I do know Pakistan's original motivtion, but Khan proliferated to Muslim states based on Israel - have no idea whether he was specific origin of detailed engineering for NK, but equally it is easy to assume that he passed his gift along in the 70's.
The only fairly positive other Muslim state with any nukes is Saudi Arabia, and even then the weapons are physically in Pakistan. The Saudis funded a significant chunk of the Pakistani nuclear program, so got a few weapons out of it.

The weird thing about nukes is that they have a critical mass* in terms of how many a nation wants before they go from "intend to use" to "deterrence". The number of warheads where that switch happens seems to be about 200. As the line goes: "I'm not worried about the man who wants 100 nukes. I'm worried about the man who only wants one."

* pun totally intended.
 
Do you really believe that?

Given that the technology has existed for 70 years, technolgy refinements available via internet - much less intelligence activities; given Pakistan/Khan's 'free distribution' of designs to Iraq, Libya & N.Korea; given zero inspections of two key known refining sites; given sincere ambition to remove Israel from the planet; given successful development of orbitable demonstrated rocket systems with IRBM paylod and range -and given a plethora of very smart scientists/engineers - why is that a rational assumption?

I realize I only asked for published asessments - but, what do you believe?
Yes I do, and I am very confident in that assessment.
 
Do you really believe that?

Given that the technology has existed for 70 years, technolgy refinements available via internet - much less intelligence activities; given Pakistan/Khan's 'free distribution' of designs to Iraq, Libya & N.Korea; given zero inspections of two key known refining sites; given sincere ambition to remove Israel from the planet; given successful development of orbitable demonstrated rocket systems with IRBM paylod and range -and given a plethora of very smart scientists/engineers - why is that a rational assumption?

I realize I only asked for published asessments - but, what do you believe?
Lifting a satellite is not quite the same capability as lifting a nuke. Not least because you need to have developed a relatively lightweight nuke. And that's a rather challenging process. Not one that can't be done, of course, since the US and USSR did it with slide rules. But it needs testing. And what we haven't seen from Iran is nuclear testing.

That and StuxNet was brilliant in taking out the centrifuge cascade, so the amount of enriched uranium they have available is limited.
 
Lifting a satellite is not quite the same capability as lifting a nuke. Not least because you need to have developed a relatively lightweight nuke. And that's a rather challenging process. Not one that can't be done, of course, since the US and USSR did it with slide rules. But it needs testing. And what we haven't seen from Iran is nuclear testing.

That and StuxNet was brilliant in taking out the centrifuge cascade, so the amount of enriched uranium they have available is limited.
Testing is desirable but not mandatory, just risky. Centrifuge cascade destruction is long way back in rear view mirror. Who is checking inventory, again? Where are inventories stored? How do you Know?

Agreed lifting a satellite - depending on payload - is not the same thing as a heavy nuc - but rocket is not the only way to deliver a nuc, nor today is it even the most reliable, depending on the target. Israel is very vulnerable to smuggling well shielded nucs on perimeter - as demonstrated recently.

BTW I don't have a feel for how well Israel has taken contingency steps to protect grid and electronics from EMP but IMO it would not take a very high yield weapon to fry Israel - of course that is a potential extinction event for the culprit - if caught. Say perhaps smuggling a 20KT device on a commercial airliner destined for Tel Aviv via Ukraine or Belarus.

One reason to not test, and be identified as the 'tester', is to not provide any 'signature' at all - or different from other nuc power weapons testing, thereby enabling identification.

That said - for planning purposes one could build an inventory before testing, gambling that when it's time to test that one is immune from any sanctions relative to destruction of the source facilities.

Just some thoughts regarding possible scenarios.
 
Iran uses a totally different generation of centrifuges post Stuxnet and at least some of them operate at the deeply buried Fordow site. They have enriched to at least 60%. It estimated that Iran has enough Uranium for several bombs even by the UN, however it isn’t publicly believed that they have enriched to full weapons grade or that they have constructed a device yet. I am assuming this to be the case because I believe if Israel’s government truly believed weapons were being manufactured, they would already have attacked. Israel’s small size make it very susceptible to even a few devices. But there seems to be general agreement that Iran is only a few months or weeks away from a nuclear breakout were it to chose to do so.
 
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Testing is desirable but not mandatory, just risky. Centrifuge cascade destruction is long way back in rear view mirror. Who is checking inventory, again? Where are inventories stored? How do you Know?

Agreed lifting a satellite - depending on payload - is not the same thing as a heavy nuc - but rocket is not the only way to deliver a nuc, nor today is it even the most reliable, depending on the target. Israel is very vulnerable to smuggling well shielded nucs on perimeter - as demonstrated recently.
You need some spectacularly good shielding in that case.

The US has dropped Rangers and then a NEST team onto a ship in the middle of the Atlantic before. Apparently detected fissionables from orbit.


BTW I don't have a feel for how well Israel has taken contingency steps to protect grid and electronics from EMP but IMO it would not take a very high yield weapon to fry Israel - of course that is a potential extinction event for the culprit - if caught. Say perhaps smuggling a 20KT device on a commercial airliner destined for Tel Aviv via Ukraine or Belarus.

One reason to not test, and be identified as the 'tester', is to not provide any 'signature' at all - or different from other nuc power weapons testing, thereby enabling identification.

