Replacement of Australia's Collins Class Submarines

Can anyone provide an "executive summary"?
From a Bloomberg summary of the article:
Under the plan, the US would provide Australia with the “first few” nuclear subs by mid-2030s to tide Australia over as it continues to develop its own production capabilities, the newspaper said, citing Western officials. The proposal -- not yet approved -- is one of several being considered...
Thanks Moose.

I am still hoping the US will realise the importance of Australia and get them at least 2 SSNs by 2030. Sadly not much the UK can do (should be building Astutes even if it means mothballing PofW).
Thing is, Australia is so completely subordinated to US policy and goals in the Western pacific, you could argue that the USN isn't really giving up two (or more) boats from it's build schedule at all, it's just assigning them (semi permanently) to the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean.
 
Thing is, Australia is so completely subordinated to US policy and goals in the Western pacific, you could argue that the USN isn't really giving up two (or more) boats from it's build schedule at all, it's just assigning them (semi permanently) to the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean.
That's complete garbage and uncalled for.
 
In what way is it garbage and in what way is it uncalled for? It's a simple statement of fact.

 
In what way is it garbage and in what way is it uncalled for? It's a simple statement of fact.

Or it might be less controversial to say that Australian and the US interests align almost perfectly in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans.
 
My thoughts on the « mid-2030s » timeline laid out in the WSJ article:

1) Any sub ordered today wouldn’t be available till 2034 anyway (at the earliest). 6 months contracting + 2 years lead time for advance procurement items like the reactors + 7 years build time + 18 months for post delivery workups in the US.

2) That’s for a sub taking a USN production slot. Add more time to ramp-up US production.

3) So best case scenario is probably 4 SSNs delivered between 2036-2040 (1x per year)…

4) …but that fast of a delivery rate would likely be impossible to absorb for the RAN sub force. So my bet on « acceleration » is 2 SSNs delivered in the latter half of the 2030s. Not terribly compelling.

5) What would be really helpful is if the USN could give up a dedicated training submarine for a decade starting around 2032, as I suspect manpower is going to be an even bigger bottleneck than US production capacity.
 
IIRC Columbia requires 2.5x the work effort (and perhaps material?) of Virginia. That was a few years ago so likely Virginia w/o VPM. It"s a really big boat. DoD has proposed to add $2.4B to industrial base to prep the increase in production capacity. Asking Australia to contribute to increasing the production capacity of the US seems politically difficult to me, but not untenable, especially when you consider the savings incurred of receiving the latest tech from a mature production line.

Increasing production sounds good but it's probably worth flushing out what that entails. Funding for serial production of Columbia starts in 2026. Block VI Virginia funding from 2024-2028 w 2 boats per year. SSN(X) funding to follow. So in 2024 we anticipate two Columbia and ten-twelve Virginia's in various stages of production.

Adding a third Virginia in 2024 (a thirteenth) sounds risky for the Columbia production timeline. Getting ready for one Columbia and two Virginia's to be added annually is already a heavy lift. It's not only one per year but cumulative growth over five years. Where are all these workers going to come from? Let alone the capacity increases in the dockyards. Yet the plan is in the works.

But...

If you're already planning to increase dockyard space and workers it makes much more sense to do it on a relatively stable production run such as Virginia, even if you're switching to block VI. The experience is there. The tooling is there. The subcontractors are there. Adding a third Virginia will increase the industrial capacity in preparation for multiple Columbia sized boats to be produced annually - which is what the Navy has stated for SSN(X).

What may be possible is for a third block VI to go to be purchased by Australia starting in 2024 through at least 2028. Then the US switches to a Columbia variant selected for SSN(X) once serial production of Columbia is static and the production maturity is reached - perhaps 2029. A third Virginia added annually in 2024 would provide five block VI Virginia's for Australia with the first delivery in 2029 or 2030 or 2031 and one each year after. That is probably the most realistic (and optimistic) timeline possible. Continued Virginia block VI production in the US (or somehow transitioned to Australia) would complete the eight or more boats they require. What may make sense is for block VI production to drop to one per year for the following three years (2029-2031) to complete their eight boat buy. If production of block VI were to transition to Australia then likely the propulsion section would be shipped from the US.

At that point, 2029, it's likely ~seventeen Virginia's and six Columbia boats would be in various stages of construction. That's a huge increase from ~twelve and one. A staggering production rate of submarines by tonnage - certainly rivaling and perhaps surpassing the 1980's.

