Lockheed Martin AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW)

[NMaude]

Following the safe separation maneuvers, the rocket motor did not ignite.

Ugh.

A rocket motor failing to ignite is not one of those "well, shoot, we're still new at this sort of thing" problems.

What are the odds someone is going to get yelled at for fucking up?

 

[bobbymike]

This comment may display my ignorance but shouldn’t firing the booster be pretty straightforward? Like I’ve seen quite a few historical videos on YouTube going back to the ‘50s. So my question is are there enhanced very complex safety systems to the point firing a simple solid rocket now is hard?

 

[Orionblamblam]

This comment may display my ignorance but shouldn’t firing the booster be pretty straightforward? Like I’ve seen quite a few historical videos on YouTube going back to the ‘50s. So my question is are there enhanced very complex safety systems to the point firing a simple solid rocket now is hard?

Back in the day, rocket ignition systems was my *job.* I designed the igniter that I understand is currently used on THAAD, for instance (I'm quite proud of the fact that I redesigned a heavy, expensive manufacturing nightmare into a single piece of plastic). Igniting a rocket motor has certain difficulties... but these are difficulties that you can look up in a friggen handbook. "Propellant A at temperature X with a throat area of Y and a bore volume of Z and a surface area of ᚠ requires such-and-such in terms of gas generation mass flow rate and thermal energy and whatnot from the ignition system." Design to that, throw in some margin and BAM, your rocket goes off, every time.

Maybe the electronics controlling the igniter went goofy. Maybe the battery died. Maybe someone didn't plug in the shock tubing or the EBW got enzapulated by a stray overvoltage from a static discharge or someone replaced the PETN in the TBI with peanut butter. All possible. And all the sort of thing that should have been detectable before the airplane left the ground.

And that handbook: downloadable from NTRS. originally published in 1971, the physics is as good today as it was then.
Solid rocket motor igniters. NASA space vehicle design criteria, chemical propulsion

 

[bring_it_on]

Following the safe separation maneuvers, the rocket motor did not ignite.

AGAIN?!

To the best of my knowledge there have been no failures during static test firings. This was the first time the rocket motor was being ignited in a flight test. A previous test did not get to that point (the weapon did not separate).

It would be strange if they didn't have a couple of BTV produced to begin testing so they should possess a second vehicle to troubleshoot and continue to test but needless to say that the odds of fielding the ARRW in FY-22 are pretty much NIL at this point. Perhaps mid-late 2023 could be a more realistic target.

 

[sferrin]

So, it just fell into the ocean like HyFly. Awesome. Even Homer Simpson kept the reactor going.

 

[sferrin]

This comment may display my ignorance but shouldn’t firing the booster be pretty straightforward? Like I’ve seen quite a few historical videos on YouTube going back to the ‘50s. So my question is are there enhanced very complex safety systems to the point firing a simple solid rocket now is hard?

Back in the day, rocket ignition systems was my *job.* I designed the igniter that I understand is currently used on THAAD, for instance (I'm quite proud of the fact that I redesigned a heavy, expensive manufacturing nightmare into a single piece of plastic). Igniting a rocket motor has certain difficulties... but these are difficulties that you can look up in a friggen handbook. "Propellant A at temperature X with a throat area of Y and a bore volume of Z and a surface area of ᚠ requires such-and-such in terms of gas generation mass flow rate and thermal energy and whatnot from the ignition system." Design to that, throw in some margin and BAM, your rocket goes off, every time.

Maybe the electronics controlling the igniter went goofy. Maybe the battery died. Maybe someone didn't plug in the shock tubing or the EBW got enzapulated by a stray overvoltage from a static discharge or someone replaced the PETN in the TBI with peanut butter. All possible. And all the sort of thing that should have been detectable before the airplane left the ground.

