Replacement of Australia's Collins Class Submarines

Actually it is theorized in open source that the initial Virginia reactor (and likely Astute as well) is or is close to weapons grade; this is why it never needs to be refueled. Presumable at some point during the usage the core falls below weapons grade, but I think it does start out that way.

It must mean like 20% or something (normal reactors are ~5%). I can't see it being 90%, I don't know how that would work without serious problems.

I believe it’s actually over 90% but I think it’s one of those things not explicitly stated. Apparently they poison the reactor with some kind of compound that inhibits the reaction that slowly burns off as the purity drops to give a relatively steady power output.
 
Interesting read:


Naval reactors (with the exception of the ill-fated Russian Alfa class described below) have been pressurised water types, which differ from commercial reactors producing electricity in that:
  • They deliver a lot of power from a very small volume and therefore most run on highly-enriched uranium (>20% U-235, originally c 97% but apparently now 93% in latest US submarines, c 20-25% in some western vessels, 20% in the first and second generation Russian reactors (1957-81)*, then 21% to 45% in 3rd generation Russian units (40% in India's Arihant). Newer French reactors run on low-enriched fuel.
  • The fuel is not UO2 but a uranium-zirconium or uranium-aluminium alloy (c15%U with 93% enrichment, or more U with less – eg 20% – U-235) or a metal-ceramic (Kursk: U-Al zoned 20-45% enriched, clad in zircaloy, with c 200kg U-235 in each 200 MW core).
  • They have long core lives, so that refuelling is needed only after 10 or more years, and new cores are designed to last 50 years in carriers and 30-40 years (over 1.5 million kilometres) in most submarines, albeit with much lower capacity factors than a nuclear power plant (<30%).
  • The design allows for a compact pressure vessel with internal neutron and gamma shield. The Sevmorput pressure vessel for a relatively large marine reactor is 4.6 m high and 1.8 m diameter, enclosing a core 1 m high and 1.2 m diameter.
  • Thermal efficiency is less than in civil nuclear power plants due to the need for flexible power output, and space constraints for the steam system.
  • There is no soluble boron used in naval reactors (at least US ones) but boron may be a burnable neutron poison in the fuel.
  • A submarine reactor is required to withstand the shock and vibration experienced by all warships in active service due to ocean turbulence and enemy action.
* An IAEA Tecdoc reports discharge assay of early submarine used fuel reprocessed at Mayak being 17% U-235.

The long core life is enabled by the relatively high enrichment of the uranium and by incorporating a 'burnable poison' such as gadolinium – which is progressively depleted as fission products and actinides accumulate and fissile material is used up. These accumulating poisons and fissile reduction would normally cause reduced fuel efficiency, but the two effects cancel one another out.

However, the enrichment level for newer French naval fuel has been dropped to 7.5% U-235, the fuel being known as 'Caramel', originally developed for research reactors and providing the possibility for greater fuel density, so helping to minimize the increased size of an LEU-fuelled core. It needs to be changed every ten years or so, but avoids the need for a specific military enrichment line, and some reactors will be smaller versions of those on the Charles de Gaulle. In 2006 the Defence Ministry announced that Barracuda class submarines would use fuel with "civilian enrichment, identical to that of EdF power plants," about 5% enriched, and certainly marks a major change there.

Long-term integrity of the compact reactor pressure vessel is maintained by providing an internal neutron shield. (This is in contrast to early Soviet civil PWR designs where embrittlement occurs due to neutron bombardment of a very narrow pressure vessel.)

The Russian, US, and British navies rely on steam turbine propulsion, the French and Chinese in submarines use the turbine to generate electricity for propulsion.

Russian ballistic missile submarines as well as all surface ships since the Enterprise are powered by two reactors. Other submarines (except some Russian attack subs) are powered by one. A new Russian test-bed submarine is diesel-powered but has a very small nuclear reactor for auxiliary power.

The smaller US Virginia-class SSN submarine first commissioned in 2004 has has a S9G reactor of about 210 MW driving a 30 MW pump-jet propulsion system built by BAE Systems (originally for the Royal Navy). The reactor does not need refuelling for the 33-year service life and can operate with convection circulation without pumps. The vessels are about 7900 dwt submerged, and 19 were in operation by mid-2021, with more being built – a total of 28 from initial contracts. In 2019 ten larger Block V versions (25 m longer, 10,800 dwt) were ordered for delivery 2025-29, costing $22.2 billion for the first nine. These are effectively a new class.

