Hitler orders advanced intercontinental bomber projects into production to carry on his war plan for attacking Manhattan

[Dilandu]

As mentioned above, the idea of a raid by 20 bombers isn't laughable, since the goal was to cause the Americans to expend time and resources which might otherwise have gone into the war effort.

Yep, Germans pioneered this concept during WW1 with zeppelin's raids; while they rarely caused significant damage (albeit there were some instances...), they worried British enough to put massive efforts into air defense. Which dragged guns, planes, and most importantly - trained personnel, from Western front.

 

[newsdeskdan]

Firstly, and oddly, the Germans don't seem to have known exactly how far it was from the west coast of France to Manhatten.

Maybe Germans were worried that airfields in Western France would be too vulnerable to attacks?

No mention of that in the GL discussion.

 

[Hood]

since the goal was to cause the Americans to expend time and resources which might otherwise have gone into the war effort.

I don't generally buy this argument. You're talking about a nation churning out arms on a massive scale, already has organisations like the Civil Air Patrol and Ground Observers, already has Army bases (admittedly mostly coastal defences) in the vicinity and has the 1st Air Force for protection - New York having the New York Fighter Wing (the Blue-nosed Bastards of Bodney began life in New York Wing before moving to Boston then Bodney to earn their fame). There was always a succession of fighter groups in 1 Interceptor Command earning their experience before heading to the UK (most seem to have been P-47 units during the mid-war period), so they were not necessarily shy of resources anyway.
By the same token Belfast was just a likely to be bombed as anywhere in the UK during the war, perhaps more so being a major port and shipbuilding centre - another example of how the Luftwaffe ignored the vital western industrial sectors on the coast with its obsessions with bombing London (no further to bomb Belfast than to bomb the Heysham Trimpnell plant churning out 100-octane fuel) - precisely the folly this thread magnifies.

However, it is worth noting that Air Warning Corps radar warning network was largely deactivated in April 1944 (it was in pretty poor shape by then anyway), so there was a chance of maybe slipping through for one surprise raid (an operator mistaking them for a B-24 staging flight from Mitchell AFB or something) before then or maybe completely unawares if timed between April-June 1944. But it's a lot of ifs and a lot of hassle for a propaganda stunt of no real value (even the St Nazaire raid wasting a destroyer blowing up the gates of a dry dock had some potential benefit).

 

[newsdeskdan]

since the goal was to cause the Americans to expend time and resources which might otherwise have gone into the war effort.

I don't generally buy this argument. You're talking about a nation churning out arms on a massive scale, already has organisations like the Civil Air Patrol and Ground Observers, already has Army bases (admittedly mostly coastal defences) in the vicinity and has the 1st Air Force for protection - New York having the New York Fighter Wing (the Blue-nosed Bastards of Bodney began life in New York Wing before moving to Boston then Bodney to earn their fame). There was always a succession of fighter groups in 1 Interceptor Command earning their experience before heading to the UK (most seem to have been P-47 units during the mid-war period), so they were not necessarily shy of resources anyway.
By the same token Belfast was just a likely to be bombed as anywhere in the UK during the war, perhaps more so being a major port and shipbuilding centre - another example of how the Luftwaffe ignored the vital western industrial sectors on the coast with its obsessions with bombing London (no further to bomb Belfast than to bomb the Heysham Trimpnell plant churning out 100-octane fuel) - precisely the folly this thread magnifies.

However, it is worth noting that Air Warning Corps radar warning network was largely deactivated in April 1944 (it was in pretty poor shape by then anyway), so there was a chance of maybe slipping through for one surprise raid (an operator mistaking them for a B-24 staging flight from Mitchell AFB or something) before then or maybe completely unawares if timed between April-June 1944. But it's a lot of ifs and a lot of hassle for a propaganda stunt of no real value (even the St Nazaire raid wasting a destroyer blowing up the gates of a dry dock had some potential benefit).

I'm not presenting an argument I've come up with - I'm relaying to you what the primary source documents say the Germans' intentions and motivation were. Milch and others explicitly state this in the stenographic account of a GL meeting. I'm not going to look up exactly which meeting it was and relay the exact wording, because the Me 264 is mentioned directly in at least 25 GL meetings and I can't be bothered to sift through all of them to find it. However, if you were to research it you'd find it in there. You can 'buy' what the Germans themselves said they wanted to do, and why they wanted to do it, or not.

 

[pathology_doc]

If Hitler had chosen not to invade the USSR just because he called communism a Jewish invention and instead cleared either the Heinkel He 277, Horten Ho XVIII, Messerschmitt Me 264, Focke-Wulf, Ta 400, Arado E.470, Arado E.555, Messerschmitt P.1107, and or Messerschmitt P.1108 for full-scale development and/or production so that the Luftwaffe could use these planes to bomb Manhattan or any other targets on the US Eastern Seaboard, would these aircraft have had a chance of bringing the US to its knees so that US government to reach an accommodation with the Nazi government's demands?

Nope. Knowing what happened when the Japanese mounted a surprise attack on an explicitly military target, we can only imagine what the reaction of the US would have been to Germany bombing New York - even in token fashion - as an opener to making demands.

Most of what is necessary for the US to wage WW2 is well beyond the reach of German bombers, and Germany can't produce enough bombers or send enough at once to do what's necessary to make even the Eastern Seaboard ports inoperable. Allied bombers were able to struggle home to be repaired or save their crews because it wasn't actually that long a trip back. Nursing a plane that's been damaged by flak or US fighter attack all the way back across the Atlantic is a whole different proposition, especially because at no time do you have the option to say "Okay, this isn't working, let's hit the silk and take our chances on the ground/accept captivity." If you bale out in mid-Atlantic, you drown.

