M1 Abrams MBT Replacement

[Volkodav]

It seems to be the opinion of some here that because tanks have been used in urban warfare before, they must be the best tool for the role. They very callously suggest that if a tank is killed while undertaking this role it is of no consequence. Are the lives of our troops so cheaply held without reguard that the lesson of the tank NOT being the best vehicle for infantry support in an urban environment is lost? It does not surprise me. Military lives are always cheap for armchair warriors.

You are missing the point that tanks save the lives of the troops they support in urban operations. While the tanks rely on dismounted infantry to protect them from ATGW teams etc. as well as to increase their situational awareness they also protect the dismounts from suppressing fire etc. and can easily take care of improvised, even prepared strong points, ambushes etc. Barricades made of overturned cars, burning tyres will slow or stop unsupported infantry, or even light armoured vehicles, but not tanks. The key as others have suggested (some of whom I know are ex army) is combined arms, this is why the TUSK includes an infantry telephone to assist in the supported infantry coordinating with the tanks. Also, as well as encouraging the other guys to keep their heads down, tanks draw fire and everything fired at them is not being fired at the accompanying infantry.

 

[Foo Fighter]

I am not suggesting a removal of the tank and not replacing it from a role it is poorly suited and RPG are the least of concerns. Combined arms of Infantry and helicopters with artillery and close support weapons is a better fit.

 

[Volkodav]

I am not suggesting a removal of the tank and not replacing it from a role it is poorly suited and RPG are the least of concerns. Combined arms of Infantry and helicopters with artillery and close support weapons is a better fit.

Battle of Mogadishu ring any bells? These were elite troops up against lightly armed militia and look what happened, if you use infantry, even special forces without appropriate support, including armour, you will suffer heavy casualties. If the situation is such it is too dangerous to send in tanks, what the hell are you doing sending in much softer forces such as infantry and aviation? Artillery is great, but what about when you don't want to level an entire city block? Indiscriminate fire resulting in heavy civilian casualties is an unacceptable outcome for most (all) western democracies, tank provide protected direct fire in an urban environment.

 

[bobbymike]

I am not suggesting a removal of the tank and not replacing it from a role it is poorly suited and RPG are the least of concerns. Combined arms of Infantry and helicopters with artillery and close support weapons is a better fit.

Battle of Mogadishu ring any bells? These were elite troops up against lightly armed militia and look what happened, if you use infantry, even special forces without appropriate support, including armour, you will suffer heavy casualties. If the situation is such it is too dangerous to send in tanks, what the hell are you doing sending in much softer forces such as infantry and aviation? Artillery is great, but what about when you don't want to level an entire city block? Indiscriminate fire resulting in heavy civilian casualties is an unacceptable outcome for most (all) western democracies, tank provide protected direct fire in an urban environment.

Mogadishu is an interesting case as the Rangers/Delta were rescued by armored forces (mostly APCs is my understanding been years since I read the book). As for artillery I wonder what a Spectre placing 105mm artillery rounds very accurately would have accomplished?

 

[Foo Fighter]

What gunship presence was there on the Mogadishu missions? Did they have armed gunships as cover?

 

[TomS]

They didn't have AC-130s available until after the Battle of Mogadishu.

 

[Foo Fighter]

For all missions? Not sure they had that many.

 

[TomS]

For all missions? Not sure they had that many.

Some AC-130s had been deployed (to good effect) in June after an attack on Pakistani forces but only stayed for a month or so. There were none in theater in October.

 

[Volkodav]

General Garrison actually requested armour and Spectors to support the operation but these were denied by government.

 

[Moose]

General Garrison actually requested armour and Spectors to support the operation but these were denied by government.

Specifically, by SECDEF Les Aspin

 

[Foo Fighter]

I suspect this denial was due to the service persons life being less of a loss than the htisstorm that comes from collateral damage among the indigenous population. Until this changes there is little point becoming involved in these situations.