In that respect it is risky. Risky for the initial Columbia timeline, risky for Virginia block VI, risky for the US taxpayers and risky for Australia. But so is not having the boats. It's certainly less risky (and less costly) than starting from scratch in Australia. I would suppose it buys down risk for SSN(X) because of the increased production capacity - a net gain for the US.

But we shall see what we shall see.
 
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A third Virginia added annually in 2024 would provide five block VI Virginia's for Australia with the first delivery in 2029 or 2030 or 2031 and one each year after.
Re-read my message… that timeline is impossible.

It takes ~11 years to order, build and deliver a Virginia due to the sequencing of critical activities which can’t be parallel pathed. Subs ordered now won’t be in service till 2034… not including the inevitable lag time needed to ramp-up production.
 
Well I applaud the willingness to explore options here......but....

Victory at sea whilst not always the instrument of decisive victory overall, is often the instrument that prevents decisive defeat and often substantially enables the means to bring about an decisive defeat of the opposition.

Thus Trafalgar didn't break the French on land, but handed the British the means to contain them and seek out their weaknesses to exploit.
The bottling up of the Kaiser's Navy, prevented them from cutting supplies to the Allies and meant they could not access supplies from outside of Europe to any great benefit.
The Belgrano and the flight to port of the Argentinian Navy. Handed the power of decision on when and were to try to retake the Falklands.

If one might advise. A willingness to think outside the box requires you go the whole hog and contemplate the extreme.
Australia is well placed to provide a potent threat to China.....with ICBMs. But strictly the most efficient option for a country of such size and vast areas of very low population density is some land based systems. Whether silo 'farms' or road mobile Launchers.
The SSBN is less vital compared to dense and more nearby threatened UK.
Arguably Australia is also better placed to provide itself with substantial ABM systems.

It would be more logical to have your own nuclear weapons program than 'share' such with the UK. In which you would need the UK to expand it's arsenal to provide you with a Deterrent that only works if the UK agrees.
A possibility might exist to share design, testing, even manufacturing of systems....even planning.
Though I suspect you'll have to prove you can do it yourself first and the UK can only provide help under the table for that.
But it is infinitely better to retain full control over the capability to launch.
 

This author has some very interesting understanding of treaties around nuclear power and weapons.

The proposal tries to parallel the NATO Multi-Lateral Force, where multiple nations had control over the weapons. But this is exactly the circumstance that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was specifically designed to prohibit.

NATO Nuclear Sharing is different, because it retains the weapons under unilateral US control. Nuclear Sharing dances right up to the NPT line and really is only allowed because the Soviets/Russians tacitly accept it becuase it changes little if anything operationally. If there were Belgian or German keys to those bunkers, that would be an absolute NPT violation. The proposal pretends to be like NS but it does a weird sleight of hand:

"those nukes would totally be British, except we'd pay most of the expenses, largely man the subs, and host the base. (Clearly, because the British government is going to be very hard-pressed to afford its own four SSBNs, much less even part of the cost of a "small fleet" in Australia.) And we're pretty sure the Brits would agree with us on when to use those nukes that are totally not ours." ;) ;)

This is inarguably a violation of the NPT, of which Australia is a signatory and long-time proponent.

I very much doubt that China would differentiate between a wink-and-a-nod "dual-key" Australian nuclear arsenal and a strictly national one -- both would be considered an unacceptable escalation. And the response would be to move Australian naval bases and command centers (including Canberra) to the very top of the counterforce strike list.
 
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I don’t see the point of Australia using SSBNs. No one is going to nuke Australia. A case might be made for Virginia Blk 5 though. As long as you’re doing it, you might as well have a significant land attack /AShM option for a little more money.
 
I don’t see the point of Australia using SSBNs. No one is going to nuke Australia. A case might be made for Virginia Blk 5 though. As long as you’re doing it, you might as well have a significant land attack /AShM option for a little more money.

If North Australia (or West, or South Australia) becomes a major US refuelling and maintenance hub then, as TomS put it, China would "move Australian naval bases and command centers (including Canberra) to the very top of the counterforce strike list"
 
To satisfy certain Mods and to honour the subject properly, it would be best to start a thread on Australia gets the Bomb. As this is veering away from this threads titled topic.
My fault in part, but it does deserve to be explored.
 
