Lockheed Martin AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW)

Y'all do realize that the Russians, Chinese, and North Koreans have also had plenty of failures as well? Failing during an R&D program is very common, the difference is the US publicizes everything, good or bad, while the other countries hate to talk about their failures.
 
From the DOT&E FY2021 Annual Report (Page 192)
DOT&E FY2021 Annual Report




In FY21, the program completed five instrumented measurement vehicle captive-carry flight tests to demonstrate initial weapon-aircraft interface integration, as well as proper fit and mechanical function of the weapon with the B-52H aircraft. The ARRW program twice attempted to execute one of the three planned booster test flights with a simulated glider. The booster test flights are intended to demonstrate final weapon-aircraft integration with the production-representative missile, the capability to launch the weapon inside the flight envelope, and proper performance of the booster rocket. Four AUR tests will ensue upon the conclusion of booster flight testing..

The first booster test flights experienced an unexpected test event on both attempts. During the first test, the missile, by design, did not separate from the B-52 because the system determined there was a fin actuator problem. The Air Force implemented a corrective action before the second attempt. During the second attempt, the missile experienced an unexpected test event after release from the B-52 aircraft that prevented the booster motor from igniting, leading to a loss of the test asset. The Air Force is currently conducting a Failure Review Board to determine the root cause(s) of the failure and implement corrective actions to the missile system before the next booster test flight. Although the second booster test experienced an unexpected event, it did demonstrate the safe release and separation of the weapon system from the aircraft. The second booster test also validated the fin actuator corrective action.

The report was likely written before the AF conducted its third attempt.
 
 
From the DOT&E FY2021 Annual Report (Page 192)
DOT&E FY2021 Annual Report




In FY21, the program completed five instrumented measurement vehicle captive-carry flight tests to demonstrate initial weapon-aircraft interface integration, as well as proper fit and mechanical function of the weapon with the B-52H aircraft. The ARRW program twice attempted to execute one of the three planned booster test flights with a simulated glider. The booster test flights are intended to demonstrate final weapon-aircraft integration with the production-representative missile, the capability to launch the weapon inside the flight envelope, and proper performance of the booster rocket. Four AUR tests will ensue upon the conclusion of booster flight testing..

The first booster test flights experienced an unexpected test event on both attempts. During the first test, the missile, by design, did not separate from the B-52 because the system determined there was a fin actuator problem. The Air Force implemented a corrective action before the second attempt. During the second attempt, the missile experienced an unexpected test event after release from the B-52 aircraft that prevented the booster motor from igniting, leading to a loss of the test asset. The Air Force is currently conducting a Failure Review Board to determine the root cause(s) of the failure and implement corrective actions to the missile system before the next booster test flight. Although the second booster test experienced an unexpected event, it did demonstrate the safe release and separation of the weapon system from the aircraft. The second booster test also validated the fin actuator corrective action.

The report was likely written before the AF conducted its third attempt.
How did the third test perform?
 
From the DOT&E FY2021 Annual Report (Page 192)
DOT&E FY2021 Annual Report




In FY21, the program completed five instrumented measurement vehicle captive-carry flight tests to demonstrate initial weapon-aircraft interface integration, as well as proper fit and mechanical function of the weapon with the B-52H aircraft. The ARRW program twice attempted to execute one of the three planned booster test flights with a simulated glider. The booster test flights are intended to demonstrate final weapon-aircraft integration with the production-representative missile, the capability to launch the weapon inside the flight envelope, and proper performance of the booster rocket. Four AUR tests will ensue upon the conclusion of booster flight testing..

The first booster test flights experienced an unexpected test event on both attempts. During the first test, the missile, by design, did not separate from the B-52 because the system determined there was a fin actuator problem. The Air Force implemented a corrective action before the second attempt. During the second attempt, the missile experienced an unexpected test event after release from the B-52 aircraft that prevented the booster motor from igniting, leading to a loss of the test asset. The Air Force is currently conducting a Failure Review Board to determine the root cause(s) of the failure and implement corrective actions to the missile system before the next booster test flight. Although the second booster test experienced an unexpected event, it did demonstrate the safe release and separation of the weapon system from the aircraft. The second booster test also validated the fin actuator corrective action.