The 14 US Ohio-class SSBNs (and four converted to SSGNs for guided missiles) have a single S8G nuclear reactor of 220 MWt delivering 45 MW shaft power. These require mid-life refuelling at about 25 years. The 12 slightly larger Columbia class to replace these will require no refuelling, hence shorter mid-life maintenance (2 years instead of 4). They will have an S1B nuclear reactor with electric drive (without reduction gears) and pump jet propulsion. They have been developed in collaboration with the UK, which will deploy them as Dreadnought-class SSBNs.

Edit:
The Rolls-Royce PWR1 of about 78 MWt was used to power the first 23 British nuclear submarines. It was based on the Westinghouse S5W reactor, one of which was provided by the US Navy in 1958 under a mutual defence agreement. The PWR1 with high-enriched fuel required refuelling every ten years or so. British Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) of 15,900 dwt submerged have a single PWR2 reactor with two steam turbines driving a single pump jet of 20.5 MW, implying a reactor power of about 145 MWt.

UK Astute-class attack submarines of 7400 dwt submerged have a modified (smaller) PWR2 reactor driving two steam turbines and a single pump jet reported as 11.5 MW. The first of seven vessels was commissioned in 2010, and five were delivered by mid-2021 at a cost of £1.65 billion each. New versions of this with 'Core H' will require no refuelling over the life of the vessel, about 25 years*. In March 2011 a safety assessment of the PWR2 design was released showing the need for improvement, though they have capacity for passive cooling to effect decay heat removal.

* Rolls-Royce claims that the Core H PWR2 has six times the (undisclosed) power of its original PWR1 and runs four times as long. The Core H is Rolls-Royce's sixth-generation submarine reactor core.

The PWR3 for the Vanguard replacement Dreadnought-class SSBNs will be largely a US design – presumably based on S9G in the Virginia-class – but using UK technology. It will be more expensive to build but cheaper to maintain than the PWR2. All UK submarine reactors use highly-enriched fuel, obtained from the USA.
 
Last edited:
Say what you want of Admiral Hyman Rickover caracter (he could be a stubborn dickhead at times) he certainly knew what was needed to power a submarine. Also safety credentials.
In passing, the one and only USN submarine ever powered by a liquid metal reactor - he instantly hated it, for good reasons, and ensured it never, ever happened again. The Soviets demurred and went full bore with liquid metal reactors submarines. It cost them an arm, a leg, and lots of sailor lives, plus a crapton of money - for nothing, or next to nothing. Stellar top speed maybe, but at what cost ? the Alfas were fast but they were also maintenance dogs. Most insane aspect was the necessity of running the reactor 100% of the time otherwise the coolant froze into a granite-like stuff and the submarine had to be scrapped.
 
Interesting read:


Naval reactors (with the exception of the ill-fated Russian Alfa class described below) have been pressurised water types, which differ from commercial reactors producing electricity in that:
  • They deliver a lot of power from a very small volume and therefore most run on highly-enriched uranium (>20% U-235, originally c 97% but apparently now 93% in latest US submarines, c 20-25% in some western vessels, 20% in the first and second generation Russian reactors (1957-81)*, then 21% to 45% in 3rd generation Russian units (40% in India's Arihant). Newer French reactors run on low-enriched fuel.
  • The fuel is not UO2 but a uranium-zirconium or uranium-aluminium alloy (c15%U with 93% enrichment, or more U with less – eg 20% – U-235) or a metal-ceramic (Kursk: U-Al zoned 20-45% enriched, clad in zircaloy, with c 200kg U-235 in each 200 MW core).
  • They have long core lives, so that refuelling is needed only after 10 or more years, and new cores are designed to last 50 years in carriers and 30-40 years (over 1.5 million kilometres) in most submarines, albeit with much lower capacity factors than a nuclear power plant (<30%).
  • The design allows for a compact pressure vessel with internal neutron and gamma shield. The Sevmorput pressure vessel for a relatively large marine reactor is 4.6 m high and 1.8 m diameter, enclosing a core 1 m high and 1.2 m diameter.
  • Thermal efficiency is less than in civil nuclear power plants due to the need for flexible power output, and space constraints for the steam system.
  • There is no soluble boron used in naval reactors (at least US ones) but boron may be a burnable neutron poison in the fuel.
  • A submarine reactor is required to withstand the shock and vibration experienced by all warships in active service due to ocean turbulence and enemy action.
* An IAEA Tecdoc reports discharge assay of early submarine used fuel reprocessed at Mayak being 17% U-235.