Cool, by that analysis Australia can scrap its entire military (since killing people or blowing stuff up never won wars) and just crew our SSBNs for us instead. Job done.
Seriously does anyone do any thinking any more?

At this rate by 2040 this thread will be 500 pages of crackpot ideas.

I still can't see any optimal solutions but then the Australian government has backed itself into a corner. I'm not entirely sure whether what was wanted originally (the informal approach to the RN/UK government) is what they will get (a US-supplied sub in kit form) but then I have always had the suspicion that the politicians saw this as a wider geopolitical bludgeon and elevated it accordingly. Really its up the people involved to make it work and provide answers. All the analysts, commentators, clickbaitists and armchair admirals in the world have no input and can only speculate.

I'm off now to write a blog about how Australia's defence needs are best met by SABRE-powered boomerangs, toodle pip.
 
A potential shift could be underway, there is talk Japan is interested in AUKUS.......
 
Boomers for the RAN is ridiculous, and the suggestion does more harm than good as it completely flies in the face of the argument that Australia does not want or need the bomb.

The biggest plus I can see for RAN SSNs, be they Virginias of some description or a new UK/US design, is the life of type reactor. For the firat time ever no Australian government will be able to delay replacement or life extend until useless an RAN submarine fleet. The only choices will be replace before the end of life or lose the capability.

Also, no more skimping on maintenance, no more refusal to listen to experts, the government will do as they are told, or the US and UK takes their bat and ball and goes home. It will be a new experience for Australian politicians, working with an industry and service they don't control and can't bully.
 
I don’t see the point of Australia using SSBNs. No one is going to nuke Australia. A case might be made for Virginia Blk 5 though. As long as you’re doing it, you might as well have a significant land attack /AShM option for a little more money.

If North Australia (or West, or South Australia) becomes a major US refuelling and maintenance hub then, as TomS put it, China would "move Australian naval bases and command centers (including Canberra) to the very top of the counterforce strike list"

I doubt the US would have any desire to base nuclear weapons there so it’s hard to picture the PRC putting it on whatever it’s equivalent of SIOP is. China would already have a long, hard to service list of CONUS targets.
 
On the other hand, thanks to Australia having no nuclear deterrent, not to mention relatively limited defences thanks to various dubious decisions in the past stretching all the way back to the Cold War, she is actually a perfect location to stage so-called demonstration strikes, without necessarily having to target inhabited areas, directly at any rate.

I agree though that this discussion should be in its own dedicated thread.
 
Boomers for the RAN is ridiculous, and the suggestion does more harm than good as it completely flies in the face of the argument that Australia does not want or need the bomb.

The biggest plus I can see for RAN SSNs, be they Virginias of some description or a new UK/US design, is the life of type reactor. For the firat time ever no Australian government will be able to delay replacement or life extend until useless an RAN submarine fleet. The only choices will be replace before the end of life or lose the capability.

Also, no more skimping on maintenance, no more refusal to listen to experts, the government will do as they are told, or the US and UK takes their bat and ball and goes home. It will be a new experience for Australian politicians, working with an industry and service they don't control and can't bully.
If the Australian government no longer controls the Australian Navy then it’s no longer really Australia’s Navy.
 
The biggest plus I can see for RAN SSNs, be they Virginias of some description or a new UK/US design, is the life of type reactor. For the firat time ever no Australian government will be able to delay replacement or life extend until useless an RAN submarine fleet. The only choices will be replace before the end of life or lose the capability.

Also, no more skimping on maintenance, no more refusal to listen to experts, the government will do as they are told, or the US and UK takes their bat and ball and goes home. It will be a new experience for Australian politicians, working with an industry and service they don't control and can't bully.

I agree with the sentiment here but it's a bit naive. We both know that if the mood takes them the Australian govt will mothball or cancel boats, possibly with no notice.

If there were an accident or a radiation leak during construction, if there was some blow up with the IAEA and public opinion turned against them, the whole program could be put in jeopardy. Hell, they might have to debate the necessity of nuclear subs in the Australian Parliament (something they haven't actually done yet).

And of course, the whole point of LOS reactors is to reduce maintenance. You seal them in a box and monitor the chemistry in the primary cooling loop for 30+ years hoping and praying there weren't errors made during construction that lead to problems requiring it to be cracked open again (looking at you SSN-783 Minnesota). So going with LOS reactors actually makes it easier to skimp on maintenance.

