Replacement of Australia's Collins Class Submarines

Introducing a nuclear submarine fleet has usually been done in conjunction with operating conventional submarines for as long as possible to cover roles not needing an SSN.
The US Navy were the only Cold War nation to take its conventional boats out of service altogether.
This became a problem when the old SSKs had all gone and US conventional boats could not be supplied to Taiwan for example.
The UK got rid of its 4 Upholder class as soon as the Cold War finished. Canada which had from time to time looked at an SSN force bought them with mixed results.
The RAN is unlucky in that options for submarines are not very convenient.
The US and UK no longer make SSK so only France could offer a design (and a possible SSN as well).
A UK or US SSN is thus needed for Australia but as explained above does not mesh well with the lifespan of RAN SSK.
Sources for off the shelf SSK with decent endurance are limited to France and Japan.. South Korea, Sweden, Germany, Italy, Netherlands make SSK but they lack endurance.
As the UK did with Nimrod before buying new Boeing ASW the Australians may have to live with a period of a few years where RAN crews serve with the US and RN and a US and or RN sub is assigned to work with the RAN.
France has operated a small force of SSN for many years with fewer submarines than the RN or USN.
Information about how closely this force has worked with the RN and USN does not seem to be available.
France has a "cultural" approach to working with NATO and its weapons are not always compatible with US and UK systems.
The Australians unlike the RAF were able to operate the Mirage III. (Spain another user was not a NATO member).
Shame that we can't all get along...
 
Hood said:
I would suggest we'll know how seriously the PLAN will take the threat the day they unveil a P-1/P-8 clone instead of warmed up transport conversion jobs. We've seen the F-35 clone and the E-3 clone but no advanced ASW/MPA aircraft yet.
Click to expand...
There is a Y-8 ASW variant in service though it is a fairly recent development.
 
uk 75 said:
Introducing a nuclear submarine fleet has usually been done in conjunction with operating conventional submarines for as long as possible to cover roles not needing an SSN.
The US Navy were the only Cold War nation to take its conventional boats out of service altogether.
This became a problem when the old SSKs had all gone and US conventional boats could not be supplied to Taiwan for example.
The UK got rid of its 4 Upholder class as soon as the Cold War finished. Canada which had from time to time looked at an SSN force bought them with mixed results.
The RAN is unlucky in that options for submarines are not very convenient.
The US and UK no longer make SSK so only France could offer a design (and a possible SSN as well).
A UK or US SSN is thus needed for Australia but as explained above does not mesh well with the lifespan of RAN SSK.
Sources for off the shelf SSK with decent endurance are limited to France and Japan.. South Korea, Sweden, Germany, Italy, Netherlands make SSK but they lack endurance.
As the UK did with Nimrod before buying new Boeing ASW the Australians may have to live with a period of a few years where RAN crews serve with the US and RN and a US and or RN sub is assigned to work with the RAN.
France has operated a small force of SSN for many years with fewer submarines than the RN or USN.
Information about how closely this force has worked with the RN and USN does not seem to be available.
France has a "cultural" approach to working with NATO and its weapons are not always compatible with US and UK systems.
The Australians unlike the RAF were able to operate the Mirage III. (Spain another user was not a NATO member).
Shame that we can't all get along...
Click to expand...
Nowhere has the RAN or the Australian Govt indicated any intent of operating for even a few years without any submarine capability. Moreover, one of the original Sovereign Industrial Capability Priorities is Collins Class submarine maintenance and technology upgrade. This translates into ensuring a capability is maintained until the Collins class is no longer in service.
 
www.reuters.com

Australians to train on British nuclear submarines for the first time

Australian naval officers will be allowed to train inside British submarines for the first time as they prepare for the arrival of nuclear-powered submarines as part of a new security partnership with Britain and the United States.
www.reuters.com www.reuters.com

www.abc.net.au

Royal Australian Navy submariners to train onboard British nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS deal

Under the AUKUS deal, Royal Australian Navy sailors will join their British counterparts on the Astute-class submarines after completing specialised nuclear training courses.
www.abc.net.au www.abc.net.au
 
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GTX said:
www.abc.net.au

US admiral's blunt warning on America's capacity to build Australian subs

Helping Australia acquire nuclear-powered submarines could be too big a burden for America's shipyards, a senior US Navy official warns.
www.abc.net.au www.abc.net.au
Click to expand...