The long core life is enabled by the relatively high enrichment of the uranium and by incorporating a 'burnable poison' such as gadolinium – which is progressively depleted as fission products and actinides accumulate and fissile material is used up. These accumulating poisons and fissile reduction would normally cause reduced fuel efficiency, but the two effects cancel one another out.

However, the enrichment level for newer French naval fuel has been dropped to 7.5% U-235, the fuel being known as 'Caramel', originally developed for research reactors and providing the possibility for greater fuel density, so helping to minimize the increased size of an LEU-fuelled core. It needs to be changed every ten years or so, but avoids the need for a specific military enrichment line, and some reactors will be smaller versions of those on the Charles de Gaulle. In 2006 the Defence Ministry announced that Barracuda class submarines would use fuel with "civilian enrichment, identical to that of EdF power plants," about 5% enriched, and certainly marks a major change there.

Long-term integrity of the compact reactor pressure vessel is maintained by providing an internal neutron shield. (This is in contrast to early Soviet civil PWR designs where embrittlement occurs due to neutron bombardment of a very narrow pressure vessel.)

The Russian, US, and British navies rely on steam turbine propulsion, the French and Chinese in submarines use the turbine to generate electricity for propulsion.

Russian ballistic missile submarines as well as all surface ships since the Enterprise are powered by two reactors. Other submarines (except some Russian attack subs) are powered by one. A new Russian test-bed submarine is diesel-powered but has a very small nuclear reactor for auxiliary power.

The smaller US Virginia-class SSN submarine first commissioned in 2004 has has a S9G reactor of about 210 MW driving a 30 MW pump-jet propulsion system built by BAE Systems (originally for the Royal Navy). The reactor does not need refuelling for the 33-year service life and can operate with convection circulation without pumps. The vessels are about 7900 dwt submerged, and 19 were in operation by mid-2021, with more being built – a total of 28 from initial contracts. In 2019 ten larger Block V versions (25 m longer, 10,800 dwt) were ordered for delivery 2025-29, costing $22.2 billion for the first nine. These are effectively a new class.

The 14 US Ohio-class SSBNs (and four converted to SSGNs for guided missiles) have a single S8G nuclear reactor of 220 MWt delivering 45 MW shaft power. These require mid-life refuelling at about 25 years. The 12 slightly larger Columbia class to replace these will require no refuelling, hence shorter mid-life maintenance (2 years instead of 4). They will have an S1B nuclear reactor with electric drive (without reduction gears) and pump jet propulsion. They have been developed in collaboration with the UK, which will deploy them as Dreadnought-class SSBNs.

Edit:
The Rolls-Royce PWR1 of about 78 MWt was used to power the first 23 British nuclear submarines. It was based on the Westinghouse S5W reactor, one of which was provided by the US Navy in 1958 under a mutual defence agreement. The PWR1 with high-enriched fuel required refuelling every ten years or so. British Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) of 15,900 dwt submerged have a single PWR2 reactor with two steam turbines driving a single pump jet of 20.5 MW, implying a reactor power of about 145 MWt.

UK Astute-class attack submarines of 7400 dwt submerged have a modified (smaller) PWR2 reactor driving two steam turbines and a single pump jet reported as 11.5 MW. The first of seven vessels was commissioned in 2010, and five were delivered by mid-2021 at a cost of £1.65 billion each. New versions of this with 'Core H' will require no refuelling over the life of the vessel, about 25 years*. In March 2011 a safety assessment of the PWR2 design was released showing the need for improvement, though they have capacity for passive cooling to effect decay heat removal.

* Rolls-Royce claims that the Core H PWR2 has six times the (undisclosed) power of its original PWR1 and runs four times as long. The Core H is Rolls-Royce's sixth-generation submarine reactor core.

The PWR3 for the Vanguard replacement Dreadnought-class SSBNs will be largely a US design – presumably based on S9G in the Virginia-class – but using UK technology. It will be more expensive to build but cheaper to maintain than the PWR2. All UK submarine reactors use highly-enriched fuel, obtained from the USA.
Have to confess, I didn't realise sub reactors used weapons grade fuel.
 
Thanks so much for that post Jeffb; that was a lot of quality info some of which I’m shocked isn’t classified.

To be fair, I have seen bits and pieces of it around in various places over the years. It was certainly nice to find it all collected in one place though.

Definitely a lucky find.
 
