fighter in 1965. It had a pair of radar-guided AIM-9Cs plus a pair of regular Sidewinders, plus guns.

Crusaders existed for Deck Launched Intercept as well as basic air superiority. Phantoms were the interim and honestly would have been replaced in the BARCAP role by F111B or Tomcat.


Granted, and if we're talking about the technical capability of a Crusader variant to operate from the mid 60s RN carriers that would be one thing. However this discussion long ago veered into how the F8 could meet the RN's requirements., and quite frankly it couldn't.
Not without some relatively significant modifications, anyways.


To go a bit circular, in another thread about the USS Midway's mid 60s refit to make her compatible with the F111B I asked if it was possible to give the Midway a less drastic refit to install a C13 catapult in the waist position for the F111B. The answer was you need 2 x C13s because if the single C13 was broken then F111Bs couldn't be launched. To bring this back to this thread, can a 103' BS4 catapult in the Hermes launch F8s in low wind-hot weather conditions if the 145' BS4A is broken? Indeed can the 145' BS4A launch a fully laden F8 in still conditions on a hot day?
@BlackBat242 You seem to have the stats for that...
 
t
That's Congress' job; with the F4 state of the art in production, the F111B in active development and the VFAX on the drawing boards keeping a day gunfighter at the end of its development trajectory in production into 1965 is wasteful.
he is referring to Crusader III... Navy wanted BOTH of those, and if they got them they might skip Cru2
 
It was not a day only fighter in 1965. It had a pair of radar-guided AIM-9Cs plus a pair of regular Sidewinders, plus guns.

Crusaders existed for Deck Launched Intercept as well as basic air superiority. Phantoms were the interim and honestly would have been replaced in the BARCAP role by F111B or Tomcat.



Not without some relatively significant modifications, anyways.



@BlackBat242 You seem to have the stats for that...

Catapults might be the most important thing in naval aviation, its what we should look at first.
 
thing occurred to me... 2sader would have a thrust to weight of 0.86 instead of 0.62 which compares nicely to the Cru3 of 0.74
 
The F-8C SAC gives a max take-off weight from catapult as 27,938 lb (same as land, and is with full internal fuel & ammo and 2 AIM-9s - the -C had no underwing pylons).
It gives "power-off" stall speed of 137.5 knots at that weight.

Stall speed at arrested landing weight of 22,000 lb is listed as 113.7 knots "power off", 110 knots "with approach power", so the take-off stall speed with power on should be ~134 knots.

So it looks like a minimum "catapult end combined speed" of 140 knots (preferably 145 knots) is required.

The 103' BS4 gives an end speed for a 30,000 lb aircraft of 101 knots and 78 knots for a 40,000 lb aircraft, so 28,000 lb should get around 108 knots from the catapult alone.

Add in 20 knots ship speed (Hermes' listed max is 28 knots, but the design speed is without diverting steam to the catapults) and we are at 128 knots... 12 knots short. So we need 12+ knots wind speed to get to safe minimum take-off speed.

The 145' BS4A gives 120 knots for a 30,000 lb aircraft, so it should throw our F-8C at ~130 knots, added with 20 knots ship speed easily gives us safe minimum take-off speed in 0-wind conditions.


The 130' BS4C of Centaur (which should fit on Hermes since on Centaur both BS4C catapults extended past the lift) gives an end speed for a 30,000 lb aircraft of 110 knots, meaning Centaur could launch a F-8C with 3+ knots of wind.


HOWEVER

Looking at the SACs for the F-8E and the F-8J (modernized -E with wing of the F-8E(FN) with BLC) the power-off stall speed (thus no BLC) for their MTOW of 35,000 lb (using the pair of underwing pylons) is 154 (F-8J) to 158 (F-8E) knots!

I would expect a 2-seat F-8 with a Spey instead of a J57 to come out about the same weights as the F-8E (considering the lighter engine would counter the added weight of the new radar, second seat & crewman, etc).

It looks like stall speeds drop some 10 knots with BLC on, but that is still an increase of 5-10 knots in take-off stall speed, so that becomes an issue for the BS4 catapult.

