Belgian Defense Minister, Ludivine Dedonder, on January 28 her STAR plan (Security, Technology, Ambition, Resilience), which updates the 2016 Strategic Vision. Different sources indicate the purchase of fifteen H145M light helicopters of Airbus would be a file already well advanced, marking the end of the NH90 TTH of the Air Component.

In June 2020, Defense already reduced flight plan for NH-90 TTH helicopters, because of their expensive upgrades and flight hours, flawed industry support and staff shortages. In principle, they were to remain operational at least until 2024. As we reported in January 2022, the Air Component of the Belgian Armed Forces plans to buy new helicopters as a replacement for the NH90-TTH medium-sized, twin-engine, multi-role military helicopter and the Agusta A109 lightweight, twin-engine, multi-purpose helicopter.

With the H145M, flight hours will be much less expensive. According to a source close to the file still quoted by VRT NWS, we would go from 15,000 euros for one hour of flight to less than 3,000 euros.

The 3.8-tonne H145M is a proven light and versatile helicopter perfectly adapted to conducting reconnaissance and support missions, while still being capable of delivering troops and materials at a fast pace. The H145M is the military version of the tried-and-tested, lightweight and powerful twin-engine H145 civil helicopter, which has been deployed across the world in harsh conditions – and has proven its high performance. In mountainous areas and in hot conditions, the H145 has made its name as a rugged and reliable helicopter.

Equipped with the Airbus HForce weapons system, the H145M also can provide vital fire support. In 2013, the H145M was chosen by the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) as part of the Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) Special Operations Forces (SOF) project.

This helicopter will replace the NH90 TTH, but not the NH90 NFH. Because of its cooperation with the Dutch Navy, the Navy Component is obliged to continue to operate the aircraft for the missions of its frigates.


15,000 euros/hour, such crazy spending, enough for three UH-60M

an update to this

 
Is there here a person who could offer practical, factual causes for the NH90 shambles? The Belgian extract above included (bad/non-existent) Product Support (Sustainment). That was a burden on Airbus A300B until c. 1978, Eastern A/L order being conditional on fixing that. Did Eurocopter learn from that? Did it read across to NHI? Did the Buyer understand, so pay for that? Is all this a Project Management, more than a design issue? If it's Mngt, does that spill into A400M? Is it there on EC665 Tigre? Is this all the fault of OCCAR?
 
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NH90 story is confusing… other small users like the RNZAF are flying the pants off their NH90s and seem very happy.


For the record the RNZAF fleet flies 3x more hours than the Norwegians, with only 8 helicopters vs. 14 (!)… 40% fewer airframes.

Their maintenance is also impressively lean - 60 technicians at squadron level to support 8 helos flying 200+ hours a year. And only 13 people for second line support (600 hour checks). No idea why New Zealand seems to have mastered the NH90 (coming from the UH-1 no less… a very old bird).
 
"New generation electro-optical system"?!

This one was canceled by French Mod, as deemed too expensive for the perfs. Pilots will rely on an improvised system similar to NVG...

Another picture of the beast in German hands. Looks impressive until you pay attention to details:

LHorgan_NH90_083.jpg



Source:
VerticalMag
 
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Propaganda.

It is also amazing to see how the author of this piece, all within his own fixation to draw a certain shiny picture of Airbus, missed the opportunity to understand that if a line of code can be replaced by a procedure, it's probably because its value is rather low and it should not come as an expensive upgrade. Especially when it could have been part of the design from day one and is the probable result of a lack of throughout testing...

Last but not least, something as important as indulging a potential catastrophic failure should not be hidden behind a line of code but should be brought at the attention of the user/pilots unequivocally. A red light, with a two actions bypass button, to prevent as much as possible any hot start would have been more useful than a back-end piece of software restriction that does not speak to pilots and mission planners.
 
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Norwegian NH90 got their last and final upgrade:

 
And it gets worse....Norway is after a $490m refund...

And.....Sweden's inquiry into NH-90 has found that per hour flight costs were 20,000 EUR per hour, compared to c3,500 EUR for Blackhawk....looks like the ASW ones might be gone in 2024 (edit: decision then, with withdrawal by 2030 dependent on new platform availability) as well...

View: https://twitter.com/DefenceGeek/status/1655174723775373312


View: https://twitter.com/Julien_Maire/status/1653775205406310400
 
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NH90 story is confusing… other small users like the RNZAF are flying the pants off their NH90s and seem very happy.


For the record the RNZAF fleet flies 3x more hours than the Norwegians, with only 8 helicopters vs. 14 (!)… 40% fewer airframes.

Their maintenance is also impressively lean - 60 technicians at squadron level to support 8 helos flying 200+ hours a year. And only 13 people for second line support (600 hour checks). No idea why New Zealand seems to have mastered the NH90 (coming from the UH-1 no less… a very old bird).

That has me intrigued as well. This article sheds more light on the RNZAF fleet. It's a bit shocking that so many large air forces with experienced logistics and maintenance departments are all struggling with this bird but the Kiwis have seemingly tamed it. But then again even if they were unhappy they probably couldn't afford to ditch the fleet and buy replacements like other countries are doing.

 
How many flight-hours per month are the Kiwis flying them?

Usage rate can make a huge difference in availability.
 
How many flight-hours per month are the Kiwis flying them?

More than than manufacturer's design level.