Have a look at that FAS article I linked to earlier on why the French went with LEU reactors, it's quite educational.

Also:
the government will do as they are told, or the US and UK takes their bat and ball and goes home.
Sovereignty, complete control of major Australian defence assets again, blah, blah, blah.
 
Australia had its chance to gain it's own bomb in the 1960s. In 1968 the government of John Gorton was seriously considering acquiring nuclear weapons. The RAN was interested in acquiring nuclear depth charges and the RAAF in acquiring atomic weapons. The department of foreign affairs was more interested in us signing the NPT. Gorton was deposed by William McMahon as Prime Minister. He decided to listen to what the Foreign Affairs told him and canned the idea of nuclear weapons and signed the NPT. Australia was in 1968 about 18 months from gaining it's own nuclear weapons. We have turned our backs on nuclear weapons in a big way.
 
Have a look at that FAS article I linked to earlier on why the French went with LEU reactors, it's quite educational.
Now that's a very good reading. Makes a lot of sense.
 

If there were an accident or a radiation leak during construction,
People keep raising this sort of thing in this thread but I am yet to see anyone provide examples of similar occurring in all the decades of o/s nuclear vessel operation.
if there was some blow up with the IAEA and public opinion turned against them, the whole program could be put in jeopardy.
Exactly what sort of IAEA blowup??

Public opinion here in Australia has been pretty much in support of the SSNs since they were announced apart from some minor "won't somebody think of the children" style fringe groups.
Hell, they might have to debate the necessity of nuclear subs in the Australian Parliament (something they haven't actually done yet).
Both main sides of Australian politics have been equally in support of the SSNs and AUKUS so what would be the point apart from allowing some inconsequential elements to make some irrelevant noise.
 
Have a look at that FAS article I linked to earlier on why the French went with LEU reactors, it's quite educational.
Now that's a very good reading. Makes a lot of sense.

It is, isn't it? The other one about the accelerated testing regime for LOS reactors is good too. That one's especially relevant given Australia may be receiving (per IAEA's current proposed requirements) a completely sealed reactor "box" that they may be banned from opening!
 
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If there were an accident or a radiation leak during construction, if there was some blow up with the IAEA and public opinion turned against them, the whole program could be put in jeopardy. Hell, they might have to debate the necessity of nuclear subs in the Australian Parliament (something they haven't actually done yet).

People keep raising this sort of thing in this thread but I am yet to see anyone provide examples of similar occurring in all the decades of o/s nuclear vessel operation.

Exactly what sort of IAEA blowup??

Public opinion here in Australia has been pretty much in support of the SSNs since they were announced apart from some minor "won't somebody think of the children" style fringe groups.

Both main sides of Australian politics have been equally in support of the SSNs and AUKUS so what would be the point apart from allowing some inconsequential elements to make some irrelevant noise.

The paragraph is just a general comment on the benign PR waters the nuclear sub buy are currently sailing through, that the Australian public historically has a deep aversion to nuclear energy and that it wouldn't take much for public opinion to turn around and possibly force some political backsliding.

I certainly agree that "public opinion has been much in support of the SSNs since they were announced" but I'm not sure that the public or the politicians are really aware of what it is they're actually getting and what it's going to cost (from a number of perspectives).
 
Well, for one thing, the new smaller reactor designs are inherently safer and more controllable (as well as cheaper of themselves)... and can be located nearer the point of consumption, so not requiring long-distance expensive & vulnerable interconnected interstate power grids.

Additionally, their overall environmental effect remains far less than almost any other production means (solar, for example, requires a lot of large-scale mining for the materials, which results in large pollution problems, as well as the refining & component manufacturing creating a lot of highly toxic waste... far more per potential megawatt generation than nuclear - and requiring a lot of energy to accomplish that mining, refining, and manufacturing).
 
(solar, for example, requires a lot of large-scale mining for the materials, which results in large pollution problems, as well as the refining & component manufacturing creating a lot of highly toxic waste... far more per potential megawatt generation than nuclear - and requiring a lot of energy to accomplish that mining, refining, and manufacturing).
err…uranium mining and processing is equally affected here.
 