As mentioned above, the idea of a raid by 20 bombers isn't laughable, since the goal was to cause the Americans to expend time and resources which might otherwise have gone into the war effort.

The problem is that the United States had those resources to spare.

 

[newsdeskdan]

since the goal was to cause the Americans to expend time and resources which might otherwise have gone into the war effort.

I don't generally buy this argument. You're talking about a nation churning out arms on a massive scale, already has organisations like the Civil Air Patrol and Ground Observers, already has Army bases (admittedly mostly coastal defences) in the vicinity and has the 1st Air Force for protection - New York having the New York Fighter Wing (the Blue-nosed Bastards of Bodney began life in New York Wing before moving to Boston then Bodney to earn their fame). There was always a succession of fighter groups in 1 Interceptor Command earning their experience before heading to the UK (most seem to have been P-47 units during the mid-war period), so they were not necessarily shy of resources anyway.
By the same token Belfast was just a likely to be bombed as anywhere in the UK during the war, perhaps more so being a major port and shipbuilding centre - another example of how the Luftwaffe ignored the vital western industrial sectors on the coast with its obsessions with bombing London (no further to bomb Belfast than to bomb the Heysham Trimpnell plant churning out 100-octane fuel) - precisely the folly this thread magnifies.

However, it is worth noting that Air Warning Corps radar warning network was largely deactivated in April 1944 (it was in pretty poor shape by then anyway), so there was a chance of maybe slipping through for one surprise raid (an operator mistaking them for a B-24 staging flight from Mitchell AFB or something) before then or maybe completely unawares if timed between April-June 1944. But it's a lot of ifs and a lot of hassle for a propaganda stunt of no real value (even the St Nazaire raid wasting a destroyer blowing up the gates of a dry dock had some potential benefit).

I'm not presenting an argument I've come up with - I'm relaying to you what the primary source documents say the Germans' intentions and motivation were. Milch and others explicitly state this in the stenographic account of a GL meeting. I'm not going to look up exactly which meeting it was and relay the exact wording, because the Me 264 is mentioned directly in at least 25 GL meetings and I can't be bothered to sift through all of them to find it. However, if you were to research it you'd find it in there. You can 'buy' what the Germans themselves said they wanted to do, and why they wanted to do it, or not.

Correction: I found the relevant passage (see below). It is, word for word, what Milch says during the GL meeting of May 19, 1942. The meeting was held at the Reichsluftfahrtministerium, Berlin, starting at 10am, and the Me 264 was item 11 on the agenda.

"Milch: Ich habe mir den Einsatz so gedacht, dass zunaechst einmal eine oder zwei Besatzungen heruebergeschickt werden, um den Amerikanern etwas auf den Kopf zu werfen, dass wir dann einen groesseren Zwischenraum machen und dann wieder eins oder zwei Flugzeuge herueber schicken, die Amerikaner dann wieder eine Weile in Ruhe lassen und so fort, um die Amerikaner zu zwingen, ihre Ruestungsproduktion fuer den eigenen Schutz anzusetzen. Damit ist aber nicht die Masse der Flugzeuge ausgelastet, sondern man kann mit denen auch noch die viel wichtigeren Aufgaben durchfuehren. Die ganze Idee war ueberhaupt nicht, Amerika von Grund auf zu zerstoeren, sondern die, die Leute zu zwingen, eine ordentliche Abwehr aufzubauen, und zu diesem Zweck wuerde man auch nicht nur New York, sondern auch andere Gebiete angreifen."

 

[newsdeskdan]

If Hitler had chosen not to invade the USSR just because he called communism a Jewish invention and instead cleared either the Heinkel He 277, Horten Ho XVIII, Messerschmitt Me 264, Focke-Wulf, Ta 400, Arado E.470, Arado E.555, Messerschmitt P.1107, and or Messerschmitt P.1108 for full-scale development and/or production so that the Luftwaffe could use these planes to bomb Manhattan or any other targets on the US Eastern Seaboard, would these aircraft have had a chance of bringing the US to its knees so that US government to reach an accommodation with the Nazi government's demands?

Nope. Knowing what happened when the Japanese mounted a surprise attack on an explicitly military target, we can only imagine what the reaction of the US would have been to Germany bombing New York - even in token fashion - as an opener to making demands.

Most of what is necessary for the US to wage WW2 is well beyond the reach of German bombers, and Germany can't produce enough bombers or send enough at once to do what's necessary to make even the Eastern Seaboard ports inoperable. Allied bombers were able to struggle home to be repaired or save their crews because it wasn't actually that long a trip back. Nursing a plane that's been damaged by flak or US fighter attack all the way back across the Atlantic is a whole different proposition, especially because at no time do you have the option to say "Okay, this isn't working, let's hit the silk and take our chances on the ground/accept captivity." If you bale out in mid-Atlantic, you drown.

As mentioned above, the idea of a raid by 20 bombers isn't laughable, since the goal was to cause the Americans to expend time and resources which might otherwise have gone into the war effort.

The problem is that the United States had those resources to spare.

We know today that they did, of course. At the time, the Germans thought that nuisance raids would cause the Americans problems.

 

[Orionblamblam]

The raid was supposed to be purely psychological effort, so Italians after some considerstion decided to drop not a bombs, but propaganda leafets. They figured out (which Germans didn't) that a few randomly dropped bombs would only anger American population against Italians; leafet raid, on the other hand, would cause more worry and anexity than anger.

It's interesting to consider how the Americans of Italian descent would have responded to either of these: the mayor at the time was Fiorello La Guardia, and it's not like he was rampagingly unpopular. I suspect that the Italian-Americans would have been as pissed off at Mussolini as anyone, and *really* pissing off the New York Mafia would not have done Il Duce any favors.