The Kiwis appear to be spending massively on spare parts which is keeping the fleet airworthy. It would be interesting to see whether the removed components are being refurbished and re-used or just discarded.
 
Interestingly....the Royal New Zealand Navy is due to put an RFP out to seek proposals to replace their Kamen Supersprites, which were purchased secondhand from Australia, in 2028...

Given the Kiwi's seemingly incredible ability to make NH-90 work will they be in the market for secondhand Australian, Belgian, Norwegian or Swedish NH-90?

EDIT: NH90 not a possibility. It won't fit in an ANZAC Class hangar and weighs too much for the OPV flight decks. Wildcat appears to be the frontrunner at present...
 
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Australians like the Germans have repeatedly proven inept at maintaining complex military equipment. With Norway however its principally parts shortage. That reoccurring parts issue seems to stem from the manufacturer ordering a large amount of parts upfront then acting as a central supplier rather than ongoing steady rate manufacture and ensuring each customer maintained their own local stocks. Essentially in retrospect they made the wrong commercial decision in going for low initial unit cost by buying in bulk but the result has been a larger ongoing support cost.

I dont think the near bankruptcy of AgustaWestland (who were the mission systems lead) in the early 2000's and Finmeccanica moving production from the UK to Italy along with mass layoffs helped much either.
 
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WZ: your para 2 relates to EH101/Merlin, not NH90.

EH101/Merlin was a Westland product and in 2000 Agusta and Westland merged to form AgustaWestland.

NH Industries was a consortium of European aviation companies founded in 1992 to jointly work on the NATO helicopter requirement, AgustaWestland had a 32% share and on the NH90 was responsible for the rear fuselage, main gearbox, hydraulic system, automatic flight control and plant management systems, power plant and the NFH mission system. After being bought by Finemeccanica in 2004 the companies production for the NH90 in Weston Super Mare was shifted to Cascina Costa in Italy which had previously been producing gearboxes with 950 redudancies.
 
Recent business politics of Euro-helis is confusing: Westland tried to ride 3 horses in the same 9ton race, Agusta 2.

Westland Helis Ltd were in (to be) NH90 Definition Study, 9/85-12/86. So were Agusta, WHL's 6/80 JV partners in EHI Ltd (to be Merlin).
Agusta had a Chinook licence, was a parastatal controlled by IRI, later Finmeccanica: all rebranded 1/1/17 as Leonardo S.p.A..

Full Devt. contract for RN EH101 was 7/3/84. In 1985 WHL lost £100Mn* and caused the Westland Affair, which took the jobs of 2 Cabinet Ministers and shook PM. WHL was saved 4/86 by (UTC+FIAT) Sikorsky taking 29.9%, licensing WS-70L hoping for UK and BAC/Saudi (to lapse).

UK, so WHL, left NH90 9/4/87. A JV, NHI SAS, was formed to hold (NATO)NAHEMA's 9/92 R&D contract: Agusta had 32%.

GKN plc 10/88 bought 22.02% of WHL (inc. FIAT's shares, UTC reduced to 18.7%), rebranding as GKN Westland Ltd; 100%, 18/4/94.

GKN Westland lost Prime Contractorship, 44xMerlin HM.1 2/9/91 to IBM Federal Systems/Southsea**, Hants (to be LORAL, to be Lockheed).
Agusta had 50% of that structure and 10/3/95 of 22xRAF HC.3 (and was System Prime on It.N. SH/EH/UH-101A).

Agusta 18/3/99 bought 50% of GKN Westland Ltd (!? did they hope for Chinooks; 100% 28/7/04), rebranding as AgustaWestland Ltd.

NAHEMA 6/00 contracted 298, soon 366xNH90: 32% Agusta workshare...in Italy: I am unaware of any work assigned to their UK sites.

Last UK Merlins flew 30/9/2002 (HC.3), 7/10/02 (HM.1), so AgustaWestland shut Weston, 5/02, re-assigning future Merlin work.

(*amended 26/5/23: that was in Alan Bristow's autobiog: it was actually £95.3Mn.
** Cosham).
 
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An interesting side note about the Norwegian NH90, is that the Navy didn't want them, but the air-force wanted them, the Navy wanted the UH60. The main argument the air-force had, was that the helicopter must be able to float, and they didn't belive the UH60 could, even when they was being told that they will be equipped with floating pontoons, just like NH90 have them internal.

Navy knew what they was getting... the air-force however... (I am not going to use those words in here!)
 
A bit of an odd MRH90 (NH90) story here:



a756e750c3a7c7adde9d6f0eff854dc2
 
Well, now we know why it is called 90.

The Orroral Valley fire burned for five weeks, destroying 90,000 hectares of the Namadji National Park near Canberra
 
Another reason NZ may be experiencing better rates is due to their small fleet and a better stocked parts count. Supposition on my part.
 
So there is no reason for NZ to get rid of their NH-90s right now yasotay. Unlike certain other countries that have got rid of theirs.
 
An interesting side note about the Norwegian NH90, is that the Navy didn't want them, but the air-force wanted them, the Navy wanted the UH60. The main argument the air-force had, was that the helicopter must be able to float, and they didn't belive the UH60 could, even when they was being told that they will be equipped with floating pontoons, just like NH90 have them internal.

It's probably a reasonable concern. The flotation bags on the SH-60 models block the cockpit doors and windows, and so haven't been fitted on the MH-60R/S. So essentially a new system would have had to be developed and tested.
 

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