And that handbook: downloadable from NTRS. originally published in 1971, the physics is as good today as it was then.
Solid rocket motor igniters. NASA space vehicle design criteria, chemical propulsion

That's why they have check lists, red "remove before flight" flags, etc. First they can't get it to come off the plane. Then, when they do, it just freefalls to the earth. MANY heads need to roll here. This is just incompetence.

 

[DWG]

The missile cleanly separated from the aircraft and successfully demonstrated the full release sequence including GPS acquisition, umbilical disconnect and power transfer from the aircraft to the missile. The missile also demonstrated fin operation and de-confliction maneuvers which ensures a safe operation for the aircrew.

Following the safe separation maneuvers, the rocket motor did not ignite.

My guess would be that ignition is looking for a go signal from each of these activities, and didn't get one of them.

 

[bring_it_on]

If the $200+ MM charge announced by LM was related to ARRW/TBG then it is quite possible that there has been some major change on the program post the May review. The AF put up some seriously (by modern standards) challenging schedule requirements for ARRW especially in light of constant delays with the Tactical Boost Glide program which was supposed to have flown 18 months ago but, based on public information, has yet to begin flight testing of the glide vehicle.

Lockheed signed up to develop ARRW and begin flight testing in just about 24 months, conduct all the flight testing and field the weapon in about 18 months after that. The 18 month delay in TBG testing is nearly as much as the schedule marked for the entire ARRW flight test program. DARPA still plans on conducting 3 TBG flight tests so I assume ARRW can't get anywhere until those have occurred and have validated the glide body design and performance. If they magically fly two TBG flights by September (as was planned based on DARPA's FY-22 submission) then that will be quite remarkable given that there hasn't been a lot of public test activity. Even so, that leaves at least one glide body test for FY-22 and then whatever integration testing is needed for the ARRW AUR testing. There probably need to be 6-8 successful flight tests before the AF is anywhere near to declaring IOC on the AGM-183A, and if we assume a pace of 1 test a quarter and 75% success rate then the AF will be at it for a couple of years more. Still not too far out, but not the rosy picture that Will Roper sold the AF when they terminated the more mature HCSW.

 

[bobbymike]

Possible Hypersonic Test 'Balk' May Add To Poor USAF Record | Aviation Week Network

An exchange during a think-tank event in Washington on July 29 may offer an explanation for the absence of a promised U.S. Air Force hypersonic flight test in July.

aviationweek.com

 

[bobbymike]

So, it just fell into the ocean like HyFly. Awesome. Even Homer Simpson kept the reactor going.

Book plot, these test failures are really successful technology theft operations they actually dropped it right near a Chinese SSN for pick up!!!

 

[Josh_TN]

I don't understand how firing a solid rocket motor could be remotely challenging in this day and age. They aren't even testing the *glider* for fucks sake.

 

[sferrin]

If the $200+ MM charge announced by LM was related to ARRW/TBG then it is quite possible that there has been some major change on the program post the May review. The AF put up some seriously (by modern standards) challenging schedule requirements for ARRW especially in light of constant delays with the Tactical Boost Glide program which was supposed to have flown 18 months ago but, based on public information, has yet to begin flight testing of the glide vehicle.

Lockheed signed up to develop ARRW and begin flight testing in just about 24 months, conduct all the flight testing and field the weapon in about 18 months after that. The 18 month delay in TBG testing is nearly as much as the schedule marked for the entire ARRW flight test program. DARPA still plans on conducting 3 TBG flight tests so I assume ARRW can't get anywhere until those have occurred and have validated the glide body design and performance. If they magically fly two TBG flights by September (as was planned based on DARPA's FY-22 submission) then that will be quite remarkable given that there hasn't been a lot of public test activity. Even so, that leaves at least one glide body test for FY-22 and then whatever integration testing is needed for the ARRW AUR testing. There probably need to be 6-8 successful flight tests before the AF is anywhere near to declaring IOC on the AGM-183A, and if we assume a pace of 1 test a quarter and 75% success rate then the AF will be at it for a couple of years more. Still not too far out, but not the rosy picture that Will Roper sold the AF when they terminated the more mature HCSW.

