Iowa and Alaska Class Conversion Projects

[Scott Kenny]

I think I'm too used to thinking in terms of full load displacement...

Design CA2-D of the Alaska preliminary designs displaced 37,800 tons, but at that point it very much at the Battleship end of the scale, with thicker belt armour than an Iowa, the machinery of an Iowa, and a Battleship-style sandwich underwater protection system.

View attachment 710630

That IS a battleship, just with 12" super guns (equal to 14")

Definitely designed to go in and brawl with any Japanese super cruisers, though.

The closest a heavy cruiser got to 20,000 tons (aside from Alaska preliminaries), was the Treaty unlimited design CA-C, which was intended to be protected against super-heavy 8-inch shells, have a speed of 35 knots.

View attachment 710631

Adding that 4th turret really added a lot of length and mass, but I don't think it added all that much capability. 70ft longer than a Des Moines, same beam and draft. And I'd swear that most of the length added was amidships, not aft...

 

[Tzoli]

I think I'm too used to thinking in terms of full load displacement...


That IS a battleship, just with 12" super guns (equal to 14")

That is called a battlecruiser not battleship.

 

[Scott Kenny]

That is called a battlecruiser not battleship.

Battleship protection and guns, if a little light compared to the current standard guns. The 12" was the equal of the older 14" guns.

A battlecruiser has battleship guns on cruiser protection, with cruiser or even destroyer speed.

A fast battleship is when it has battleship guns and battleship protection with cruiser speed.

 

[Tzoli]

Battlecruiser = sacrafice armour and/or armament for speed
CA2-D Sacrafices armament for speed.
Though the armour difference is minimal: Iowa had 307mm belt inclined to 29 degrees equals to 328mm vertical armour while CA2-D had 330mm on only 10 degrees equalling to 335mm vertical armour.
Similarly Kronstadt, Stalingrad and B-65 were battlecruisers as well.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Battlecruiser = sacrafice armour and/or armament for speed
CA2-D Sacrafices armament for speed.
Though the armour difference is minimal: Iowa had 307mm belt inclined to 29 degrees equals to 328mm vertical armour while CA2-D had 330mm on only 10 degrees equalling to 335mm vertical armour.
Similarly Kronstadt, Stalingrad and B-65 were battlecruisers as well.

CA2-D's 335mm is more than Iowa's 328mm, though.

CA2-D is a full on battleship design, cosplaying as a cruiser.

 

[Firefinder]

Ah its that time of month again.

Arguments bout ship classification.

Those starting losing their meaning with the switch to steam and the WNT was a jugular cut.

They are meaningless these days in basically all regards since modern ships are so multirole.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Ah its that time of month again.

Arguments bout ship classification.

Those starting losing their meaning with the switch to steam and the WNT was a jugular cut.

They are meaningless these days in basically all regards since modern ships are so multirole.

There are still "cruiser capabilities" that haven't been properly migrated over to the current generation of ships. Specifically the onboard repair capabilities and armor.

The various foreign Aegis ships suggest that it's not all that hard to build a destroyer-sized and -supported ship with flag facilities.

 

[Firefinder]

There are still "cruiser capabilities" that haven't been properly migrated over to the current generation of ships. Specifically the onboard repair capabilities and armor.

The various foreign Aegis ships suggest that it's not all that hard to build a destroyer-sized and -supported ship with flag facilities.

Only really flag support is missing.

Armor outside of shrapnel protection is basically useless since an airburst of any size will blind a modern ship from the radars being deleted.

With a blind and deaf ship being a dead ship with theres no way to repair the SPYs or other systems outside of the Yards.

And what repair facilities you can do is being added as we speak.

Hell the USS Kearsarge recently got a set of metal 3d printers. Tge follow week they told Big Navy not to bother asking for them back, they are not giving them up.

And what I was talking bout was the classification debate of the Alaska and other designs.

Cause honestly thanks to the like of the Montanas, you can make decent argument that the Iowa is a battlecruiser.

Classification is basically what the navy says to get the many tics to buy a design...

 

[Scott Kenny]

Only really flag support is missing.

Armor outside of shrapnel protection is basically useless since an airburst of any size will blind a modern ship from the radars being deleted.

Not external armor.

Internal armor to limit damage to certain areas, to be able to still fight while hurt.