Last edited:
Potential solution of the sub fissile material verification problem (although it’s not really much of a problem with Western Democracies)

For land-based reactors, inspectors keep track of using neutrino detectors placed close to an operating core (see Feature: Neutrino Detectors for National Security). But this technique doesn’t work for the water-submerged cores in submarines at sea. It also fails for the weak signals from powered-down cores, allowing operators to subvert checks of docked submarines.



Cogswell and Huber’s technique solves this issue. Even when turned off, nuclear reactors emit antineutrinos due to the decay of 235 U fission by-products such as radioactive isotopes of cerium and ruthenium. Cogswell and Huber predict that these antineutrinos, which have lower energies than those emitted by an operating reactor, should be detectable using current technologies from a docked, submerged submarine.
 
Interesting read:


Naval reactors (with the exception of the ill-fated Russian Alfa class described below) have been pressurised water types, which differ from commercial reactors producing electricity in that:
  • They deliver a lot of power from a very small volume and therefore most run on highly-enriched uranium (>20% U-235, originally c 97% but apparently now 93% in latest US submarines, c 20-25% in some western vessels, 20% in the first and second generation Russian reactors (1957-81)*, then 21% to 45% in 3rd generation Russian units (40% in India's Arihant). Newer French reactors run on low-enriched fuel.
  • The fuel is not UO2 but a uranium-zirconium or uranium-aluminium alloy (c15%U with 93% enrichment, or more U with less – eg 20% – U-235) or a metal-ceramic (Kursk: U-Al zoned 20-45% enriched, clad in zircaloy, with c 200kg U-235 in each 200 MW core).
  • They have long core lives, so that refuelling is needed only after 10 or more years, and new cores are designed to last 50 years in carriers and 30-40 years (over 1.5 million kilometres) in most submarines, albeit with much lower capacity factors than a nuclear power plant (<30%).
  • The design allows for a compact pressure vessel with internal neutron and gamma shield. The Sevmorput pressure vessel for a relatively large marine reactor is 4.6 m high and 1.8 m diameter, enclosing a core 1 m high and 1.2 m diameter.
  • Thermal efficiency is less than in civil nuclear power plants due to the need for flexible power output, and space constraints for the steam system.
  • There is no soluble boron used in naval reactors (at least US ones) but boron may be a burnable neutron poison in the fuel.
  • A submarine reactor is required to withstand the shock and vibration experienced by all warships in active service due to ocean turbulence and enemy action.
* An IAEA Tecdoc reports discharge assay of early submarine used fuel reprocessed at Mayak being 17% U-235.

The long core life is enabled by the relatively high enrichment of the uranium and by incorporating a 'burnable poison' such as gadolinium – which is progressively depleted as fission products and actinides accumulate and fissile material is used up. These accumulating poisons and fissile reduction would normally cause reduced fuel efficiency, but the two effects cancel one another out.

However, the enrichment level for newer French naval fuel has been dropped to 7.5% U-235, the fuel being known as 'Caramel', originally developed for research reactors and providing the possibility for greater fuel density, so helping to minimize the increased size of an LEU-fuelled core. It needs to be changed every ten years or so, but avoids the need for a specific military enrichment line, and some reactors will be smaller versions of those on the Charles de Gaulle. In 2006 the Defence Ministry announced that Barracuda class submarines would use fuel with "civilian enrichment, identical to that of EdF power plants," about 5% enriched, and certainly marks a major change there.

Long-term integrity of the compact reactor pressure vessel is maintained by providing an internal neutron shield. (This is in contrast to early Soviet civil PWR designs where embrittlement occurs due to neutron bombardment of a very narrow pressure vessel.)

The Russian, US, and British navies rely on steam turbine propulsion, the French and Chinese in submarines use the turbine to generate electricity for propulsion.

Russian ballistic missile submarines as well as all surface ships since the Enterprise are powered by two reactors. Other submarines (except some Russian attack subs) are powered by one. A new Russian test-bed submarine is diesel-powered but has a very small nuclear reactor for auxiliary power.

The smaller US Virginia-class SSN submarine first commissioned in 2004 has has a S9G reactor of about 210 MW driving a 30 MW pump-jet propulsion system built by BAE Systems (originally for the Royal Navy). The reactor does not need refuelling for the 33-year service life and can operate with convection circulation without pumps. The vessels are about 7900 dwt submerged, and 19 were in operation by mid-2021, with more being built – a total of 28 from initial contracts. In 2019 ten larger Block V versions (25 m longer, 10,800 dwt) were ordered for delivery 2025-29, costing $22.2 billion for the first nine. These are effectively a new class.