 

[Moose]

It's complex and situational. Secretary Aspin's defense of his actions was that the request wasn't made in the terms of supporting the snatch-and-grab operation, but as part of the humanitarian mission to feed the Somalis. He decided that the overwhelming firepower wasn't needed for and might hinder that mission. It was and remains a poor decision, but illustrates that there are more complexities in the real world than "the troops will always have X to rely on or they shouldn't be there."

 

[Foo Fighter]

It should be a part of the test as to whether troops should be placed on the ground. Warlords as they were known, were a known threat and even if the predominant thought was that these warlords would not intercede, the support SHOULD have been in place for ANY deployment.

 

[Rickshaw]

Interesting that no one has brought up the point that the US policy of picking a warlord and making him their strong man on the ground by attempting to snatch Mohamed Farrah Aidid was a mistake on the part of the policy makers and the military that attempted to pull it off. The US forces had carried out one massacre, before the Black Hawk Down incident where many anti-Aidid people were killed. That put Aidid in a position to control his clan more effectively and to attack the UN forces.

 

[bobbymike]

Interesting that no one has brought up the point that the US policy of picking a warlord and making him their strong man on the ground by attempting to snatch Mohamed Farrah Aidid was a mistake on the part of the policy makers and the military that attempted to pull it off. The US forces had carried out one massacre, before the Black Hawk Down incident where many anti-Aidid people were killed. That put Aidid in a position to control his clan more effectively and to attack the UN forces.

I don't think anyone attempted to broach the 'politics' on the ground or DC decision making at all (other than why there were no M-1s maybe). The threads natural progression from Tanks FIBUA to what happened in Somalia and why certain weapon systems were not present, simple as that.

 

[Foo Fighter]

Somalia came up because of the discussion as to the fitness of tanks in an urban environment and the preference of some, myself included, for the deployment of purpose designed infantry support vehicles in their stead. Nothing to do with hijacking the thread and moving into politics.

 

[kaiserd]

Somalia came up because of the discussion as to the fitness of tanks in an urban environment and the preference of some, myself included, for the deployment of purpose designed infantry support vehicles in their stead. Nothing to do with hijacking the thread and moving into politics.

A few quick points;
- It is unrealistic to think that armour (tanks or a lighter more transportable alternative vechicles as suggested above) can or will be available/ present in every situation where it may be in retrospect desirable to have them.
- The whole Black-Hawk-down incident owes rather more to mission-creep and over-confidence by civilian & military decision makers rather than to lack of armoured vihicles (which is more of a symptom of these issues). Very easy to blame politicians but the military senior brass equally responsible for this type of scenario.

 

[Foo Fighter]

The Somalia problem was a lack of gunship and spectre support, those troops went in with nothing but their personal and squad weapons. A complete lack of proper planning.

 

[Kat Tsun]

Somalia came up because of the discussion as to the fitness of tanks in an urban environment and the preference of some, myself included, for the deployment of purpose designed infantry support vehicles in their stead. Nothing to do with hijacking the thread and moving into politics.

Tanks aren't an anachronism or anything, though. They're a fairly specific and unique blend of the characteristics of mobility, firepower, and protection that have a pretty clear niche, even 100 years after the fact. I'm not sure how you could make a purpose designed infantry support vehicle that is protected enough, mobile enough, and deadly enough that it doesn't simply turn into a tank.

Tanks are already purpose designed infantry support vehicles. Their whole role in all their existence has been to get the infantryman across no man's land and into the other guy's trench.

 

[Foo Fighter]

I am not talking about developing a vehicle fit to engage tanks in a combat situation, an infantry support vehicle does NOT need to do that. You can develop a much cheaper vehicle from an IFV that can better support infantry IN AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT or anywhere else at a much lower price. ERA and BAR armour is readily available if an upgrade is needed. Added to this is a better fit for the job.