Well if America has no room in its SSN production schedule of Virginias for a couple of RAAN ones - then no chance in hell UK and Astutes could pull a similar trick.
Also applies to France and Barracudas, obviously - unless you remove nuclear propulsion and call then Attack oh wait forgot that...
 
Probably bears repeating:
Nothing is ever simple, and a further complication is both the US and the UK have now initiated programs for their next-generation successors to the Virginia and Astute classes.

The timing of the US SSN(X) and UK Submersible Ship Nuclear Replacement (SSNR) programs ensures their relevance to Australia, probably not as potential platforms but featuring enhanced capabilities capable of inclusion in late-build Virginia-class or Astute-class boats.

The first nuclear boat for the RAN is expected to be completed around 2035, completion of the first US SSN(X) is scheduled for 2031, while a firm timeline has yet to be disclosed for the SSNR, but it’s likely to be required around 2035 when first-of-class HMS Astute completes 25 years of service.
Click to expand...

www.australiandefence.com.au

Which submarine will Australia build? - Australian Defence Magazine

Now it’s been decided that the RAN is to acquire a fleet of nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarines (SSNs), the question is – which one?
www.australiandefence.com.au www.australiandefence.com.au
 
Hood said:
A tri-national SSN(X)? Sounds like a recipe for disaster to me on all levels.
Click to expand...
It depends, the new boomers have a common missile section, while NG and EB are sharing Virginia construction, each building the same sections for every boat. The Virginias in particular were deliberately designed to be modular, which has facilitated the massive block to block changes.

I can see common sections being used on three or more related designs. Say a US reactor section and an RN reactor section, US bow section, RN bow section. Common VPM sections for which ever navy wants them, pretty much everything else being common. Same basic design enables USN SSN, RN SSN and RAN SSN, as well as a USN SSGN.
 
Such an approach would appear to remove the UK’s ability to independently build their own submarines (and not just those responsible for carrying the nuclear deterrent).

With such an approach the UK would make some content but inevitably it would be primarily US content (or UK licenced build of US content) in these theoretical future “British” (and/ or Australian) SSNs.

There is an argument that this capacity has really already been sacrificed (future dependence re: reactors, etc)).

However interestingly that aspect isn’t really being spelled out or explained (may not play great politically - for some may not feel like “getting back control” and instead feel more like loosing sovereign capacities).
 
Volkodav said:
Hood said:
A tri-national SSN(X)? Sounds like a recipe for disaster to me on all levels.
Click to expand...
It depends, the new boomers have a common missile section, while NG and EB are sharing Virginia construction, each building the same sections for every boat. The Virginias in particular were deliberately designed to be modular, which has facilitated the massive block to block changes.

I can see common sections being used on three or more related designs. Say a US reactor section and an RN reactor section, US bow section, RN bow section. Common VPM sections for which ever navy wants them, pretty much everything else being common. Same basic design enables USN SSN, RN SSN and RAN SSN, as well as a USN SSGN.
Click to expand...

But if there is an RN bow and an RN reactor (and likely an RN-specific control room), what actually is left in common between the RN and USN? Berthing? Which then has to be modified because of different accommodation standards.
 
kaiserd said:
Such an approach would appear to remove the UK’s ability to independently build their own submarines (and not just those responsible for carrying the nuclear deterrent).
Click to expand...
Jumping to conclusions on something that is purely speculative at this stage. I suggest you hold off on such negative opinions until there are some facts. And even if such a design goes ahead there is nothing to suggest this would occur.
kaiserd said:
With such an approach the UK would make some content but inevitably it would be primarily US content (or UK licenced build of US content) in these theoretical future “British” (and/ or Australian) SSNs.
Click to expand...
More of the same as above.
 
Jimmo952 said:
GTX said:
Hood said:
A tri-national SSN(X)? Sounds like a recipe for disaster to me on all levels.
Click to expand...
Or an outstanding success which brings the strengths of all 3 nations and offers multiple sources for production and support.
Click to expand...

More likely the former.
Click to expand...
Cynicism will get you nowhere. Remember that we are talking about something that is just speculation as this stage.
 
As it currently stands, as I understand it, the Astutes are UK designed, produced with UK technology and systems (there is inevitably some cross-sharing of knowledge and some technology with the US).

The UK sub building pattern is building their SSN class then their SSBN class then back again to maintain the ongoing capacity/ capability.

