If you were Sandys or Mcnamara?

[pathology_doc]

Would a Lightning's pair of reheated Avon engines meet your specification?

Concorde Olympuses or go home.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

IIUC the Conway in the Victor had a bypass ratio of 30% but freed of the diameter constraints of the wing root mounting the Conway in the VC10 had a bypass ratio of 80%. I think the bypass ratio of the later JT8 was 140%.

Page 518 of the Putnams on Handley Page aircraft says.

XL159 was delivered to Park Street for installation of up-rated Rolls-Royce Conway Co.17 engines of 20,600 lb s.t., while XL160, with the same installation on one side only, went to Rolls-Royce Ltd at Hucknall for full development and elimination of surging, which recurred at the hinger mass low of the new engine; the later had a reduced by-pass radio to match the Victor's limited rib spacing and could not achieve the full potential of the pod-mounted R.Co.22 in the VC10.

Are what you call the wing root mounting and what the book calls rib spacing the same thing?

XL159 was the 10th Victor B.2 and the first 9 seem to have been completed Conway Co.11 engines producing 17,250lbst which were replaced by the more powerful version later. The book was difficult to follow, but the Victors with the more powerful Conway engine were known as the Victor B.2R.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The Olympus was a turbojet and the Conway was a low-bypass turbofan. Does that mean the latter had better fuel consumption?

At low altitude, definitely. At high altitude, questionable.

 

[Hood]

Did the TSR.2 really need the rough field capability?

I would say no.
I'm not really sure what the Air Staff planners were thinking of. What were the last RAF bombers to actually operate from a rough field? Fairey Battles in 1940?
I get the whole nuclear threat dispersal thing and other nations did similar things (Baradour with skids etc., F-104Gs with rockets) but the logistical and C&C practicalities would seem to outweigh the benefits. Arguably the VTOL craze was a continuation of this dispersal mania - which thankfully TSR.2 was just early enough to avoid.

 

[alertken]

Why 2 Marks 2 Mediums? Why more from Avro than HP?

DoD bet the farm on B-47 and had some built by Douglas and Lockheed as if Avro Victor, HP Vulcan.

Sandys had little to do with this: he had left MoS (the procurer Agent and Industry sponsor) when R&D was funded for both Mks.2, 31/5/56 and had left MoD before UK 13/4/60 selection of Skybolt ALBM (14/10/59 at MoA {succeeding MoS} he arranged 6/6/60 purchase, did not resist sole fit to Vulcan, nor 7/60 cancellation of 25 Victors. He left MoA 27/7/60).

So: Q1: why did Vulcan ease past Victor? and Q2: What would I have done in DS's shoes?

Q1: On 31/5/56 Avro Blue Steel (ASM) was to be carried by both Mks.2. At MoD from 13/1/57 he inherited schemes for more Stand Off Bombs by Avro and by HP (zero GW under their belt but trying to protect their platform). DS accepted briefing in the sense: "“few (projects caused) such bitter feelings (Avro puffed 1,000n.m: if they) could not perfect (100n.m) how could they (do 1,000? Avro Wpns.Res.Div., 6 ex-RAE staff') weak management (criticisms) recriminations” MoA/A.M., '60/1,Wynn, RAF N.Deterrent Forces,P202/4; MoS gave no credence to HP's schemes; ALBM Sister Firm Avro WRD assessed Victor as unable to fit Skybolt under the wing. DS took input from BDRSS/Embassy, DC and was very happy to add >100 to >1,000 ALBMs for SAC. A1: Me too.

Q2: Sir Fred HP was valuing his firm in 1959 at numbers unrecognised by others. DS' job 10/59, was to create 2 airframers worthy of our money. Blame the PM if you disagree. HS Group were trying to "coalesce". Goodnight Victor. A2: Me too.

 

[red admiral]

I'm not really sure what the Air Staff planners were thinking of. What were the last RAF bombers to actually operate from a rough field? Fairey Battles in 1940?

From rereading the GORs, I think it's really about operating from smaller runways, and likely the older WW2 bomber bases. There's a lot more of them at this point than the V bomber bases.

It's not really a "rough" field. The Classification Numbers in GOR343 are like BAC 1-11 or large regional / business jets. It's way away from Jaguar operating from grass fields.

In terms of what impact on the design this makes - negligible in my view. The mass forces to a twin wheel bogie unless you only want to operate from V bomber bases, so the wheels would just be a bit thinner (25%?) and wheel bays a bit smaller so there would be slightly more room for fuel and so the range shortfall would be reduced.

 

[ItalianAFDFail]

As a part of my defense spending initiative in the thoughts i had i have ultimately come to the conclusion of using an off the shelf engine that can provide me with all the power i coul ever need for m planes and maybe possibly save some engine technology in the process, as the Orenda company had many interesting projects i have come to the conclusion that instead of just reusing the old F-11 i have decided that if i had the opportunity i would attempt to get one F-11-1F for testing, get FIAT Aviazione to work and deisgn what i can best describe as the Fiat G-95 in conventional form, the plane would be a homegrown, effective and multirole single engine fighter with the Orenda Iroquois Engine made by Orenda first and secondly the italian nation, if the Orenda company ever goes bankrupt, the possibilities for the plane would be endless for development, it may be expensive, it maybe complicated but dammit i want it to work, alternatively i can design something after the F-11 as a new plane, in collaboration with Grumman of course

 

[Rule of cool]

What about the Riyah airfield in the Aden protectorate, that featured so heavily in the VRET and was one key reason the Hunter FGA9 beat the Gnat? http://www.radfanhunters.co.uk/mainframeset.htm

Would this count as a rough field in terms of the TSR2? Certainly Hunters operated from there, so if a tarted up early 50s fighter can do it then surely a mid 60s bomber with specific attention paid to good field performance could be able to as well.

