In 1959 the USN put out a requirement for long loiter at long distance from the carrier to fire long-range missiles and the result was the F6D Missileer, which I doubt anyone would believe it a good result, the USN certainly didn't.
IIRC the only reason the F6D didn't go through is because it was close to the end of an administration and the outgoing incumbents decided not to bind the incoming replacement to honouring a service contract. Said replacement took a look at it, said no, and it went the way of the dodo.

Catholic intellectuals like to think of Adam and Eve's screwup in the Garden of Eden as felix culpa (fortunate sin) in that it blemished mankind but led to the advent of Christ. In the same way, the failure of Missileer and F-111B is responsible for us having Tomcat.
 
Yes, see the F-4 Phantom, something which Macmillan repeatedly asked the RAF to emulated in the lead up to the the 1957 Defence White Paper instead of F.155T.
Reference please. When did Macmillan ask for a British F4?
 
Reference please. When did Macmillan ask for a British F4?
Not specifically an F-4, I misremembered that, Greg Baughen's article on the 1957 Defence White Paper, A Brief History of the Future for The Aviation Historian Issue 20 mentions that in February 1956 Macmillan pointed out to the Air Staff that a case could be made for a manned fighter force supporting operations East of Suez, and that this was a real possibility given the then ongoing Suez Crisis.

Later in June that year, he circulated a note suggesting that Fighter Command could not perform it's role in a nuclear war had no part to play in other more limited wars, and could not protect against Ballistic Missile attack. He conceded that a new Fighter was needed by the Royal Navy to defend the fleet, and that the RAF might need a fighter for use overseas, and it might need to be an "entirely different type of fighter", but was critical of short-range fighters to intercept Soviet bombers.

TNA References in the footnotes for these statements are AIR 20/9774, February 1956, and AIR 8/2014, 11.6.56 respectively.
 
No transonic fighter fleet, Britain needs supersonic aircraft ASAP, not in 5+ years.
This bullet isn't one of the issues of the time. It was all about protecting the V bomber detterent.

The need was to have an effective means of intercepting bombers capable of a low supersonic dash speed, that the existing Javelin + Firestreak combination was less effective against. Hence a need for some better option:
  • Increased climb rate, acceleration and speed for the interceptor (Lightning, SR.177)
  • Forward aspect weapons e.g. Red Top, Genie, Sparrow III
  • Combining both the above into a Surface to Air Guided Weapon
  • Earlier warning e.g. additional ground based radars up threat, AEW

An additional issue at this time is around competence of UK Industry as the RAF and RN have just been stung by recent delivery issues from all their main fighter manufacturers (Swift, early Hunters, Javelin, Sea Vixen etc.)
 
The discipline of collaboration with foreign partners and learning of new methods by British industry was matched by guaranteed numbers of the final aircraft.
It is no accident that the biggest foul ups in later years involved two UK attempts to do a "national solution" with Nimrod AEW and then with Nimrod MR4. A national BAe 1216 might well have been P1154 revisited.
 
Not specifically an F-4, I misremembered that, Greg Baughen's article on the 1957 Defence White Paper, A Brief History of the Future for The Aviation Historian Issue 20 mentions that in February 1956 Macmillan pointed out to the Air Staff that a case could be made for a manned fighter force supporting operations East of Suez, and that this was a real possibility given the then ongoing Suez Crisis.

Later in June that year, he circulated a note suggesting that Fighter Command could not perform it's role in a nuclear war had no part to play in other more limited wars, and could not protect against Ballistic Missile attack. He conceded that a new Fighter was needed by the Royal Navy to defend the fleet, and that the RAF might need a fighter for use overseas, and it might need to be an "entirely different type of fighter", but was critical of short-range fighters to intercept Soviet bombers.

TNA References in the footnotes for these statements are AIR 20/9774, February 1956, and AIR 8/2014, 11.6.56 respectively.

That's the best reference I've seen on the subject.

However the US MDAP money that paid for the likes of the Javelin, RAF Sabres and part of Valiant development dried up in 1956 and the 57 DWP took 100 million out of the budget. So we're back to squaring the circle of recognising the future RAF requirement but not having the resources or time to fill it to the standard required.

So what can Britain do that most closely meets this requirement while fitting most closely with the time and money constraints?
 