I doubt it occurred to him they'd screw up something as basic as getting the booster to ignite.

 

[sferrin]

Maybe the electronics controlling the igniter went goofy. Maybe the battery died. Maybe someone didn't plug in the shock tubing or the EBW got enzapulated by a stray overvoltage from a static discharge or someone replaced the PETN in the TBI with peanut butter. All possible. And all the sort of thing that should have been detectable before the airplane left the ground.

Hell, amateur high-powered rocketry hobbyists have been known to double up the ignition system on upper stages to guarantee motor ignition. Considering the amount of money, effort, and resources behind this effort, and the importance to the security of the country, a failure like this is simply inexcusable.

 

[bring_it_on]

If the $200+ MM charge announced by LM was related to ARRW/TBG then it is quite possible that there has been some major change on the program post the May review. The AF put up some seriously (by modern standards) challenging schedule requirements for ARRW especially in light of constant delays with the Tactical Boost Glide program which was supposed to have flown 18 months ago but, based on public information, has yet to begin flight testing of the glide vehicle.

Lockheed signed up to develop ARRW and begin flight testing in just about 24 months, conduct all the flight testing and field the weapon in about 18 months after that. The 18 month delay in TBG testing is nearly as much as the schedule marked for the entire ARRW flight test program. DARPA still plans on conducting 3 TBG flight tests so I assume ARRW can't get anywhere until those have occurred and have validated the glide body design and performance. If they magically fly two TBG flights by September (as was planned based on DARPA's FY-22 submission) then that will be quite remarkable given that there hasn't been a lot of public test activity. Even so, that leaves at least one glide body test for FY-22 and then whatever integration testing is needed for the ARRW AUR testing. There probably need to be 6-8 successful flight tests before the AF is anywhere near to declaring IOC on the AGM-183A, and if we assume a pace of 1 test a quarter and 75% success rate then the AF will be at it for a couple of years more. Still not too far out, but not the rosy picture that Will Roper sold the AF when they terminated the more mature HCSW.

I doubt it occurred to him they'd screw up something as basic as getting the booster to ignite.

It's not just that but the fact that the TBG, which is the single most important thing on the weapon (and the most challenging) hasn't flown yet (based on public info) and was supposed to fly about 12 months after Lockheed was put on contract for the AGM-183A. If the idea was to have TBG mature the glide body and the ARRW to just use it and integrate it into an operational booster / weapon then TBG hasn't really delivered on that promise. If they truly have not tested the glide body then they are 18+ months behind schedule on that program. And to think that the entire ARRW test program was supposed to end within that much time as per the originally agreed upon schedule. Given all this it is remarkable that the USAF continues to insist (in budget documents and in front of Congress) that it will operationalize the ARRW by end of FY-22. For that to happen they not only need to catch up to nearly two years of delayed flight testing but also basically hit 100% on their test results. Despite the hype about the ramp up in hypersonic testing we haven't really seen the pace pick up so I doubt that we're even set up for that sort of pace from a testing, range infrastructure, and other organizational/logistical perspective..

 

[sferrin]

If the $200+ MM charge announced by LM was related to ARRW/TBG then it is quite possible that there has been some major change on the program post the May review. The AF put up some seriously (by modern standards) challenging schedule requirements for ARRW especially in light of constant delays with the Tactical Boost Glide program which was supposed to have flown 18 months ago but, based on public information, has yet to begin flight testing of the glide vehicle.

Lockheed signed up to develop ARRW and begin flight testing in just about 24 months, conduct all the flight testing and field the weapon in about 18 months after that. The 18 month delay in TBG testing is nearly as much as the schedule marked for the entire ARRW flight test program. DARPA still plans on conducting 3 TBG flight tests so I assume ARRW can't get anywhere until those have occurred and have validated the glide body design and performance. If they magically fly two TBG flights by September (as was planned based on DARPA's FY-22 submission) then that will be quite remarkable given that there hasn't been a lot of public test activity. Even so, that leaves at least one glide body test for FY-22 and then whatever integration testing is needed for the ARRW AUR testing. There probably need to be 6-8 successful flight tests before the AF is anywhere near to declaring IOC on the AGM-183A, and if we assume a pace of 1 test a quarter and 75% success rate then the AF will be at it for a couple of years more. Still not too far out, but not the rosy picture that Will Roper sold the AF when they terminated the more mature HCSW.