Another thing about the rough field/STOL or whatever else you want to call it was the ground support equipment. IIUC the TSR2 was designed to operate away from both main bases and the industrial backup of the home country. For example it apparently was to have a mobile, self-contained systems test cart to diagnose systems serviceability for maintenance, among other pieces of GSE designed to help it operate worldwide. In contrast the Tornado was designed to fly and fight from within it's industrial support heartland, apparently this caused challenges when deployed to the Mid East for the 1991 PGW.

 

[red admiral]

Would this count as a rough field in terms of the TSR2? Certainly Hunters operated from there, so if a tarted up early 50s fighter can do it then surely a mid 60s bomber with specific attention paid to good field performance could be able to as well.

It's really physics driven in terms of ground pressure / peak ground pressure so a heavier aircraft is at a disadvantage. I'd expect Hunter to have a lower LCN than TSR2 based on mass and wheel size.

I can't see any historical details on Riyah field; from the few pictures it looked like hard packed dirt so ground pressure will be an issue, but more likely ground clearance to reduce FOD given that it's not a bonded surface (well the pictures have small rocks all over the surface)

I'd be pretty amazed if TSR2 was actually more deployable overseas than Tornado. I mean they spent multiple years in Afghanistan and other places. Probably more around first/second/depth maintenance differences.

 

[Rule of cool]

It's really physics driven in terms of ground pressure / peak ground pressure so a heavier aircraft is at a disadvantage. I'd expect Hunter to have a lower LCN than TSR2 based on mass and wheel size.

I can't see any historical details on Riyah field; from the few pictures it looked like hard packed dirt so ground pressure will be an issue, but more likely ground clearance to reduce FOD given that it's not a bonded surface (well the pictures have small rocks all over the surface)

I'd be pretty amazed if TSR2 was actually more deployable overseas than Tornado. I mean they spent multiple years in Afghanistan and other places. Probably more around first/second/depth maintenance differences.

From airvectors.

the TSR.2 was designed in accordance with the "weapons system" concept, with all details considered for operations from rough forward airstrips. The aircraft was fitted with an auxiliary power unit (APU) for self-starting and ground power. BAC designed a comprehensive ground-servicing system, including:

• A "ground system vehicle (GSV)" that could tow the aircraft on the ground, while providing systems to power the aircraft during servicing and pump fuel from flexible storage bags.
• A self-powered "heavylift trolley" that could be used to lift or remove stores or systems to or from the aircraft and provide a service platform capable of reaching any part of the aircraft. Although care had been taken to provide plenty of service doors in the aircraft and make them accessible, the tall landing gear kept the machine high off the ground and demanded a servicing platform.
• A "universal testing trolley", towed by the GSV, that could perform functional tests on the aircraft's systems.

The entire service kit was designed for airlift, with its specifications requiring that it be able to support a TSR.2 at an advance base for 30 days.

That's a fair bit of useful special kit to enable deployment. I don't doubt that by 2003 the Tornado was easily deployable, it had a decade from the 91 PGW to develop the capability. However the TSR2 was designed to do it from the start, which gives it the edge in the early days. Did the Tornado have an APU, or did it always require external power?

Riyan was compacted sand, the Gnat's low ground clearance damaged the surface during trials. I don't know if it was particularly short, but it probably is a good example of what the RAF was thinking about when they specc'd the TSR2 STOL/rough field requirement.

 

[pathology_doc]

DoD bet the farm on B-47

DOD could afford to bet the farm on the B-47, as it had sponsored a four-way fly-off between the B-45 through B-48 in which the -47 was the runaway winner, the -45 was lucky to see limited squadron service (not many people remember it, though it gets a brief moment of glory in George Pal's War of the Worlds as a fast courier aircraft), and the other two were complete failures that never amounted to anything more than flying test-beds and lessons in how not to build a jet bomber.

 

[Rule of cool]

One thing I can't contort myself into as Sandys is the other great loss of the 60s, fleet carriers. During Sandys 57-59 tenure Victorious finished her double rebuild, Hermes was completed and Eagle started her rebuild which was to give her 15-20 years of life.

I can't imagine him ordering a new carrier given these circumstances. About the only other opportunity would be with the Ark Royal getting similar treatment to the Eagle, but I don't see how he would arrange things for that to happen.

 

[Scott Kenny]

One thing I can't contort myself into as Sandys is the other great loss of the 60s, fleet carriers. During Sandys 57-59 tenure Victorious finished her double rebuild, Hermes was completed and Eagle started her rebuild which was to give her 15-20 years of life.

I can't imagine him ordering a new carrier given these circumstances. About the only other opportunity would be with the Ark Royal getting similar treatment to the Eagle, but I don't see how he would arrange things for that to happen.

Which fleet carrier was really way too damaged to upgrade? Was that Vicky?

 

[Rule of cool]

Which fleet carrier was really way too damaged to upgrade? Was that Vicky?