 

[Kat Tsun]

If we assume that infantry are fighting combined arms, then engaging tanks is not only going to happen, but it's an absolute necessity for a hypothetical infantry support vehicle. The US Army has recognized this by arming its infantry fighting vehicles with the TOW missile and infantry squads with the Javelin missile, but it's also been recognized that missiles are generally inferior to high velocity guns for killing armored vehicles of any type. They are slow, vulnerable to interception or disruption/jamming, and most of them require continuous line-of-sight and guidance. Russian T-90s have been menacing the Ukrainian Army because of the vulnerability of the Ukrainians' missiles to jamming and the rocket teams to counter-fires in close combat, and the inability of T-64's ammunition to kill the T-90; the Merkava IVs deployment of the Trophy APS in 2014 successfully defeated Hamas's well-honed urban anti-tank tactics, etc.

The thing to notice from the Israelis is that a vehicle adequately protected against attack for an urban environment will weigh at least as much as modern tanks, and more if you give it troop carrying capability. BAE's Ground Combat Vehicle was designed for urban combat, and included RPG protection all around and an active protection system, and weighed close to 90 tons. It was neither cheap nor better than a tank, but it was better than the US Army's current IFV in a few small areas which were dramatically offset by its huge size. A few things that were learned in GCV was "protection isn't cheap" and "IFVs can't be armored like tanks and maintain the same load class".

You'll need the big gun of the tank to destroy Pavlov's House and opposing tanks, like T-90s and T-64s in Debaltseve. You'll also need the big armor of the tank to stop hollow charges, EFPs, and the standoff mine threat. This has been demonstrated in the various conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East of the past few years.

Explosive and bar armor is not as effective as passive armor, and bar armor is probably less effective against specific threats because it's tailored to specific warhead designs. Chain/ball armour can somewhat mitigate that but is less effective and both are lacking compared to active protection systems. It will also not always be available, which is sometimes the case for an air-deployed armored force whose width requirements preclude installing applique armours. Applique is a good idea in theory, but in practice it becomes passive armor and rarely/never do you see vehicles operating without it, so building that armor into the vehicle from the start is the better proposition.

The only advantage that an IFV offers over a tank is a higher angle of fire and an automatic cannon. Though what you seem to be arguing for is more like tank support vehicles: tank-like vehicles with IFV armaments. Things like BMPT simply take that high angle, automatic armament and puts it onto a tank chassis, to protect tanks from dismounted ATGW and RPG. It's not a replacement for the tank in urban combat, but a supplement to the tank in all terrains.

To that I would say there is definite merit in the idea. The Western World seems to be coalescing around the idea of a heavily armored IFV rather than a tank support vehicle, but it effectively looks to accomplish the same task. The Russians may do this in the future with T-14/T-15.

 

[Foo Fighter]

I am not talking about removing the tank from the battlefield, I am talking about a vehicle with similar weight and protection to a decent IFV with a howitzer type weapon suitable to give localised fire support to the infantry in all terrain. Something similar in role to the early STUG used by the Wermacht although they use a tank platform as there were no suitable infantry carrying platforms at the time fit for the role.

 

[bobbymike]

https://special-ops.org/news/tech/us-military-develop-new-tank-replace-abrams-2030s/

 

[yasotay]

Intersting that no one has brought up Israeli experiance in urban armor operations. If I am not mistaken they have transitioned to evern heavier vehicles for urban operations.

 

[marauder2048]

Intersting that no one has brought up Israeli experiance in urban armor operations. If I am not mistaken they have transitioned to evern heavier vehicles for urban operations.

Hard to draw up general conclusions: the latest Israeli AFV, inspired by their experience in urban combat, is an 8x8 APC.

 

[Kat Tsun]

Intersting that no one has brought up Israeli experiance in urban armor operations. If I am not mistaken they have transitioned to evern heavier vehicles for urban operations.

Hard to draw up general conclusions: the latest Israeli AFV, inspired by their experience in urban combat, is an 8x8 APC.