I doubt it occurred to him they'd screw up something as basic as getting the booster to ignite.

It's not just that but the fact that the TBG, which is the single most important thing on the weapon (and the most challenging) hasn't flown yet (based on public info) and was supposed to fly about 12 months after Lockheed was put on contract for the AGM-183A. If the idea was to have TBG mature the glide body and the ARRW to just use it and integrate it into an operational booster / weapon then TBG hasn't really delivered on that promise. If they truly have not tested the glide body then they are 18+ behind schedule on that program. And to think that the entire ARRW test program was supposed to end within that much time as per the originally agreed upon schedule.

And they just threw one of them in the ocean.

 

[sferrin]

The Air Force conducted its second AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon booster flight test July 28.

While it did not meet all flight objectives, the test demonstrated several first-time events as the program continues to track toward fielding a hypersonic capability in the early 2020s.

Objectives for the test included demonstrating the safe release of the booster test vehicle from the B 52H and assessing booster performance. An Edwards AFB B-52 released the ARRW test missile, dubbed Booster Test Vehicle 1b or BTV-1b, over Point Mugu Sea Range.

The missile cleanly separated from the aircraft and successfully demonstrated the full release sequence including GPS acquisition, umbilical disconnect and power transfer from the aircraft to the missile. The missile also demonstrated fin operation and de-confliction maneuvers which ensures a safe operation for the aircrew.

Air Force conducts latest hypersonic flight test

Test demonstrated several first-time events for the program.

www.eglin.af.mil

Talk about putting lipstick on a pig. "At least we got it off the airplane this time."

 

[Josh_TN]

As a comparison, look at how quickly they managed to test the PrSM. Fired the motor and guided it to a target right off the bat, with two more successful tests within months. Meanwhile this rocket has failed to even ignite twice in a row. Someone on that testing team needs to be fired/demoted.

 

[bring_it_on]

I still think that is the least of their worries. Given what's new here is the BGV, the Warhead, and the Booster. Of these, the warhead was successfully tested recently. I assume the booster has done multiple static test firings so I don't see it being a major source of problems resulting in massive delays. But the BGV appears to be the most behind and DARPA seems to be totally silent on the state of that (or the HAWC for that matter even though we know it is 0/2 in flight testing so far). The program is a dead end if the glider doesn't work which is/was the biggest risk in terms of the AF went into a weapons program without actually flying the glider hardware first to validate viability and performance (they are doing the same with the scramjet cruise missile BTW).

Glad they left a weapons data-link and other technologies out of the A variant (Navy is working to add a WDL to the TBG glider) otherwise that would have added additional risk and delays. But the critical portion, as far as I'm concerned, is going to be TBG proving that the glide body performs as required. Without that, all you have is just an expensive short-medium range ballistic missile.

 

[sferrin]

I still think that is the least of their worries. Given what's new here is the BGV, the Warhead, and the Booster. Of these, the warhead was successfully tested recently. I assume the booster has done multiple static test firings so I don't see it being a major source of problems resulting in massive delays. But the BGV appears to be the most behind and DARPA seems to be totally silent on the state of that (or the HAWC for that matter even though we know it is 0/2 in flight testing so far). The program is a dead end if the glider doesn't work which is/was the biggest risk in terms of the AF went into a weapons program without actually flying the glider hardware first to validate viability and performance (they are doing the same with the scramjet cruise missile BTW).

