M1 Abrams MBT Replacement

[marauder2048]

No it isn't.

The latter is the opposite of the former. Using a tank platoon or a mixed infantry-tank platoon to advance down a street is concentrating force. Using a mortar as an ersatz tank risks losing concentration.

A tank can only be a tank.
An infantry carrier can only be a carrier.
A mortar can only be a mortar.

At least ideally.

This completely ignores the practical realities of using vehicles equipped with high velocity cannon in the urban environment.
The minimum separation for dismounts from the Abrams while firing is 55 yards. And yet you've consisently advocated for
higher velocity guns for future tanks. This does not contribute to concentrate of force.

And in order to compensate for the inability of tanks to employ high angle fireyou have to employ
two of them (assuming the buildings are short enough as they were in Fallujah but not in Grozny) , separated by a
not-inconsiderable distance, meaning they are not both on line, contributing to direct fire. This does not contribute
to concentration of force.

I don't see how using SPGs like NLOS-M in the direct fire role risks "losing concentration" given the high
rate-of-fire (16 spm), time-on-target fire and (especially) the ability the employ guided rounds that can fly
non-ballistic trajectories.The latter reduces the cost of fire control/gun/vehicle stabilization since the rounds are
more tolerant of gun laying errors. And of course, lower cannon velocities enable closer coordination with your
fireteam, quicker follow-up shots less signature etc.

But going back to first principles:

Historically, only a vehicle mounted, high velocity cannon in relatively close proximity to the target
could responsively delivery rounds with the accuracy and velocity to both penetrate structure and deliver
lethal effects to those behind/within.

That close proximity requirement necessitated a survivable, armored vehicle.
The narrow confines of the urban scene necessitated a vehicle with a turret.

In the post WWII-era, the MBT was that vehicle because munitions technology did not
permit any other vehicle or platform (artillery or air) to meet all of the above requirements.

I contend that munitions technology has advanced to the point that lower-velocity gun-fired PGMs
can enable up-armored (both passively and actively protected) SPGs to operate with the same or greater
effectiveness in the urban scene than the MBT. And it should be pointed out that most, if not all, planned
future MBT rounds will be "smart" rounds in some sense which negates some of the cost advantage the
MBT currently enjoys.

Note: This is not an argument for SPGs supplanting MBTs in any other role.

 

[Foo Fighter]

It is difficult for those who have not experienced it, to comprehend the effects of muzzle blast from a high velocity tank gun. Perhaps it could be possible to ask for permission to stand next to a tank when it fires, even a lower velocity practice round.

The tank in an urban environment is a wasted and overly expensive asset for the role.

 

[Kat Tsun]

No it isn't.

The latter is the opposite of the former. Using a tank platoon or a mixed infantry-tank platoon to advance down a street is concentrating force. Using a mortar as an ersatz tank risks losing concentration.

A tank can only be a tank.
An infantry carrier can only be a carrier.
A mortar can only be a mortar.

At least ideally.

This completely ignores the practical realities of using vehicles equipped with high velocity cannon in the urban environment.
The minimum separation for dismounts from the Abrams while firing is 55 yards. And yet you've consisently advocated for
higher velocity guns for future tanks. This does not contribute to concentrate of force.

And in order to compensate for the inability of tanks to employ high angle fireyou have to employ
two of them (assuming the buildings are short enough as they were in Fallujah but not in Grozny) , separated by a
not-inconsiderable distance, meaning they are not both on line, contributing to direct fire. This does not contribute
to concentration of force.

I don't see how using SPGs like NLOS-M in the direct fire role risks "losing concentration" given the high
rate-of-fire (16 spm), time-on-target fire and (especially) the ability the employ guided rounds that can fly
non-ballistic trajectories.The latter reduces the cost of fire control/gun/vehicle stabilization since the rounds are
more tolerant of gun laying errors. And of course, lower cannon velocities enable closer coordination with your
fireteam, quicker follow-up shots less signature etc.

But going back to first principles:

Historically, only a vehicle mounted, high velocity cannon in relatively close proximity to the target
could responsively delivery rounds with the accuracy and velocity to both penetrate structure and deliver
lethal effects to those behind/within.

