If you were Sandys or Mcnamara?

[Scott Kenny]

Deck launched intercepts are primarily a fleet specific defensive role, and doesn't so much pertain to the RAF procurement.

It's still got the same timing issues between detection and getting into position as an RAF interceptor.

Same functional role, different details.

 

[Rule of cool]

I suspect that was the Army HQ not thinking about what throwing nukes around would mean

I think the Army thought it could still fight even with the odd nuke being thrown around. After all the Soviet Union and Germany lost tens of millions of people in WW2 and kept fighting.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I think the Army thought it could still fight even with the odd nuke being thrown around. After all the Soviet Union and Germany lost tens of millions of people in WW2 and kept fighting.

But not in one battle with all their equipment.

 

[Rule of cool]

I was thinking about the likes of the initial phase of Barbarossa, or Bagration.

 

[Purpletrouble]

I think the Army thought it could still fight even with the odd nuke being thrown around. After all the Soviet Union and Germany lost tens of millions of people in WW2 and kept fighting.

I think the (British) Army just went “phew, thank fk thats over. Back to proper soldiering where they’ve only got sharp bits of fruit”. That (well actually some quite demanding colonial minor wars) and an increasingly comfy garrison life in BAOR plus trying to manage peacetime national service pretty much occupied it fully.

I find it amazing how little the British Army modernised its armoured/mechanised forces (thinking armoured infantry vehicles and orbat, less so tanks) between 1945 and the 1960s yet had copious evidence its tactics and organisational structures even in 45 were at best sub par. In contrast the RN and RAF poured vast effort into shaping their 1950s forces to be much better at refighting WW2 and recognised when nukes meant that wasnt the best idea (RN by 54 radical review, RAF perhaps had it imposed in 57).

 

[ItalianAFDFail]

i just realized these past weeks a lot of various things regarding the defense situation of Italy in the 50s and 60s, arguably the big necessity for survival in that time is efficiency over "fancy stuff" F-11F-1F would be the godsend the AF needs for the "low" component of the Hi-Low strategy but unfortunately due to likely political shenanigans that are 100% bound to happen the High component would be either significantly reduced or scrapped entirely, the AF could use Super Tigers like the F-104 and the end result is an F-11F-1F ASA in the late 90s and maybe it would be kept around and sold also to Turkey untill the 2000s, the High component could lead to political suicide and relying too much on planes like the F-4 would lead to massive issues later down the line, development of a national fighter could result in a competitive plane but then you would find yourself with Aeritalia trying to sell it to a lot of people that would probably use it aggressively (look at the MB-339 and it's operators), development of further planes would lead to likely clashes with the Brits and Germans when making Tornado and Typhoon down the line and if everything goes south we would find ourselves forced to make a plane on our own or at least collaborating with the French. so the AF would also be even more annoying than in the OTL when it comes to certain opinions (ie Italy has an AF lobby that belives most of the funding would have to go to them, they were the premier complainers of the F-35 procurement), opponent wise the candidates are either Lybia or Yugoslavia so this F-11 would have access to Aspide and BVR capabilities because after it's procurement i fully expect the AF to treat it like the F-104 in the OTL but that would also mean that pilots would die less often due to this plane being well, better designed and made than a Starfighter and if push comes to shove Italy may even be tempted to buy Hornets if Grumman plays their cards right.
Army wise they could also try to revive the italian missile program (SAMs) but the results would lead to issues later down the line as in the MiC becoming way too powerful, ADS would be relegated to a Skyguard system and also to an OTOMATIC with added missiles, the goal of that would be a system that would have to deal with missiles, planes and self defense if cought in encirclements by invading forces (due to the idea of the Fanteria d'Arresto or Stoppage Infantry units) the idea is that the OTOMATIC of this timeline would have to hold the line untill the army would arrive in force, the vehicle would be essentially irreplacable even after the cold war due to the versatility it offers and with clever marketing i am sure OTO would sell even just the turret system to ex-Soviet clients as un upgrade, i wouldn't be surprised to see a Greek and Turkish version of it, this would lead to even more interest in infrastructure of the country and traveling of troops, likely forcing the civilian government to continue advancement in train stuff, but i digress...
the navy part will come later due to it needing a full article alone. the continuation of Army stuff will also be there, later

 

[Mike OTDP]

I'll play...

A competent alternative to MacNamara would have spiked F-111 development very early, before contract award. The USAF gets A-6s for the medium strike mission. USAF requirements are rolled into a USN-led A-6 successor program, which fields an aircraft around 1975. This is part of a much larger effort that puts the Navy in charge of tactical aircraft development. The F-14 gets built, but the A model is rapidly replaced by the B with upgraded engines (possibly RR Speys), and a C with digital flight controls that make it MUCH better mannered in the air.

For the UK? The problem is that the UK was badly lagging the United States in radar development. British engines were excellent, the airframes were OK, and the radars were underwhelming. With the increasing emphasis on avionics with the third generation jets, that was crippling. The best bet might have been to partner with American firms, persuade the USAF and USN to adopt joint US/UK requirements.

 

[edwest4]

The Americans made their second biggest mistake after Korea, they expelled their allies from the Middle East to replace them with Israel, then they continued to make mistakes in Cuba, in Vietnam, in Cambodia, in Afghanistan, in Libya... it's not easy to be the world's policeman, they should have hired Columbo instead of Kissinger.

Kissinger was former OSS. A global intelligence organization. They ignored Presidents starting with Truman, then Eisenhower, and then Kennedy. As the OSS, they killed people and blew up things. After the war, they would just keep going to fight the Soviet threat.