"Crusaderizing" Hermes does require replacing the BS4 with a BS4C to allow launches from both catapults.

This would see Hermes (and Centaur) capable of launching 35,000 lb weight F-8(RN)s from their BS4Cs with ~15+ knots wind speed, and from Hermes' BS4A with ~5+ knots wind (less wind needed for less-than-max take-off weights - stall speed drops by 5 knots at 33,767 lb and another 7 at 31,800 lb with 4x AIM-9s and nothing on the underwing pylons ).


Looking at the arresting gear of Hermes, she completed with 5-wire 35,000 lb system which was increased to 45,000 lb in her 1964-66 refit (along with getting the BS4A) - so this should be more than adequate.

Centaur got a 6-wire 35,000 lb system in 1960 along with her catapults... so she could operate Crusaders as well, although they would have little "bring-back" weight available.

Needless to say, the slightly faster trio of Eagle (from 1964 on), Ark Royal (BS4As from 1960, and Victorious (BS4As from 1958) could operate our proposed Royal Crusader ;) as soon as they could be delivered, with Centaur available as well! Poor Hermes would get them by July 1966 as well!


As for aircraft lifts - Eagle & Ark Royal had 54' x 33' aft lifts & 54' x 45' fore lifts, Victorious had a 54' x 34' aft and 58' x 40' fore lift, both of Centaur's lifts were 54' x 44', and Hermes had a 54' x 44' aft lift and a 54' x 45' side lift.

The F-8E was 54' 6' long (all others were 54' 3" long) and 35' 8" wingspan (22' 6" with wings folded), so even with a larger radome it would easily fit on all the lifts if set slightly diagonally (or straight if the radome folds to one side).

All of these lifts had a weight capacity of 40,000 lb save Centaur's fore lift, which was limited to 37,000 lb.



OOPS... did I just clear the F-8(RN) for 5 RN carriers? :p
 
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Add in 20 knots ship speed (Hermes' listed max is 28 knots, but the design speed is without diverting steam to the catapults) and we are at 128 knots... 12 knots short. So we need 12+ knots wind speed to get to safe minimum take-off speed.
I've found a letter from the Captain of Hermes in 1963 that makes interesting reading on Hermes' performance in the tropics.
Basically only 24-25kt on a good day.

1730630580699.png
 
In terms of arrester gear performance - the prospect of the heavier Sea Vixen FAW.2 scared the hell out of the pilots, so much so that some left the service rather than face the risks.

The Sea Vixen FAW.1 was already pushing Hermes to its limits.

1730630998122.png

At this time Ark Royal had her arrester gear up-rated to 37,000lb landing weight on its maximum spline setting of 19 - the only carrier that had that.

Approach speed at max landing weight will be the limiting factor for the F-8. 120kt would seem to be the max limit for Hermes at the 31,000lb ballpark.
 
In terms of arrester gear performance - the prospect of the heavier Sea Vixen FAW.2 scared the hell out of the pilots, so much so that some left the service rather than face the risks.

The Sea Vixen FAW.1 was already pushing Hermes to its limits.

View attachment 746440

At this time Ark Royal had her arrester gear up-rated to 37,000lb landing weight on its maximum spline setting of 19 - the only carrier that had that.

Approach speed at max landing weight will be the limiting factor for the F-8. 120kt would seem to be the max limit for Hermes at the 31,000lb ballpark.

That document was written before her modernization in 1964-66. In that refit, along with lengthening her port catapult by 44', her arresting gear was strengthened from a limit of 35,000 lb to a limit of 45,000lb.

Note that the normal "no external ordnance" arrested landing weight of the F-8 in any version was 22,000 lb - the highest "with bring-back" I saw listed was 26,642 lb for the F-8E.

The stall speed with power on (and BLC) for that weight should be (from comparing the F-8E SAC with the F-8J SAC) about 122 knots (133.7 without BLC) - so likely ~130 knots approach speed.