And what I was talking bout was the classification debate of the Alaska and other designs.

Cause honestly thanks to the like of the Montanas, you can make decent argument that the Iowa is a battlecruiser.

Classification is basically what the navy says to get the many tics to buy a design...

The Iowas were built as the main line fighting ships of the fleet, as were the Montanas. That makes them battleships by definition.

Battlecruisers are battleship guns on cruiser protection with cruiser speed (that's Fisher's original definition, not mine). The Alaskas as completed meet that definition. The CA2-D is a battleship because of the amount of protection.

 

[Tzoli]

Wven the designers aeen them as cruisers as tge CA1 series became the Baltimores and CA2 the Alaskas. If they were battleships they would had started as BB designation. CA2 was a cruiser because it had cruiser style protection scheme both against shells and torpedoes, cruiser style weapon layout and machinery.

Where would you classify the fast Iowa preliminary design with 4x3 16" mark 2, 35knots and only 8" belt armour?

 

[Scott Kenny]

Wven the designers aeen them as cruisers as tge CA1 series became the Baltimores and CA2 the Alaskas. If they were battleships they would had started as BB designation. CA2 was a cruiser because it had cruiser style protection scheme both against shells and torpedoes, cruiser style weapon layout and machinery.

Where would you classify the fast Iowa preliminary design with 4x3 16" mark 2, 35knots and only 8" belt armour?

Battlecruiser. Not enough protection to be a battleship.

 

[that_person]

Not external armor.

Internal armor to limit damage to certain areas, to be able to still fight while hurt.

You don't get it. Once a ship takes a hit, it's mission killed. Modern electronics are very vulnerable to any kind of shrapnel and extensive vibrations, both of which are virtually guaranteed if a ship takes a hit. Not to mention the loss of power means you can't power the electronics either. And without them you're just fighting blind.

 

[Scott Kenny]

You don't get it. Once a ship takes a hit, it's mission killed. Modern electronics are very vulnerable to any kind of shrapnel and extensive vibrations, both of which are virtually guaranteed if a ship takes a hit. Not to mention the loss of power means you can't power the electronics either. And without them you're just fighting blind.

Then why was that on the Cruiser Baseline (CGBL) studies post-Tico?

 

[Firefinder]

Then why was that on the Cruiser Baseline (CGBL) studies post-Tico?

Cause it been a constant want for everyship class since the Des Moines class.

Cause who doesn't want armor?

Thing is theres a reason why no post 1950 ship have gotten any armor outside of heavy splinter protection on the bulkheads from the thick heavy duty steel used.

And that cause the benefits of going heavier on armor is not worth either the cost, armor steel is extremely expensive, or weight.

Its more worthwhile to add better sensors or weapons for actively engaging stuff. Get far more usage out of the budget, either one, that way.

Or do what the USN does and use metals that are a grade down from proper armor metal for tge hulls. Resulting in a very tough vessel that can take one hell of a knock.

That is also fairly expensive cause those grade of metal are am absolute PITA to work with. But even working with the Quarter to slightly over an inch of that metal is fair bit cheaper then the nearly foot worth needed to stop a modern missile.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Cause it been a constant want for everyship class since the Des Moines class.

Cause who doesn't want armor?

Thing is theres a reason why no post 1950 ship have gotten any armor outside of heavy splinter protection on the bulkheads from the thick heavy duty steel used.

And that cause the benefits of going heavier on armor is not worth either the cost, armor steel is extremely expensive, or weight.

Its more worthwhile to add better sensors or weapons for actively engaging stuff. Get far more usage out of the budget, either one, that way.

Or do what the USN does and use metals that are a grade down from proper armor metal for tge hulls. Resulting in a very tough vessel that can take one hell of a knock.

That is also fairly expensive cause those grade of metal are am absolute PITA to work with. But even working with the Quarter to slightly over an inch of that metal is fair bit cheaper then the nearly foot worth needed to stop a modern missile.

So you use a couple inches of steel between engine rooms, etc. So that if you do take a missile in one, you don't take fragments into the adjacent compartments.

It probably will be 1000-2000 tons of steel, in order to stop said fragments in critical directions. Upwards, you probably don't care, that's just intake and exhaust ducting for gas turbines. downwards you may care about, since that might be letting water into the people tank but it also helps put fires out. Fore and aft you care about, and deeper into the hull you care about so that you don't take out other engine rooms.