 

[Rule of cool]

For the UK? The problem is that the UK was badly lagging the United States in radar development. British engines were excellent, the airframes were OK, and the radars were underwhelming. With the increasing emphasis on avionics with the third generation jets, that was crippling. The best bet might have been to partner with American firms, persuade the USAF and USN to adopt joint US/UK requirements.

What's wrong with the AI23? It was the worlds first monopulse radar in 1959 and far better than the French Cyrano II. Even the fallback AI20 found useful service as the Red Steer tail warning radar in the V bombers?

If the AI23 had a 'problem' it was lack of British government support on the scale of the French government with the Mirage III family.

 

[Pioneer]

Leaving aside all the problems that the RoE and basic design and technology caused there's really little excuse for the Aim9d breaking up on launch or Aim7e2 detonation at 1000' from launch and all the other reliability problems.

So initiate Blue-Ribbon Committee earlier than later. Although this would require the Pentagon to be far more honest and critical of the Sparrow and Sidewinder poor performance earlier......


Regards
Pioneer

 

[Justo Miranda]

Kissinger was former OSS. A global intelligence organization. They ignored Presidents starting with Truman, then Eisenhower, and then Kennedy. As the OSS, they killed people and blew up things. After the war, they would just keep going to fight the Soviet threat.

In my opinion, all the misfortunes that are happening to Trump are a consequence of having hired Kissinger as an adviser. This man may have had good intentions, but those who hired him were very unlucky.

 

[Pioneer]

I'll play...

A competent alternative to MacNamara would have spiked F-111 development very early, before contract award. The USAF gets A-6s for the medium strike mission.

Model 128B USAF Intruder Air Force Proposal SR-195

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/attachments/128b-jpg.4616/

Regards
Pioneer

 

[Rule of cool]

I think the A6 would be a hard pill for the USAF to swallow when the F105 and the B58 are in service. A more acceptable Navy aircraft would be the A5, like the RAAF Hancock mission recommended to the Australian government in November 1963.

Or more appropriately Mac should have halted production of the F111A, got the problems sorted out then restarted production of the F111F spec aircraft. This would have avoided the problems that arose from building 4 different versions in ~100 strong batches and instead seen greater numbers overall built.

 

[MadRat]

A5 is a legacy mostly manually controlled aircraft from the start. In contrast, the A-6 was a pretty advanced machine throughout its service.

 

[Rule of cool]

A5 is a legacy mostly manually controlled aircraft from the start. In contrast, the A-6 was a pretty advanced machine throughout its service.

The F111 was the benchmark for tactical strike in the late 60s, the A6 is so far behind it that the RAF and RAAF never even looked at it.

 

[Pioneer]

The F111 was the benchmark for tactical strike in the late 60s, the A6 is so far behind it that the RAF and RAAF never even looked at it.

The TFX/F-111 was irrufutably the benchmark for tactical strike in the 1960's Rule for cool, but you'd undoubtedly appreciate that it was also extremely technically advanced and immature. An issue not many air force could afford, let alone maintain and operate the F-111 effectively.
I've read that the Israeli Air Force lobbied for the A-6 Intruder after France shafted them, but instead got the supplementary offer of the A-4 Skyhawk by the United States.
I would find it extremely interesting to know how many maintenance man hours went into maintain the A-5B (or even better, the A-5C) and the F-111A/C?

P.S. I'm only guessing, but would the A-6 Intruder's radar have performed somewhat better over water - against shipping better than the original F-111A/C's radar?

Regards
Pioneer

 

[Rule of cool]

The F111 had a few avionics fits, IIUC the A/C/E was the simplest and most reliable, the FB and D the most complex and difficult and the F sorted out the problems with the D. In any case the A6 avionics suite was also extremely complex and so integral to the aircraft that an usserviceability in the avionics meant an unservicable aircraft. In both cases the answer isn't to throw these aircraft away and get some worse but more reliable aircraft, rather its to work on fixing these problems and getting the inherent capability.

 

[MadRat]

From what I understand, the A-6 was actually a very maintenance-friendly design with large access hatches and the big hinged nose. An engine that, although a turbojet, was economy and cost friendly. A-6 would have been a modders dream. F-111, not so much.

Nothing built within the next two decades really featured details like that until Northrop's F-20A innovations from the experience with the F-17 and F-18 programs. The F-20A was quietly a masterclass in implementation of creature comforts that small air forces would have benefitted from. It was designed with future modifications in mind. We are spoiled today because most 4th generation programs have focused on maintenance friendly layouts.

A part of me wishes the USAF had opted for an F-110 program to upgrade the F-111 tactical fleet. That, and give them the APG-71s off the retired Tomcats. The FB-111 fleet was long since turned into a jamming capability earmarked for obsolescence, so no real path existed to re-engine or upgrade them any more than they had. If you could have saved the best parts of the Raven with a refit back to a strike capability then it had potential. But the Raven program pretty much permanently killed the FB airframe's future off.

 

[Rule of cool]

Its not small hatches and hard to access bits that are the problem, it's the transition from analogue to digital computers at a time when solid state electronics, integrated circuits and data buses were in their infancy. This is why the 1970 A6E was the definitive model, not the 1963 A6A who's sophisticated avionics took years to become reliable enough.

Another example of this is when the British went looking for a ruggedised digital computer for the TSR2 there was only 1 available in the world; the VERDAN, which was so limited that they needed 2 in the TSR2 to get the job(s) done. This is typical of the era.