The report was likely written before the AF conducted its third attempt.
How did the third test perform?

Same as the first. Missile was not released and the RCA is still being performed.
 
This is really stupid, is Congress to actively make sure the US is to stay behind the PRC and Russia in the field of hypersonic weapons?
Convincing Congress to buy an untested weapon is tough. Convincing it to buy a weapon that's flunked 3 tests in a row is quite challenging.
 
given that ARRW fail 3 out of 3 test and the motor didn't even get to ignite , it hard to imagine they have a lot of incentive to buy more and not cancel the whole program like they always do.
 
given that ARRW fail 3 out of 3 test and the motor didn't even get to ignite , it hard to imagine they have a lot of incentive to buy more and not cancel the whole program like they always do.
I hate being right sometimes.
 
Part of the sales pitch for ARRW was producing a servive-ready weapon fast, so DoD wouldn't have to wait for the more challenging air-breathers to come along. But if ARRW has major problems which need significant time to sort out, the desire to just just skip right to the latter weapons may be winning out.
 
Part of the sales pitch for ARRW was producing a servive-ready weapon fast, so DoD wouldn't have to wait for the more challenging air-breathers to come along. But if ARRW has major problems which need significant time to sort out, the desire to just just skip right to the latter weapons may be winning out.
That's an excuse they've frequently used in the past. "We're going to leap-frog this and go right for the better technology- and then cancel that too when it doesn't succeed on the first flight." At this point (well, right from the start pretty much) hypersonics in the US is a complete joke. More than happy to eat my words but pretty sure I won't have to.
 
Part of the sales pitch for ARRW was producing a servive-ready weapon fast, so DoD wouldn't have to wait for the more challenging air-breathers to come along. But if ARRW has major problems which need significant time to sort out, the desire to just just skip right to the latter weapons may be winning out.
That's an excuse they've frequently used in the past. "We're going to leap-frog this and go right for the better technology- and then cancel that too when it doesn't succeed on the first flight." At this point (well, right from the start pretty much) hypersonics in the US is a complete joke. More than happy to eat my words but pretty sure I won't have to.
At this point, they may as well resurrect ASALM and air launched ATACM.
 
The USAF has not asked to, nor has the Congress cancelled or scaled back the RDT&E funding for ARRW in any significant way. For FY-22, they even plan to ove half of the money marked to buy production AUR's to the R&D program given the setbacks and need to re run tests. They fund RDT&E in FY-23 as well. Any sensible person would zero out the procurement funding for the program given that they have failed or not succeeded in a single booster flight test, leave aside any glider or AUR flight test. What exactly would you buy with FY-22 procurement funds when they can't even show it to work (a booster even)?

So Lockheed, and the AF program office has all the money they need to demonstrate the capability of the weapon through tests scheduled this year and next and if they succeed the AF can then make a case for buying and fielding an inventory of XXXX AGM-183's. The previous admin/AF-leadership set this up as an operational prototyping program and for that to move to the next phase it has to be shown to work allowing the AF to field limited quantities before moving it over to a formal program of record. It has yet to make that case and buying rounds of stuff that doesn't work will be abuse of their authority and just bad acquisition practice.

The current secretary is not that keen on fielding large volumes of expensive hypersonic. weapons and program test failures are not going to help the service make its case. The current delays are longer than what the AF provisioned for the entire development program so someone running this did a pretty crappy job of setting the prorgram. I have a feeling they are still around and running things so it doesn't bode very well.