And that's also wrapped around CIC as well, since a ship without a CIC is incapable of fighting.

 

[Dilandu]

Thing is theres a reason why no post 1950 ship have gotten any armor outside of heavy splinter protection on the bulkheads from the thick heavy duty steel used.

Well, USAAF tested shaped charge as anti-battleship weapons as early as 1945. They build a full-scale model of battleship's horizontal protection - composed of several layers of armor and deck plates, arranged as on real battleship, with deck-high air spaces between them - and tested a 1000-pdr shaped charge bomb on it. Essenially they imitated the situation of guided shaped charge bomb (it was part of RAZON radio-controlled bomb project) hitting battleship into the roof of main turret, the part of battleship most protected from attacks from above.

And, well, the shaped charge in the casting of standard 1000-pdr bomb punched right through the whole test rig, through armor plates, deck plates and air spaces. Observers concluded that if it was a real battleship, the jet of pressure-liquified metal would hit the magazines, causing catastrophic detonation (they acually put a number of small bombs without fuzes under the test rig to test the chances, and sure, jet from shaped charge made them explode).

After that test USN lost all interest in heavy steel armor.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Well, USAAF tested shaped charge as anti-battleship weapons as early as 1945. They build a full-scale model of battleship's horizontal protection - composed of several layers of armor and deck plates, arranged as on real battleship, with deck-high air spaces between them - and tested a 1000-pdr shaped charge bomb on it. Essenially they imitated the situation of guided shaped charge bomb (it was part of RAZON radio-controlled bomb project) hitting battleship into the roof of main turret, the part of battleship most protected from attacks from above.

And, well, the shaped charge in the casting of standard 1000-pdr bomb punched right through the whole test rig, through armor plates, deck plates and air spaces. Observers concluded that if it was a real battleship, the jet of pressure-liquified metal would hit the magazines, causing catastrophic detonation (they acually put a number of small bombs without fuzes under the test rig to test the chances, and sure, jet from shaped charge made them explode).

After that test USN lost all interest in heavy steel armor.

I can only imagine the amount of "salty language" used when that went boom... Probably about as much profanity as an entire Mat dialect dictionary!

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

Then why was that on the Cruiser Baseline (CGBL) studies post-Tico?

CGBL's protection was the same splinter protection found on the Arleigh Burkes. It was essentially Ticonderoga systems on a new hull with restored margins, and the improved survivability standards that were built into the Arleigh Burkes.

 

[Scott Kenny]

CGBL's protection was the same splinter protection found on the Arleigh Burkes. It was essentially Ticonderoga systems on a new hull with restored margins, and the improved survivability standards built into the Arleigh Burkes.

I was under the impression that there were also some heavy bulkheads dividing the enginerooms and wrapped around the CIC. Which I suppose would generally be classed as splinter protection.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Cause it been a constant want for everyship class since the Des Moines class.

Cause who doesn't want armor?

Thing is theres a reason why no post 1950 ship have gotten any armor outside of heavy splinter protection on the bulkheads from the thick heavy duty steel used.

And that cause the benefits of going heavier on armor is not worth either the cost, armor steel is extremely expensive, or weight.

Its more worthwhile to add better sensors or weapons for actively engaging stuff. Get far more usage out of the budget, either one, that way.

Or do what the USN does and use metals that are a grade down from proper armor metal for tge hulls. Resulting in a very tough vessel that can take one hell of a knock.

That is also fairly expensive cause those grade of metal are am absolute PITA to work with. But even working with the Quarter to slightly over an inch of that metal is fair bit cheaper then the nearly foot worth needed to stop a modern missile.

US carriers are armored, but the details are classified so I can't give any specifics about that. The USS Long Beach had armor too and not just splinter protection, again I can't give you any specifics.

On modern ships, armor can be steel or aluminum too, or even non-metal materials.

 

[Dilandu]

US carriers are armored, but the details are classified so I can't give any specifics about that. The USS Long Beach had armor too and not just splinter protection, again I can't give you any specifics.

According to what could be found in open sources, they used kevlar plates over reactors and magazines (0,75 inch, if I recall correctly). Plus the carrier's hull plating itself is quite thick.