Formidable maybe, or one of the late war I's with the low hangars. However I think the decision to not modernize these old WW2 ships was taken well before Sandys tenure.

 

[red admiral]

That's a fair bit of useful special kit to enable deployment. I don't doubt that by 2003 the Tornado was easily deployable, it had a decade from the 91 PGW to develop the capability. However the TSR2 was designed to do it from the start, which gives it the edge in the early days. Did the Tornado have an APU, or did it always require external power?

Yes Tornado has an APU. One of the moves from the 50s has been to common ground support equipment between types, as moving a bunch of bespoke equipment is a large logistics burden. e.g. common weapon jammers for loading stores.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Post 223.

• The unit cost of UK assembled aircraft would decrease if more aircraft than 66 aircraft were built.
  • E.g. if 31 two-engine Transalls were built for the RAF ITTL instead of the 31 Andover C.1s built for the RAF IOTL.
  • The agreement with France & West Germany might have been that all aircraft built for export were to be assembled in the UK. AFIAK (1) that was the case with Jaguar and AFAIK (2) under the Anglo-French helicopter agreement the Lynxes built for export were assembled in the UK while the Gazelles & Pumas built for export were assembled in France.
  • IOTL the only aircraft exported IOTL were the 9 C.160Zs built for the SAAF, but ITTL the two-engine version might take orders from countries that bought DHC-4 Caribous, DHC-5 Buffaloes and G.222s IOTL.
  • The four-engine version might win some export orders too. E.g. from countries that the USA wouldn't sell the Hercules to. OTL C-130 operators that had the twin-engine Transall might buy the four-engine Transall instead of the Hercules in the interest of standardisation. One might be the AA which IIRC bought some C-130Hs during the production run of the OTL C-160NG. Another might be the RAAF which might buy as many as 30 two-engine C.160s in place of the 30 Caribous that it ordered IOTL and 24 four-engine versions in place of the 12 C-130Es purchased in the 1960s and the 12 C-130Hs that IIRC were purchased in the 1970s to replace the 12 C-130As bought in the 1950s.

Other possible customers for the four-engine Transall.

• Belgium bought 12 C-130Hs IOTL.
• Italy bought 14 C-130Hs IOTL. However, if they did their G.222s may have had Tyne engines instead of GE T64s in the interest of standardisation. That is with the 18 Atlantics that they bought IOTL and the Quad-Transalls they might buy ITTL. Taking it a step further maybe they buy Twin-Transalls instead of the G.222 either by building them under licence or joining the consortium.
• New Zealand bought 3 C-130Hs in the 1960s and 2 more in the 1970s for a total of 5.

 

[Hood]

From rereading the GORs, I think it's really about operating from smaller runways, and likely the older WW2 bomber bases. There's a lot more of them at this point than the V bomber bases.

I would agree that was the most likely option.

GOR.339 says:

Close attention is required to minimise permanent base requirements, and it is also necessary to cater for operations from dispersed sites. The increasing importance of dispersal emphasises the need to reduce the required runway dimensions to the minimum. The Air Staff wish any worthwhile, though possibly unconventional, means of improving take-off and landing performances to be thoroughly examined. If runways are used operation is to be practical from strips 3,000ft in length. A LCN not exceeding 40 is desired.

Most WW2 airfields, in the UK at least, had 4,000ft long runways at least, most RAF stations had 1x 6,000ft and 2x 4,000ft runways - so did some 8th AF fields. So in theory, assuming the runways were mostly intact, there should have been ample length with some to spare.

RAF Station Runways

RAF Station Runways Main Airfield Site consisted of: Perimeter Track, with Dispersals 3 (Interlocking A Shape) Runways Hangars Technical / Administrative Site Watch O…

masterbombercraig.wordpress.com

But it does go onto say "unconventional means" which ended up with the Shorts VTOL piggyback-style solutions and it does it say "If runways are used operation is to be practical..." - my bolding for emphasis. So non-runway (probably PSP or compacted dirt strips) were considered likely when the OR was thought up in 1957.

OR.343 says:

The flexibility of role and tactics outlined above is dependent upon a comparable ground flexibility. This can only be realised by an ability to use small airfields with rudimentary surfaces and restricted maintenance facilities.

It is the intention normally to operate the aircraft from airfields having paved runways about 2,000yd [6,000ft] in length, when safety margins are required. However, under the threat of an attack it will be necessary to disperse to semi-prepared airstrips, or existing airfields, whose length may be less than 1,500yd [4,500ft] and which may have surfaces which have deteriorated or are rudimentary.... .... some abetment of the margins of safety during takeoff and landing may be accepted.

The lowest possible [LCN] is required and LCN, as near to 20 as possible should be aimed at.

An LCN of 20 would the same at the Avro 748 or a C160 Transall (at just over gross weight) (the Argosy's LCN was 33)
There is an interesting discussion on LCN numbers and what that mean for WW2-era infrastructure. An aggregate soft surface strip from WW2 would be about LCN 15. Improving that to LCN 25 when dry would require excavation and hard core underpinning.

Soft runways | CalClassic Forum

Hi all, FSAviator adds this link of a modern propliner departure to this discussion: http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=5c1_1350976434 ____________________________________________

calclassic.proboards.com

Paved runways and taxiways from WW2 would equate to LCN 50 and most commercial airfields were upgraded to LCN 65 in the 1950s. The Short Belfast was qualified to operate at LCN 65 at MTOW.