There are already points of significant convergence between UK subs and US subs plan going forward: my understanding is that the next classes of US and UK SSBNs will share the same (US designed and specified) missile sections while the UK appears to be aligning with future US reactor designs (presumably still to be built in the UK but very much the US designs).

In that context proposals to have a tri-nation future SSN is really a case of becoming a junior partner/ sub-contractor in producing the future US SSN which the UK would then effectively licence build in the UK. It makes sense from a US perspective (more subs produced for improved economies of scale, can cherry pick the minority content from the UK that suits them, etc.) and for the UK it would have significant cost advantages by greatly reducing duplication of effort/ overlap with the US etc. In fairness this may be seen by the UK as the only affordable and/or realistic direction to go in.

But such a move would inevitably eliminate the realistic ability of the UK to regenerate that independent capability and capacity (much more so than, say, even an aviation equivalent of ditching the Tempest project and the UK becoming a junior partner in the next generation US combat aircraft project).

Too much independent infrastructure, experience, knowledge etc, that couldn’t realistically be rebuilt would inevitably go away; the UK won’t be able to turn the clock back and will be dependent on the US for future submarine classes with the proportion UK content subject to future negotiations.
 
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kaiserd said:
As it currently stands, as I understand it, the Astutes are UK designed, produced with UK technology and systems (there is inevitably some cross-sharing of knowledge and some technology with the US).

The UK sub building pattern is building their SSN class then their SSBN class then back again to maintain the ongoing capacity/ capability.

There are already points of significant convergence between UK subs and US subs plan going forward: my understanding is that the next classes of US and UK SSBNs will share the same (US designed and specified) missile sections while the UK appears to be aligning with future US reactor designs (presumably still to be built in the UK but very much the US designs).

In that context proposals to have a tri-nation future SSN is really a case of becoming a junior partner/ sub-contractor in producing the future US SSN which the UK would then effectively licence build in the UK. It makes sense from a US perspective (more subs produced for improved economies of scale, can cherry pick the minority content from the UK that suits them, etc.) and for the UK it would have significant cost advantages by greatly reducing duplication of effort/ overlap with the US etc. In fairness this may be seen by the UK as the only affordable and/or realistic direction to go in.

But such a move would inevitably eliminate the realistic ability of the UK to regenerate that independent capability and capacity (much more so than, say, even an aviation equivalent of ditching the Tempest project and the UK becoming a junior partner in the next generation US combat aircraft project).

Too much independent infrastructure, experience, knowledge etc, that couldn’t realistically be rebuilt would inevitably go away; the UK won’t be able to turn the clock back and will be dependent on the US for future submarine classes with the proportion UK content subject to future negotiations.
Click to expand...

Let's just agree to disagree.
 
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TomS said:
Volkodav said:
Hood said:
A tri-national SSN(X)? Sounds like a recipe for disaster to me on all levels.
Click to expand...
It depends, the new boomers have a common missile section, while NG and EB are sharing Virginia construction, each building the same sections for every boat. The Virginias in particular were deliberately designed to be modular, which has facilitated the massive block to block changes.

I can see common sections being used on three or more related designs. Say a US reactor section and an RN reactor section, US bow section, RN bow section. Common VPM sections for which ever navy wants them, pretty much everything else being common. Same basic design enables USN SSN, RN SSN and RAN SSN, as well as a USN SSGN.
Click to expand...

But if there is an RN bow and an RN reactor (and likely an RN-specific control room), what actually is left in common between the RN and USN? Berthing? Which then has to be modified because of different accommodation standards.
Click to expand...

Current speculation is that the Astute successor will essentially be a shortened Dreadnought class. So, if true, lots of potential for standardisation and/or common modules.

Also, given that Dreadnought and Colombia classes are going to be based around a common missile section (slightly larger than the Ohio's to accommodate the new D5LE2), that standardisation could go even further.
 
TomS said:
Volkodav said:
Hood said:
A tri-national SSN(X)? Sounds like a recipe for disaster to me on all levels.
Click to expand...
It depends, the new boomers have a common missile section, while NG and EB are sharing Virginia construction, each building the same sections for every boat. The Virginias in particular were deliberately designed to be modular, which has facilitated the massive block to block changes.

I can see common sections being used on three or more related designs. Say a US reactor section and an RN reactor section, US bow section, RN bow section. Common VPM sections for which ever navy wants them, pretty much everything else being common. Same basic design enables USN SSN, RN SSN and RAN SSN, as well as a USN SSGN.
Click to expand...