The 14 US Ohio-class SSBNs (and four converted to SSGNs for guided missiles) have a single S8G nuclear reactor of 220 MWt delivering 45 MW shaft power. These require mid-life refuelling at about 25 years. The 12 slightly larger Columbia class to replace these will require no refuelling, hence shorter mid-life maintenance (2 years instead of 4). They will have an S1B nuclear reactor with electric drive (without reduction gears) and pump jet propulsion. They have been developed in collaboration with the UK, which will deploy them as Dreadnought-class SSBNs.

Edit:
The Rolls-Royce PWR1 of about 78 MWt was used to power the first 23 British nuclear submarines. It was based on the Westinghouse S5W reactor, one of which was provided by the US Navy in 1958 under a mutual defence agreement. The PWR1 with high-enriched fuel required refuelling every ten years or so. British Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) of 15,900 dwt submerged have a single PWR2 reactor with two steam turbines driving a single pump jet of 20.5 MW, implying a reactor power of about 145 MWt.

UK Astute-class attack submarines of 7400 dwt submerged have a modified (smaller) PWR2 reactor driving two steam turbines and a single pump jet reported as 11.5 MW. The first of seven vessels was commissioned in 2010, and five were delivered by mid-2021 at a cost of £1.65 billion each. New versions of this with 'Core H' will require no refuelling over the life of the vessel, about 25 years*. In March 2011 a safety assessment of the PWR2 design was released showing the need for improvement, though they have capacity for passive cooling to effect decay heat removal.

* Rolls-Royce claims that the Core H PWR2 has six times the (undisclosed) power of its original PWR1 and runs four times as long. The Core H is Rolls-Royce's sixth-generation submarine reactor core.

The PWR3 for the Vanguard replacement Dreadnought-class SSBNs will be largely a US design – presumably based on S9G in the Virginia-class – but using UK technology. It will be more expensive to build but cheaper to maintain than the PWR2. All UK submarine reactors use highly-enriched fuel, obtained from the USA.
Have to confess, I didn't realise sub reactors used weapons grade fuel.
It's a bit misleading: Depending on how the fuel rods are constructed it might not be possible to get the burnable neutron "poison" out via simple means. Which would lead to the fuel technically being weapons-grade, but still unusable for that specific purpose.
 
Interesting, though I suspect highly unlikely to be taken up, proposal:


This is apparently the class proposed:

 
Interesting, though I suspect highly unlikely to be taken up, proposal:


This is apparently the class proposed:

And now a Korean diesel-electric sub proposal/consideration!:rolleyes:
How long has South Korea been designing and building subs?
Wow, this indecisive political bullshit only gets better for Australia, does it not.
In my opinion the fact that we (Australia) invested so much time, money and resources into building the Collins Class subs, only to have neglected so much national learnt skills and talent to no avail in such a short time, has me literally asking myself how the $@&# we are going to maintain, let alone deploy these SSN's effectively.


Regards
Pioneer
 
Last edited:
Interesting read:


Naval reactors (with the exception of the ill-fated Russian Alfa class described below) have been pressurised water types, which differ from commercial reactors producing electricity in that:
  • They deliver a lot of power from a very small volume and therefore most run on highly-enriched uranium (>20% U-235, originally c 97% but apparently now 93% in latest US submarines, c 20-25% in some western vessels, 20% in the first and second generation Russian reactors (1957-81)*, then 21% to 45% in 3rd generation Russian units (40% in India's Arihant). Newer French reactors run on low-enriched fuel.
  • The fuel is not UO2 but a uranium-zirconium or uranium-aluminium alloy (c15%U with 93% enrichment, or more U with less – eg 20% – U-235) or a metal-ceramic (Kursk: U-Al zoned 20-45% enriched, clad in zircaloy, with c 200kg U-235 in each 200 MW core).
  • They have long core lives, so that refuelling is needed only after 10 or more years, and new cores are designed to last 50 years in carriers and 30-40 years (over 1.5 million kilometres) in most submarines, albeit with much lower capacity factors than a nuclear power plant (<30%).
  • The design allows for a compact pressure vessel with internal neutron and gamma shield. The Sevmorput pressure vessel for a relatively large marine reactor is 4.6 m high and 1.8 m diameter, enclosing a core 1 m high and 1.2 m diameter.
  • Thermal efficiency is less than in civil nuclear power plants due to the need for flexible power output, and space constraints for the steam system.
  • There is no soluble boron used in naval reactors (at least US ones) but boron may be a burnable neutron poison in the fuel.
  • A submarine reactor is required to withstand the shock and vibration experienced by all warships in active service due to ocean turbulence and enemy action.
<SNIP>
Have to confess, I didn't realise sub reactors used weapons grade fuel.
It's a bit misleading: Depending on how the fuel rods are constructed it might not be possible to get the burnable neutron "poison" out via simple means. Which would lead to the fuel technically being weapons-grade, but still unusable for that specific purpose.
This is something that will not be mentioned by such analysts, as stoking nuclear fear is the goal. The same thing happens with fact that plutonium 240 causes used-fuel bombs to fizzle - gets ignored. And other things, like the amount of plutonium 239 being uncertain, because it is embedded in fuel rods, is boosted as “missing plutonium”.
 