As the Sea Vixen FAW mk2 had an approach speed of 128 knots at 31,000 lb*, I don't agree with your 120kt limit for Hermes - even with the historical mod. 1177 to the Sea Vixen to reduce approach speed by 3 knots (in daylight only), they were still landing on Hermes with an approach speed of 125kt at 31,000 lb (128kt was still required for night landings).

With its MUCH lower landing weights** and barely faster approach speed the F-8 would be much easier on Hermes' arresting gear than the Sea Vixen FAW mk2s she actually operated from 1966 to the end of fixed-wing operations in 1970..



* add 2 knots per 1,000 lb additional weight as per Part III, Chapter 3, Paragraph 3 of https://www.seavixen.org/images/documents/Pt3._3._Handling._Circuit_and_Landing_Procedures.pdf

The whole is available at https://www.seavixen.org/seavixen-technical-documents/faw-mk2-pilot-notes

** The F-8's maximum carrier landing weight was 4,350 lb less than the minimum carrier landing weight of the Sea Vixen.
 
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That document was written before her modernization in 1964-66. In that refit, along with lengthening her port catapult by 44', her arresting gear was strengthened from a limit of 35,000 lb to a limit of 45,000lb.
Yes, oddly no reference to Hermes' future refit is mentioned at all. In the light of this minor panic that went all the way to the Flag Officer Aircraft Carriers and higher, its surprising that not long afterwards they proposed operating Phantom from Hermes given how marginal the ship was.

Do you have a source for the 45,000lb rating of the arrester gear? I was under the impression that the Mk 13 was only upgraded to 40,000lb in 1960. Even the later DAAG sets - including the DA.2 fitted to Eagle and Ark Royal were only rated at 40,000lb at 125kt.

Anyhow, as you say the F-8 should have safely been within Hermes original configuration.
 
Wondering what a USN "test" of a single seat, AI.23 equipped SpeySader would be like in Vietnam?
 
I read those docs and can't help but think CVA01 is the only way forward, all attempts to make Hermes into something she isn't are futile and the RN shouldn't be buying aircraft to suit the least capable carrier in their 4 ship fleet.
 
OOPS... did I just clear the F-8(RN) for 5 RN carriers? :p
Sure looks like it! :D

Thanks for that!


I read those docs and can't help but think CVA01 is the only way forward, all attempts to make Hermes into something she isn't are futile and the RN shouldn't be buying aircraft to suit the least capable carrier in their 4 ship fleet.
If you don't buy aircraft based on the least capable carrier, that carrier doesn't have any aircraft at all...
 
Like HM Treasury I take the long view of the RN carrier conundrum. CVA01 on its own in 1960s planning would have needed replacing in the mid 1990s while Eagle/Ark and Hermes could not serve much beyond 1980. Thus to operate a three carrier force in the 1990s would require ordering a CVA in 1966, 1976 and 1986 at the bare minimum.
Today that sounds reasonable but in the fast changing world of 60s Britain it might be committing us to building an obsolete navy if the threat from missiles, aircraft and subs grew as feared.
The RAF could adapt faster to this environment than the RN.
 
I read those docs and can't help but think CVA01 is the only way forward, all attempts to make Hermes into something she isn't are futile and the RN shouldn't be buying aircraft to suit the least capable carrier in their 4 ship fleet.
not futile, possible and only necessary for a short time as she is going Commando with Harriers in not very long. EDIT. 1971 she went in for conversion
 
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Like HM Treasury I take the long view of the RN carrier conundrum. CVA01 on its own in 1960s planning would have needed replacing in the mid 1990s while Eagle/Ark and Hermes could not serve much beyond 1980. Thus to operate a three carrier force in the 1990s would require ordering a CVA in 1966, 1976 and 1986 at the bare minimum.
Today that sounds reasonable but in the fast changing world of 60s Britain it might be committing us to building an obsolete navy if the threat from missiles, aircraft and subs grew as feared.
The RAF could adapt faster to this environment than the RN.
Why would she need replacing in the mid-90s? The USN was able to operate ships of older vintage well into the 2000s with an SLEP refit.
 