IIRC, Eitan is simply a replacement for M113 utility carriers and ambulances in certain units. It's not really clear if Israel will ever develop a Merkava Mk 5 because, unfortunately, Israel seems to be afflicted by the same mentality that had infected the US Army in the 1990s: http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/29665

OTOH... http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/land/vehicles/2015/10/25/israel-builds-first-prototype-future-fighting-vehicle/74346650/

Sources say Carmel — a Hebrew acronym for Advanced Ground Combat Vehicle — will not be a Merkava Mk5, nor will it replace the Mk4, which is expected to remain in production through 2020.

 

[marauder2048]

So one 35 ton 8x8 (Eitan) and one 32 ton tracked vehicle demonstrator (Carmel).

At the very least, a trend towards lighter vehicles driven as much by design-for-manfacturability/cost as anything else.

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2017/5/25/next-generation-combat-vehicle-could-replace-aging-bradleys

 

[bobbymike]

http://breakingdefense.com/2017/07/railguns-robotics-ultra-light-armor-general-milleys-future-tank/

 

[DrRansom]

http://breakingdefense.com/2017/07/railguns-robotics-ultra-light-armor-general-milleys-future-tank/

This whole article reeks of the sloppy, undisciplined, thinking which gave the US Army the FCS catastrophe. The Army faces massive equipment shortfalls in air defense, artillery, survivable reconnaissance, and electronic warfare. The budget has no room for massive basic research projects, when immediate problems are so big and so overwhelming.

Promising some breakthrough tank in the future, when US tanks today lack modern electronic warfare and active protection systems, is sheer folly. Worse, if the Russians go with 152mm cannons in a near-term Armata variant, the US Army will be outgunned now and won't have the luxury of waiting for railguns and their power storage to become available.

Granted, one could say that Russian ATGMs already put the TOW to shame, but those aren't sexy enough for the US Army to invest in.

 

[jsport]

http://breakingdefense.com/2017/07/railguns-robotics-ultra-light-armor-general-milleys-future-tank/

This whole article reeks of the sloppy, undisciplined, thinking which gave the US Army the FCS catastrophe. The Army faces massive equipment shortfalls in air defense, artillery, survivable reconnaissance, and electronic warfare. The budget has no room for massive basic research projects, when immediate problems are so big and so overwhelming.

Promising some breakthrough tank in the future, when US tanks today lack modern electronic warfare and active protection systems, is sheer folly. Worse, if the Russians go with 152mm cannons in a near-term Armata variant, the US Army will be outgunned now and won't have the luxury of waiting for railguns and their power storage to become available.

Granted, one could say that Russian ATGMs already put the TOW to shame, but those aren't sexy enough for the US Army to invest in.

Minus the rail gun, would absolutely agree.

 

[sferrin]

http://breakingdefense.com/2017/07/railguns-robotics-ultra-light-armor-general-milleys-future-tank/

This whole article reeks of the sloppy, undisciplined, thinking which gave the US Army the FCS catastrophe. The Army faces massive equipment shortfalls in air defense, artillery, survivable reconnaissance, and electronic warfare. The budget has no room for massive basic research projects, when immediate problems are so big and so overwhelming.

Promising some breakthrough tank in the future, when US tanks today lack modern electronic warfare and active protection systems, is sheer folly. Worse, if the Russians go with 152mm cannons in a near-term Armata variant, the US Army will be outgunned now and won't have the luxury of waiting for railguns and their power storage to become available.

Granted, one could say that Russian ATGMs already put the TOW to shame, but those aren't sexy enough for the US Army to invest in.

Dead nuts on, and very well said.

 

[bobbymike]

http://breakingdefense.com/2017/07/railguns-robotics-ultra-light-armor-general-milleys-future-tank/

This whole article reeks of the sloppy, undisciplined, thinking which gave the US Army the FCS catastrophe. The Army faces massive equipment shortfalls in air defense, artillery, survivable reconnaissance, and electronic warfare. The budget has no room for massive basic research projects, when immediate problems are so big and so overwhelming.