This bullet isn't one of the issues of the time. It was all about protecting the V bomber detterent.

The need was to have an effective means of intercepting bombers capable of a low supersonic dash speed, that the existing Javelin + Firestreak combination was less effective against. Hence a need for some better option:
  • Increased climb rate, acceleration and speed for the interceptor (Lightning, SR.177)
  • Forward aspect weapons e.g. Red Top, Genie, Sparrow III
  • Combining both the above into a Surface to Air Guided Weapon
  • Earlier warning e.g. additional ground based radars up threat, AEW

An additional issue at this time is around competence of UK Industry as the RAF and RN have just been stung by recent delivery issues from all their main fighter manufacturers (Swift, early Hunters, Javelin, Sea Vixen etc.)

As Tentative Fleet Plan pointed out there was a recognition within political circles in 1956 that a fighter was required going forward, and in reality this was met in an interim, sub-standard fashion by the Hunter FGA/FR conversion from 1958.
 
If I were MacNamara or Sandys?

Well, the latter is even less likely than the former, but
1) I'd still yell at the services about jointness. They had actually gotten pretty good about training aircraft, except for the necessary difference between trainers that need to operate onto and off of carriers.
2) It would be nice for the USAF and USN to have a common strike aircraft, but the two missions being jammed into the F-111 were too disparate: the USN wanted what was probably the closest the US ever came to a Tu-28 since the Bell FM-1. Whether this was a wise idea is a second question (but I think the answer is "no"). What the USAF wanted was a supersonic strike aircraft. These missions are too discrepant to be merged without severe compromise and way to much money up front (arguably, what the USAF wanted was more like the TSR.2 than anything else).
3) Examine missions that overlap between the two services: fighters, strike aircraft, attack aircraft. Come up with specs that permit the same aircraft to be used for both services with minimal compromise. This may require locking USAF and USN/USMC spec writers in a windowless room for several days, as both would have parochial preferences that are, in sum "we've always done it that way" and can't be explained further. "We've always done it that way" isn't a reason; it's an excuse.
4) Remember that an MBA or PhD in Management doesn't give expertise in anything else. Neither does large amount of gold trim on a uniform. While I have much greater respect for military officers, in general, than MBAs (want to ruin China's economy? Give free scholarships to business schools so they can get MBAs), they also have specialized knowledge with large blind spots.

-------------------------------------

Sandys' issues are different, partly because he bought into the idea that manned aircraft were rendered obsolete by missiles, but also because the UK's political elites may still have been thinking in terms of a world-wide empire that no longer existed, resulting in a military budget that could no longer be sustained. The main threat, the USSR, was within easy missile and bomber range and the amount of damage by a few nuclear strikes would make most of the UK look like Berlin in about May 1945. When you're in a position where any conceivable defense against the primary threat is insufficient to prevent apocolyptic levels of damage, it may begin to look like defenses against that threat are pointless.
 
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If I were Mac I'd order the JFK as an SCB250 full sized nuclear carrier with 4 x A3W reactors, and make it work from a budget perspective.
 
Not specifically an F-4, I misremembered that, Greg Baughen's article on the 1957 Defence White Paper, A Brief History of the Future for The Aviation Historian Issue 20 mentions that in February 1956 Macmillan pointed out to the Air Staff that a case could be made for a manned fighter force supporting operations East of Suez, and that this was a real possibility given the then ongoing Suez Crisis.

Later in June that year, he circulated a note suggesting that Fighter Command could not perform it's role in a nuclear war had no part to play in other more limited wars, and could not protect against Ballistic Missile attack. He conceded that a new Fighter was needed by the Royal Navy to defend the fleet, and that the RAF might need a fighter for use overseas, and it might need to be an "entirely different type of fighter", but was critical of short-range fighters to intercept Soviet bombers.

TNA References in the footnotes for these statements are AIR 20/9774, February 1956, and AIR 8/2014, 11.6.56 respectively.

Coming back to this if I may.

The Lightning F1 and F1A were ordered in November 1956, when the fuel capacity of the Lightning was measly 3200 litres and a 910 litre HTP tank for the Napier Double Scorpion, the rocket used the fuel from the aircraft. This is what Macmillan would have been critical of, and not surprising really.