The DOD and the AF leadership has basically fully funded the development of ARRW in FY22 and also FY23. They are completing the prototyping program as was designed though its going to take 2x the time the previous AF leaders anticipated it to take. Between now and end of FY-23, the AF has to show it to work, and then make a case for buying it. With early operational prototypes for HACM entering production in FY-25-26 the AF has a couple of years to show ARRW viability and they have all the money they need to do so.
Part of the sales pitch for ARRW was producing a servive-ready weapon fast, so DoD wouldn't have to wait for the more challenging air-breathers to come along. But if ARRW has major problems which need significant time to sort out, the desire to just just skip right to the latter weapons may be winning out.
That's an excuse they've frequently used in the past. "We're going to leap-frog this and go right for the better technology- and then cancel that too when it doesn't succeed on the first flight." At this point (well, right from the start pretty much) hypersonics in the US is a complete joke. More than happy to eat my words but pretty sure I won't have to.
At this point, they may as well resurrect ASALM and air launched ATACM.

Why would you want to do that? Launching a hypersonic TBG is the survivability and speed they needed. Its a key driver for ARRW. An air launched ATACMS (Kinzhal approach) won't get them that. Time sensitive target strike capability is already being provided by the Navy prompt strike, and the Army LRHW program so why would the DOD fund an AF program if it actually waters down survivability which one would assume is a key driver for the program?

The AF has an alternate to the ARRW and that is HCSW. It completed its CDR and can move into component fabrication, testing and later production. Its CHGB, shared with the Army and Navy, has already moved into production at Dynetics Alabama. It will be a lot more expensive than ARRW and a lot larger as well. But it is available if they wish to field an alternate boost glide system. But that will be foolish since ARRW failures have nothing to do with the "hypersonic" part of the system (the glider, its accuracy, survivability or its lethality) so cancelling it would be a foolish thing to do compared to fixing what's wrong and demonstrating that it works. If ARRW is.a catastrophic and non-fixable failure, the AF would be better to accelerate its investments in HACM and field that more broadly. If they absolutely need the range, and speed of a boost glide system then the next logical thing would be to resurrect the HCSW which they have always maintained is the fall back option.
 
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Part of the sales pitch for ARRW was producing a servive-ready weapon fast, so DoD wouldn't have to wait for the more challenging air-breathers to come along. But if ARRW has major problems which need significant time to sort out, the desire to just just skip right to the latter weapons may be winning out.
That's an excuse they've frequently used in the past. "We're going to leap-frog this and go right for the better technology- and then cancel that too when it doesn't succeed on the first flight." At this point (well, right from the start pretty much) hypersonics in the US is a complete joke. More than happy to eat my words but pretty sure I won't have to.
At this point, they may as well resurrect ASALM and air launched ATACM.
They tried that, LRASM-B, got scared and cancelled almost before the powerpoint was done. "Too risky."
 
The USAF had built contingency plans for what to do if ARRW was not successful. This was the reason why it continued to fund the HCSW CDR work and completion even though it decided to pass on production of that weapon. But unlike 2020, in 2024, the AF will have HACM in the pipeline as well so if ARRW continues on its current trajectory of failures, it could simply walk away and not pursue it further and move the money into HACM. As it is, development was expected to transition into production in FY-22 and now they'll continue with development through most of FY-23. If on the other hand, the AF and Lockheed turn it around then the AF has options to balance inventories b/w ARRW and HACM as they always wanted. The fuss seems to be about the AF not spending anything on production which is totally the right thing to do given all the failures. There is nothing workable to buy in FY-22 or FY-23. I'm sure if they knock it out of the park with the remaining FY-22 planned tests, Congress could reconsider reprogramming some RDT&E money into early production buys. But that's months away.
 
That's an excuse they've frequently used in the past. "We're going to leap-frog this and go right for the better technology- and then cancel that too when it doesn't succeed on the first flight." At this point (well, right from the start pretty much) hypersonics in the US is a complete joke. More than happy to eat my words but pretty sure I won't have to.

Yeah, it's this start stop, start stop bullshit over the decades which has retarded the US hypersonic programmes. If they'd maintained a consistent funding for a couple of decades the US would be in a much better position today.