So it seems unlikely that TSR.2 could not have used existing airfield infrastructure in the UK/Western Europe. Overseas would be a different matter of course - but any Allied-built airfield should broadly have conformed to those LCN limits.

Take-off: ISA +30C at sea level with a ground roll of less than 1,000yd [3,000ft] for the 1000nm radius sortie, or less than 600yd [1,800ft] ground roll for the 450nm radius sortie in ISA conditions.

Landing: The aircraft is to be capable of being stopped in a ground roll of less than 600yd on a wet surface in ISA conditions at sea level.

RATO is not required. The landing performance specified is to be met without the use of ground aids such as arrester wires. A tail braking parachute may be used if required. [The following was deleted from Issue 2] It is to be expected that at some airfields safety barriers may be available.

It does seem that airfields are preferred but the distances quoted here leave a lot of margins on most airfields for safety, the engine-out condition could require 7,000ft to land with zero flap - as much as 9,000ft in the wet.

The following were the basic parameters for operational use:
Normal peacetime bases: minimum 8,000ft with permanent arrester installation
Exercise bases: minimum 6,000ft with portable arrester gear
Operational use: minimum 2,400ft

The specs also wanted serviceability with minimal work for 30 days stored outdoors without cover, not entirely practical and Handley Page came up with a large servicing tent.

Ground refuelling is normally to be a pressure fuelling system... [The following was deleted from Issue 2] but the alternative of open line refuelling is required.

It looks like the more basic requirements for ground support kit were deleted.
Likewise so was the SRV (Servicing and Readiness Vehicle) in favour of a cheaper Bedford-truck based TTRV (Turn-Round and Readiness Vehicle), but no work on that was started either. A large ATE (Automatic Test Equipment) vehicle/trolley was also required.

 

[Rule of cool]

Those runway requirements are excessive. A survey of UK airfields in 1958-60 should have been undertaken and the TSR2 been specc'd to operated from the 100th 'largest'. They were only going to have 11 sqns with a front line strength of ~110 aircraft and ~400 tactical nukes, thinking these priceless assets were going to be shuttling around every flat piece of cleared land in the UK, Germany, Middle and Far East is ludicrous.

I suppose the other side of the coin was the 1958 (?) report about ballistic missiles which postulated that by ~1965 some 300 nukes could hit Britain within 1 minute and I believe this turned out to be more or less correct. Therefore you need to put TSR2s in places where those 300 missiles won't hit because they're not worth allocating a nuke missile to.

I'd suggest the answer to that problem is to go with the Polaris in 1960 instead of Skybolt. Further I'd suggest of those 300 nuke missiles a very large portion would be allocated to cities and industrial targets and the number to be used against TSR2 airfields would be much less than 300, meaning they don't need 300 TSR2 capable sites.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Does this thread include civil aircraft?

If it does can BEA be told to buy the Medway-Trident whether it likes it or not?

Furthermore, can it be turned into a proto-Airbus? The development & production of the airframe being shared with French, West German & possibly Italian companies on the condition that their state airlines buy it instead of the B.727. IOTL Air France, Alitalia and Lufthansa bought 101 B.727s between them.

Furthermore, to counter the usual claims that it wouldn't sell in the USA, build a factory in there or have an American firm build it under licence. IOTL Fairchild-Hiller built Fokker 27s & 28s under licence IOTL. Another way might be to built it in Canada at the Avro Canada factory or the De Havilland Canada factory. As I understand it the Avro Canada factory was sold to Douglas in 1963 and it was used to build major components for the DC-9.

 

[Rule of cool]

Apparently the Minister of Supply, who was responsible for the decision to shrink both the Trident and Super VC10 in 1958 was a candidate for Sandys job in that cabinet reshuffle. He was also involved in dealing with the West German government with the SR177 in 1957, telling them it was still on when Sandys was telling them it was dead. Was the Medway in play for any military projects in 1957-59?

The problem I have with the Medway Trident and VC10 Super 200 is that their success is judged by American standards, B707, DC8, B727, DC9 so therefore nothing is good enough. However if judged by European standards Medway Trident selling double and VC10 Super 200 selling triple actual numbers (117-234 & 54-162) makes them very successful, more so given they would be the only European aircraft in their size classes. After all the BAC1-11 sold 244 and Fokker F28 sold 241 and they're considered successful, as is the Caravelle with 282 with only about ~60 being turbofan powered late model versions.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The problem I have with the Medway Trident and VC10 Super 200 is that their success is judged by American standards, B707, DC8, B727, DC9 so therefore nothing is good enough. However if judged by European standards Medway Trident selling double and VC10 Super 200 selling triple actual numbers (117-234 & 54-162) makes them very successful, more so given they would be the only European aircraft in their size classes. After all the BAC1-11 sold 244 and Fokker F28 sold 241 and they're considered successful, as is the Caravelle with 282 with only about ~60 being turbofan powered late model versions.

I want sales of the Medway-Trident to be 3-to-5 times more than the Spey-Trident which is 351 to 595. IOTL 117 Tridents and 1,832 B.727s were built for a total of 1,949 aircraft. The sales I'm aiming for are 18-to-30 percent of that market, which as far as I'm concerned isn't fantastically large.

I'd like the BAC-111 (with Medway engines) & VC.10 to be international projects too in order to spread the financial risk and increase sales.