And now a Korean diesel-electric sub proposal/consideration!

So the Koreans are proposing conventional subs for delivery from ~2030 that don’t meet RAN requirements. And the AUKUS alliance is struggling to get nuclear subs delivered from ~2040.

Meanwhile the French can deliver SSNs that *DO* meet requirements from ~2032 (if the 1st hull is built abroad), ie. almost as soon as the most optimistic SSK offer. With a US combat system and greater AUS content than any of the SSK options. At least 4-5 Barracuda SSNs could be delivered by 2040 without jeopardizing AUKUS (by all means switch to a Virginia or Astute SSN after that).

Maybe time to reconsider?

(From the article)

South Korea made clear its eagerness to deepen defense ties with Australia, making the bold offer of building advanced conventional attack submarines in “seven years from signature to delivery.”

The Collins are now expected to sail safely until 2030 or so, but few experts believe Australia can get its first nuclear-powered attack boat into the water until closer to 2040.
 
Last edited:
And now a Korean diesel-electric sub proposal/consideration!

So the Koreans are proposing conventional subs for delivery from ~2030 that don’t meet RAN requirements. And the AUKUS alliance is struggling to get nuclear subs delivered from ~2040.

Meanwhile the French can deliver SSNs that *DO* meet requirements from ~2032 (if the 1st hull is built abroad), ie. almost as soon as the most optimistic SSK offer. With a US combat system and greater AUS content than any of the SSK options. At least 4-5 Barracuda SSNs could be delivered by 2040 without jeopardizing AUKUS (by all means switch to a Virginia or Astute SSN after that).

Maybe time to reconsider?

(From the article)

South Korea made clear its eagerness to deepen defense ties with Australia, making the bold offer of building advanced conventional attack submarines in “seven years from signature to delivery.”

The Collins are now expected to sail safely until 2030 or so, but few experts believe Australia can get its first nuclear-powered attack boat into the water until closer to 2040.

The politics on the Australian side were atrocious (to say the least) but it seems Naval Group were also a bit of dickheads, unfortunately.

This said and done, I've said the same since the crisis burst last year: Attack could have been an entry door to Barracuda... unfortunately that train has left the station now.

The Australians will (re)pay nearly $900 million to Naval Group - and I can't see the Australian PM making another 180 degree turn and saying "ah sure, back to those Attack subs, except nuclear, that is: Barracuda !" Everybody would thought he landed on his head.

IMHO I realized from all this that France is one of the very few countries in the world with one foot into SSNs, and the other in AIP-SSKs. It goes even further: Attack were AIP-Barracudas, or close enough.
 
People need to remember that AUKUS was/is more than just SSNs. Yes, that was a big initial part but there is much more to it. As such one can’t really compare a French SSN to it because there French might be able to supply the SSNs but not the rest…
 
@GTX While that is certainly true, AUKUS did not have to include the SSNs.

The SSN decision was done by choice and ultimately the impact (positive or negative) can only be measured based on « subs in the water » ie. how many hulls, when, with what availability and military capability.

By those metrics it would be hard to beat 5 Barracuda SSNs in the water by 2040, with high availability and double crews if needed enabling 1,000 sea days per year (more than the Collins class has ever done… 600-700 sea days per year IIRC).
 
Last edited:
At least in terms of the nuclear subs it appears that was really needed was a multiple-decade transition plan - i.e. a potentially reduced buy of the planned French conventional subs followed by an implementable viable plan for the nuclear subs be they a US, UK or French design.

Instead you get wishful-thinking presented as a viable procurement strategy.