At this point, they may as well resurrect ASALM and air launched ATACM.
There was air-launched ATACMS?
 
You don’t need a couple of decades of R&D for boosters to work as desired. It’s a screw up by the contractor and the program. ARRW will complete development unless they continue to fail at which point Congress may redirect its money to programs that actually work. But as far as the USAF budget is concerned, it funds the development part of the prototyping effort fully.
 
That’s not the problem that’s leading to a delay in ARRW. It’s been delayed and scaled back because they’ve run into issues getting the weapon to separate or for the booster to work properly.
 
That's an excuse they've frequently used in the past. "We're going to leap-frog this and go right for the better technology- and then cancel that too when it doesn't succeed on the first flight." At this point (well, right from the start pretty much) hypersonics in the US is a complete joke. More than happy to eat my words but pretty sure I won't have to.
At this point, they may as well resurrect ASALM and air launched ATACM.

Why would you want to do that? Launching a hypersonic TBG is the survivability and speed they needed. Its a key driver for ARRW. An air launched ATACMS (Kinzhal approach) won't get them that. Time sensitive target strike capability is already being provided by the Navy prompt strike, and the Army LRHW program so why would the DOD fund an AF program if it actually waters down survivability which one would assume is a key driver for the program?

The AF has an alternate to the ARRW and that is HCSW. It completed its CDR and can move into component fabrication, testing and later production. Its CHGB, shared with the Army and Navy, has already moved into production at Dynetics Alabama. It will be a lot more expensive than ARRW and a lot larger as well. But it is available if they wish to field an alternate boost glide system. But that will be foolish since ARRW failures have nothing to do with the "hypersonic" part of the system (the glider, its accuracy, survivability or its lethality) so cancelling it would be a foolish thing to do compared to fixing what's wrong and demonstrating that it works. If ARRW is.a catastrophic and non-fixable failure, the AF would be better to accelerate its investments in HACM and field that more broadly. If they absolutely need the range, and speed of a boost glide system then the next logical thing would be to resurrect the HCSW which they have always maintained is the fall back option.
ARRW program already messed up, not once but 3 different time with the booster which supposed to be the simple/well known part. It doesn't give a lot of confident that their glider will work. And ARRW seem quite expensive as well, Iam skeptical that they will field it in great number. Kinzhal approach is simple, and more or less have been proved to work and likely a lot cheaper
 
ARRW program already messed up, not once but 3 different time with the booster which supposed to be the simple/well known part. It doesn't give a lot of confident that their glider will work. And ARRW seem quite expensive as well, Iam skeptical that they will field it in great number. Kinzhal approach is simple, and more or less have been proved to work and likely a lot cheaper

The posts makes no sense. Unless you have security clearance and know more details than us, you have no basis to state that claim. The TBG glider was chosen and pursued more than half a decade back for a reason. The trade space would have logically involved, speed, lethality and survivability. It would most definitely not have been pursued because it was the cool thing to do. Given the AF's own analysis led them to this, and then to incorporate that as the front end of its hypersonic missile, why would it now all of a sudden look to develop an AL-ATACMS? It makes zero sense. And while ARRW has had setbacks, the AF is also now committing money to complete its development and demonstrations. If they cancelled any program that had early setbacks, we would not have half the fleet or systems currently vital to our national security. Think THAAD, JASSM and what not.

If the USAF wanted an ALBM it would have developed and requested industry to supply it an ALBM. Its own analysis as far back as 2014 suggested it needed a next-gen glider, and that is what it has pursued for 8 years under the TBG (with DARPA) and ARRW programs both of which are fully funded to completion.