 

[Dilandu]

It's interesting to consider how the Americans of Italian descent would have responded to either of these: the mayor at the time was Fiorello La Guardia, and it's not like he was rampagingly unpopular. I suspect that the Italian-Americans would have been as pissed off at Mussolini as anyone, and *really* pissing off the New York Mafia would not have done Il Duce any favors.

Well, bloodless leaflet drops would most likely cause exactly the desired effect; New Yorkers would get nervous figuring out that "if Italians done that, Germans may not be far behind... and they wouldn't be so civilized to only drop paper".

 

[Dilandu]

I suspect that the Italian-Americans would have been as pissed off at Mussolini as anyone, and *really* pissing off the New York Mafia would not have done Il Duce any favors.

Yeah, it wasn't like in WW1, when a lot of German-Americans were deeply unhappy with US entering the war against Germany, and were quite ready to participate in any "fifth column" (if such existed).

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Haris and Spaatz didn't waste time consulting tourist guides, they just ringed the map "let's flatten this area".

Bombing Wall Street is like asking Bomber Command to just hit Wilhelmstraße in Berlin. Unless flying in broad daylight its unlikely the German crews would even find Wall Street accurately let alone bomb it. Even allowing for no blackout at night with a grid street pattern it would be a difficult job and of course the Germans have nothing like H2S to help them.

A raid by 20 bombers is laughable, even assuming all made it across without engine problems, fuel cocks sticking etc. it would amount to about 60,000kg of bombs in total.
Even if you did succeed in making a token raid with a handful of Me 264s in, say, early 1944, the next day the 8th AF is going to pay sunny Bordeaux a visit and flatten the place with a few hundred B-17s and B-24s and P-47s strafing anything that moves or remotely resembles a parked aircraft in that area just for good measure.

Yet compared to Allied efforts, even a RAF Pathfinding force on an average raid would be about as big as this postulated raid And 60,000kg is only 9 Lancaster loads! Yep there's only one winner in this arm wrestle.
And if we're waiting for German industry to produce Ta 400s, P.1107s or Ho XVIIIs then Germany had better find a way to stop any Allied invasion on every front until about 1949 or 1950... (and a foolproof air defence system post-August 45...)

As mentioned above, the idea of a raid by 20 bombers isn't laughable, since the goal was to cause the Americans to expend time and resources which might otherwise have gone into the war effort.
The Germans actually succeeded in this strategy with Belfast. The city was hit by German bombers four times in April-May 1941. Afterwards there were huge recriminations about lack of preparedness and the British government was forced to establish a massive air defence system around the city (to which my grandfather was stationed as an AAA battery commander - I have a photo of him somewhere standing next to a ginormous searchlight bulb). But the Germans never came back. The raids did cause some damage - but the most significant effect was in all the resources the air defence system tied up for the next four years.

Except that wouldn't be the case. There were already lots of AA units in the US. The USAAF had, in that region of the US the 1st Air Force with the subordinate 1st Fighter Command headquartered out of Mitchell Field on Long Island. Within other parts of the US the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Air Forces were providing coverage. These commands not only did training, but provided operational aircraft for various missions including air defense.



There was already early warning radar associated with coast defense fortresses, a number of which were in the Long Island area alone. These fortresses generally already had a battery of 4 to 6 90mm DP guns assigned to them, so flying over one would have drawn AA fire. The most common fighter in 1st Fighter Command is the P-47. This is due to the location of the Republic Aircraft factory. Pilots were taking delivery of these planes and flying them to airfields in that region for further movement forward as replacements and also for training before being sent overseas.

Since whatever German bomber was flying these missions was right at the edge of its range, the Germans couldn't make much use of varied routing in flying to their targets meaning the US could pretty rapidly deploy additional fighter, radar, and AA units along those lines of approach.

All of this existed in the US as forces being readied for overseas duty, in training, and operationally in defense of the continental US. So, the US would not have to expend any additional resources or effort beyond what they already had in plenty to defend against such attacks.

 

[newsdeskdan]

Again, I'm not saying that I think the German plan would've been a great success; I'm just telling you what the plan actually was.

 

[Hood]

I'm not presenting an argument I've come up with - I'm relaying to you what the primary source documents say the Germans' intentions and motivation were. Milch and others explicitly state this in the stenographic account of a GL meeting.

I'm not disagreeing with you personally.
Milch and co. may well have had sound grounds to think that at the time. Of course in May 1942 the US had barely been in the war for six months and therefore far from fully mobilised. In those heady days anything seemed possible in Berlin and Tokyo.

But by the time you set a up special Gruppe (Staffel strength in reality) of Ju 290s (for obvious reasons it can't be the Me 264 as only 2 existed by early 1944!) it's spring 1944 and Milch is busy with his political infighting to oust Goring and thousands of Allied bombers are starting to wreak havoc.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Again, I'm not saying that I think the German plan would've been a great success; I'm just telling you what the plan actually was.

And I'm pointing out the historical reality was it was a complete fantasy on the German's part. They wanted to build aircraft they could neither afford to build nor acquire in quantities that would do anything. They planned to use them against the US in a way that ensured they'd almost certainly all be lost in short order.

Of course, part of this is the Germans had next to zero actual intelligence on what was going on in the US, what US defenses were, how they were set up, or what their strength was. They quite literally didn't even know where much of US industry was located, particularly factories set up post 1941.

For them, locations like North American Dallas, Boeing Wichita, or Oak Ridge didn't exist. They knew nothing about these massive operations. Sure, a surprise raid scattering some bombs over NYC and Manhattan would be a local scare and nuisance, but it wouldn't have any effect on the outcome of the war. It would be a meaningless gesture.

