@Hood: you have to read fully what is written before embarking other in lengthy discussions.
First, the budgetary line is now needed since earlier Rafale sales generously compensated have dried down export financing mechanisms that generally are used for less onerous products (export industries have complained that those funds being not available anymore they've lost some of their competitive edge in their segments). You then have to understand that using those extensively backed funds for what they have no purpose generate profit losses and deprive French state from direct revenue.
Then the second aspect you've seemingly missed is the financial guarantee: 85%
Ukraine being at war, it is dubious than refinancing the portion of the loan that is guaranteed would be a priority if the situation locally worsen.
France is then increasing their own risk level in financing such sale.
It wouldn't be much of a problem if the risk was one time. But by requiring France to buy again new planes afterward, and this is my third point, it's, as exposed already very conversly (see post above) it's the dynamic of generating long term debts for private profit today that has a dubious meaning.
As written, this simply weaken future generations in their own right to then build a proper defense.
Last but not least, it's all the French defense posture that has to endure the brunt shock of such sales: lack of airframe, lack of training, loss of hard to source expertise (less airplane would invariably lead to reduced maintenance infrastructures), missed international objectives (see the situation in Mali with an under equipped projected forces - 30 helicopters in total with a large portion of the fleet having below 50% availability)), delayed programs leading to an increased lethality in opex, less reactivity with an over stretched AdlAE due to the lack of airframe...
Fourth, such financial backing of an export through divesting in-service assets amount to a subsidy to hide the lack of competitive pricing of Dassault-Aviation products. That could IMOHO could well be exposed to litigation.
Last but not least, as observed earlier, what would be the equipments that will then flow away from AdLAE inventory? How many more of those already scarce AESA radars? How much delay before the new sensors are fleetwide available? How many truncated pilot yearly flight hours resulting from the lack of airframe(remember that the last fatal Rafale crash was imparted on the lack of training)?
Less is less. There is no
win win in losses.
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