As I had written earlier, and as the USAF itself (along with the man leading the hypersonic portfolio) clearly stated, the backup to ARRW was always HCSW as they pumped money into the program even after they had decided to sideline it, to ensure that it completed its CDR and was ready for production in case ARRW went south. Since then the glider (CHGB) has entered production with industry. USAF pursued its most difficult of its hypersonic choices (ARRW instead of HCSW) knowing of the risk, and knowing that it had a backup that it could bring back. Fast forward to late 2023 (when ARRW is expected to complete its RDT&E phase) and the AF will have another system as an option in HACM that did not exist when it chose b/w the HCSW and ARRW around 2020. So it has choices in case it does not want to acquire the ARRW system for whatever reason (either the development program fails, it is too expensive, or it doesn't like what it has seen in terms of performance).

You don't field something just for the sake of fielding something. Kinzhal and ARRW are completely different systems, capabilities designed around totally different needs, missions and requirements. An AL-ATACMS would share little in mission overlap with ARRW and thus won't replace that mission need. Its only worth pursuing if all you want to do is check a box somewhere which is not how either the USAF nor the DOD process works in terms of the justification needed to start a program.ATACMS is dated, has obsolescence issues, and is having its production gradually replaced by PrSM. It makes zero sense to go back in time especially when the capabilities aren't even comparable.

The way I see it, the AF has three choices depending on how the next 18 or so months of flight test activity goes:

1) ARRW completes development and enters production in late FY-23 / early FY-24 and is fielded in FY-24/FY-25 timeframe
2) ARRW is not pursued post testing and AF green lights HCSW
3) ARRW is not pursued post testing, fails several upcoming tests and has its FY23 funding re-directed to HACM instead

Given where we are (and what we know from public records), all three have about an equal probability at this time. We should know more once the tests scheduled for this Spring happen.

That said, the USAF could surely make use of something like an Air launcher PrSM. But it would be the stand off counterpart to the stand in attack weapon and not an ARRW alternative. You don’t need a 10 million dollar capability if a 2 mm capability would suffice for the same role which is why ARRW is unique. That said there’s a case to have HACM fill they void which is what they seem to be doing.
 
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ARRW program already messed up, not once but 3 different time with the booster which supposed to be the simple/well known part. It doesn't give a lot of confident that their glider will work. And ARRW seem quite expensive as well, Iam skeptical that they will field it in great number. Kinzhal approach is simple, and more or less have been proved to work and likely a lot cheaper

The posts makes no sense. Unless you have security clearance and know more details than us, you have no basis to state that claim. The TBG glider was chosen and pursued more than half a decade back for a reason. The trade space would have logically involved, speed, lethality and survivability. It would most definitely not have been pursued because it was the cool thing to do. Given the AF's own analysis led them to this, and then to incorporate that as the front end of its hypersonic missile, why would it now all of a sudden look to develop an AL-ATACMS? It makes zero sense. And while ARRW has had setbacks, the AF is also now committing money to complete its development and demonstrations. If they cancelled any program that had early setbacks, we would not have half the fleet or systems currently vital to our national security. Think THAAD, JASSM and what not.

If the USAF wanted an ALBM it would have developed and requested industry to supply it an ALBM. Its own analysis as far back as 2014 suggested it needed a next-gen glider, and that is what it has pursued for 8 years under the TBG (with DARPA) and ARRW programs both of which are fully funded to completion.

As I had written earlier, and as the USAF itself (along with the man leading the hypersonic portfolio) clearly stated, the backup to ARRW was always HCSW as they pumped money into the program even after they had decided to sideline it, to ensure that it completed its CDR and was ready for production in case ARRW went south. Since then the glider (CHGB) has entered production with industry. USAF pursued its most difficult of its hypersonic choices (ARRW instead of HCSW) knowing of the risk, and knowing that it had a backup that it could bring back. Fast forward to late 2023 (when ARRW is expected to complete its RDT&E phase) and the AF will have another system as an option in HACM that did not exist when it chose b/w the HCSW and ARRW around 2020. So it has choices in case it does not want to acquire the ARRW system for whatever reason (either the development program fails, it is too expensive, or it doesn't like what it has seen in terms of performance).