 

[Nik]

May I point out that steering V-1s or such onto Wall Street in New York using gyros, timers etc after launch from wonky U-Boots is sorta missing point ?

Make much more sense for 'spies' or sympathisers to set up a radio beacon and have the missiles follow it in...

Luftwaffe had to 'cross the beams' to guide aircraft onto eg Coventry because UK managed to 'roll and turn' the German pre-war spy network. US was a very different environment where, IMHO, a false-flag operation had much more chance of success...

 

[newsdeskdan]

Again, I'm not saying that I think the German plan would've been a great success; I'm just telling you what the plan actually was.

And I'm pointing out the historical reality was it was a complete fantasy on the German's part. They wanted to build aircraft they could neither afford to build nor acquire in quantities that would do anything. They planned to use them against the US in a way that ensured they'd almost certainly all be lost in short order.

Of course, part of this is the Germans had next to zero actual intelligence on what was going on in the US, what US defenses were, how they were set up, or what their strength was. They quite literally didn't even know where much of US industry was located, particularly factories set up post 1941.

For them, locations like North American Dallas, Boeing Wichita, or Oak Ridge didn't exist. They knew nothing about these massive operations. Sure, a surprise raid scattering some bombs over NYC and Manhattan would be a local scare and nuisance, but it wouldn't have any effect on the outcome of the war. It would be a meaningless gesture.

We all know the historical reality. There's really no need to spell it out. It is absolutely obvious that the German plan was ridiculous. It is, surely, obvious that going to war with the US at all was a complete disaster for the Germans - they basically lost the moment they declared war on the US, it simply became a matter of when they lost, not if they would lose. We know that the Germans couldn't afford the resources to build a fleet of heavy bombers, even a small one. All that should go without saying.
What's not been obvious is what the Germans actually were planning (regardless of its chances of success, i.e. zero). The assumptions underpinning the question we're responding to suggest that people don't realise that the Germans were not trying to 'bring the US to its knees', nor that they had very few aircraft designs that could have even reached the US and returned. Nor that most of the designs mentioned were never intended as 'Amerikabombers'. These are the things that aren't known - and that is the gap in awareness that I am attempting to fill with knowledge gleaned from primary source research.
It's also not obvious what intelligence the Germans had about what was going on in the US. German archivists have estimated that something like 98% of files on intelligence about foreign powers were destroyed.
It's not a topic I've paid too much attention to, exactly what the Germans did and didn't know about US military planning, but I wouldn't be too hasty to say that they "had next to zero actual intelligence on what was going on in the US". Certainly, they seem to have had a remarkable degree of knowledge about the B-29, B-32 and other aircraft. In addition, if you look through the ADRC/T-2 microfilm files (i.e. air technology documents captured from the Germans at the end of the war) you will occasionally find articles on air technology lifted from American magazines with dates ranging from 1940 to 1944. There's a good one on Northrop's flying wings, for example, which gives away far more than you'd think either Northrop or the American government would have been comfortable with.
So while I agree with you about the ludicrously low chances of the Me 264/Ju 290/Ju 390 achieving anything other than being a massive waste of resources, I'm hesitant to agree with you about the state of German intelligence on the US. They knew far less, I think it's fair to say, about what was happening in Britain.

 

[newsdeskdan]

I'm not presenting an argument I've come up with - I'm relaying to you what the primary source documents say the Germans' intentions and motivation were. Milch and others explicitly state this in the stenographic account of a GL meeting.

I'm not disagreeing with you personally.
Milch and co. may well have had sound grounds to think that at the time. Of course in May 1942 the US had barely been in the war for six months and therefore far from fully mobilised. In those heady days anything seemed possible in Berlin and Tokyo.

But by the time you set a up special Gruppe (Staffel strength in reality) of Ju 290s (for obvious reasons it can't be the Me 264 as only 2 existed by early 1944!) it's spring 1944 and Milch is busy with his political infighting to oust Goring and thousands of Allied bombers are starting to wreak havoc.

This is largely incorrect. I think there had been heady days of anything seeming possible but these evaporated when the US actually entered the war. The quote I dug out from Milch (see reply #47) is him explaining what it had been hoped could be achieved, after a discussion about why it was much more realistic to concentrate on attacking shipping in the Atlantic than to even attempt an attack on the US.
Again, there is a real gap in knowledge here that is currently being filled with assumptions based on... I'm not sure what.
Incidentally, the plan to use the Me 264 for nuisance raids had basically been given up by this point. The distance was too great and air-to-air refuelling was (it was thought) a pipe dream. However, they still believed that the Me 264 could make a valuable contribution via anti-shipping missions (I'm well aware that, whatever it's intended mission, the Me 264 would have been a massive waste of time and resources).
The Me 264s built were only ever flying mock-ups. No mission-capable Me 264s were ever built. No Ju 290s capable of dropping actual conventional bombs from a bomb bay were ever built either, though a handful were able to launch anti-shipping glide bombs. Only a handful were built full stop.
Last point: There was no political infighting between Milch and Goering. None. Not even at the Luftwaffe's lowest ebb. Milch always did as he was told by Goering and Hitler. He never tried to oust Goering - I've no idea where that notion could have come from.

 

[TomS]

I suspect that the Italian-Americans would have been as pissed off at Mussolini as anyone, and *really* pissing off the New York Mafia would not have done Il Duce any favors.

Yeah, it wasn't like in WW1, when a lot of German-Americans were deeply unhappy with US entering the war against Germany, and were quite ready to participate in any "fifth column" (if such existed).