 

[Dilandu]

One of the last ships that carried conventional steel armor were "Kirov"-class nuclear heavy missile cruisers. Since those ships grew to be very big and costly even on drawing boards, Soviet admirals wanted them to be reasonably durable, so they couldn't be disabled by a single unlucky hit.

"Kirov"-class armor protection is box-type 3-to-4-inch (70-100 mm) homogenous steel armor. Individual boxes are installed around reactors, combat information center, helicopter fuel & ammo supplies, and forward P-700 "Granit" missile launchers (those missiles are fueled by kerosene, so they require splinter protection while on ship), as well as anti-submarine missiles launcher magazine.

 

[TomS]

Thing is theres a reason why no post 1950 ship have gotten any armor outside of heavy splinter protection on the bulkheads from the thick heavy duty steel used.

This is absolutely not accurate. There is definitely actual armor on some modern ships, around key electronics, machinery, and control spaces, mainly. What exactly that consists of is not public info.

(Source, so I don't get into trouble: https://ingalls.huntingtoningalls.com/our-products/ddg/)

Now, what's the purpose of that armor? Not to stop missiles arriving intact at the target, for the most part, but to deal with fragments from missiles detonated close aboard (e.g., by CIWS), small arms (potentially up to RPGs and artillery rockets), and even some damage from missile impacts to other parts of the ship. And yes, that translates into preserving some ability to "fight hurt," along with all the other system hardening, duplication, etc. that happens in modern warships.

I am always reminded of USS Princeton, which ran over a pair of mines in the north Persian Gulf during ODS, and within 15 minutes was able to get her combat system back online and to serve as AW for the entire region for another 30 hours until relieved. Now, armor isn't the counter to mines, but you get the idea -- modern warships have a remarkable degree of resiliency. And armoring critical systems is part of that.

PS: I stumbled across a nice post by the OOD on Princeton that day that makes for good reading.

Princeton Mine Strike…

After celebrating Veterans Day 2013 yesterday, I thought it apropos that I would share one of my own ‘veteran stories’ from my days serving in the U.S. Navy. First let me say this story…

astoryworthtelling.blog

 

[T. A. Gardner]

The objective of ship armor today, at least in the US Navy, comes from experience from WW 2 and on with the results of hits and near misses by various types of weapons systems.

What was found was that fragmentation and penetration of the hull by fragments was more dangerous than a single large hole caused by a shell or torpedo. What a bunch of smaller holes scattered over the ship's hull did was allow multiple routes for progressive flooding that could eventually sink the ship. Even a small hole could potentially let in hundreds of gallons of water in minutes, and those holes were difficult to find and plug.

Thus, why the US went to armoring the entirety of a carrier's hull. This would prevent fragment damage to the outer hull of the ship that could lead to flooding. Deck armor was done the same way. It is designed to keep out fragments first and foremost.

What keeps the ship afloat and surviving modern weapons hits is a combination of compartmentation and decentralized power systems. So long as the ship has some power available and can contain the flooding to a localized set of compartments, it will remain afloat and can counter damage.

The older ideas of heavy belt and deck armor to prevent shells from penetrating to the "vitals" of a ship are simply and completely outdated. On the other hand, no armor is almost as bad as heavy armor. The idea today is one of you can't realistically stop damage from a direct hit, but you can minimize collateral damage from near misses and direct hits where fragmentation, blast, and fire damage are concerned.

 

[Firefinder]

This is absolutely not accurate. There is definitely actual armor on some modern ships, around key electronics, machinery, and control spaces, mainly. What exactly that consists of is not public info.

(Source, so I don't get into trouble: https://ingalls.huntingtoningalls.com/our-products/ddg/)

Now, what's the purpose of that armor? Not to stop missiles arriving intact at the target, for the most part, but to deal with fragments from missiles detonated close aboard (e.g., by CIWS), small arms (potentially up to RPGs and artillery rockets), and even some damage from missile impacts to other parts of the ship. And yes, that translates into preserving some ability to "fight hurt," along with all the other system hardening, duplication, etc. that happens in modern warships.

I am always reminded of USS Princeton, which ran over a pair of mines in the north Persian Gulf during ODS, and within 15 minutes was able to get her combat system back online and to serve as AW for the entire region for another 30 hours until relieved. Now, armor isn't the counter to mines, but you get the idea -- modern warships have a remarkable degree of resiliency. And armoring critical systems is part of that.