Promising some breakthrough tank in the future, when US tanks today lack modern electronic warfare and active protection systems, is sheer folly. Worse, if the Russians go with 152mm cannons in a near-term Armata variant, the US Army will be outgunned now and won't have the luxury of waiting for railguns and their power storage to become available.

Granted, one could say that Russian ATGMs already put the TOW to shame, but those aren't sexy enough for the US Army to invest in.

Dead nuts on, and very well said.

Another, "Will we survive the 30 year procurement holiday from 1988 to today"

We should have:
1) 450+ F-22s
2) 132 B-2s
3) More Seawolfs
4) M-1 replacement
5) Bradley replacement
6) 200 Peacekeepers
7) 300+ Midgetmen
8) W92 to W?? replacement nuke warheads
9) Many ACMs
10) CPGS missile

Feel free to add to the list

 

[DrRansom]

Minus the rail gun, would absolutely agree.

I do think that the railgun does have some great Army applications, as a 'towed' artillery piece. Getting a railgun into a tank is a ton of work and a ton of money, which the Army doesn't have.

As an Air Defense Artillery / Divisional Artillery piece, a railgun would offer great flexibility to a maneuver force. It gives the Army relatively low-cost per shot long range artillery, replacing and more than compensating for lost capability when the 8inch guns were retired. Or, the gun can be put into defending command and logistical nodes.

But as a tank gun? It is too much effort for a tank. A couple of trucks per gun is a vastly easier task and gets something now, a policy the Army is chronically incapable of doing.

This gets to a more fundamental problem the US military faces, there are trades between technological sophistication and numbers of units. We no longer have the luxury of pursuing the best technology in everything...

 

[jsport]

Minus the rail gun, would absolutely agree.

I do think that the railgun does have some great Army applications, as a 'towed' artillery piece. Getting a railgun into a tank is a ton of work and a ton of money, which the Army doesn't have.

As an Air Defense Artillery / Divisional Artillery piece, a railgun would offer great flexibility to a maneuver force. It gives the Army relatively low-cost per shot long range artillery, replacing and more than compensating for lost capability when the 8inch guns were retired. Or, the gun can be put into defending command and logistical nodes.

But as a tank gun? It is too much effort for a tank. A couple of trucks per gun is a vastly easier task and gets something now, a policy the Army is chronically incapable of doing.

This gets to a more fundamental problem the US military faces, there are trades between technological sophistication and numbers of units. We no longer have the luxury of pursuing the best technology in everything...

AD railguns maybe, not indirect fire..need payload and range no need for speed.
Facing large armies w/ small sophisticated units is an extremely hard problem as escalation against Centers of Gravity to stop the large might get nuknasty early. Maybe Gen Milley was correct when he went against conventional wisdom and said conflicts might be long rather quite sort.

 

[Void]

http://breakingdefense.com/2017/07/railguns-robotics-ultra-light-armor-general-milleys-future-tank/

This whole article reeks of the sloppy, undisciplined, thinking which gave the US Army the FCS catastrophe. The Army faces massive equipment shortfalls in air defense, artillery, survivable reconnaissance, and electronic warfare. The budget has no room for massive basic research projects, when immediate problems are so big and so overwhelming.

Promising some breakthrough tank in the future, when US tanks today lack modern electronic warfare and active protection systems, is sheer folly. Worse, if the Russians go with 152mm cannons in a near-term Armata variant, the US Army will be outgunned now and won't have the luxury of waiting for railguns and their power storage to become available.

Granted, one could say that Russian ATGMs already put the TOW to shame, but those aren't sexy enough for the US Army to invest in.