Glad they left a weapons data-link and other technologies out of the A variant (Navy is working to add a WDL to the TBG glider) otherwise that would have added additional risk and delays. But the critical portion, as far as I'm concerned, is going to be TBG proving that the glide body performs as required. Without that, all you have is just an expensive short-medium range ballistic missile.

Imagine where we'd be if they hadn't up and quit after X-51, HyFly, RATTLRS, HTV-2, etc, but instead kept trying to work the bugs out. I guess, "hey, let's quit because we've got problems, I'm sure it will go smoother if we just wait", isn't a viable strategy.

 

[Ronny]

I honestly don't understand how it is possible to screw up the rocket ignition????. If they fuck up the glider then I can understand but the solid rocket booster fail to ignite ????? That like a mistake that banana republic would have made

 

[Jeb]

So, it just fell into the ocean like HyFly. Awesome. Even Homer Simpson kept the reactor going.

Book plot, these test failures are really successful technology theft operations they actually dropped it right near a Chinese SSN for pick up!!!

No lie, I did just think "sabotage?" as a possible cause.

 

[bring_it_on]

I still think that is the least of their worries. Given what's new here is the BGV, the Warhead, and the Booster. Of these, the warhead was successfully tested recently. I assume the booster has done multiple static test firings so I don't see it being a major source of problems resulting in massive delays. But the BGV appears to be the most behind and DARPA seems to be totally silent on the state of that (or the HAWC for that matter even though we know it is 0/2 in flight testing so far). The program is a dead end if the glider doesn't work which is/was the biggest risk in terms of the AF went into a weapons program without actually flying the glider hardware first to validate viability and performance (they are doing the same with the scramjet cruise missile BTW).

Glad they left a weapons data-link and other technologies out of the A variant (Navy is working to add a WDL to the TBG glider) otherwise that would have added additional risk and delays. But the critical portion, as far as I'm concerned, is going to be TBG proving that the glide body performs as required. Without that, all you have is just an expensive short-medium range ballistic missile.

Imagine where we'd be if they hadn't up and quit after X-51, HyFly, RATTLRS, HTV-2, etc, but instead kept trying to work the bugs out. I guess, "hey, let's quit because we've got problems, I'm sure it will go smoother if we just wait", isn't a viable strategy.

To their credit they did immediately pivot and spend a lot of money on hypersonics right after the X-51 program. The AFRL and DARPA collectively poured in excess of a billion dollars into TBG and HAWC starting 2014. There are also a whole host of other scramjet engines that AFRL is testing that are expected to be larger than what's on the HAWC. But you are right, instead of just asking for a higher performing requirements (to the X-51) they should have also kept flying the existing configuration as a test bed which in hindsight would probably have helped. The just took a 5-6 year flight test gap while those new requirements and their technology was developed..

 

[NMaude]

To their credit they did immediately pivot and spend a lot of money on hypersonics right after the X-51 program.

The USAF should've listened to Boeing and ordered ten NOT four X-51A test-vehicles and flown them.

 

[bring_it_on]

The HAWC vehicles and program is said to be more advanced. If anything the X-51 should have involved multiple engine suppliers like the HAWC. We could have had two teams flying hardware for more than half a decade by now. But now HAWC is doing just that (TBG too has Raytheon as a second supplier) so as long as we stick with two suppliers, and at least two sizes for our S&T and R&D focus we should be in a good place in the medium (5-6 years out) term. If they stick to it (and to their credit multiple administrations, and Congress has continued to increase R&D funding to virtually every program) we could have multiple classes of air-breathing hypersonic vehicles by the end of this decade - early next decade. There will be failures and a lot of short term pain as we pivot from developing and testing glide munitions (which we've essentially focused on for the greater part of the last decade and a half) to more challenging systems. But the industrial capacity is there to make dramatic leaps and if they stick with it..Go back to the initial pains when fielding JASSM. Now the AF wants an inventory of 10,000 JASSM-ER's. I don't think the development of ARRW, HACM etc is going to be very dramatically different.