In the case of the former Air Canada bought 53 DC-9s and Alitalia bought 88 while Air France bought 35 Classic B.737s, British Airways bought 71 and Lufthansa bought 156. Germany's state airline was one of the B.737's launch customers and IIRC sales in the early 1970s were so poor that Boeing considered closing the production line. Maybe the 737 looses enough orders to the Medway-111 that Boeing has to close the production line ITTL or not getting the Lufthansa contract prevents it from launching the 737 in the first place.

 

[Hood]

Those runway requirements are excessive. A survey of UK airfields in 1958-60 should have been undertaken and the TSR2 been specc'd to operated from the 100th 'largest'. They were only going to have 11 sqns with a front line strength of ~110 aircraft and ~400 tactical nukes, thinking these priceless assets were going to be shuttling around every flat piece of cleared land in the UK, Germany, Middle and Far East is ludicrous.

I suppose the other side of the coin was the 1958 (?) report about ballistic missiles which postulated that by ~1965 some 300 nukes could hit Britain within 1 minute and I believe this turned out to be more or less correct. Therefore you need to put TSR2s in places where those 300 missiles won't hit because they're not worth allocating a nuke missile to.

I'd suggest the answer to that problem is to go with the Polaris in 1960 instead of Skybolt. Further I'd suggest of those 300 nuke missiles a very large portion would be allocated to cities and industrial targets and the number to be used against TSR2 airfields would be much less than 300, meaning they don't need 300 TSR2 capable sites.

The plan seems to have been that the UK-based TSR.2s would not have participated in the conventional phase of the war and would be dispersed to await the nuclear exchange - SACEUR's R-Hour.

So this would be something akin to the V-Bomber dispersal. The V-bomber dispersal bases had purpose-built pads built etc. and presumably as the Vulcans and Victors retired/phased onto MRR and tankers, these QRA pads would have been available for TSR.2 and no cost and no runway issues. Evidently the Air Staff must have concluded that these dispersed bases were compromised and wouldn't survive a first strike due to location/already on Soviet target maps, clearly TSR.2 was meant to sit out the first strike (unlike the V-Force which would head one-way east as soon as the hooter went).

It only takes less than a dozen H-Bombs to make the UK a wasteland, arguably any airbase along the eastern coast is in some kind of fallout zone at the very least. Some bases in the west, or Wales and Scotland might survived fairly unscathed. The majority of ex-WW2 airfields are in Lincolnshire, East Anglia and in the Home Counties - all prime irradiated wasteland territory.

Given all the emphasis on self-engine starting, ground-running air con, special vehicles etc. it seems odd that there is no specific mention of NBC activities. Talk of open-air servicing or belated tent servicing implies airfields without hangarage or any sort of protection.

Assuming the TSRs arrive at their locations already loaded with WE.177, presumably the ground-running air con would be kept going on the aircraft 24/7 in certain temperature conditions to keep the bay cool and dry?

The LCN targets still don't make complete sense, the original GOR.339 LCN of 40 seems fair given the size and weight, but would not confer any soft runway capability and any paved runway in the country should in theory have been at least LCN 50 - the OR.343 "close to 20" seems pointless, as soft runways would be LCN 15, so there is no merit in going too far low. Saying that, I agree with Red Admiral that a twin-wheel bogie was inevitable given the aircraft's size and bulk.
I think ideally a twin-wheel side-by-side leg would have been better - but of course fitting it into the airframe would have been more difficult as it could not have tucked up along the intake flanks above the bomb bay. Given that the undercarriage could barely manage Boscombe Down's runway without additional support, I doubt it had any real rough runway capability and a redesign was surely on the cards.

 

[red admiral]

The LCN targets still don't make complete sense, the original GOR.339 LCN of 40 seems fair given the size and weight, but would not confer any soft runway capability and any paved runway in the country should in theory have been at least LCN 50 - the OR.343 "close to 20" seems pointless, as soft runways would be LCN 15, so there is no merit in going too far low.

It's only some of the military airfields today in the UK (or NATO) that are >40 actually. And those are the ones that have survived and been resurfaced and upgraded multiple times. This is also for the main runways rather than any secondary runway to manage crosswind. The secondary runways are usually lower strength (sometimes a lot). That thread on civilian runways is interesting, but I think the military runways are more limiting

Back to the WW2 bomber bases - there were still lots of these and they are largely concrete slabs laid with gaps between. Maybe of variable quality and not maintained for 20 years?

The compatibility of LCN is also a risk based thing e.g. with a LCN of 20 you can still operate from say a 15 strip, but with damage to it being likely - but then it's few sorties and more likely to be damaged by the nukes...

On the take-off/landing distances side then there's quite a bit of variability in this depending on risk again - there are large safety factors for normal operations that can be waived if deemed necessary. e.g. the difference between the 8,000ft normal and 6,000ft exercise bases is well within the safety factor variation rather than necessarily changing the aircraft design. Further confusing things is the difference between ground roll (i.e. length of runway) and distance to clear obstacle (usually 50ft high) which is much longer. Often unclear which is actually being quoted.

Looking back to EE P.17A then the tandem bogie arrangement seems to be fixed then against GOR.339; the later TSR2 baseline just grows the tyre size in response to higher mass and the lower LCN requirement in GOR.343. Many of the other submissions have more "interesting" main undercarriage arrangements.

As being built then TSR2 appears to have much lower take-off /landing performance than the spec - e.g. BAC's firm offer was 3,300ft Vs 1,800ft spec - and this was also at a much lower mass condition.