You don't field something just for the sake of fielding something. Kinzhal and ARRW are completely different systems, capabilities designed around totally different needs, missions and requirements. An AL-ATACMS would share little in mission overlap with ARRW and thus won't replace that mission need. Its only worth pursuing if all you want to do is check a box somewhere which is not how either the USAF nor the DOD process works in terms of the justification needed to start a program.ATACMS is dated, has obsolescence issues, and is having its production gradually replaced by PrSM. It makes zero sense to go back in time especially when the capabilities aren't even comparable.

The way I see it, the AF has three choices depending on how the next 18 or so months of flight test activity goes:

1) ARRW completes development and enters production in late FY-23 / early FY-24 and is fielded in FY-24/FY-25 timeframe
2) ARRW is not pursued post testing and AF green lights HCSW
3) ARRW is not pursued post testing, fails several upcoming tests and has its FY23 funding re-directed to HACM instead

Given where we are (and what we know from public records), all three have about an equal probability at this time. We should know more once the tests scheduled for this Spring happen.

That said, the USAF could surely make use of something like an Air launcher PrSM. But it would be the stand off counterpart to the stand in attack weapon and not an ARRW alternative. You don’t need a 10 million dollar capability if a 2 mm capability would suffice for the same role which is why ARRW is unique. That said there’s a case to have HACM fill they void which is what they seem to be doing.
I don't doubt that TBG has many advantages that make it valuable for them to pursuit, but after various set back, it also feel like the program probably too ambitious for them to complete. There seem to be very high chance that ARRW will follow the footstep of NGM . HCSW is likely even more expensive than ARRW and since there isn't a prototype yet, it will take even longer than ARRW to develop and get into production. Air launched ballistic missile might not be as survivable as TBG, but cheaper, more simple, more likely that we can get it in short term and higher number. Ballistic hypersonic missile clearly still survivable enough that USN want to pour money in SM-6 Block IB. That seem like a cheap/quick/sure way to get hypersonic capability. If they redirect ARRW funding into HACM, I also think that will be great, but HACM being an air breather unlikely able to match the range/speed of TBG.
 
If the USAF wanted an ALBM it would have developed and requested industry to supply it an ALBM.

Talking about ALBMs assuming the ARRW does go into production I wonder if it will be named Skybolt-II.
Given 90% of the last fielded weapons had no name it would probably be called the "AGM-183A ARRW". Maybe some would call it "Arrow".
 
I don't doubt that TBG has many advantages that make it valuable for them to pursuit, but after various set back, it also feel like the program probably too ambitious for them to complete

Here's a question, why do you think they decided that they needed the type of glide body that they started developing in 2014? Also, the setbacks on ARRW have nothing to do with it, and are integration related which could A) surface on any other program that is similarly rushed, and B ) can be fixed with time because they are not catastrophic failures with the fundamental design or architecture of the weapon system. Not that those failures can't surface in the future but they don't appear to be there now so canceling the program and moving to a completely unrelated and insufficient plan B is a rather dumb idea. Which is why even the Biden administration (that didn't start the program and could very easy wash its hands of it) is recommending that they stay the course and complete development. Again, look at the programs that had early setbacks and became extremely successful once eventually completed.
HCSW is likely even more expensive than ARRW and since there isn't a prototype yet, it will take even longer than ARRW to develop and get into production.

HCSW will be more expensive but still very doable within a reasonable timeframe (OTA standard which it met when it was started and will easily meet again because they pick up from a completed critical design review). The CDR was completed on time, and on budget before it was shelved. Since then, the CHGB has gone from government low rate production at Sandia, to industry low rate production with Dynetics. Its a production system that has two other services fully backing its rate production (3-5 batteries for the Army, and Navy glide bodies to support DDG-1000 class and subs).
Air launched ballistic missile might not be as survivable as TBG,

Thats it then. So it can't be a replacement for the ARRW capability. If it could have been, it would have been the option pursued since you could likely field an Al-PrSM for under $2 Million vs the $8-10 Million cost of the ARRW.
That seem like a cheap/quick/sure way to get hypersonic capability.
Which seems to be the main problem with your argument in that they are seeking "hypersonic" capability only. As if they are checking a box. ARRW has those characteristics of speed, survivability and lethality because it is intended for a mission, against targets with a broad survivability in mind. Speed isn't the only characteristic that is desired here. If they had gone to industry and requested a weapon that could top Mach 5 so that they can check off a hypersonic box, I'm sure the industry would have come back with a much cheaper, much simpler, and a lot less effective/survivable weapon. That's not what the ask was. TBG was pursued for a reason. ARRW incorporates it for a reason.