In 1958 the rocket was cancelled and the conformal belly store was routinely (I believe almost always) used as a fuel tank, adding 1,120 litres bringing the total up to 4,320 litres. Better but still not good.

The January 1962 order for 45 F3 was amended at some point to 16 F3, 16 F6(Interim) and 13 F6, while 33 F6 were ordered in January 1964. These had a new, kinked, conically cambered wing leading edge, incorporating a slightly larger leading edge fuel tank holding an extra 60 litres of fuel, for a total of 3260. With the small belly tank this is a total 4,380 litres.

The F6 also replaced the 1,120 litre belly tank with the 2,800 litre tank, almost doubling the internal fuel of the basic aircraft to a grand total of 6,060 litres.

Now what if in 1957 someone at EE, in response to the PM's criticism of the short range of RAF interceptors, proposed the 2,800 litre belly tank for the Lightning which effectively doubled the fuel and therefore the range presumably at the expense of ultimate climb performance. Would that ameliorate some of the PMs criticism, leading him and Sandys to not be so harsh in their judgements?
 
What about ZELL?

Even the Germans thought the F-104 was too sluggish and looked at ZELL as a means to blast them skyward from dispersed sites.
Imagine a laden Lightning with ZELL to get it airborne to save fuel (yes its borderline crazy but not as crazy as a catapult-launched Avro Manchester).
 
There is no doubt the Lightning could have been improved. The main wings were iconic but gave it strict limitations. But for that period it was an effective design. Certainly it could have used a shorter chord like on the XF8U, a bigger radar, and a better landing gear solution. But then its not a Lightning. If anything they could have purchased more F-4s, with or without Speys.
 
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What about ZELL?

Even the Germans thought the F-104 was too sluggish and looked at ZELL as a means to blast them skyward from dispersed sites.
Imagine a laden Lightning with ZELL to get it airborne to save fuel (yes its borderline crazy but not as crazy as a catapult-launched Avro Manchester).
Maybe? The problem is providing security to all those dispersed sites versus the Spetsnaz that were assumed to be raiding western Europe.

I think the right answer is actually RATO/JATO bottles at the air bases.

There is no doubt the Lightning could have been improved. The main wings were iconic but gave it strict limitations. But for that period it was an effective design. Certainly it could have used a shorter chord like on the XF8U, a bigger radar, and a better landing gear solution. But then its not a Lightning.
A revised Lightning that was closer to Crusader 2 or 3 would be just about ideal. We can argue one engine or two, but just going to Crusader-like aerodynamics would have helped a lot.

1) Treat the chin inlet as roughly 1/4 of a conical inlet(or however much of the circle it actually represents) for the math. This gives you space for a bigger radar dish.
2) Put the main landing gear into the fuselage where it belongs! This frees up space in the wing for fuel tanks.
3) refine that wing shape some more.
4) add a spine for either fuel or electronics.

5) not strictly a Lightning issue, but build both a Sparrow equivalent and a Sidewinder equivalent, guidance packages that can be fitted to whatever size ground-attack rockets the UK makes. That makes your guided missiles relatively simple and easy to upgrade over time. Say, RP-3 and 7" UP, though both radar and IR missiles may need to go on the 7" rocket because the 3" would be a tight fit even for Sidewinder electronics. (related, steal the idea of Rollerons as soon as you see a Sidewinder to save having to make a full autopilot fit into the missile)
 
Put the main landing gear into the fuselage where it belongs! This frees up space in the wing for fuel tanks.

I believe there was a variant proposed with this, the 'hips' were flared in accordance with the area rule and the main landing gear was moved to those flared hips.

However the biggest driver is cost, US MWDAP funding dried up in 1956 and the 57 DWP cut 100m from the budget. The Lightning development batch was the only 'fighter' aircraft flying in April 57 so anything to increase the range has to be cheap and immediate, which the 2,800l tank is if it was thought of early enough. The PM's public concern in mid and late 1956 could/should have been sufficient for MoD/MoS/RAF/EE to investigate the possibility, especially given the rocket HTP oxidiser tank was mounted semi-externally.
 