PS: I stumbled across a nice post by the OOD on Princeton that day that makes for good reading.

Princeton Mine Strike…

After celebrating Veterans Day 2013 yesterday, I thought it apropos that I would share one of my own ‘veteran stories’ from my days serving in the U.S. Navy. First let me say this story…

astoryworthtelling.blog

... That just proves what I said boss not refutes it.

I said post 1950 ships only got Splinter Protection.

What you post literally is the defination of SPLINTER PROTECTION.

Aka the armoring level use to keep chunks of metal from flying though the damn ship.

It does not stop the projectile from penerating, but it will contain the blast to that area.

Basically the ship version of the old Flak Jackets which only will stop shrapnel. And not the modern IOTV that stops rifle rounds which alot of the pre 1950 ships had.

A modern missile will punch though to a Burke CIC and basically mission kill it instantly. It not coming back up without massive repairs since that missile will shred everything important even with the protection there to say nothing of the crew. But the engines likely can still run so she can and likely will limp back to port.

But if that same missile hit 200 feet either side of the CIC, and assuming dont hit the engines or VLS, the ship can and WILL keep running after damcon efforts.

The heavy armoring like found on pre1950 ships, which I was refering to, means that each ship system is protected by multiple inches of armor steel and would allow for the different weapons to keep fighting even if the rest of the ships on fire. And ment to outright stop the projectile from getting in.

Thats is definitely not true for modern ships.

 

[TomS]

.. That just proves what I said boss not refutes it.

You said they just used heavy bulkheads. Which is not accurate -- there are structures that are not bulkheads, not just thicker HTS, but actual armor. And that's all I'll say because it's all that I know is public for sure.

 

[Firefinder]

You said they just used heavy bulkheads. Which is not accurate -- there are structures that are not bulkheads, not just thicker HTS, but actual armor. And that's all I'll say because it's all that I know is public for sure.

And thats covered under splinter protection. Its an umbrella term for all that.

Bulkheads, kelvar inserts, all thats covered under splinter protection.

Cause that all it good for.

It will not Stop a SAP type Warhead from getting in and wrecking a certain area. It will stop the adjoining areas from being wrecked through.

And thats often enough to keep the ship afloat.

Baring said area being hit is the Mags, but the number of ships surviving a mag hit is low.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

The heavy armoring like found on pre1950 ships, which I was refering to, means that each ship system is protected by multiple inches of armor steel and would allow for the different weapons to keep fighting even if the rest of the ships on fire. And ment to outright stop the projectile from getting in.

Thats is definitely not true for modern ships.

Even on pre-50's ships with heavy armor, it often did little real good in keeping systems in the fight. In two cases with battleships, one with Gneisenau at the Lofoten Islands, and another v. Jean Bart, a heavy battleship round struck the turret - barbette joint and damaged it such that the turret could no longer turn. The turret and guns were intact but now out of action. Bismarck might have suffered a similar hit too.

If you look at the case of S. Dakota at Guadalcanal, the ship was peppered with 5" to 8" rounds and was essentially a mission kill without ever suffering a single penetration of its heavier armor. The ship didn't get a single main battery round off in that fight.

With magazines, heavier armor often proved a detriment to survival rather than a preventive measure. Ships with lighter armor often survived a magazine hit because the magazine could vent rather than explode, causing massive damage but leaving the ship afloat. The USS Savanah off Salerno is an example of this.

If you look at the Kirishima battle damage, the USS Washington with 16" rounds demolished that ship without ever hitting the main belt itself. The belt did nothing to protect the ship in essence.

http://navweaps.com/index_lundgren/Kirishima_Damage_Analysis.pdf

In fact, it was mainly splinter damage that did Kirishima in. Yes, the actual hits caused some massive flooding, but that alone wouldn't have finished the ship. Instead, it was the spread of flooding through secondary damage (splinters) that really doomed it. The other cause was improper damage control responses to that flooding.

The DC officer on the Kirishima ordered counter flooding rather than pumping as a means of keeping the ship afloat and on an even keel. This just settled the ship in the water and allowed for more flooding to occur.