So I have difficulty seeing that there's actually much design impact unless the dispersal concept is got rid of entirely and just operate from >6,000ft LCN >60 bomber / airliner runways - maybe result is in removing the blown flaps and having a single wheel (if it fits). I'm not sure either is "significant" in changing programme success/failure

 

[Rule of cool]

I want sales of the Medway-Trident to be 3-to-5 times more than the Spey-Trident which is 351 to 595. IOTL 117 Tridents and 1,832 B.727s were built for a total of 1,949 aircraft. The sales I'm aiming for are 18-to-30 percent of that market, which as far as I'm concerned isn't fantastically large.

I'd like the BAC-111 (with Medway engines) & VC.10 to be international projects too in order to spread the financial risk and increase sales.

In the case of the former Air Canada bought 53 DC-9s and Alitalia bought 88 while Air France bought 35 Classic B.737s, British Airways bought 71 and Lufthansa bought 156. Germany's state airline was one of the B.737's launch customers and IIRC sales in the early 1970s were so poor that Boeing considered closing the production line. Maybe the 737 looses enough orders to the Medway-111 that Boeing has to close the production line ITTL or not getting the Lufthansa contract prevents it from launching the 737 in the first place.

Can HS physically build 350-600 Tridents? The original 1958 orders for 25 Tridents and 35 VC10s were the catalyst for the 'encouraged' mergers of the British aviation industry, as these were the biggest orders in British aviation history (by value?) and it was thought that at the time only HS had the market capitalisation to handle such large orders. It wasn't until the 70s and 80s that European airliners got those sorts of numbers, the Avro 146 getting 394 from 1983 onwards and the Airbus A300 getting 561 from 1974 onwards. I picked double the sales because it seemed to fit in with what single European countries could do with airliners in the mid 60s, although I'd guess the Medway Trident could pick up the RAF and/or NATO MP/ASW orders to bump up production numbers close to the bottom of what you've suggested.

My aim with my alternative scenarios is to maintain British independence for as long as possible, and when this independence is no longer practical have the British be the lead in unequal partnerships until that is no longer practical. The early/mid 60s is certainly not the time for Britain need cooperative projects, the VC10 was developed well enough but was cut off a the knees by BOAC demanding the 28' stretch being too much making the Super VC10 stretch only 13'. Unlike the Medway Trident which was nothing special, the VC10 Super 200 would have been the largest trans-Atlantic airliner in the world in the late 60s which is quite the sales hook and I believe would have offered better operating economics than the B707. Again I picked triple the sales not from any survey of the market, the world market will still be fractured and countries will still support their own industries as much as possible, but from what I think BAC could build in about 5 years and the sales of other European airliners in that period.

I can't help but think that the 'European scale' success of the Medway Trident and VC10 Super 200 might lead BAC and HS to cooperate on a widebody airliner from the late 60s for the 70s and onwards.

 

[Rule of cool]

So I have difficulty seeing that there's actually much design impact unless the dispersal concept is got rid of entirely and just operate from >6,000ft LCN >60 bomber / airliner runways - maybe result is in removing the blown flaps and having a single wheel (if it fits). I'm not sure either is "significant" in changing programme success/failure

I'm inclined to agree, flap blowing was pretty standard by the early 60s, the Buccaneer had bleed air blowing all over the place and the Spey was fitted to the Phantom to provide more flap blowing than the J79. Similarly the landing gear requirement might have been easier to achieve and not have driven other design criteria without such demanding requirements, but again I don't think that was a success/fail factor.

One thing I do wonder was the costs of all this. Did they make the TSR2 5% more expensive or 25%, as cost was critical to success/failure.

Also it should be kept in mind that the F111 also had to make contortions to meet it's requirement with the swing-wing, its just a different set of problems to get to the same solution so there's likely no primrose path to unicorn land.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Can HS physically build 350-600 Tridents?

Yes. 350 to 600 aircraft over 20 years equals an average of 18 to 30 a year built by a consortium of British, French, German & possibly Italian companies.

 

[Rule of cool]

Yes. 350 to 600 aircraft over 20 years equals an average of 18 to 30 a year built by a consortium of British, French, German & possibly Italian companies.

I'm catching what you're throwing. I was thinking about the 60s production numbers; all 54 VC10, 95 of 117 Trident and 150 of 244 Bac111 were built by about 1970. These are the numbers I want to boost, and in the same timeframe. If these aircraft keep ticking along in the 70s and even 80s are built by other companies that's all well and good but its the big boost in the 60s that will give British industry the critical mass needed to build a new generation of airliners in the 70s, like the BAC 311.

 

[Hood]

It's only some of the military airfields today in the UK (or NATO) that are >40 actually. And those are the ones that have survived and been resurfaced and upgraded multiple times. This is also for the main runways rather than any secondary runway to manage crosswind. The secondary runways are usually lower strength (sometimes a lot). That thread on civilian runways is interesting, but I think the military runways are more limiting

True, the article is referencing mainly commercial LCNs.
I have found this though - the modern building regs for airfield construction.

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7f7d3de5274a2e8ab4c7cd/DMG_27.pdf

Back to the WW2 bomber bases - there were still lots of these and they are largely concrete slabs laid with gaps between. Maybe of variable quality and not maintained for 20 years?