The Royal Navy fighter requirement should have produced something as decent as the Buccaneer was in the strike role.
This thread needs to consider why the Royal Navy saddled itself with the Scimitar and Sea Vixen and impractical alternatives like SR177, HS1154 and the F4.
Choosing the large F4 could only work if new carriers were built to carry them. By limiting its options to expensive new ships the RN condemned the FAA to eventual extinction and forced the RAF to buy F4s instead of a mix of P1154 and Lightnings.
If only Supermarine could have built a decent Scimitar sized supersonic fighter.
A Vickers VG or De Haviland delta would have taken at least until 1970 to develop.
The VG Lightning would have needed a similar time to materialise but might have been the best alternative to the F4.
 
The Royal Navy fighter requirement should have produced something as decent as the Buccaneer was in the strike role.
This thread needs to consider why the Royal Navy saddled itself with the Scimitar and Sea Vixen and impractical alternatives like SR177, HS1154 and the F4.
Choosing the large F4 could only work if new carriers were built to carry them. By limiting its options to expensive new ships the RN condemned the FAA to eventual extinction and forced the RAF to buy F4s instead of a mix of P1154 and Lightnings.
If only Supermarine could have built a decent Scimitar sized supersonic fighter.
A Vickers VG or De Haviland delta would have taken at least until 1970 to develop.
The VG Lightning would have needed a similar time to materialise but might have been the best alternative to the F4.
I honestly think that the problem was the UK not building a run of low supersonic fighters (F100 equivalents) and jumping straight to Mach 2. No experience with building supersonic aircraft at the different companies.

Build a hundred or so of the Mach 1.whatever planes, fly the wings off them for a few years, and pass them from Fighter Command to the named Air Forces in place of Hunters. Let the Mach 1.whatever planes totally replace the Hunters!

Fighter command then gets a much more refined Lightning (closer to a Crusader II if not Crusader III) instead of a decade-old armed research aircraft.

For the RN? If British industry cannot deliver, buy American or License it. I'm sure the F4D Skyray would have been an excellent option. Stick a Spey in it so the Buccs and Skyrays both use the same engine (Skyray with afterburner), it will take some work to fit the Spey in there since the Spey is 4" larger in diameter than the J57.

Westland did very well licensing Sikorsky helicopter designs, and became a very respectable and capable helicopter design house themselves. And Douglas was one of the best Naval aircraft manufacturers of the 1950s and 1960s!
 
If I were MacNamara or Sandys?

Well, the latter is even less likely than the former, but
1) I'd still yell at the services about jointness. They had actually gotten pretty good about training aircraft, except for the necessary difference between trainers that need to operate onto and off of carriers.
... and try to end the endless turf wars between Army, Navy and Air Force. Which would have been a thankless job, because of the inifitesimal chances of success.
 
The Royal Navy fighter requirement should have produced something as decent as the Buccaneer was in the strike role.

If only Supermarine could have built a decent Scimitar sized supersonic fighter.
not to sound weird or anything but could Supermarine try to make the type 545 work for the role? it needs improvements in ruggedness but the design itself is sound and that would also give the RAF the opportunity to develop it further
 
No experience with building supersonic aircraft at the different companies.
Well if you stop things for years because you've run out of money in 1945 and it all gets so bad by 1948 you seriously plan for domestic famine, were rationing would be 300 calories less than during WWII. Having almost the entire RN tied up at port to save money and finally admit you cannot afford to
fight the Communists in Greece. Then obviously your state's companies wanting to develop reheat or swept wings are going to lag behind.
Korea kicks off but you're ordering production off the drawing board, with precious little time to work out the flaws and you're companies are still learning hard lessons from this when the Korean War stopped and the money dried up.
 
Well if you stop things for years because you've run out of money in 1945 and it all gets so bad by 1948 you seriously plan for domestic famine, were rationing would be 300 calories less than during WWII. Having almost the entire RN tied up at port to save money and finally admit you cannot afford to
fight the Communists in Greece. Then obviously your state's companies wanting to develop reheat or swept wings are going to lag behind.
Korea kicks off but you're ordering production off the drawing board, with precious little time to work out the flaws and you're companies are still learning hard lessons from this when the Korean War stopped and the money dried up.

This is the problem with alternative history scenarios, without a good point to start they can get lost by going back one more step or pulling one thread in a bundle. 1914 is a good starting point, as is 1957 for Britain as a bunch of factors converged on a single point in time and big decisions were made.