If you don't buy aircraft based on the least capable carrier, that carrier doesn't have any aircraft at all...
On the other hand, if you only buy aircraft based on the least capable carrier, you wind up with an entire fleet of least-capable carriers.

There's a balance to be struck, and I'm not convinced that keeping HERMES running as a strike carrier in the longer term is on the right side of that balance.
 
On the other hand, if you only buy aircraft based on the least capable carrier, you wind up with an entire fleet of least-capable carriers.

There's a balance to be struck, and I'm not convinced that keeping HERMES running as a strike carrier in the longer term is on the right side of that balance.
you only have to keep her one until '71 when she goes in for commando conversion.
 
So we dance around the same issues again.

But.....if the F8 in some flavour, is in RN planning from 1960.....
Then we know that the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, proposed during the CVA-01 process, a 40,000ton convertible carrier. This to fly initially the Sea Vixen and Buccaneer. But later the P.1154RN "Harrier".

We know the earlier 1960 comparative study included a 42,000ton CV able to operate a limited number of 18 OR.346 in the future, but some 31 Buccaneer and Sea Vixen sized aircraft initially.

And we know that F8 could in fact have been entering service by 1959, despite Suez's interruption.

So we can envision, that lower end study and the Civil Lord's 40,000ton ship being opted into in a world where OR.346 is put off....and shrinking (thanks to advances in electronics, engines and VG), and the P1154 is foisted onto the RN. That their successor planning for F8, becomes P.1154 and when that fails.... Mirage F2 and F3 be live projects....succeeded by Mirage G.

Additional edited in.
We also know the Medium Fleet Carrier Studies be ongoing from 1953, and that this is still live when Suez hits.
Technically still live beyond 1957.

In a world were the F8 is coming and enters service, the Medium Fleet Carrier has a future.
A future possible to see beyond F8 and Buccaneer in the likes of the F8U-III and F4.........
And again with P.1154 and French options, a future exists for such Carriers.
 
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Of course, the issue is good 'ol sunk cost fallacy and the 1957 reduction in the size of the carrier fleet. Victorious and Hermes are almost done by then and there's pressure to make use of them after all the work and money. With the fleet down to four carriers, along with Eagle and Ark Royal that's it, there's your four-carrier fleet until 1975.

The Medium Carrier has life from 1954-1957 in the six-carrier fleet. But from 1957 on you need to stack on more PODs to keep the concept alive.
 
Of course, the issue is good 'ol sunk cost fallacy and the 1957 reduction in the size of the carrier fleet. Victorious and Hermes are almost done by then and there's pressure to make use of them after all the work and money. With the fleet down to four carriers, along with Eagle and Ark Royal that's it, there's your four-carrier fleet until 1975.

The Medium Carrier has life from 1954-1957 in the six-carrier fleet. But from 1957 on you need to stack on more PODs to keep the concept alive.

What's more I don't think a 40,000t carrier is at any less risk if cancellation than a 53,000t carrier, it would only lost about 10% less and the Sandystorm would still have painted Britain into the ludicrous P.1154/HS.681 corner by the early 60s.
 
Of course, the issue is good 'ol sunk cost fallacy and the 1957 reduction in the size of the carrier fleet. Victorious and Hermes are almost done by then and there's pressure to make use of them after all the work and money. With the fleet down to four carriers, along with Eagle and Ark Royal that's it, there's your four-carrier fleet until 1975.

The Medium Carrier has life from 1954-1957 in the six-carrier fleet. But from 1957 on you need to stack on more PODs to keep the concept alive.
you would have to replace Ark and Eagle with them in the four carrier fleet. It is not going to cost much more for new with three times the projected hull life and Centaur is already in place to cover for Eagle... seems like the best time, and best time to rue-load HK's fantastic Verdun drawing as inspiration
 

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What's more I don't think a 40,000t carrier is at any less risk if cancellation than a 53,000t carrier, it would only lost about 10% less and the Sandystorm would still have painted Britain into the ludicrous P.1154/HS.681 corner by the early 60s.
if you use them as replacements for Eagle and Ark Royals rebuilds instead of being in addition TO that expenditure you should be fine your net spend is going to be less painful and give you something with 3 times the hull life: It would come across and be sold as a vastly more responsible use of tax money.
 
if you use them as replacements for Eagle and Ark Royals rebuilds instead of being in addition TO that expenditure you should be fine your net spend is going to be less painful and give you something with 3 times the hull life: It would come across and be sold as a vastly more responsible use of tax money.