I remember many years ago, a colleague who had been a building contractor telling me that on one job they had a tough job breaking up the concrete on an old airbase (I can't remember which one, I think it was one of the ex-USAF bases closed in the early 90s). A JCB with an hydraulic drill attachment ended up with a knackered bit and not much hole to show for it!

 

[uk 75]

I have a lot of sympathy with the emotion behind this thread.
VC10, Trident and 111 adorn my model and toy collections in various guises.
But so too do the simple and elegant Boeing fleet of Lufthansa in their livery which competes with BOAC for my affections.
Lufthansa did buy the Vickers Viscount, so a benchmark for Rule of Cool's alt world would be at least getting them to buy BAC 111.

 

[Rule of cool]

I think in European terms the BAC 111 did OK, almost identical to the Fokker F28.

What I'd be interested to know is which airlines might buy the VC10 Super 200, the most capacious trans-Atlantic airliner in the world in the mid-late 60s? It would have 213 seats and 5000+ mile range when the B707 and DC8 had 189 seats at that range (DC8 could have 256 seats at 3500 mile range). Obviously BOAC/BA, but what about others such as Air France or Lufthansa?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I think in European terms the BAC 111 did OK, almost identical to the Fokker F28.

FWIW my copy of the Observers Book of Aircraft 1981 Edition says that orders at the beginning of 1981 were:

245 BAC.111​

867 Boeing 737​

1,071 DC-9​

​

Total 2,183 if which 11% were BAC.111s.​

However, I've read that more BAC.111s would have been sold if more powerful engines such as the Medway or a re-fanned Spey had been available.

Maybe the Proto-Airbus of TTL would keep developing the BAC.111 (as Boeing did with the 737 & MD did with the DC-9) instead of producing the A320 family. Similarly, the consortium might have developed Medway-Trident into something like the HS.132 or HS.134 (similar to how Boeing developed the 727 into the 757) instead of producing the A310?

What I'd be interested to know is which airlines might buy the VC10 Super 200, the most capacious trans-Atlantic airliner in the world in the mid-late 60s? It would have 213 seats and 5000+ mile range when the B707 and DC8 had 189 seats at that range (DC8 could have 256 seats at 3500 mile range). Obviously BOAC/BA, but what about others such as Air France or Lufthansa?

For what it's worth.

60 BOAC instead of 31 B.707s and 29 VC.10s.​

42 Air Canada instead of DC-8s.​

38 Air France instead of B.707s.​

Maybe the AA buys 12 VC.10 tankers instead of 12 KC.135Fs.​

31 Lufthansa instead of B.707s.​

26 Alitalia instead of DC-8s.​

​

Total 197 aircraft.​

Lufthansa was one of the few airlines (other than BOAC) to buy B.707s with Conway engines. The others were Air India, El Al and Varig. However only 37 of the 92 aircraft bought by those airlines had Conway engines.

Air Canada and Alitalia were 2 of the 3 airlines that bought DC-8s with Conway engines. The other was Canadian Pacific. But only 32 of the 79 aircraft bought by those airlines had Conway engines.

Furthermore, the VC.10 can't be put into service early enough to prevent those airlines buying some Boeing & Douglas aircraft. Or can it?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

What I'd be interested to know is which airlines might buy the VC10 Super 200, the most capacious trans-Atlantic airliner in the world in the mid-late 60s? It would have 213 seats and 5000+ mile range when the B707 and DC8 had 189 seats at that range (DC8 could have 256 seats at 3500 mile range). Obviously BOAC/BA, but what about others such as Air France or Lufthansa?

Although I like the idea, Boeing and Douglas will fight back. Could 707s & DC-8s with longer fuselages and more powerful engines been produced?

On the other hand competition from Proto-Airbus might mean that they didn't have the money to do so. I've already suggested that competition from a developed BAC.111 may result in Boeing terminating production of the 737 in the early 1970s or not built it in the first place.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I'm catching what you're throwing. I was thinking about the 60s production numbers; all 54 VC10, 95 of 117 Trident and 150 of 244 Bac111 were built by about 1970. These are the numbers I want to boost, and in the same timeframe. If these aircraft keep ticking along in the 70s and even 80s are built by other companies that's all well and good but its the big boost in the 60s that will give British industry the critical mass needed to build a new generation of airliners in the 70s, like the BAC 311.

Another thing is that a lot of British aircraft factories were closed as a result of the Sands and Healey defence cuts. Perhaps they could have provided some or all of the required capacity.

 

[Rule of cool]

FWIW my copy of the Observers Book of Aircraft 1981 Edition says that orders at the beginning of 1981 were:
245 BAC.111 867 Boeing 737 1,071 DC-9 Total 2,183 if which 11% were BAC.111s.
However, I've read that more BAC.111s would have been sold if more powerful engines such as the Medway or a re-fanned Spey had been available.

Another way to look at it might be:
244 BAC111
241 Fokker F28
117 Spey Trident
60 Caravelle NG
54 VC10
12 Mercure
19 VFW Fokker 641
Total 748 more expensive aircraft in a fractured market. This is the number to aim at, not the vast US/International market, when looking at success.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Another way to look at it might be:
244 BAC111
241 Fokker F28
117 Spey Trident
60 Caravelle NG
54 VC10
12 Mercure
19 VFW Fokker 641
Total 748 more expensive aircraft in a fractured market. This is the number to aim at, not the vast US/International market, when looking at success.

Also to the beginning of 1981.

