MDA saying hypersonic missiles difficult to counter due to their ability to maneuver in flight though they are planning to field a new version of the SM-6 in the interim before the Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) reaches operational capability in 2032. Would be correct in assuming that driving the GPI requirement to be a big and very expensive missile with a range of approx. 1,000 miles?
Every analysis of intercepting HGVs I've seen says that the launcher needs to be within about 10km of the target to be able to make the interception AT ALL.

So either you have a relatively small number of expensive super long range missile that can pop the hypersonics while they're out of the atmosphere and unable to maneuver, or you have an enormous number of individually relatively cheap point defense missiles. Both alternatives are expensive as total programs.

I had an idea for a drone that was pretty fast climbing and pretty fast in general (basically a cross between an F104 and a D21 drone with a couple of PAC3s on it or similar), just so you might be able to get away with basing the interceptors ~180km away from the objects to be protected. 2 minutes to climb to interception altitude and accelerate to M2.9+, 3 minutes to get over the defended area. But the interception geometry works out to needing to launch that drone when the HGV is ~1800km away!
 
Real answer is to intercept at mid-stage or earlier. Anything past that would be playing to the missile’s advantage.
Depends on the glide vehicle. Some start gliding WAY out. The problem is much like Boost Phase Intercept if you're not going after the glider.
 

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This might have been mentioned already and likely obvious to everyone for a while now, but giving the Army the new mid-range strike capabilities with Tomahawk's (as well as long-range capability real soon!) and SM-6's deployed spread throughout Guam (potentially in very large numbers).
With all that, Pacific DDG's only need to have AD Missiles in their VLS!
Maybe certain ships can be loaded out with a small quantity of Tomahawk's for deeper strikes, as they can sail closer to the target...
My point is, more SM-3/6 Interceptors for HGV defense...
 
US Army/USMC land launchers cannot achieve anything like the salvo density of a Burke class destroyer. An MRC battery is 16 missiles. A Burke with only a quarter of its cells is 24. A CSG with 25-35% of its Mk41s dedicated to tomahawk is 100-150 missiles. Land based systems can reload and continue to be threat longer perhaps, but large scale surge strikes are still a USN thing. Or a USAF bomber thing.
 
Kind of makes you wonder what it is. Would a missile interceptor be a classified means? I wouldn't have thought so, the missile itself might be classified but the fact it's a missile probably wouldn't.



 
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View: https://x.com/defense_news/status/1884549305081467257

 
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‘Defending the homeland’ from missile strikes is a hopeless task. It would be far more relevant to defend several key bases/ports and call it a day, and even that require a lot of spending from Congress that quite frankly is not going to happen.
 
‘Defending the homeland’ from missile strikes is a hopeless task. It would be far more relevant to defend several key bases/ports and call it a day, and even that require a lot of spending from Congress that quite frankly is not going to happen.

Is Palm Beach a key port or base? Because you know that's what he's concerned about defending.
 
Raytheon appeals decision award:

Also in May, MDA entered an agreement with Japan’s ministry of defense to jointly develop the GPI.

That is where Raytheon claims the awarding process began to go awry. Details are shown in two court filings from November that recently were made public by the court – though with heavy redactions.

In its complaint, Raytheon alleges MDA “internally changed its evaluation criteria,” though specifics are not publicly given. The agency’s decision was an “arbitrary and irrational” one that “applied unstated criteria” and “treated Northrop and Raytheon unequally,” according to lawyers for Raytheon.

 
At 3:06 he says an RF seeker would not see beyond the plasma sheath. But I know that plasma sheaths have their own frequency and don't attenuate the entire spectrum uniformly. Is it therefore not possible to simply match an RF seeker to the corresponding plasma sheath frequency and achieve impact at a high velocity?

I've only briefly went through this document and they propose seekers from X band (8-12GHz) up to Ka (27-40GHz).

I didn't find anything quickly on how to calculate plasma sheath frequency so I consulted ChatGPT and it gave me this answer:
  • The plasma frequency (fpf_pfp) is determined by the electron density:
    fp=8.98×103×ne(Hz)f_p = 8.98 \times 10^3 \times \sqrt{n_e} \quad \text{(Hz)}fp=8.98×103×ne(Hz)
    where nen_ene is the electron density in cm−3\text{cm}^{-3}cm−3.
  • At Mach 10, depending on altitude and material properties, the plasma electron density can reach values exceeding 1012−101310^{12} - 10^{13}1012−1013 electrons/cm³, leading to a plasma frequency in the range of 9-30 GHz or more.
I then asked the same about a missile decelerating to Mach 6 and it gave me this answer:
For a Mach 6 missile, the plasma frequency range is approximately:

0.9 GHz to 2.8 GHz

I acknowledge the challenge in locking onto the correct target at exceptionally high range (10's of km) and maneuvering to align with it in such short time. I'm only asking about seeker functionality.
 

 


 
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The most controversial piece of the plan calls for space-based interceptors capable of taking out missiles during their boost phase – a significant escalation in space-based capabilities.


One much-invoked 2004 study repeated many similar cost concerns. At the same time, critics continued to argue that pursuing space-based missile defense would accelerate the weaponization of space. A 2012 report reexamined space-based interceptors, warning that they could cost over $300 billion. Ironically, from 2002 to 2022, the Department of Defense would end up spending at least $174 billion on a different missile defense concept that targets missiles in their midcourse phase of flight, in many ways a far more difficult challenge than targeting a missile during its boost phase.
That was 20 years ago. Many of the assumptions baked into these prior assessments have changed due to tectonic geopolitical, strategic and technological shifts. Space access is far cheaper and satellites are manufactured at a scale exponentially greater than anything possible decades ago. Russia and China are busily weaponizing space to their advantage, in spite of U.S. calls for responsible behaviors in space. Meanwhile, hostile regimes, like Iran and North Korea, are developing better, longer-range missiles capable of striking the homeland.
In 1989, it cost about $30,000 per kilogram for launch into low Earth orbit. In 2018, it cost $1,500 per kilogram. That cost should drop to around $500 per kilogram in the coming years. Additionally, many companies have shown they can build and operate satellite constellations at scale. SpaceX alone can produce about five satellites per day and has thousands of satellites in orbit. Other companies are pursuing responsive space systems to put satellites into space on short notice, operating satellites at lower altitudes than had been the norm, and building capsules to survive atmospheric reentry — all three developments could support missile intercept systems. As launch costs plummet, the barriers to space fires do as well.

 
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View: https://x.com/MilitaryTimes/status/1894505064003186989


I'd have gone with Orange Dome personally.


 
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Alex Hollings from Sandboxx has recently uploaded a video about whether or not Trump's proposed Golden Dome system is feasible:


On January 27, 2025, one week after taking office, President Trump issued an executive order entitled, “The Iron Dome for America,” outlining the new administration’s goal of fielding a next-generation air defense network meant to deter future conflict and, if necessary, defend the American mainland from a wide variety of airborne attacks, including nuclear cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic missiles.
But is this plan actually feasible? Let's discuss.
 
Without having watched I would say generally “no”, though perhaps very finite areas or target subsets could be defended against some specific opposing capabilities. The extent of the defense and the type of attacking systems it would defend against have naturally never been articulated becathe administration has little idea.
 

Wow, that is great news!

What "hypersonic missile" was used to test and validate this new capability? Surely it was tested against some hypersonic missile acting as a target. Maybe this system was tested against ARRW and prevents booster ignition?

Or was this actually a "simulated capability" against a "simulated missile" ? Because if this is the "classified capability" I think it was, yes that's actually what happened. Which is like saying that we now have "capabilities" that were validated in Call of Duty.
 

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