First part certainly true. Second part very much questionable. There were scattered acts of pro-German sabotage but the idea that a large fraction of German-Americans would happily have become saboteurs just doesn't hold up.

There was a huge, and largely unwarranted, anti-German movement in the U.S. when war was declared. Enough so that it stopped being safe to be publicly German in some places. My ancestors, shop keepers in a Midwestern farming community whose ancestors arrived in the 1830s, stopped speaking German around 1918. Partially for self-protection, and partially out of a conscious choice that their future was American, not German. As my great great grandfather said, "We are Americans, in this house we speak only English."

 

[Orionblamblam]

My ancestors, shop keepers in a Midwestern farming community whose ancestors arrived in the 1830s, stopped speaking German around 1918. Partially for self-protection, and partially out of a conscious choice that their future was American, not German. As my great great grandfather said, "We are Americans, in this house we speak only English."

Nothing quite like a war to bring a people together. Well... used to be true, anyway. Stopped around the time of Vietnam, I think, when the widespread belief that it was good to be American stopped being quite so widespread in the US.

But back to WWII: it is my vague recollection that the Sicilian mafia worked against the Axis powers, and aided the Allies... and that the mafia in the US served to connect the Allies and the local mafia. Sure, a criminal organization would prefer to have a corrupt government in charge; that not only sets things up in society to make people want the things that the criminal element can provide, it also makes it easier for the criminal element to work with government officials with graft and bribes and blackmail. But a totalitarian government that doesn't just line up criminals for summary execution, but the criminals customers, clients and *family,* well, that's a bit much. And having that totalitarian government wander across an ocean to blow up the mafia's turf? Uh-uh, nope. If the Italians landed saboteurs who started causing real trouble, the local mafia would undoubtedly be the FBI's best weapon against them for the simple fact that if news got out that Italians were blowing things up, things would get *real* rough for Italian-Americans.

 

[edwest4]

New York Times, 14 December, 1944.

LA GUARDIA'S ADVICE DRAWS NAZI IRONY (Published 1944)

LaGuardia predicts that Natl Socialist party will not continue in power another 100 wks, reply to Ger spokesman comment

www.nytimes.com

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Again, I'm not saying that I think the German plan would've been a great success; I'm just telling you what the plan actually was.

And I'm pointing out the historical reality was it was a complete fantasy on the German's part. They wanted to build aircraft they could neither afford to build nor acquire in quantities that would do anything. They planned to use them against the US in a way that ensured they'd almost certainly all be lost in short order.

Of course, part of this is the Germans had next to zero actual intelligence on what was going on in the US, what US defenses were, how they were set up, or what their strength was. They quite literally didn't even know where much of US industry was located, particularly factories set up post 1941.

For them, locations like North American Dallas, Boeing Wichita, or Oak Ridge didn't exist. They knew nothing about these massive operations. Sure, a surprise raid scattering some bombs over NYC and Manhattan would be a local scare and nuisance, but it wouldn't have any effect on the outcome of the war. It would be a meaningless gesture.

We all know the historical reality. There's really no need to spell it out. It is absolutely obvious that the German plan was ridiculous. It is, surely, obvious that going to war with the US at all was a complete disaster for the Germans - they basically lost the moment they declared war on the US, it simply became a matter of when they lost, not if they would lose. We know that the Germans couldn't afford the resources to build a fleet of heavy bombers, even a small one. All that should go without saying.
What's not been obvious is what the Germans actually were planning (regardless of its chances of success, i.e. zero). The assumptions underpinning the question we're responding to suggest that people don't realise that the Germans were not trying to 'bring the US to its knees', nor that they had very few aircraft designs that could have even reached the US and returned. Nor that most of the designs mentioned were never intended as 'Amerikabombers'. These are the things that aren't known - and that is the gap in awareness that I am attempting to fill with knowledge gleaned from primary source research.
It's also not obvious what intelligence the Germans had about what was going on in the US. German archivists have estimated that something like 98% of files on intelligence about foreign powers were destroyed.
It's not a topic I've paid too much attention to, exactly what the Germans did and didn't know about US military planning, but I wouldn't be too hasty to say that they "had next to zero actual intelligence on what was going on in the US". Certainly, they seem to have had a remarkable degree of knowledge about the B-29, B-32 and other aircraft. In addition, if you look through the ADRC/T-2 microfilm files (i.e. air technology documents captured from the Germans at the end of the war) you will occasionally find articles on air technology lifted from American magazines with dates ranging from 1940 to 1944. There's a good one on Northrop's flying wings, for example, which gives away far more than you'd think either Northrop or the American government would have been comfortable with.
So while I agree with you about the ludicrously low chances of the Me 264/Ju 290/Ju 390 achieving anything other than being a massive waste of resources, I'm hesitant to agree with you about the state of German intelligence on the US. They knew far less, I think it's fair to say, about what was happening in Britain.

They actually had close to zero up-to-date intelligence on what was going on in the US. They had no spies, and the two attempts to land ones from submarines both ended with all of them rounded up in short order and either imprisoned or executed. In fact, if you read about them--or the ones that went to England--it sounds like a badly written comedy. It's almost unbelievable how inept they were.
The most well-known group of four landed on Long Island where they ran into a Coast Guard sentry on the landing beach. Four more landed in Florida a day later. They were rounded up in less than a month, in part because two of them turned themselves into the FBI...

Their plan was completely amateurish. They had only the vaguest notion of where US defense industries were and no idea on how they might move around the country.
Another group of two was later landed in Maine and they too were quickly caught.



It didn't help Germany that there were few Germans who spoke American English well enough that they could pass without question if used as spies. The Soviet Union and Britain were much better at this game, while the US was better at what might be called 'dirty tricks.'