700 DH Doves & Herrons​

500 HS.125​

350 HS.748​

445 Viscounts​

517 F.27 (excluding 205 by Fairchild)​

169 F.28​

I'm aiming for somewhere between the modest sales of European airliners of OTL and the vast sales of Boeing & Douglas aircraft IOTL. I've suggested forming a proto-Airbus to build Medway-BAC.111, Medway-Trident & the VC.10 as a way of reducing the production cost as the larger launch orders would allow the consortiums members to build their "bits" of these aircraft using larger scale production methods.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

If the Medway-Trident is built ITTL is the Shackleton replacement a Trident derivative by default? If it is, are the similarities between the aircraft sufficient to reduce the airframe production costs of both aircraft significantly? We're talking about a minimum of 166 airframes instead of 117 Spey-Tridents & 49 modified Comets with Spey engines. Presumably, it's a six-and-two-threes with the engines as it's about 500 Medways v 550 Speys and not enough of the avionics was the same to reduce its production cost.

 

[Hood]

I had an idle thought the other day - the Caravelle used a Comet nose section and thought struck me if DH ever considered a smaller twin-engined companion to the Comet - a sort of 707 and 727 combo (but obviously not entirely analogous) - using the Comet fuselage with a new wing and empennage and perhaps aft engines.
That might have opened up some commonality to save money and R&D costs.


Britain didn't do badly but Britannia, Vanguard and VC.10 all badly underperformed in terms of sales. It's hard to get up much enthusiasm for the 2-11 or 3-11 given that the odds of sales success were not in their favour - in the 70s the TriStar and DC-10 underperformed in terms of sales, and it took Airbus a long time to acheive success.

Arguably the companies who sell the most airliners have a family to sell - just having a standalone product often doesn't cut it, it lessens your market penetration.
Arguably the UK ministries and companies thought too much about individual projects and not enough about a marketable brand. Things like Concorde were halo products but with nothing solid behind them.
BAC and HSA should have been able to string together a coherent line of civil aircraft instead of the hotch-potch of names - heaven forbid BAC and HSA might actually have cooperated to produce a decent UK airliner family.

 

[Rule of cool]

I think it’s important to put some context around what constitutes success for British aircraft, both civil and military. In 1965 the US economy was some 38% of the entire world, with the Soviet Union being about 20% while the big 2 European aircraft manufacturers Britain and France were likely in single digits and behind the likes of West Germany and Japan. Speaking of WG and Japan (and Italy for that matter), they were minnows in the 1960s aviation industry leaving a gaping hole for US industry with its massive political and financial clout to fill. These economic facts are why it’s ludicrous to try to achieve US level success with British/French level of resources, nobody would argue that the Mirage III wasn't a great success, but it is dwarfed by the F104, F4, A4 or F5, let alone all 4 in combination. This is why I think ~237 Medway Tridents and ~162 VC10 Super 200s should be considered a success, not because they make deep cuts into the world airliner market dominated by US products and cut out of the Eastern Bloc but because they provide a big boost for a country that was fighting for the scraps of that market.



As for the airliners themselves, I think airliners come in 3 generations; 1st generation like the Comet, 2nd generation like the B707, B727, BAC111, VC10 with early turbofan engines and the 3rd generation wide-body, high-bypass turbofans like B747, A300 and DC10. I don’t think much can be done with the 1st generation, technology just moved to quickly for them to be competitive against the 2nd generation. Similarly the bigger 2nd generation planes like the B707, DC8 and VC10 Super 200 just can’t cut it against the B747, DC10, Tristar and later A300 and B767, they have to do what they can do in the 60s because by the 70s they’re superseded. However it is possible for smaller 2nd generation planes to last longer in production, even the Spey Trident lasted in production until 1978, the BAC 111 until 1982 and B727 until 1984. If Britain is to stay in the airliner game as an independent, which I think is a worthy national goal, it will have to have its own wide-body, high-bypass turbofan powered airliner ready in the early 70s and build at least 200 of them.

 

[uk 75]

The UK suffers from being large enough to create individual aircraft projects but not large enough to give manufacturers a decent home market.
One has to ask why Boeing or Douglas only used rear engines for smaller airliners and in Boeing's case went for pods rather than rear engines for the 737.
VC10 was designed for a specific BOAC requirement for its African and Asian routes which USAID rendered irrelevant by building longer runways all over the world. As with flying boats and turboprops the British were overtaken by changes in the world.
Boeing unlike Hawker talked to its customers and designed planes for them. That is why 727 sold more than the UKcentric Trident.
Boeing had Lufthansa as its launch customer for the 737 City Jet. BAC would just send them an English language brochure.

 

[uk 75]

Secretary of State, why is making civil airliners a worthwhile national goal?

You have to imagine a puzzled Sir Humprey Appleby at this point.

British Aerospace no longer makes any civil airliners. Instead the UK makes a decent living from selling Rolls Royce engines, Airbus wings, various components both physical and virtual.

Brazil and Canada have built decent small airliners/biz jets and subsidise them for regional employment reasons.

Even the mighty US has seen Boeing as its last manufacturer of big airliners. Boeing these days is a far cry from the company which developed the 707 and B52 and seems to have lost its way.

Airbus gambled and lost on the Airbus 380 though like its 300 Airbus may find freight conversions a useful new market.

So Secretary of State do you really want to spend money on white elephants rather than schools and hospitals?