But if there is an RN bow and an RN reactor (and likely an RN-specific control room), what actually is left in common between the RN and USN? Berthing? Which then has to be modified because of different accommodation standards.
Click to expand...
Submarines are extremely complex beasts, their auxiliary and hotel systems are a level beyond what you find pretty much anywhere else. Almost every system on a submarine is bespoke, the savings on standardising on even just auxiliary systems would be substantial. The savings on the cost of certifying common systems alone would be mind blowing.

Optronics, radars, propellers, control surfaces, control systems, electric motors, power control systems, sewerage systems, oxygen generation, firefighting, escape systems, emergency breathing, emergency diesel and batteries.....
 
kaiserd said:
GTX said:
kaiserd said:
...
Click to expand...
Click to expand...

The UK sub building pattern is building their SSN class then their SSBN class then back again to maintain the ongoing capacity/ capability.

There are already points of significant convergence between UK subs and US subs plan going forward: my understanding is that the next classes of US and UK SSBNs will share the same (US designed and specified) missile sections while the UK appears to be aligning with future US reactor designs (presumably still to be built in the UK but very much the US designs).

In that context proposals to have a tri-nation future SSN is really a case of becoming a junior partner/ sub-contractor in producing the future US SSN which the UK would then effectively licence build in the UK. It makes sense from a US perspective (more subs produced for improved economies of scale, can cherry pick the minority content from the UK that suits them, etc.) and for the UK it would have significant cost advantages by greatly reducing duplication of effort/ overlap with the US etc. In fairness this may be seen by the UK as the only affordable and/or realistic direction to go in.

But such a move would inevitably eliminate the realistic ability of the UK to regenerate that independent capability and capacity (much more so than, say, even an aviation equivalent of ditching the Tempest project and the UK becoming a junior partner in the next generation US combat aircraft project).

Too much independent infrastructure, experience, knowledge etc, that couldn’t realistically be rebuilt would inevitably go away; the UK won’t be able to turn the clock back and will be dependent on the US for future submarine classes with the proportion UK content subject to future negotiations.
Click to expand...
The reality is the UK ad a submarine design and building blackhole before the Astutes that meant they had serious issues with the project due to loss of institutional knowledge. The fix they used was to reach out to the US, EB specifically, to help them get over the issues. Don't get me wrong the Astutes are great boats, but they were built with substantial US help.
 
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I think its to early to have any idea what will happen, and its hard to picture a way forward given US/UK production limitations which would be necessary at a minimum for the reactor spaces. Presumably more will be known after the 18 month review.
 
Fun factoid, HMS Anson is the last Royal Navy vessel to be commissioned as Her Majesty's Ship this century at least and will probably hold the record as the shortest time actually commissioned as such before becoming His Majesty's Ship.
 
Pioneer said:
www.smh.com.au

Indonesia claims success in fight over AUKUS nuclear subs

Amid anxiety about Australia’s submarine plans under its pact with the US and Britain, Jakarta says its bid for stricter regulations on nuclear naval power has won wide support.
www.smh.com.au www.smh.com.au


Regards
Pioneer
Click to expand...
This may actually help AUKUS as the original Chinese push through other parties was aimed as killing the RAN nuclear power option, this however is aimed at increasing safeguards which could make it more certain that the RAN option will proceed.

Remove the loop holes that other countries may use to acquire nuclear weapons through the back door of nuclear power and the RAN case looks better and better.
 
Volkodav said:
Pioneer said:
www.smh.com.au

Indonesia claims success in fight over AUKUS nuclear subs

Amid anxiety about Australia’s submarine plans under its pact with the US and Britain, Jakarta says its bid for stricter regulations on nuclear naval power has won wide support.
www.smh.com.au www.smh.com.au


Regards
Pioneer
Click to expand...
This may actually help AUKUS as the original Chinese push through other parties was aimed as killing the RAN nuclear power option, this however is aimed at increasing safeguards which could make it more certain that the RAN option will proceed.

Remove the loop holes that other countries may use to acquire nuclear weapons through the back door of nuclear power and the RAN case looks better and better.
Click to expand...
Just another argument for why LEU is a better option.
 
jeffb said:
Probably bears repeating:
Nothing is ever simple, and a further complication is both the US and the UK have now initiated programs for their next-generation successors to the Virginia and Astute classes.