Right now, with almost no R&D, the US could:

• Upgun the Abrams to the L55
• Replace the hydraulic turret and elevation drives
• Re-engine the Abrams with a new turbine or diesel
• Install Trophy or Iron Fist

And they would immediately get a tank with more firepower (greater muzzle energy from the L55 gun and better precision from the electric az/el drives), more survivable (active protection and the removal of hydraulics), more mobile (reduced fuel consumption) and cheaper to maintain (fuel!). And all of these things have already been explored by the Army in the past. But in defiance of all reason, they are still trying to revive the FCS.

 

[jsport]

http://breakingdefense.com/2017/07/railguns-robotics-ultra-light-armor-general-milleys-future-tank/

This whole article reeks of the sloppy, undisciplined, thinking which gave the US Army the FCS catastrophe. The Army faces massive equipment shortfalls in air defense, artillery, survivable reconnaissance, and electronic warfare. The budget has no room for massive basic research projects, when immediate problems are so big and so overwhelming.

Promising some breakthrough tank in the future, when US tanks today lack modern electronic warfare and active protection systems, is sheer folly. Worse, if the Russians go with 152mm cannons in a near-term Armata variant, the US Army will be outgunned now and won't have the luxury of waiting for railguns and their power storage to become available.

Granted, one could say that Russian ATGMs already put the TOW to shame, but those aren't sexy enough for the US Army to invest in.

Right now, with almost no R&D, the US could:

• Upgun the Abrams to the L55
• Replace the hydraulic turret and elevation drives
• Re-engine the Abrams with a new turbine or diesel
• Install Trophy or Iron Fist

And they would immediately get a tank with more firepower (greater muzzle energy from the L55 gun and better precision from the electric az/el drives), more survivable (active protection and the removal of hydraulics), more mobile (reduced fuel consumption) and cheaper to maintain (fuel!). And all of these things have already been explored by the Army in the past. But in defiance of all reason, they are still trying to revive the FCS.

Also very well said. Except for Trophy etc.. Quickill, Metalstorm (believe there is an Israeli patent beside the original Australian, EM Armor developments known but not pursued yet.

 

[DrRansom]

Right now, with almost no R&D, the US could:

• Upgun the Abrams to the L55
• Replace the hydraulic turret and elevation drives
• Re-engine the Abrams with a new turbine or diesel
• Install Trophy or Iron Fist

And they would immediately get a tank with more firepower (greater muzzle energy from the L55 gun and better precision from the electric az/el drives), more survivable (active protection and the removal of hydraulics), more mobile (reduced fuel consumption) and cheaper to maintain (fuel!). And all of these things have already been explored by the Army in the past. But in defiance of all reason, they are still trying to revive the FCS.

To add injury to the insult, the Russians can't exactly afford a wave of Armatas right now. The Army could buy the tank fleet 10 more years of competitiveness with those upgrades, then look at a more advanced solution in the future.

There is a total lack of discipline on spending and R&D priorities. Ranged fires, mobile air defense, and EW ought to be the top R&D priority. But the Army still wants a high tech supertank..

For railguns, they will have fantastic range that tube artillery can't really match. Payload can be achieved by flechette warheads and choosing softer targets, like truck depots, air defense sites,etc. If it is a hard target at range, use some penetrating rocket artillery.

 

[sferrin]

If they felt the L55 with the latest US DU round wasn't enough they could even go with the 130mm the Germans are playing with.

"According to the company, the increase of 8 percent in caliber results in a plus of 50 percent moreof kinetic energy over the 120mm gun from Rheinmetall, installed in thousands of tanks worldwide."

http://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/eurosatory/2016/06/15/german-rheinmetall-works-on-new-130mm-tank-gun/

 

[TomS]

If they felt the L55 with the latest US DU round wasn't enough they could even go with the 130mm the Germans are playing with.

Not without a massive redesign. The 130mm round is significantly longer than the 120mm. No way it fits in the M1 turret bustle.

http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,26693.msg284076.html#msg284076