(solar, for example, requires a lot of large-scale mining for the materials, which results in large pollution problems, as well as the refining & component manufacturing creating a lot of highly toxic waste... far more per potential megawatt generation than nuclear - and requiring a lot of energy to accomplish that mining, refining, and manufacturing).
err…uranium mining and processing is equally affected here.
Yes... but the whole selling point of solar was "non-polluting, environmentally friendly, free energy"!

Which it most certainly is NOT - thus making nuclear not look as bad as it used to.

And the data I've seen seems to indicate that uranium mining & processing can actually be done in a cleaner and less-destructive manner than mining for all of the exotic metals needed for solar - most of which are found in much lower densities than uranium (requiring larger-scale mining per ton of desired material)... and much larger quantities are needed than with uranium for the same power generation capacity.
 
Boomers for the RAN is ridiculous, and the suggestion does more harm than good as it completely flies in the face of the argument that Australia does not want or need the bomb.

The biggest plus I can see for RAN SSNs, be they Virginias of some description or a new UK/US design, is the life of type reactor. For the firat time ever no Australian government will be able to delay replacement or life extend until useless an RAN submarine fleet. The only choices will be replace before the end of life or lose the capability.

Also, no more skimping on maintenance, no more refusal to listen to experts, the government will do as they are told, or the US and UK takes their bat and ball and goes home. It will be a new experience for Australian politicians, working with an industry and service they don't control and can't bully.
If the Australian government no longer controls the Australian Navy then it’s no longer really Australia’s Navy.
The Australian government will still control the RAN, the difference is they will no longer have complete control over the over the contractors doing the maintenance.

Many of the sustainment issues with the Collins Class sustainment can be directly traced to decisions made by ASCs sole owner and sole share holder the Australian Federal Government. If they didn't like what ASC said or was doing, they would sack senior managers, up to and including the Managing Director. As he owner and customer, they quite literally could ignore any contract, any agreement, and sadly sometimes did.

Nuclear power and the AUKUS treaty introduces a level of compliance and certification that currently doesn't exist, there are contracts with very real consequences if they are not honoured. Nuclear propulsion means the government(s) has to stop playing politics with the submarine capability and grow up.
 
The biggest plus I can see for RAN SSNs, be they Virginias of some description or a new UK/US design, is the life of type reactor. For the firat time ever no Australian government will be able to delay replacement or life extend until useless an RAN submarine fleet. The only choices will be replace before the end of life or lose the capability.

Also, no more skimping on maintenance, no more refusal to listen to experts, the government will do as they are told, or the US and UK takes their bat and ball and goes home. It will be a new experience for Australian politicians, working with an industry and service they don't control and can't bully.

I agree with the sentiment here but it's a bit naive. We both know that if the mood takes them the Australian govt will mothball or cancel boats, possibly with no notice.

If there were an accident or a radiation leak during construction, if there was some blow up with the IAEA and public opinion turned against them, the whole program could be put in jeopardy. Hell, they might have to debate the necessity of nuclear subs in the Australian Parliament (something they haven't actually done yet).

And of course, the whole point of LOS reactors is to reduce maintenance. You seal them in a box and monitor the chemistry in the primary cooling loop for 30+ years hoping and praying there weren't errors made during construction that lead to problems requiring it to be cracked open again (looking at you SSN-783 Minnesota). So going with LOS reactors actually makes it easier to skimp on maintenance.

Have a look at that FAS article I linked to earlier on why the French went with LEU reactors, it's quite educational.

Also:
the government will do as they are told, or the US and UK takes their bat and ball and goes home.
Sovereignty, complete control of major Australian defence assets again, blah, blah, blah.
When you are using gear supplied under very strict contractoral or treaty conditions you follow those conditions, or you lose access to the gear.

Ever heard of ITAR?

ITAR is not the only factor, there are various export controls, deeds, country to country agreements in place over many capabilities and systems. With defence equipment there are multiple layers of compliance associated with accessing and using sovereign capabilities developed by other nations.

There are levels of control on EW, for instance, that if there are breaches you can lose access. Particular systems on various platforms are subject to very strict controls because if you stuff up, you are also damaging the capability of the parent service/nation.
 
The Australian government will still control the RAN, the difference is they will no longer have complete control over the over the contractors doing the maintenance.
arguably this already happens with many platforms, especially at the deeper maintenance levels. For instance the C-17s and F-35s are part of global support programs where the RAAF is only indirectly contracting those doing the actual maintenance.
 

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