That close proximity requirement necessitated a survivable, armored vehicle.
The narrow confines of the urban scene necessitated a vehicle with a turret.

In the post WWII-era, the MBT was that vehicle because munitions technology did not
permit any other vehicle or platform (artillery or air) to meet all of the above requirements.

I contend that munitions technology has advanced to the point that lower-velocity gun-fired PGMs
can enable up-armored (both passively and actively protected) SPGs to operate with the same or greater
effectiveness in the urban scene than the MBT. And it should be pointed out that most, if not all, planned
future MBT rounds will be "smart" rounds in some sense which negates some of the cost advantage the
MBT currently enjoys.

Note: This is not an argument for SPGs supplanting MBTs in any other role.

The tank is still that vehicle, because the very nature of direct fire means fewer rounds are expended per target than indirect fire. A combination of accurate ranging and high velocity means accuracy can be achieved out to far distances. Even a terminally guided mortar will not have the same level of Ph as a tank gun because you can't actually see your target, or because its shell travels slower when it is being used for direct fire. Tanks did PGMs before it became a buzzword, being able to hit things from several kilometers consistently and accurately.

Tanks weren't fighting in cities when they got turrets. In fact they were still fighting in the most open of battlefields: The Western Front. The turret grew as a need to hit things from beyond merely the frontal arc of the tank.

Anyway you're actually arguing for BMP-3, not NLOS-M.

There is some argument to be made there, the Russians agree that medium caliber HE throwing guns are useful for infantry vehicles. The late Richard Simpkin advocated for a 76-105mm cannon for infantry fighting vehicles for purposes of throwing high explosive ammunition. However, replacing tanks isn't one of them in either case, in any terrain. Nor has BMP-3 supplanted the Nona mortar carrier, despite being able to do its job in a pinch.

Most of your arguments apply equally well to tanks as they do mortar carriers pretending to be tanks because they're doing the same thing. Tanks are just better at it.

The major thing you seem to be ignoring is the virtual attrition of the mortar carrier when it is playing tank. If a mortar battery or platoon is conducting direct fire, it cannot contribute to the battalion's overall indirect fire capacity, because it is currently preoccupied pretending to be tanks. There are two ways to solve this:

1) Retain a separate assault gun battery or company in a battalion that can respond to the needs of the infantry for direct fire. There is literally no reason this would not be tanks except that, for some reason, you think that it shouldn't be.
2) Make the mortar batteries bigger.

It's somewhat the inverse of using tanks as self-propelled guns. Guns are indirect fire, so if the tanks are conducting fire missions for the battalion or brigade Fire Direction Center, they are otherwise not doing anything else and it doesn't risk losing concentration because these tanks aren't being taken from other, more valuable tasks (besides maintenance?), like indirect fire.

The only practical reality here is that your multiple purpose mortar-tank will be used as a means to replace both the mortar carrier and the tank, probably with half as many vehicles and twice as many jobs. That seems a fair trade given that it can perform both roles. This is exactly what happened with MMEV. There's no reason it wouldn't happen with any sort of hypothetical assault gun-mortar organization.

It is difficult for those who have not experienced it, to comprehend the effects of muzzle blast from a high velocity tank gun. Perhaps it could be possible to ask for permission to stand next to a tank when it fires, even a lower velocity practice round.

The tank in an urban environment is a wasted and overly expensive asset for the role.

If the infantry can manage an 84mm recoilless, they can manage being a few yards behind or beside a tank.

Flying debris kicked up by muzzle blast is more of a hazard than the overpressure anyway. A sabot petal will kill you further out too.

 

[Foo Fighter]

I have been exposed to the effects of this kind of fire while on a range. There is a rule to not go as far as the gun trunnions while firing the main armament. The effects are not just physical injury but the concussion that also occurs. Not being entirely compos mentis while engaging in any kind of combat operations is contra indicated. Not everyone in the vicinity of a tank in an urban environment can be guaranteed to be behind the trunnions. Going back to the original topic which is the development of the M1, should it be developed as a jack of all trades or should it major on those roles best suited to a tank?
I think there is a better way is all.