Of course it would be better if the Miles M52 programme had spawned a heap of transonic aircraft including the Victor. But then again it would be better if Crete was held and the war was shorter. But then again etc etc etc ...... it never ends.
 
Of course it would be better if the Miles M52 programme had spawned a heap of transonic aircraft including the Victor. But then again it would be better if Crete was held and the war was shorter. But then again etc etc etc ...... it never ends.
Or Wilson doesn't get five seats in 1964 and Alec Douglas-Home caves in to President Johnson and the UK joins the Vietnam War, suddenly the MoD gets/finds a few million down the back of the Downing Street sofa....
 
Or Wilson doesn't get five seats in 1964 and Alec Douglas-Home caves in to President Johnson and the UK joins the Vietnam War, suddenly the MoD gets/finds a few million down the back of the Downing Street sofa....
I have occasionally wondered how the FV432/30 (the so-called 'Fox in a Box') would have fared in the urban pacification and counter-insurgency roles in Vietnam.
1722719874070.png
Original image source (note: slightly inaccurate caption)
 
Or Wilson doesn't get five seats in 1964 and Alec Douglas-Home caves in to President Johnson and the UK joins the Vietnam War, suddenly the MoD gets/finds a few million down the back of the Downing Street sofa....

I don't like to spin out speculation too much, however I have wondered about the electoral ramifications of Sandys making better decisions. IIUC Labour got those 5 seats by less than 250 votes in total, and with something like 8000 votes nationwide the Conservatives could have had a 20 seat majority. I saw someone write it out, but I can't find it - Wiki says 900 votes in 8 seats which is a good indication.

The decisions of the Sandys era 1957-59 play out by 1964, the Labour party had the outcome of Sandys appalling decisions in its sights as an election issue: P1154, AW681 & TSR2. However if in 1964 the British aviation industry was churning out Lightnings and Buccaneers for the RAF/RN and export instead of being mired in development hell with the P1154, AW681 and to a much lesser extent TSR2 surely it would have positive political ramifications for the Tories given those tiny numbers of votes.
 
Most of our European allies (including France) were much more adroit in meeting the needs of their air forces. Where necessary they chose US aircraft.
Clearly the Belfast and 681 should have been dropped in favour of the C130. If the RAF needed a few bigger transports, the Globemaster could have been leased.
TSR2 was viable if the requirements had been more realistic and its Valiant replacement role acknowledged. We might even have persuaded the RAAF to have some.
That leaves P1154. I do not accept the Lightning as a close air support aircraft. It is too much of an ask away from its point defence role. The P1121 is tempting. It is the closest we have to a suitable airframe.
But for RAFG the main role is carrying a US nuke. So reluctantly like France I would order the F100 Super Sabre.
 
Most of our European allies (including France) were much more adroit in meeting the needs of their air forces. Where necessary they chose US aircraft.
Clearly the Belfast and 681 should have been dropped in favour of the C130. If the RAF needed a few bigger transports, the Globemaster could have been leased.
TSR2 was viable if the requirements had been more realistic and its Valiant replacement role acknowledged. We might even have persuaded the RAAF to have some.
That leaves P1154. I do not accept the Lightning as a close air support aircraft. It is too much of an ask away from its point defence role. The P1121 is tempting. It is the closest we have to a suitable airframe.
But for RAFG the main role is carrying a US nuke. So reluctantly like France I would order the F100 Super Sabre.

The only British ally that can compare to Britain in terms of aviation is France, none of the others came close. France is known for choosing its own products in order to defend itself and its interests as early as it could, certainly by the 60s it was procuring mostly French and 50-50 French cooperative products with few exceptions. French products did well on the export market and France wasn't held hostage by the whims of the US the way other countries were.

As for the C130, it is a quality aircraft no doubt, but much like the above point Britain had the capability to build it's own aircraft to meet its needs. However the AW681 wasn't a British need, it was a NATO Basic Military Requirement linked to NMBR3. Britain could have built more Argosy and Belfast to meet it's transport needs.

The RAFG in 1964 was equipped with 4 sqns of Canberra to drop nukes, and these would and should have been replaced by TSR2. The role of the Lightning in RAFG in 1964 (to pick a random but early year) would have been instead of the 2 Hunter FR10 sqns and the 2 Javelin sqns.
 