 

[edwest4]

Preparing the American Public for a V-3 Attack, Dec 1944, US Historical Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama, L/C Box 223, USAF Microfilm Reel 43811.

V-3 Ready to Hit New York This Month, German Says (Published 1944)

Reptd saying that Ger V-3 weapon will soon be ready to hit NY

www.nytimes.com

 

[bobtdwarf]

The raid was supposed to be purely psychological effort, so Italians after some considerstion decided to drop not a bombs, but propaganda leafets. They figured out (which Germans didn't) that a few randomly dropped bombs would only anger American population against Italians; leafet raid, on the other hand, would cause more worry and anexity than anger.

It's interesting to consider how the Americans of Italian descent would have responded to either of these: the mayor at the time was Fiorello La Guardia, and it's not like he was rampagingly unpopular. I suspect that the Italian-Americans would have been as pissed off at Mussolini as anyone, and *really* pissing off the New York Mafia would not have done Il Duce any favors.

The scene from the Rocketeer...

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_D-Z0AA-7vQ

"I may not make an honest buck, but I am 100% American"

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Preparing the American Public for a V-3 Attack, Dec 1944, US Historical Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama, L/C Box 223, USAF Microfilm Reel 43811.

V-3 Ready to Hit New York This Month, German Says (Published 1944)

Reptd saying that Ger V-3 weapon will soon be ready to hit NY

www.nytimes.com

A prepare for the worst scenario. The Germans quite literally lacked the industrial base and economy to build an intercontinental ballistic missile in the 40's.

 

[Dilandu]

A prepare for the worst scenario. The Germans quite literally lacked the industrial base and economy to build an intercontinental ballistic missile in the 40's.

Well, yes, but ballistic missiles were new and poorly understood even by experts, so nobody could actually be sure in 1944 what is possible and what isnt. The mere fact that Germans bombarded London with the weapon that could not be stopped by any known defense was unnerving.

 

[Hood]

I'm not presenting an argument I've come up with - I'm relaying to you what the primary source documents say the Germans' intentions and motivation were. Milch and others explicitly state this in the stenographic account of a GL meeting.

I'm not disagreeing with you personally.
Milch and co. may well have had sound grounds to think that at the time. Of course in May 1942 the US had barely been in the war for six months and therefore far from fully mobilised. In those heady days anything seemed possible in Berlin and Tokyo.

But by the time you set a up special Gruppe (Staffel strength in reality) of Ju 290s (for obvious reasons it can't be the Me 264 as only 2 existed by early 1944!) it's spring 1944 and Milch is busy with his political infighting to oust Goring and thousands of Allied bombers are starting to wreak havoc.

This is largely incorrect. I think there had been heady days of anything seeming possible but these evaporated when the US actually entered the war. The quote I dug out from Milch (see reply #47) is him explaining what it had been hoped could be achieved, after a discussion about why it was much more realistic to concentrate on attacking shipping in the Atlantic than to even attempt an attack on the US.
Again, there is a real gap in knowledge here that is currently being filled with assumptions based on... I'm not sure what.
Incidentally, the plan to use the Me 264 for nuisance raids had basically been given up by this point. The distance was too great and air-to-air refuelling was (it was thought) a pipe dream. However, they still believed that the Me 264 could make a valuable contribution via anti-shipping missions (I'm well aware that, whatever it's intended mission, the Me 264 would have been a massive waste of time and resources).
The Me 264s built were only ever flying mock-ups. No mission-capable Me 264s were ever built. No Ju 290s capable of dropping actual conventional bombs from a bomb bay were ever built either, though a handful were able to launch anti-shipping glide bombs. Only a handful were built full stop.
Last point: There was no political infighting between Milch and Goering. None. Not even at the Luftwaffe's lowest ebb. Milch always did as he was told by Goering and Hitler. He never tried to oust Goering - I've no idea where that notion could have come from.

May 1942 was the high-water mark of Axis success, German forces have taken Kerch and Case Blue is about to begin with the aim to reach Baku and the Soviet counter-attack at Kharkov was stopped in its tracks. Rommel was still advancing east though getting held up and delayed and the loss of Tobruk was a blow to Britain (in morale terms at least with Churchill facing a motion of no-confidence - but it was this shock that led to Roosevelt giving Churchill the equipment - Shermans - needed for the 8th Army and the beginning of planning for Torch) and would ultimately stall at El Alamein in July. The Japanese had taken Corregidor, midget subs were raiding Sydney and Midway was yet to happen, though Coral Sea had singed Japanese efforts to go further south.
In May it would be easy to project that German forces might have cut the Suez by the end of summer (meeting up with German forces via the Caucasus was another fantasy but hey ho Hitler lived in fantasy land and Rommel's drive killed the plan to invade Malta which in hindsight was the biggest blunder). It would take the Americans another 6 months to show up with Operation Torch while Rommel seemed so close to success. The Japanese seemed to be mopping up the Americans and Allies pretty easily.
Ironically the last day of May brought the first 1,000 bomber raid on Cologne...

Certainly Germany was doomed but in May 1942 it didn't necessarily look that way, with Britain's list of defeats from Dec 41 to May 42 hardly looked awe-inspiring that we'd stick it to the finish, the Soviets were still disorganised and not matching the Germans. The Germans were slowly grinding to a halt from losses on both fronts, even if that wasn't immediately accepted by the OKW. And let's face it the US Army felt it was feasible to paddle ashore in France in late 1942 and that Torch was a diversion job...
Even so, the idea of sending a couple of planes on nuisance raids seems incongruous when it looked like the end of the war might be in sight if Stalin and Churchill lost their crucial southern communication links (Volga/Suez).