Do you think the voters would agree with you, or do you think they'd see a number of brand new carriers and say that line of argument was a scam? As much as we go on about the technical and even economic minutiae taking a look at it from the perspective of a slightly interested or disinterested voter can explain a lot.
 
you would have to replace Ark and Eagle with them in the four carrier fleet. It is not going to cost much more for new with three times the projected hull life and Centaur is already in place to cover for Eagle... seems like the best time, and best time to rue-load HK's fantastic Verdun drawing as inspiration
By 1960 it's really too late to avoid the problems that sank CVA-01. The RN probably isn't getting any of these 40,000-tonners before 1970, which does admittedly solve the sunk-cost fallacy problem by putting the new ships in service near retirement of the old ships anyway, and more to the point doesn't solve the Hermes problem because she's going to need to stick around as a strike carrier for a decade.
 
Sea Harrier was a big capability drop and success from its uniqueness lived in myth more than reality. CATOBAR capabilities would have thwarted the Falklands from the get-go. Argentina had realistic expectation of the Sea Harrier and dumb luck prevented more losses than it could have been for the attack version. Argentina over estimated their own capabilities if anything. But CATOBAR operatoons would have allowed the fleet to have much greater defensive umbrella that would have been foolhardy to challenge.

The US offered the UK several opportunities at much better used carriers than were in service. The UK suffered from NIH.
 
Do you think the voters would agree with you, or do you think they'd see a number of brand new carriers and say that line of argument was a scam? As much as we go on about the technical and even economic minutiae taking a look at it from the perspective of a slightly interested or disinterested voter can explain a lot.
pretty certain they would on Eagle, she was going to need a major rebuild, IIRC a new build medium carrier was costed out at 24 million pounds and Eagle was going to cost about 18 to rebuild... so for 6 million more than the rebuild which would be good for another 10 years you would get a brand new ship good for 30.

Do a quick Centaur style 2 year cat swap on Eagle and you can run her mostly as is until '74-ish
 
Sea Harrier was a big capability drop and success from its uniqueness lived in myth more than reality. CATOBAR capabilities would have thwarted the Falklands from the get-go. Argentina had realistic expectation of the Sea Harrier and dumb luck prevented more losses than it could have been for the attack version. Argentina over estimated their own capabilities if anything. But CATOBAR operatoons would have allowed the fleet to have much greater defensive umbrella that would have been foolhardy to challenge.

The US offered the UK several opportunities at much better used carriers than were in service. The UK suffered from NIH.
and the RN turned down 2 Essex conversion paid for by the US because they had serious doubts on getting 20 years out of them.

We covered that in of all things a UK in Vietnam thread IIRC
 
Was the design life of a new capital ship in the 50s? Because I have a feeling that it wasn't 30+ years and 20-25 years was more realistic. Therefore a refit that gives 15 years for 18m compared for 24m for a new ship for 20-25 years isn't a big deal. In any case to a cabinet minister and average voter 15 years is so far away as to not worth thinking about in any real sense, and 30+ years might as well be science fiction territory.
 
Was the design life of a new capital ship in the 50s? Because I have a feeling that it wasn't 30+ years and 20-25 years was more realistic. Therefore a refit that gives 15 years for 18m compared for 24m for a new ship for 20-25 years isn't a big deal. In any case to a cabinet minister and average voter 15 years is so far away as to not worth thinking about in any real sense, and 30+ years might as well be science fiction territory.
The design life of the Forrestal and Kitty Hawk classes was 30 years. The later SLEP refits increased that by 15 years to 45. I would assume things would be similar in the RN, given design life for escorts with an MLU was set at 26 years.
 
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