Wanting to go all-in on AUKUS is understandable from an Australian perspective, particularly given the key significance for them of strengthening Australian and US defence and intelligence relationships.
But it looks like the Collins will at best be extremely tired we’ll before Australian Virgina’s (or less likely, Astutes) are available.
And in the short to medium term that doesn’t exactly fit the bill of strengthening Australian naval strength to help deter an increasingly “assertive” PRC, does it?
And that’s before the political consequences of what the nuclear sub program actually requires/ involved becomes real and concrete.
Personally hope to see that Australian Virgina class sub in the water and for the program to be an ultimate success.
 
And now a Korean diesel-electric sub proposal/consideration!

So the Koreans are proposing conventional subs for delivery from ~2030 that don’t meet RAN requirements. And the AUKUS alliance is struggling to get nuclear subs delivered from ~2040.

Meanwhile the French can deliver SSNs that *DO* meet requirements from ~2032 (if the 1st hull is built abroad), ie. almost as soon as the most optimistic SSK offer. With a US combat system and greater AUS content than any of the SSK options. At least 4-5 Barracuda SSNs could be delivered by 2040 without jeopardizing AUKUS (by all means switch to a Virginia or Astute SSN after that).
The French promised much more Aus content in the CONTRACT for the Attack SSKs then they were ever going to allow... as evidenced by the continual reduction of Aus content after the contract was signed that was a big part of the cancellation of the contract.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
In any case, the die is cast and the new reality is RAN has to figure out a way to get its boats given all the issues such a purchase entails. I hope it works out but it seems like a tall order.
 
And now a Korean diesel-electric sub proposal/consideration!

So the Koreans are proposing conventional subs for delivery from ~2030 that don’t meet RAN requirements. And the AUKUS alliance is struggling to get nuclear subs delivered from ~2040.

Meanwhile the French can deliver SSNs that *DO* meet requirements from ~2032 (if the 1st hull is built abroad), ie. almost as soon as the most optimistic SSK offer. With a US combat system and greater AUS content than any of the SSK options. At least 4-5 Barracuda SSNs could be delivered by 2040 without jeopardizing AUKUS (by all means switch to a Virginia or Astute SSN after that).
The French promised much more Aus content in the CONTRACT for the Attack SSKs then they were ever going to allow... as evidenced by the continual reduction of Aus content after the contract was signed that was a big part of the cancellation of the contract.

I see your point. Same issues with the Swedes for Collins no ? Australia wanted a large local part for the program to create jobs and technical knowledge. And both sides ended pretty frustrated. That local contain was a sensitive matter. Still is.
More generally: overpromising to get juicy military contracts ? nothing new under the sun. Everybody do that.
 
And now a Korean diesel-electric sub proposal/consideration!

So the Koreans are proposing conventional subs for delivery from ~2030 that don’t meet RAN requirements. And the AUKUS alliance is struggling to get nuclear subs delivered from ~2040.

Meanwhile the French can deliver SSNs that *DO* meet requirements from ~2032 (if the 1st hull is built abroad), ie. almost as soon as the most optimistic SSK offer. With a US combat system and greater AUS content than any of the SSK options. At least 4-5 Barracuda SSNs could be delivered by 2040 without jeopardizing AUKUS (by all means switch to a Virginia or Astute SSN after that).
The French promised much more Aus content in the CONTRACT for the Attack SSKs then they were ever going to allow... as evidenced by the continual reduction of Aus content after the contract was signed that was a big part of the cancellation of the contract.

I see your point. Same issues with the Swedes for Collins no ? Australia wanted a large local part for the program to create jobs and technical knowledge. And both sides ended pretty frustrated. That local contain was a sensitive matter. Still is.
More generally: overpromising to get juicy military contracts ? nothing new under the sun. Everybody do that.

Good point, Archibald. Are there likely to be similar problems with US or UK suppliers as well?
 
Are there likely to be similar problems with US or UK suppliers as well?

Should be no problem… because the US/UK haven’t (very smartly IMHO) promised anything concrete!

No committed timeline, workshare, technology transfer, cost or anything. Mostly just a lot of talk about broader partnership and working together on all the latest buzz word technologies (cyber, hypersonics, AI, quantum etc).

At work our sales team calls this sales approach “jazz hands” - if you do enough fancy hand waving, the client forgets to ask all the tough questions! (Works especially well with senior decision makers)
 
The USN and RN and their suppliers aren't dictating to the RAN, whose "how do we make an SSN happen" study is ongoing, so there's not a lot of detail because a lot of decisions still need to be made. I do know, from purely US sources, that there's a desire for Australia to have more than window dressing in the SSN realm. Australian maintenance and sustainment capabilities which USN could rent on occasion for their own boats would be pretty popular given the saturation of US domestic yards.
 