I certainly don't disagree re: the Me 264 and Ju 290, 390, "Amerikabombers" et al.

As to Milch, his failings led to his positions of power being stripped from him in 1944. Unfair perhaps given the problems he faced but doubtless Goring didn't try to protect him.

 

[Foo Fighter]

As I see it, the whole NAZI leadership was in a state of internecine warfare, looking for personal gain and influence. Small wonder politics is unwanted here.

 

[newsdeskdan]

Even so, the idea of sending a couple of planes on nuisance raids seems incongruous when it looked like the end of the war might be in sight if Stalin and Churchill lost their crucial southern communication links (Volga/Suez).

I certainly don't disagree re: the Me 264 and Ju 290, 390, "Amerikabombers" et al.

As to Milch, his failings led to his positions of power being stripped from him in 1944. Unfair perhaps given the problems he faced but doubtless Goring didn't try to protect him.

I know the history - there was really no need to explain it all to me. I presume you missed the following bit in my previous response: "The quote I dug out from Milch (see reply #47) is him explaining what it had been hoped could be achieved, after a discussion about why it was much more realistic to concentrate on attacking shipping in the Atlantic than to even attempt an attack on the US."
The idea of sending a couple of planes on nuisance raids had been pretty much abandoned by this point.
Also, Milch wasn't stripped of his positions of power in 1944. He effectively sidelined himself by initiating organisational changes which placed responsibility for aircraft production within Speer's ministry. I explain the whole process on p321 of my Secret Projects of the Luftwaffe Volume 1 Jet Fighters 1939-1945 book complete with fully cited primary source references.

 

[Hood]

Also, Milch wasn't stripped of his positions of power in 1944. He effectively sidelined himself by initiating organisational changes which placed responsibility for aircraft production within Speer's ministry.

I hadn't realised that Milch had talked himself out of a job and the trappings of rank and power, must have been about the only person in the Third Reich to accomplish that!

 

[newsdeskdan]

Also, Milch wasn't stripped of his positions of power in 1944. He effectively sidelined himself by initiating organisational changes which placed responsibility for aircraft production within Speer's ministry.

I hadn't realised that Milch had talked himself out of a job and the trappings of rank and power, must have been about the only person in the Third Reich to accomplish that!

The Jaegerstab was set up at Milch's behest at the beginning of March 1944. He'd previously discussed the idea of integrating aviation production into the wider structure of German arms manufacturing with Speer while the latter was ill in hospital during the early part of the year. With Speer himself out of commission, the Jaegerstab was jointly headed by Milch and Speer's duty - Karl-Otto Saur. Goering gave the idea his approval and off they went.
Initially, Saur was supposed to be Milch's subordinate and most early Jaegerstab meetings were presided over by Milch. However, before long Saur took over and led most meetings - since he was already connected to so many other parts of industry and he was the direct superior of the various teams who were making everything happen. These were Speer ministry officials, not RLM staffers. There was really no need for Milch to be there and he recognised that.
Milch resigned as Generalluftzeugmeister and State Secretary for Aviation on June 20, 1944, but continued to work in a sort of transitional role through July and possibly into August. After that he was completely divorced from aviation production/planning etc.
The new Chef-TLR structure was launched in August 1944, which replaced both the Jaegerstab and the remainder of the RLM's original hierarchy.

 

[edwest4]

Preparing the American Public for a V-3 Attack, Dec 1944, US Historical Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama, L/C Box 223, USAF Microfilm Reel 43811.

V-3 Ready to Hit New York This Month, German Says (Published 1944)

Reptd saying that Ger V-3 weapon will soon be ready to hit NY

www.nytimes.com

A prepare for the worst scenario. The Germans quite literally lacked the industrial base and economy to build an intercontinental ballistic missile in the 40's.

CIOS Report XXXII-125 German Guided Missile Research. "A-11, A-12, A-13, A-14 further development models of the A9/10 with 3500 miles range. Long-range rockets for attacks on the United States. A-15: This project probably never left the drawing board".

 

[royabulgaf]

It's well-known that Hitler considered African Americans inferior to the Aryan race, falsely claimed that Wall Street was controlled by Jewish bankers, and decried the US as a "Jewish rubbish heap" of "inferiority and decadence" that was "incapable of waging war", which is why he ordered the drafting of war plans for attacking Manhattan. If Hitler had chosen not to invade the USSR just because he called communism a Jewish invention and instead cleared either the Heinkel He 277, Horten Ho XVIII, Messerschmitt Me 264, Focke-Wulf, Ta 400, Arado E.470, Arado E.555, Messerschmitt P.1107, and or Messerschmitt P.1108 for full-scale development and/or production so that the Luftwaffe could use these planes to bomb Manhattan or any other targets on the US Eastern Seaboard, would these aircraft have had a chance of bringing the US to its knees so that US government to reach an accommodation with the Nazi government's demands?

The He 277 and Ta 400 were intended for sinking supply convoys in the Atlantic - neither would have had the range to reach the US, nor were they intended to. The Arado E.470 was a paper exercise, rather than a plan to build an actual aircraft. The E.555, P 1107, P 1108 and H XVIII would have had significantly less range than the He 277 and Ta 400. They were intended for an attack on the UK - to destroy the USAAF and RAF bomber fleets on the ground and buy Germany a respite from the constant bombing raids of 1944. The Hortens did speculate that the XVIII might have been capable of reaching the US but in reality, it wasn't even close.
That leaves the Me 264 and the U-boats with Fi 103s. Both those projects actually were considered for attacks on the US. The latter, however, got no further than a few sketches before being dismissed.