The other modern design difference is that ships today are designed to have a certain amount of flexibility in their hull. This is to prevent overly massive damage from under-the-keel torpedo hits. Against an older heavily armored ship, such a hit would be far more devastating in that it would flex a very rigid and stiff hull causing it to snap rather than flex. The result is the ship's back is broken and the ship breaks up. A modern ship design would allow for the ship to rise with the explosion bubble, flex, then settle back in the water intact and damaged rather than broken in two.



That's the USS Wilkes Barre after being hit under the keel by a Mk 48 torpedo. The cruiser broke in half and sank.

 

[TomS]

And thats covered under splinter protection. Its an umbrella term for all that.

Bulkheads, kelvar inserts, all thats covered under splinter protection.

Cause that all it good for.

It will not Stop a SAP type Warhead from getting in and wrecking a certain area. It will stop the adjoining areas from being wrecked through.

And thats often enough to keep the ship afloat.

Baring said area being hit is the Mags, but the number of ships surviving a mag hit is low.

OK, we're probably on more or less the same page here. Sorry for the guff.

 

[that_person]

Then why was that on the Cruiser Baseline (CGBL) studies post-Tico?

What does CGBL have to do with this? The CGBL was designed to examine the deficiencies in the Burke and Tico designs and figure out how they could be fixed in a new ship, specifically low growth margins.

 

[Scott Kenny]

What does CGBL have to do with this? The CGBL was designed to examine the deficiencies in the Burke and Tico designs and figure out how they could be fixed in a new ship, specifically low growth margins.

And one of the deficiencies noted is a lack of protection around critical systems.

 

[that_person]

And one of the deficiencies noted is a lack of protection around critical systems.

That doesn’t mean they’d add actual armor. It probably just means they’d further subdivide the hull, move the machinery rooms farther apart, reinforce a few bulkheads, etc. Modern protection has very little to do with traditional armor.

 

[Kat Tsun]

That doesn’t mean they’d add actual armor.

It does, actually.

Historical Review of Cruiser Characteristics, Roles and Missions

web.archive.org

If a future cruiser is not a dedicated AAW/ASW carrier escort (directly replacing the CG 47 class in the force structure, intended to surge with the carrier battle groups), the ship design features that come from a return to historical mainline of cruiser missions would include:

• Increased survivability, especially against ambush attacks, including a return to structural armor,

This, being at the literal top of the list of potentials for a future cruiser, is rather indicative of the thinking.

NAVSEA has been softly mulling armor protection for surface combatants for decades. The PLAN may have actually done it, if you believe the Japanese, and they designed the ASM-3 to handle this by doing a high angle (80-degree or higher) top attack onto the deck. Besides that, most U.S. warships have spall liners and armored steel boxes for the VLS, aside from the Ticos perhaps.

Three or so inches of HY80 should be sufficient in practical terms to stop any existing light anti-ship missile, from Penguin to Harpoon, if the British experience is any indication. In that sense, a few inches of HY80 may end up being the TLAM-N of future surface escorts: something requiring allocation of heavy anti-ship resources that would strain available war shots of anti-ship aviation regiments pretty significantly for outsized potential losses.

The solution would be to develop a new class of anti-ship missile while the extant stockpiles of anti-ship missiles are mollified. Given U.S. comparative advantage is in missiles, this is not practical for the U.S. Navy, because it is hard for America to make even fairly simple warships. It is simple for the PRC, though, while it is probably difficult for them to develop advanced missiles.

So no, the USN won't add actual armor to its ships, but that's mostly because it can't make new ships anyway, rather than it thinks it's dumb.

If the US were able to produce new ships rapidly, putting a few inches of steel on a bigger Burke hull would be pretty nice, as it would help reduce the impact of things like USS Cole-type bombings and preclude Stark-type incidents where an Exocet went through one end and out the other of a warship and causing fires as it flew. If it ended up as big as the Clevelands it would still be eminently producible.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

And one of the deficiencies noted is a lack of protection around critical systems.

The Arleigh Burke had significant amount of passive protection, that was literally one of the main innovations in its design.

CGBL was drawn up to provide a "modern cruiser" baseline design could be compared with other future designs. That's why it combined the features of a modern destroyer (the Arleigh Burke) with the "cruiser" features of the Ticonderoga (although given the Ticos were laid down as DDGs, I don't know what traditional cruiser features they actually have).