The USN and RN and their suppliers aren't dictating to the RAN, whose "how do we make an SSN happen" study is ongoing, so there's not a lot of detail because a lot of decisions still need to be made. I do know, from purely US sources, that there's a desire for Australia to have more than window dressing in the SSN realm. Australian maintenance and sustainment capabilities which USN could rent on occasion for their own boats would be pretty popular given the saturation of US domestic yards.
Indeed plus the whole AUKUS thing kind of already addressed the tech transfer aspect. Thus normal AIC/SICP aspects will be less of an issue going forward with the SSNs.
 
More generally: overpromising to get juicy military contracts ? nothing new under the sun. Everybody do that.

Good point, Archibald. Are there likely to be similar problems with US or UK suppliers as well?
This is definitely a concern but historically ( in my experience at least) it is less of an issue with US and UK companies. I fear it will definitely be a problem with other programs though especially L400-3 and with one contender in particular,,,
 
The USN and RN and their suppliers aren't dictating to the RAN, whose "how do we make an SSN happen" study is ongoing, so there's not a lot of detail because a lot of decisions still need to be made. I do know, from purely US sources, that there's a desire for Australia to have more than window dressing in the SSN realm. Australian maintenance and sustainment capabilities which USN could rent on occasion for their own boats would be pretty popular given the saturation of US domestic yards.
Indeed plus the whole AUKUS thing kind of already addressed the tech transfer aspect. Thus normal AIC/SICP aspects will be less of an issue going forward with the SSNs.

The thing about AUKUS to this point, in regards to tech transfer and training, is that it really doesn't help Australia build its own nuclear powered subs, yet. But it certainly helps with the goal of maintaining and servicing other people's nuclear subs.

Still, early days and all that.
 
We don’t really know how far the AUKUS treaty goes in this respect as I don’t believe anyone in the general public have seen the text of the agreement especially in terms of SSNs.
 
The USN and RN and their suppliers aren't dictating to the RAN, whose "how do we make an SSN happen" study is ongoing, so there's not a lot of detail because a lot of decisions still need to be made. I do know, from purely US sources, that there's a desire for Australia to have more than window dressing in the SSN realm. Australian maintenance and sustainment capabilities which USN could rent on occasion for their own boats would be pretty popular given the saturation of US domestic yards.

Excellent point.

The eighteen months will be up and then we will hear Australia's decision.

IMO, sustainment is the prize. The US has 50+ fast boats in the water with several sitting dockside awaiting work. They also want to run many of them in the Pacific. Any sustainment business with the US would be a win-win. There is no opportunity for this business with the French.
 
After the Koreans, here’s another unsolicited long shot bid to build 4 subs abroad as a stopgap until the Aussie SSNs are ready… by the French (!).

French made another bid to Albanese to build submarines
French President Emmanuel Macron proposed to Anthony Albanese that four conventionally powered submarines be built in France for the Australian navy to avoid a capability gap created by the AUKUS deal to acquire nuclear-powered boats. (…) Mr Macron’s pitch was that the five years of preliminary design work that had gone into Australia’s planned Attack class submarine had made it the most advanced diesel-electric submarine in the world.

(…) The seriousness of the offer is unclear. One source said Mr Macron made the offer as a friendly gesture on a “nothing to lose” basis, and Mr Albanese’s response was to say thank you while remaining non-committal. Naval Group executives did not take it seriously.



So the kicker is that Australia could still get Attack class subs if it wanted to!
 
After the Koreans, here’s another unsolicited long shot bid to build 4 subs abroad as a stopgap until the Aussie SSNs are ready… by the French (!).

French made another bid to Albanese to build submarines
French President Emmanuel Macron proposed to Anthony Albanese that four conventionally powered submarines be built in France for the Australian navy to avoid a capability gap created by the AUKUS deal to acquire nuclear-powered boats. (…) Mr Macron’s pitch was that the five years of preliminary design work that had gone into Australia’s planned Attack class submarine had made it the most advanced diesel-electric submarine in the world.

(…) The seriousness of the offer is unclear. One source said Mr Macron made the offer as a friendly gesture on a “nothing to lose” basis, and Mr Albanese’s response was to say thank you while remaining non-committal. Naval Group executives did not take it seriously.



So the kicker is that Australia could still get Attack class subs if it wanted to!

My reaction was akin to this

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XYrbsOTHkbM


I think it is quite appropriate.
 

Similar threads

Please donate to support the forum.

Back
Top Bottom