The role of Canberras as nuke carriers had already been distilled by creating the Valiant wing at Marham. TSR2 was also planned after some changes to operate from the UK not Germany.
When TSR2 was cancelled its role as a nuke carrier was taken on by 15 and 16 sqn with Buccaneers and by the Vulcan B2 force of around 50 aircraft.
Confusingly P1154 was also planned to carry US bombs though I think this had been dropped by cancellation.
Depending on how much the revised TSR2 cost in my scheme between 50 and 75 aircraft seems reasonable to replace Valiants and Vulcans in the free fall bomb role.
P1121 could provide Macmillan's out of area fighter, ground recce at a more realistic cost than P1154. Lightnings would still be needed to work with Bloodhound against Bisons, Bears and Badgers.
As I understand it C130 gives you a single type which is faster and more effective than Beverley, Hastings, Argosy and Belfast. A more conventional 681 like Japan's Kawasaki C1 would be good but Vickers were probably the only firm who could do it.
 
The decision to replace 64 Canberras with 24 Valiants in the tactical nuclear role was made during Sandys tenure as Minister, so it’s doubtful that he and his successors didn’t think of the TSR2 as at least partly a V bomber replacement. However that shouldn’t be overblown, March 1964 Plan P had three sqns of free-fall and Blue Steel Vulcans in service until 1972 and 2 sqns of Blue Steel and 1 sqn recce Victors until 1975 despite a full complement of 2 sqns of bomber and 1 sqn of recce TSR2 in service by 1970. RAFG was also planning to have full complement of 2 bomber and 2 recce TSR2 sqns in service by 1970. In 1964 it was planned to have 11 TSR2 sqns with 106 aircraft on active strength, with OCUs, trials and other special duties, deep maintenance and reserve/attrition aircraft that’s well over 150 aircraft produced.



Any P1121 would be a replacement for Hunter conversions, as it would not be ready by 1960-61 to replace Venoms and Swifts. I don’t know how it would avoid suffering from very low production numbers, that would make it very expensive indeed.



The Argosy was new in 1962 and Belfast new in 1966, I don’t understand why the RAF needed Hercules in 1966 instead of more of these aircraft. AW681 that fits NBMR4 is understandable, although the requirement itself is stupid, but then going for the US conventional transport instead of the UK ones is strange.
 
The Argosy was new in 1962 and Belfast new in 1966, I don’t understand why the RAF needed Hercules in 1966 instead of more of these aircraft. AW681 that fits NBMR4 is understandable, although the requirement itself is stupid, but then going for the US conventional transport instead of the UK ones is strange.
I'm wondering if it was a Balance of Payments thing. Sure, the US will give you all this military assistance, but it's got to be bought from US companies.
 
I'm wondering if it was a Balance of Payments thing. Sure, the US will give you all this military assistance, but it's got to be bought from US companies.
This.
It's quite explicitly stated and you hear a figure of the time say it in Oceans Apart, a TV series by Alan Curtis who interviewed many figures to cover the topic of US/UK relations.
 
Any P1121 would be a replacement for Hunter conversions, as it would not be ready by 1960-61 to replace Venoms and Swifts. I don’t know how it would avoid suffering from very low production numbers, that would make it very expensive indeed.
If it's funded as a CTOL MRI platform, it'll be as the backup to V/STOL NMBR.3 solution and would takeover after NMBR.3 becomesa farce. That's roughly 150 airframes.

If it's funded as a FAW platform, then it would replace late Javelin production. Roughly 80 airframes
 
If it's funded as a FAW platform, then it would replace late Javelin production. Roughly 80 airframes
Possibly then Lightning development stops after the F.1 or F.2 if P.1121 is entering service in 61/62? So maybe another 100-150 airframes there for the UK.

But its more the knock on effect on other programmes; e.g. TSR2 and P.1154 cancellations for the same historical reasons lead to P.1121 as an easy alternative to fill a void of maybe a few hundred airframes. Maybe the RN still ends up going Phantom though. And killed off the success of Harrier.
 
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The P1121 would have to be developed from 1957-58, by the mid 60s it would be behind the state of the art.

If the Lightning was considered a failure because 337 were built the P1121 would be worse because it wouldn't get to 337.
 