The added margins were so it could be compared to new designs which also had margins designed in, if it had been a serious design drawn up with the intention of actually being built it would not have needed those margins as all of its onboard systems were already in service and a known quantity.

 

[Hood]

Can folks please stay on topic? Not sure what any of this has to do with Iowa or Alaska-class conversions to be honest.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Can folks please stay on topic? Not sure what any of this has to do with Iowa or Alaska-class conversions to be honest.

The discussion of armor and such is relevant since all of that could have been changed or rearranged on a major conversion. Certainly any main turrets removed would have their armored barbettes removed too. Deck and belt armor could have been altered or removed.

The weight difference in a missile conversion would be an issue where you are replacing heavy guns, shells, and turrets with light missile launchers, radars, and light (by comparison for their volume) missiles.

That last is a serious issue. Shells and powder are compact but heavy and take up less volume than missiles and their handling system would. Protecting the larger magazine volume could be an issue as could watertight integrity of the ship in that the new larger magazines allow too much flooding.

 

[moin1900]

Interdiction Assault Ship

Interdiction Assault Ship - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Concept Model BB(V)-63
Martin Marietta Aerospace

https://www.reddit.com/r/WarshipPorn/comments/11gqlka

View: https://www.reddit.com/r/WarshipPorn/comments/11gqlka/concept_model_of_uss_missouri_bb63_after/


USS NEW JERSEY PHASE TWO MODEL
with FMC 155mm VLG

https://www.reddit.com/r/WorldOfWarships/comments/98q11f

View: https://www.reddit.com/r/WorldOfWarships/comments/98q11f/unholy_spawn_of_an_iowa_class_and_a_cv/

 

[JoeCalPo]

The discussion of armor and such is relevant since all of that could have been changed or rearranged on a major conversion. Certainly any main turrets removed would have their armored barbettes removed too. Deck and belt armor could have been altered or removed.

The weight difference in a missile conversion would be an issue where you are replacing heavy guns, shells, and turrets with light missile launchers, radars, and light (by comparison for their volume) missiles.

That last is a serious issue. Shells and powder are compact but heavy and take up less volume than missiles and their handling system would. Protecting the larger magazine volume could be an issue as could watertight integrity of the ship in that the new larger magazines allow too much flooding.

The barbettes were integral to the structure of the ship, so removing them would require major reconstruction of the ship.
The space would likely have been adapted for storage of ammunition, parts, and fuel for the aircraft.

The built-up flight deck and hangar would have balanced the lost weight, except it would be higher up and thus shift the ship's metacentric height.

An idea I had was, instead of the radically new designed VLG, why not adapt 155mm turrets adapted from Paladin SPGs? They're a proven platform, though needing modification for ship-borne use. They have a much smaller crew than the old 5"/38 twins with a bigger shell and better range.

 

[TomS]

An idea I had was, instead of the radically new designed VLG, why not adapt 155mm turrets adapted from Paladin SPGs? They're a proven platform, though needing modification for ship-borne use. They have a much smaller crew than the old 5"/38 twins with a bigger shell and better range.

This idea resurfaces periodically (most recently the Germans with a PzH2000 turret on a frigate).

There are lots of issues, starting with marinization (salt water is very rough on standard vehicle parts) to continuous motion (SPGs don't have to account for the constant forward motion plus pitch/roll/yaw/heave of a ship) to ammunition (Army ammo usually isn't safe for shipboard use due to the complex electromagnetic environment).

Plus, in this specific case, I'd be worried about the swept diameter of the turret. The bustle on Paladin might be too long to fit where the 5"/38 mounts go. It's a tight fit to the superstructure.

 

[Scott Kenny]

This idea resurfaces periodically (most recently the Germans with a PzH2000 turret on a frigate).

There are lots of issues, starting with marinization (salt water is very rough on standard vehicle parts) to continuous motion (SPGs don't have to account for the constant forward motion plus pitch/roll/yaw/heave of a ship) to ammunition (Army ammo usually isn't safe for shipboard use due to the complex electromagnetic environment).

Plus, in this specific case, I'd be worried about the swept diameter of the turret. The bustle on Paladin might be too long to fit where the 5"/38 mounts go. It's a tight fit to the superstructure.

Anyone got some 1/350 scale STL files? or 1/285 we can downscale?