 

[dan_inbox]

Going back to the original topic which is the development of the M1, should it be developed as a jack of all trades or should it major on those roles best suited to a tank?

Or should it major in the roles which are most likely to be assigned to it by the politicians and brass, whether they are best suited to a tank or not?

This is not only a rhetoric question. Especially when it comes to urban terrain, where the politickers won't stomach the "efficient" way of conducting such fight.

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.nextbigfuture.com/2017/03/plans-for-new-us-super-tank-with.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+blogspot%2Fadvancednano+%28nextbigfuture%29&utm_content=FaceBook

 

[TomS]

http://www.nextbigfuture.com/2017/03/plans-for-new-us-super-tank-with.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+blogspot%2Fadvancednano+%28nextbigfuture%29&utm_content=FaceBook

The premise of this article, that the XM360 is an electro-thermal cannon, is probably untrue. It's often repeated online but the language is exactly the same everywhere, meaning it's all from one source.

 

[Foo Fighter]

The problem I see with an EM railgun type weapon on a tank is the signature. It would have an effective "shoot me" result where any bvr weapon could lock on and destroy the carrier. Not exactly what you want in a manouvre OR ambush scenario.

 

[TomS]

The problem I see with an EM railgun type weapon on a tank is the signature. It would have an effective "shoot me" result where any bvr weapon could lock on and destroy the carrier. Not exactly what you want in a manouvre OR ambush scenario.

First of all, ETC is not a railgun, it's really just a way to improve the efficiency of combustible propellant guns.

But what signature are you thinking of? It's not like there's some continuous electromagnetic signature that could be tracked. It has a big IR pulse when a railgun fires, but then so does a real tank gun.

The real problem for railguns in tanks is the bulk of the equipment. It takes a huge amount of pulsed power machinery to convert fuel burned in a conventional engine into very short, very intense pulses of electricity to power railguns. That works on a ship, and maybe for an artillery gun like General Atomics suggested. But it don't easily fit in a tank in the near future.

 

[Foo Fighter]

My understanding of the system is the short electro magnetic pulse assists in the initial propulsion phase but still has a relatively high magnetic signature. Sensors have been developed to detect these magnetic signatures for some time now and with the loitering capability of modern drones, artillery can relatively quickly, attack these targets of opportunity.

That being said, I understand I do NOT know everything. Otherwise I would not be living in a small one bedroom flat with 1 cat and far too many books for my shelves. I would have won the lottery or gained a significant placement in a fortune 500 or equivalent company. I would probably still have my very old VW though.

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/8144/u-s-army-m1-abrams-tanks-in-europe-are-getting-explosive-reactive-armor

 

[TomS]

My understanding of the system is the short electro magnetic pulse assists in the initial propulsion phase but still has a relatively high magnetic signature. Sensors have been developed to detect these magnetic signatures for some time now and with the loitering capability of modern drones, artillery can relatively quickly, attack these targets of opportunity.

ETC doesn't do an electromagnetic pulse in the same way as a railgun. It uses a burst of electricity to create a plasma that is injected into a mass of propellant, causing it to combust far more efficiently than a conventional initiator.

Beyond that, I'm not convinced that actual railguns produce usefully detectable magnetic signatures. It's not an issue that I've seen brought up in technical discussions of railguns.

 

[Foo Fighter]

Thanks Tom, clears that up.

 

[bobbymike]

http://breakingdefense.com/2017/03/tank-2022-demos-decisions-for-armys-next-generation-combat-vehicle/

 

[sferrin]

http://breakingdefense.com/2017/03/tank-2022-demos-decisions-for-armys-next-generation-combat-vehicle/

"A new armored vehicle by 2035. . ." Ye gods. Let's not hurry or anything.

 

[DrRansom]

http://breakingdefense.com/2017/03/tank-2022-demos-decisions-for-armys-next-generation-combat-vehicle/

"A new armored vehicle by 2035. . ." Ye gods. Let's not hurry or anything.