Air Force very carefully looked at its options back in 2020 when it was short of cash and chose to sideline HCSW but made it a point to finish the CDR (they did not have to do it) because they knew that ARRW was a bold and risky move so they wanted another system that they could fall back on.

The HCSW programme will continue development a little longer, despite being cancelled.

“We will close out [critical design review] for HCSW, so that we tie up that design in case it needs to be started in the future,” says Roper.


If they redirect ARRW funding into HACM, I also think that will be great, but HACM being an air breather unlikely able to match the range/speed of TBG.
They will only do that if A) The ARRW shows catastrophic design flaws that cannot be rectified within the current planned funding levels and B) If they decide to pursue just one hypersonic prototyping effort. FY-23 budget request makes it clear that the Pentagon is fully committed to funding arrow through remainder of this fiscal year, and all of next fiscal year (September 2023). More than half of the procurement funding set aside to buy the first operational prototype AUR's for ARRW is now being diverted to re-do testing and other design work. So they are fully backing the development program. Whether they decide to buy it will depend on how succesfull the program is. Congress could also step in if they are highly succesfull in the coming 6-8 months and ask that money be put back into procurement for FY-23. Its too early to tell. They've really only had 1 failed test (where they lost the booster vehicle). They've had a bunch of "no tests" but that doesn't cost them another test vehicle.

but HACM being an air breather unlikely able to match the range/speed of TBG.

A succesfull HACM would basically negate the need to have a Stand Off Attack Weapon analog to say the SiAW. It would make a light weight ALBM redundant. While it would not be the type of capability being sought from ARRW but different and better for tactical platforms, especially the F-15E and F-15EX as they are now calling for those platforms to be the initial carriers of HACM.
 
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Given 90% of the last fielded weapons had no name it would probably be called the "AGM-183A ARRW". Maybe some would call it "Arrow".
Good point however while Arrow is logical looking at its acronym it might not be chosen as to avoid confusion with the Israeli Arrow ABM.
 
It’s already called ARRW (pronounced Arrow). Why would they change the name?
 
It’s already called ARRW (pronounced Arrow). Why would they change the name?

They might because as I pointed out in my previous post there is already existing missile called the Arrow and they might want to avoid to prevent confusion.
 
America doesn't use Israeli missiles, though, so who would be confused?
 
It’s already called ARRW (pronounced Arrow). Why would they change the name?

They might because as I pointed out in my previous post there is already existing missile called the Arrow and they might want to avoid to prevent confusion.

ARRW is an acronym just like HCSW (pronounced hacksaw) and the system has been named that since it was first revealed. Not sure what the relation to Israeli arrow is or any reason why those naming it would care.
 
It’s already called ARRW (pronounced Arrow). Why would they change the name?

They might because as I pointed out in my previous post there is already existing missile called the Arrow and they might want to avoid to prevent confusion.

ARRW is an acronym just like HCSW (pronounced hacksaw) and the system has been named that since it was first revealed. Not sure what the relation to Israeli arrow is or any reason why those naming it would care.
He's talking about a proper name. "amraam", "jassm", "jaysow". "assram", "thaad", etc. aren't names. They're just acronyms read as words. "ARRW" is the same, it just happens to be pretty much the same as an actual word when read as a word. It's not called the "AGM-183 Arrow". For whatever reason they don't seem to bother with names anymore. "La Razm" is not a name either. (Maybe French?)
 

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