Granted, it would work as a force multiplier, tying down considerably more AA resources compared to the 3 or so bomber squadrons. However, if cooler heads prevailed, the US military would realize that they were no more than nuisance raids on the Eastern Seaboard. Various training squadrons and units working up for deployment would handle the aerial defense. Didn't we have a good supply of AA guns in the US? Truthfully, I don't know. Have some ships in the convoys function as radar piockets. Hell, with radar stations in England you could have a good 10 hours warning; Unescorted bomber with crews spending 8-10 hours in flight? Air defense having just as long to prepare? Fish in a barrel.

 

[Kat Tsun]

P.S. Italians actually considered air raid on New York, too. Either with long-range four-engine transport/bomber, or with high-speed pre-war trimotor record-setting plane. In first case, plane was supposed to return back to Europe; in second case, plane was supposed ditch near Newfoundland, and crew would be rescued by awaiting submarine.

The raid was supposed to be purely psychological effort, so Italians after some considerstion decided to drop not a bombs, but propaganda leafets. They figured out (which Germans didn't) that a few randomly dropped bombs would only anger American population against Italians; leafet raid, on the other hand, would cause more worry and anexity than anger.

This is done in Konpecki no Kantai the lolest WW2 AH anime.

 

[newsdeskdan]

It's well-known that Hitler considered African Americans inferior to the Aryan race, falsely claimed that Wall Street was controlled by Jewish bankers, and decried the US as a "Jewish rubbish heap" of "inferiority and decadence" that was "incapable of waging war", which is why he ordered the drafting of war plans for attacking Manhattan. If Hitler had chosen not to invade the USSR just because he called communism a Jewish invention and instead cleared either the Heinkel He 277, Horten Ho XVIII, Messerschmitt Me 264, Focke-Wulf, Ta 400, Arado E.470, Arado E.555, Messerschmitt P.1107, and or Messerschmitt P.1108 for full-scale development and/or production so that the Luftwaffe could use these planes to bomb Manhattan or any other targets on the US Eastern Seaboard, would these aircraft have had a chance of bringing the US to its knees so that US government to reach an accommodation with the Nazi government's demands?

The He 277 and Ta 400 were intended for sinking supply convoys in the Atlantic - neither would have had the range to reach the US, nor were they intended to. The Arado E.470 was a paper exercise, rather than a plan to build an actual aircraft. The E.555, P 1107, P 1108 and H XVIII would have had significantly less range than the He 277 and Ta 400. They were intended for an attack on the UK - to destroy the USAAF and RAF bomber fleets on the ground and buy Germany a respite from the constant bombing raids of 1944. The Hortens did speculate that the XVIII might have been capable of reaching the US but in reality, it wasn't even close.
That leaves the Me 264 and the U-boats with Fi 103s. Both those projects actually were considered for attacks on the US. The latter, however, got no further than a few sketches before being dismissed.

Granted, it would work as a force multiplier, tying down considerably more AA resources compared to the 3 or so bomber squadrons. However, if cooler heads prevailed, the US military would realize that they were no more than nuisance raids on the Eastern Seaboard. Various training squadrons and units working up for deployment would handle the aerial defense. Didn't we have a good supply of AA guns in the US? Truthfully, I don't know. Have some ships in the convoys function as radar piockets. Hell, with radar stations in England you could have a good 10 hours warning; Unescorted bomber with crews spending 8-10 hours in flight? Air defense having just as long to prepare? Fish in a barrel.

To reiterate, I'm stating what the German plan was - not it's likeliness to succeed. Knowing what we all know today, it's obvious that it would not have succeeded.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Actually, there is a way the Germans could have bombed the US, but it involves a more complex plan and different aircraft. It is workable with what they had however.

 

[Dilandu]

Actually, there is a way the Germans could have bombed the US, but it involves a more complex plan and different aircraft. It is workable with what they had however.

Overcomplicated plans are more risky to fail.

 

[Archibald]

How about detonating a Type VII U-boat in New York Harbor, instead ? Although I suppose American ASW patrols were no teletubbies...

 

[edwest4]

How about detonating a Type VII U-boat in New York Harbor, instead ? Although I suppose American ASW patrols were no teletubbies...

Not a practical idea. Releasing mustard gas, or similar, with prevailing winds would have been more practical.

World War II: German Raid on Bari

Dubbed the 'second Pearl Harbor,' the 1943 German attack on Bari also revealed an Allied secret--mustard gas.

www.historynet.com

 

[Dilandu]

Well, I calculated a bit... A Blohm & Voss BV.222 V1 flying boat have a range of about 6000 km with 4 tons of load. Its fuel capacity was about 3450 litres of aircraft fuel per engine - circa 15,7 tons.

So... four BV.222 flying boats, flying on 3000 km range, could carry enough fuel to completely refuel the fifth one, and return back.

Let's imagine nine BV.222 raid on New York. Eight boats are tankers, loaded only with fuel. The ninth one is the bomber. Five boats (four tankers and bomber) took off from Brest, fly Mid-Atlantic, land. The bomber is refueled. Empty tankers fly back to Brest.

Bomber came to North America, drop bombs on New York, and retreat to arranged rendezvous point. The second flight of four tankers took off, use radio navigation beacon of bomber to find it, and refuel it for return flight. All five boats returns to Brest.

Complicated, but seems somewhat possible... if enough BV.222 could be gathered.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Actually, there is a way the Germans could have bombed the US, but it involves a more complex plan and different aircraft. It is workable with what they had however.

Overcomplicated plans are more risky to fail.

Absolutely, but the plan I devised would theoretically work, and it seems the sort of convoluted, specialized, over-engineered plan that the Germans seem to love.