Until abt 1980, Russia had better tanks than the US. We are, in a sense, returning to the traditional order.

 

[Foo Fighter]

It will take until at least 2020 to work out what colour binders to use for their files and whether to staple, clip or go staple/clipless not to mention who's turn it is to buy the doughnuts.

 

[bobbymike]

http://breakingdefense.com/2017/03/is-small-beautiful-for-the-armys-next-generation-combat-vehicle/?utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=45985304&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--1OOT8DByNodRHJfb8SH_4lSAvckDvLqwxNGjyUDpWPf01EgJ-Qs5eGTJVXGEnncGqljZ6t1rNNzpKc4eOXoLKaIg4tA&_hsmi=45985304

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/general-us-no-longer-has-a-world-class-tank/article/2618158

 

[Abraham Gubler]

It is difficult for those who have not experienced it, to comprehend the effects of muzzle blast from a high velocity tank gun. Perhaps it could be possible to ask for permission to stand next to a tank when it fires, even a lower velocity practice round.

You know what's worse than muzzle blast effects? Being shot. Also the blast effects of a tank gun should not conflict with the position of friendly, dismounted infantry in close proximity. Who will tend to be behind and beside in line with the rear of the tank. Also in urban close combat most infantry will be inside the structures while the tanks are in the streets.

The tank in an urban environment is a wasted and overly expensive asset for the role.

The tank is ideally suited for urban combat if used correctly. As it remains the only combat system with protection against threat weapons, mobility to cross obstacles and highly lethal weaponry. As to its cost if and when it gets written off it still remains much cheaper than the cost of the lives of the soldiers that would have to die to achieve the mission and of course the cost of mission failure.

Combat experience and battle simulation has proven this time and time again.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Until abt 1980, Russia had better tanks than the US. We are, in a sense, returning to the traditional order.

LOL. Cue:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9B1M3IPVcXs

 

[bobbymike]

It is difficult for those who have not experienced it, to comprehend the effects of muzzle blast from a high velocity tank gun. Perhaps it could be possible to ask for permission to stand next to a tank when it fires, even a lower velocity practice round.

You know what's worse than muzzle blast effects? Being shot. Also the blast effects of a tank gun should not conflict with the position of friendly, dismounted infantry in close proximity. Who will tend to be behind and beside in line with the rear of the tank. Also in urban close combat most infantry will be inside the structures while the tanks are in the streets.

The tank in an urban environment is a wasted and overly expensive asset for the role.

The tank is ideally suited for urban combat if used correctly. As it remains the only combat system with protection against threat weapons, mobility to cross obstacles and highly lethal weaponry. As to its cost if and when it gets written off it still remains much cheaper than the cost of the lives of the soldiers that would have to die to achieve the mission and of course the cost of mission failure.

Combat experience and battle simulation has proven this time and time again.

https://www.facebook.com/RealClearDefense/videos/1304037839687169/

Look at the -3:25 mark two soldiers standing awfully close to a firing tank.

 

[sferrin]

And how many times do you see guys sticking their heads out of the turret while firing? (Tried to find one of a driver sticking his head out while firing, with no luck. I'm sure they're out there though. )

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBwBsaA8VdI

 

[Foo Fighter]

It is difficult for those who have not experienced it, to comprehend the effects of muzzle blast from a high velocity tank gun. Perhaps it could be possible to ask for permission to stand next to a tank when it fires, even a lower velocity practice round.

You know what's worse than muzzle blast effects? Being shot. Also the blast effects of a tank gun should not conflict with the position of friendly, dismounted infantry in close proximity. Who will tend to be behind and beside in line with the rear of the tank. Also in urban close combat most infantry will be inside the structures while the tanks are in the streets.

The tank in an urban environment is a wasted and overly expensive asset for the role.

The tank is ideally suited for urban combat if used correctly. As it remains the only combat system with protection against threat weapons, mobility to cross obstacles and highly lethal weaponry. As to its cost if and when it gets written off it still remains much cheaper than the cost of the lives of the soldiers that would have to die to achieve the mission and of course the cost of mission failure.