 

[NMaude]

If anything the X-51 should have involved multiple engine suppliers like the HAWC.

Since the US DoD has paid for the design, development and testing of the X-51A Boeing could build, say, ten new X-51As and do follow on tests using company funds.

 

[Kat Tsun]

Mfw Starship explodes a dozen times but ARRW fails a captive carry and a launch ignition.

At least they solved the release problem. Now they need to figure out why it didn't ignite the motor. Slow, but judging by this avant-garde "SpaceX model" of weapons development, ARRW should be ready sometime before 2030. If we consider every failure to actually be a success, both Starship and ARRW have been a litany of successes because they've gotten one (baby) step closer to orbit/target impact with each flight test.

USAF is pushing the boundaries of weapons development by proving it can adopt the same genius methods of "incremental success" as private industry at the same time.

Not really a big deal though I see why there's so much hand wringing about it. Bringing up THAAD is pretty funny though. I don't think AGM-183 will take +30 years or outlive some dozen odd subcontractors before it gets out of its growing pains to the point that we can be certain it can safely and reliably fire and engage targets in a testing range. ARRW is way better managed and has more talent than that.

 

[bring_it_on]

If anything the X-51 should have involved multiple engine suppliers like the HAWC.

Since the US DoD has paid for the design, development and testing of the X-51A Boeing could build, say, ten new X-51As and do follow on tests using company funds.

What's the point? Its old technology and not a weapons concept but merely a demonstrator vehicle. HAWC has built two actual scramjet engine powered weapon concepts (not mere propulsion demonstrators) that have started flying (though we've seen 1 or 2 failures with at least one performer) and is in the process of ramping up their testing. Furthermore, AFRL has worked with both scramjet engine vendors to develop an even more powerful engine that should be transitioned to flight testing in the next five years for a larger application. So they are not short of funding as far as developing new scramjet engines, and testing them. They just have to pick up the pace in flight testing.

HAWC is expected to perform multiple flight tests this year, and next year before concluding. Its follow on USAF program will be launched in FY-22 upon its completion so the technology and research is transitioning. There are additional scramjet development and test opportunities within OSD funded programs. We are not short of programs to fund..we are short on actual testing and having vendors succeed.

 

[aonestudio]

ARRW Schedule Still On Track Pending Failure Review - Breaking Defense

If ARRW continues to fail, the service could resuscitate the Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon as a fall-back, says Brig. Gen. Heath Collins, who heads AFLCMC's Armaments Directorate.

breakingdefense.com

 

[bring_it_on]

ARRW Schedule Still On Track Pending Failure Review - Breaking Defense

If ARRW continues to fail, the service could resuscitate the Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon as a fall-back, says Brig. Gen. Heath Collins, who heads AFLCMC's Armaments Directorate.

breakingdefense.com

For it to be "still on track" would mean that they literally built in a one year buffer on a 4 year program. Unless they cut the original flight test plan, there is really zero chance that they make their original EOC targets. That shouldn't really matter since the four year program was always going to be difficult. The focus should now squarely be on succeeding in testing, and then spinning that into a program of record for an eventual AGM-183B with all the other features that got excluded from the ARRW prototyping effort. If they can have the "B" variant in rate production by 2025, I'd consider this a huge success.

 

[bobbymike]

AGM-183 ARRW Production Timetable Hinges on Failure Review | Air & Space Forces Magazine

The Air Force's hypersonic AGM-183A ARRW missile could be delayed by a review into what went wrong in its second test failure.

www.airforcemag.com

 

[NMaude]

I hope they have another prototype on hand ready to test.

 

[Grey Havoc]

I hope they have another prototype on hand ready to test.

Given the way things are currently, not likely, unfortunately.

 

[bring_it_on]

Recent comments about potentially meeting (if RCA and resolution was swift) the next test availability window seems to suggest that they do. Of course there is no point in going into test with it until you've root caused what caused the failure with the last one and implemented the necessary corrected actions.