The timing of the US SSN(X) and UK Submersible Ship Nuclear Replacement (SSNR) programs ensures their relevance to Australia, probably not as potential platforms but featuring enhanced capabilities capable of inclusion in late-build Virginia-class or Astute-class boats.

The first nuclear boat for the RAN is expected to be completed around 2035, completion of the first US SSN(X) is scheduled for 2031, while a firm timeline has yet to be disclosed for the SSNR, but it’s likely to be required around 2035 when first-of-class HMS Astute completes 25 years of service.
Click to expand...

www.australiandefence.com.au

Which submarine will Australia build? - Australian Defence Magazine

Now it’s been decided that the RAN is to acquire a fleet of nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarines (SSNs), the question is – which one?
www.australiandefence.com.au www.australiandefence.com.au
Click to expand...
Perhaps it's too obvious to state...the US has the advantage of adding block changes to a continuous production line in Virginia-class boats. The economy of scale, expertise, and production experience on a given platform is an objective fact. The UK loses all three when production of one class stops to build another.

It is likely, at some point, the US will decide that a larger diameter boat is advantageous for their fast attack platform. Whether that is initiated in the follow-on to block 5 Virginia's or a block 6 is selected (based largely on block 5 with its cost advantages) may be a substantive decision factor for the RAN. A larger diameter boat being a more expensive proposition. If this replacement boat is larger, and based on the Columbia platform and its existing production line may mitigate but...a 43' diameter boat is egregiously expensive - let alone the inshore facilities required to support them.

However, I still believe Australia will benefit most, in submarine program and security, by designing their agreements with the US firmly around guarantees of servicing and supporting US boats as well as ensuring the US will decommission the boats they purchase. This would require US DoD oversight of EB and HII assistance to Australia in designing, building, and training shipyard personnel for some period of time, perhaps a decade. Perhaps the same deal could be made with the UK but they lack depth of production, money, and largess that the US enjoys. The concern the US has re the CCP offers leverage that will carry weight in these negotiations, perhaps more so than the UK. Either way, I hope they will use them.
 
You gonna like the reactivity of French media. They are presently grasping the August 5 Australian headline, only six weeks late. Opex 360 is a valuable resource nonetheless, but REALLY - they are a bit late ! And then the Huffpost react to Opex 360. That's why I checked my sources before posting - the Huffpo ain't very good at military matters.


Bottom line: see you next March for a proposal to build four Attack subs in France (not Australia) to fill the gap with the AUKUS SSN... eventually ! The Swedes are also on the case, and all the other SSK builders probably (Sweden Spain, Germany, South Korea, Japan...) and of course a Collins massive upgrade.
 
GTX said:
www.abc.net.au

Leaked document sheds light on cancellation of French subs contract

A leaked confidential document gives an insider's perspective on how the Morrison government went about cancelling the French submarine contract, highlighting how officials running the contract were kept in the dark.
www.abc.net.au www.abc.net.au
Click to expand...
Here’s the full note written by Kim Gillis… I haven’t had time to read the whole thing but certainly he seems like one of the best positioned experts to talk about the history of the Attack program.


I was a member of the Naval Group Australia Board since January 2021 and resigned as an Independent Director of Naval Group Australia on the 30th of June this year. I write this to you in my personal capacity to the last few remaining NGA staff members and to those who have left the business.

For some context, I retired four years ago as the Deputy Secretary CASG. I am in the unique position of having been involved in the Competitive Evaluation Process (CEP), the decision to select Naval Group, the negotiations of the contract and SPA and as an Independent Director for Naval Group Australia. After I retired from Defence, I was asked by
MINDEF to return to assist in finalising the negotiations between Naval Group France and Defence so that the Strategic Partnering Agreement (SPA) could be signed.

I was asked by Pierre Éric Pommellet to join the Naval Group Board in late December 2020 as an independent Director. I accepted that offer with some trepidation because like many of you, much of what I had heard or read about the program in the media was negative. I was however so impressed with Pierre Éric and the calibre of my fellow directors that I decided to accept the role. And like many of you I was excited about the challenge of being involved Australia’s most complex and challenging program.

The purpose of this note is twofold firstly to express my pride in NGA’s contribution to the submarine program and to recognise the sacrifices that each one you and your families have made. Secondly, I would like to provide you with a personal perspective into the schedule and cost blowout commentary that contributed to the decision made by the Government in 2020. These are my own views and may not reflect the views of the any of the ex Naval Group Australia Board or even the Board of Naval Group France.

(Continues in linked document)
 

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