Combat experience and battle simulation has proven this time and time again.

What is your background for understanding this scenario? Do you have the required experience or are you just working from what you read?

Take a look at the tanks that have been lost in urban combat, there are enough youtube etc videos.

Tanks cannot be considered mobile when the streets are full of rubble, they just cannot work effectively and are useless unless you throw dismounted infantry ahead of them, this will lead to the situation in an urban environment.

 

[Void]

Take a look at the tanks that have been lost in urban combat, there are enough youtube etc videos.

That we see tanks destroyed in cities is further evidence that they are still seen as valuable enough in urban combat to send them there in the first place.

 

[Rickshaw]

Tanks provide more than sufficient firepower, with armoured protection to allow them to destroy most strong points with direct fire. However, they are effectively "blind" when closed down, when in urban environments, which allows the enemy to approach closely and attack them, unless they have sufficient infantry supporting them. Indeed, the idea of attacking urban sites with armoured forces alone is considered crazy by most tacticians. People seem to forget that today, most armies utilise "combined arms teams" - armour, infantry and other supporting arms to provide them with sufficient firepower and the means to overcome obstacles/strong points when they encounter them.

This was confirmed by the Israelis in 1982 when the invaded Lebanon. They tried to send M113s with infantry inside to support tanks in the cities they were attacking. The infantry were reluctant to leave their APCs and as a result everybody suffered casualties from RPGs and ATGWs. Nowadays, the Israelis kick their mounts out and make them walk when they reach the outer limits of the cities.

 

[marauder2048]

And how many times do you see guys sticking their heads out of the turret while firing? (Tried to find one of a driver sticking his head out while firing, with no luck. I'm sure they're out there though. )

It's a bad scene, man. Cue Kenny Loggins.

 

[sferrin]

Take a look at the tanks that have been lost in urban combat, there are enough youtube etc videos.

Planes still get shot down. Does that mean they're useless too?

 

[DrRansom]

Until abt 1980, Russia had better tanks than the US. We are, in a sense, returning to the traditional order.

LOL.

Patton versus T-72 or T-64? The latter models had better FCS, but were still out armored and out gunned by their Soviet contemporaries.

 

[sferrin]

Until abt 1980, Russia had better tanks than the US. We are, in a sense, returning to the traditional order.

LOL.

Patton versus T-72 or T-64? The latter models had better FCS, but were still out armored and out gunned by their Soviet contemporaries.

And how did the T-72 do against USMC M60s in Desert Storm?

 

[Rickshaw]

Until abt 1980, Russia had better tanks than the US. We are, in a sense, returning to the traditional order.

LOL.

Patton versus T-72 or T-64? The latter models had better FCS, but were still out armored and out gunned by their Soviet contemporaries.

And how did the T-72 do against USMC M60s in Desert Storm?

Iraqi T-72s were "monkey models" with plain steel armour and and plain steel penetrators for their guns. They had simplified FCS and crews who were barely trained. Now, how did the T-72M1 tested by the West Germans do against all that AT weaponry at the same time? Even the US Army was forced to admit that the German results of testing were correct in ascertaining that that version of the T-72 was immune to all NATO AT weapons (including US Army 120mm penetrators BTW) from the frontal quarter.

 

[DrRansom]

And how did the T-72 do against USMC M60s in Desert Storm?

About as badly as you'd expect an undertrained force operating after a month of constant air attack facing an army which had months to prepare.

 

[sferrin]

And how did the T-72 do against USMC M60s in Desert Storm?

About as badly as you'd expect an undertrained force operating after a month of constant air attack facing an army which had months to prepare.

So the Iraqis didn't have "months to prepare"? As I recall they not only had more time than Coalition forces to prepare but they were dug in to boot. And the Republican Guard was untrained?

 

[Moose]

The RG were some of the best-trained and most-experienced in the region prior to the war.

 

[dan_inbox]

The RG were some of the best-trained and most-experienced in the region prior to the war.