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The Argosy was new in 1962 and Belfast new in 1966, I don’t understand why the RAF needed Hercules in 1966 instead of more of these aircraft. AW681 that fits NBMR4 is understandable, although the requirement itself is stupid, but then going for the US conventional transport instead of the UK ones is strange.
FWIW IIRC from "On Atlas' Shoulders" the C-130 couldn't operate from the airstrips the RAF would use in the Island Base concept and that was one of the reasons for buying the AW.681. Except that by the time AW.681 was cancelled and C-130K ordered in its place it had been discovered that there were enough airstrips long enough for the C-130 after all and a cheaper AW.681 (i.e. without the STOL characteristics) could have been built in the first place.

Have I remembered correctly?
 
The decision to replace 64 Canberras with 24 Valiants in the tactical nuclear role was made during Sandys tenure as Minister, so it’s doubtful that he and his successors didn’t think of the TSR2 as at least partly a V bomber replacement. However that shouldn’t be overblown, March 1964 Plan P had three sqns of free-fall and Blue Steel Vulcans in service until 1972 . . .
FWIW & IIRC (1) the 3 squadrons of Vulcans to be retained until 1972 and the 3 squadrons of Victors to take their place afterwards had two roles. The first was to deter China. The second was conventional bombing in warm and cold wars.
. . . and 2 sqns of Blue Steel and 1 sqn recce Victors until 1975 despite a full complement of 2 sqns of bomber and 1 sqn of recce TSR2 in service by 1970. RAFG was also planning to have full complement of 2 bomber and 2 recce TSR2 sqns in service by 1970. In 1964 it was planned to have 11 TSR2 sqns with 106 aircraft on active strength, with OCUs, trials and other special duties, deep maintenance and reserve/attrition aircraft that’s well over 150 aircraft produced.
FWIW & IIRC (2) 193 TSR.2s were to be built to support the first line U.E. of 106 aircraft.
 
FWIW IIRC from "On Atlas' Shoulders" the C-130 couldn't operate from the airstrips the RAF would use in the Island Base concept and that was one of the reasons for buying the AW.681. Except that by the time AW.681 was cancelled and C-130K ordered in its place it had been discovered that there were enough airstrips long enough for the C-130 after all and a cheaper AW.681 (i.e. without the STOL characteristics) could have been built in the first place.

Have I remembered correctly?

I've not read On Atlas Shoulders, however the RAF operated Beverly, Hastings and Argosy around the world well enough before the AW681 was conceived. IIUC the AW681 was to meet NBMR4 in support of NBMR3, both of which likely met other RAF needs.

Going back a bit further the Hunter was chosen over the Gnat in 1958 was because it could better operate from the compacted sand runway at RAF Riyan in Aden. The Gnat, with it's low ground clearance, blasted the surface of Riyan so I imagine the AW681 (and P1154) would have totally destroyed it.
 
FWIW & IIRC (1) the 3 squadrons of Vulcans to be retained until 1972 and the 3 squadrons of Victors to take their place afterwards had two roles. The first was to deter China. The second was conventional bombing in warm and cold wars.

FWIW & IIRC (2) 193 TSR.2s were to be built to support the first line U.E. of 106 aircraft.

Yes, I've seen 193 TSR2s as well, but I think in the event they wouldn't quite reach that number.

Interesting about the post-Polaris role of the Vulcan and Victor, but it fits with the East of Suez role Britain played until the late 1967 devaluation of the pound. As you said earlier in the thread the Labour government wasn't anti-EoS they just thought they could do it 400 million a year cheaper.
 
Possibly then Lightning development stops after the F.1 or F.2 if P.1121 is entering service in 61/62? So maybe another 100-150 airframes there for the UK.

But its more the knock on effect on other programmes; e.g. TSR2 and P.1154 cancellations for the same historical reasons lead to P.1121 as an easy alternative to fill a void of maybe a few hundred airframes. Maybe the RN still ends up going Phantom though. And killed off the success of Harrier.
If someone sends a P1127 to the US to show off, the Marines will buy it because it lets them put an A4 equivalent attack plane onto their LHAs and not depend on having a carrier close by. (Pretty sure the Marines bought more Harriers than RAF and RN combined)

As to who else might buy some Harriers, who knows. Probably not many countries have the same Marine needs.
 

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