 

[sferrin]

Recent comments about potentially meeting (if RCA and resolution was swift) the next test availability window seems to suggest that they do. Of course there is no point in going into test with it until you've root caused what caused the failure with the last one and implemented the necessary corrected actions.

Bet the root cause of the last test failure could be written on a single sheet of paper.

 

[NMaude]

Recent comments about potentially meeting (if RCA and resolution was swift) the next test availability window seems to suggest that they do. Of course there is no point in going into test with it until you've root caused what caused the failure with the last one and implemented the necessary corrected actions.

Bet the root cause of the last test failure could be written on a single sheet of paper.

Someone fucked up and didn't do their job.

 

[Grey Havoc]

'Twould appear so.

 

[bring_it_on]

Babione told reporters Aug. 10 the initial examples of the ARRW’s hypersonic glide body will be built at Building 601 at Skunk Works’ Palmdale, Calif., facility at Air Force Plant 42. The company has the capacity to build “8-12” units of ARRW per year at the plant, but Babione didn’t indicate how many years of low-rate production are anticipated.

Once the missile is given the green light for large-scale production, Babione said manufacturing will likely shift to Lockheed Martin’s Missiles and Fire Control facility, which is better for large-scale work.

“We can stand up manufacturing” of hypersonics programs generally at Palmdale “in a relatively short space of time,” he said.

But after that initial pulse of production, “I see a very similar future to the JASSM [AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile] model, where we would develop an early prototype like TBG [Tactical Boost Glide], HAWC [Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept], and then we would find the best place to produce it,” he said.

Skunk Works Will Hand Off ARRW Production to Missiles and Fire Control | Air & Space Forces Magazine

Lockheed Martin's Skunk Works will handle low-rate production of the hypersonic ARRW missile before transferring rate production to another division.

www.airforcemag.com

 

[sferrin]

Boiled down it's, "we don't currently have a plan". Awesome. They should be soliciting industry right now if they want to hit the ground running.

 

[bring_it_on]

The ARRW program plans to transition into production next year. Money for that is in the budget. Hopefully it can maintain that but that is subject to what happens in the coming months with testing. The Fiscal Year 2022 budget includes the low rate lot for the prototype weapon. FY-23 will likely include money for another prototype lot. Once the USAF concludes testing, it will likely begin rolling out a formal program of record and defining what that "non prototype" weapon configuration looks like (for beyond "few dozen weapons" inventory). The DARPA "parent program" continues to offer additional options that were not available to ARRW when it was set up. By end of next year, DARPA would have done significant R&D and testing on incorporating a data link into the boost glide vehicle. the second TBG glide vehicle would have also likely flown. Maybe a seeker is what comes next. Regardless, probably a couple of years of low rate prototype production will allow the USAF to field an early operational capability. That's what they can do with an advanced prototyping program. Beyond this, they have to conclude testing and move into full rate production and that means transitioning to a more traditional program (which the ARRW is not).

 

[sferrin]

The ARRW program plans to transition into production next year. Money for that is in the budget. Hopefully it can maintain that but that is subject to what happens in the coming months with testing. The Fiscal Year 2022 budget includes the low rate lot for the prototype weapon. FY-23 will likely include money for another prototype lot. Once the USAF concludes testing, it will likely begin rolling out a formal program of record and defining what that "non prototype" weapon configuration looks like (for beyond "few dozen weapons" inventory). The DARPA "parent program" continues to offer additional options that were not available to ARRW when it was set up. By end of next year, DARPA would have done significant R&D and testing on incorporating a data link into the boost glide vehicle. the second TBG glide vehicle would have also likely flown. Maybe a seeker is what comes next. Regardless, probably a couple of years of low rate prototype production will allow the USAF to field an early operational capability. That's what they can do with an advanced prototyping program. Beyond this, they have to conclude testing and move into full rate production and that means transitioning to a more traditional program (which the ARRW is not).

Right. But it reads like they haven't even seriously thought about talking to companies who might build the production model.