This is true, but it still does not mean much. The Iraqi army has one of the worst track records of the world.
They attacked Israel 3 times (48 67 73) and got trounced each time. They attacked on their own terms Iran when it was down with its revolution and still failed.
Their performance in ODS was dismal. And in 2003 they didn't defend even halfway-competently.
Not to mention that they kept running like rats in front of ragbag terrorists, to the point of losing half their country.

The Iraqi army always looked good to the casual observer because of their impressive inventories, but even for the standards of the armies of this region and culture, they've consistently underperformed.
Iraq's is really a failed military culture. Jordan's Arab legion is in a different class, for example.

 

[bobbymike]

The RG were some of the best-trained and most-experienced in the region prior to the war.

This is true, but it still does not mean much. The Iraqi army has one of the worst track records of the world.
They attacked Israel 3 times (48 67 73) and got trounced each time. They attacked on their own terms Iran when it was down with its revolution and still failed.
Their performance in ODS was dismal. And in 2003 they didn't defend even halfway-competently.
Not to mention that they kept running like rats in front of ragbag terrorists, to the point of losing half their country.

The Iraqi army always looked good to the casual observer because of their impressive inventories, but even for the standards of the armies of this region and culture, they've consistently underperformed.
Iraq's is really a failed military culture. Jordan's Arab legion is in a different class, for example.

I don't disagree that we 'found out' during ODS the RG weren't what they were cracked up to be but I'd really be interested in links to who was saying this BEFORE the conflict. IIRC most articles I read said the US should be prepared to lose 20k+ soldiers.

Not taking away from the superb performance of the US military and her allies whose speed of advance and low losses stunned almost everyone.

 

[Foo Fighter]

It seems to be the opinion of some here that because tanks have been used in urban warfare before, they must be the best tool for the role. They very callously suggest that if a tank is killed while undertaking this role it is of no consequence. Are the lives of our troops so cheaply held without reguard that the lesson of the tank NOT being the best vehicle for infantry support in an urban environment is lost? It does not surprise me. Military lives are always cheap for armchair warriors.

 

[Rickshaw]

It seems to be the opinion of some here that because tanks have been used in urban warfare before, they must be the best tool for the role. They very callously suggest that if a tank is killed while undertaking this role it is of no consequence. Are the lives of our troops so cheaply held without reguard that the lesson of the tank NOT being the best vehicle for infantry support in an urban environment is lost? It does not surprise me. Military lives are always cheap for armchair warriors.

Any AFV in an urban environment is vulnerable, tank or other. What is required is combined arms operations, with each element supporting and protecting the other. It won't matter if it's a tank, a SPG or an Assault Gun.

 

[sferrin]

It seems to be the opinion of some here that because tanks have been used in urban warfare before, they must be the best tool for the role. They very callously suggest that if a tank is killed while undertaking this role it is of no consequence. Are the lives of our troops so cheaply held without reguard that the lesson of the tank NOT being the best vehicle for infantry support in an urban environment is lost? It does not surprise me. Military lives are always cheap for armchair warriors.

What brings more firepower than a tank? Why would one assume the only thing a tank would be used for is urban warfare, therefore it's useless? Guarantee you, whatever is making your tank "useless" is gonna make scrap of your "solution" even easier.

 

[Void]

It seems to be the opinion of some here that because tanks have been used in urban warfare before, they must be the best tool for the role. They very callously suggest that if a tank is killed while undertaking this role it is of no consequence.

A tank being knocked out does not mean anyone inside, let alone everyone, died. Even on comparative deathtraps like the T-64 and T-72 total crew loss is an exceptional event. The idea there is some vast sacrifice of tank crews in close combat is baseless nonsense. Conventional tank/anti-tank combat has caused far more tank losses and deaths among tank crews than urban operations over the past thirty years. IEDs and RPGs are a manageable threat with existing armour technology and most losses which have occurred were ultimately caused by inadequate armour placement.

Even in the infamous Battle of Grozny the Russians lost 62 tanks, which probably resulted in 60 or 70 dead, while the Russians lost more than 1400 men killed in total during the same period. It was not the tank crews who were bleeding.