That said - for planning purposes one could build an inventory before testing, gambling that when it's time to test that one is immune from any sanctions relative to destruction of the source facilities.

Just some thoughts regarding possible scenarios.
Considering how long Israel chased after SS officers, even just guards at one of the camps, well, I'd personally put the odds of anyone surviving the retribution for nuking Israel at zero. Them, their family, probably even their entire extended clan. Because they extinguished the extended clans of those doing the retribution.

And hell, the Egyptians would probably help.
 
You need some spectacularly good shielding in that case.

The US has dropped Rangers and then a NEST team onto a ship in the middle of the Atlantic before. Apparently detected fissionables from orbit.



Considering how long Israel chased after SS officers, even just guards at one of the camps, well, I'd personally put the odds of anyone surviving the retribution for nuking Israel at zero. Them, their family, probably even their entire extended clan. Because they extinguished the extended clans of those doing the retribution.

And hell, the Egyptians would probably help.
I agree all you say. I will close with comment that rational thought does not outpoint crazy.
 
I think it is short-sighted retiring the B83 as it is the last megaton-range weapon the US has in its inventory.
honestly, replacing a weapon that costs 53 million dollars a year to maintain with an acceptably sufficient newbuild sounds like a good deal
 
I think it is short-sighted retiring the B83 as it is the last megaton-range weapon the US has in its inventory.

I assume retirement just means being stored at Kirkland and B-2 ground crews no longer being trained to handle it. There are still some B-53 physics packages retained.

Also it’s hard to imagine what target set would require a megaton free fall bomb versus even a B-61 mod 12. Certainly the new mod 13 should be far, far more effective against deeply buried targets. The only thing I can see the B-83 being better at is a wide area soft target.
 
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The “new” bomb is apparently just the mod 12 update being applied to existing mod 7 strategic B-61s vice the tactical mod 4. Seems like a very sensible approach; it really shouldn’t require any development time. It’s kind of surprising this wasn’t part of the mod 12 project in the first place.
 
I thought all the W-53s had been dismantled by now.

Some of the B-53s were apparently stored disassembled for possible “planetary defense”. I think all the W-53s have been disassembled; the B-53 was in service longer until it was replaced with B-61 mod 11.
 
The “new” bomb is apparently just the mod 12 update being applied to existing mod 7 strategic B-61s vice the tactical mod 4. Seems like a very sensible approach; it really shouldn’t require any development time. It’s kind of surprising this wasn’t part of the mod 12 project in the first place.
Mt Yamantau or similar but put a guidance kit and a hardened penetrator nose-body on it....."just in case" maintain 50 of them like we did with the B53 bombs.
 
I would announce a joint US/UK planetary defense warhead. The peaceniks won’t stop us from defending the planet will they ;)
 
Defense Updates has just put out a video about the latest B61 Mod:


The Pentagon has stated that it is looking for a higher-yield nuclear-gravity bomb based on the B61-12 design.The bomb is designated as B61-13.
As per the Pentagon, the goal for the B61-13 will be to provide a new choice against specific targets like well-protected underground military facilities.
In this video, Defense Updates analyzes why the US Department of Defense is planning to develop a new nuclear-gravity bomb B61-13 ?
 
They were alternate MX warheads:

The W-87 was selected over three other options: the W78 used on the Minuteman III, and two higher yield warheads -- the 500-600 Kt CALMENDRO warhead (developed at LANL but transferred to LLNL), and the 800 Kt MUNSTER. The W-87 is more efficient than the W-78, using less fissile material for a similar yield.
———————

Their targets classified ;)
 
I’m guessing that those yields come with a weight and volume penalty. 350 seems like a comfortable place to be, particularly as I would guess that a new missile will have MX level accuracy and smart fusing RVs.
 
I’m guessing that those yields come with a weight and volume penalty.

The main way IIRC to get a compact TN warhead with very high yield like the W88 is to use a shitload of Oralloy in the warhead's secondary.
 
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The main way IIRC to get a compact TN warhead with very high yield like the W88 is to use a shitload of Orally in the warhead's secondary.

Isn’t W88 a lot bigger and heavier than W-76? Although admittedly drastically more bang as well. But with a 100 meter CEP I suspect the W76 is enough for most targets. Certainly the 350 of W87 seems adequate.

Is Orally a typo I assume? What material boost the secondary yield? Typically I think DU is used as a tamper/booster of the fusion stage but the B-41 actually used weapons grade U235 to get its extremely high yield : weight ratio. I think this was the only true three stage weapon (fission-fusion-fission) the US produced.
 
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The US has very specific targeting needs with specific yield requirements. Any new warhead will be designed for these needs, if we don't do high yield weapons its because there is no need for them.
 
Is Orally a typo I assume?

Yes (Bloody autocorrect), I meant Oralloy, Oralloy is short for Oak Ridge alloy which is weapons-grade U-235 (Enriched to at least 93.5% U-235).

What material boost the secondary yield?

The W87 uses either natural Uranium or depleted Uranium (The US has hundreds of thousands of tons of the stuff) for the bulk of its' secondary's explosive yield, using Oralloy instead increases the yield by 50% from what I've read.
 
Yes (Bloody autocorrect), I meant Oralloy, Oralloy is short for Oak Ridge alloy which is weapons-grade U-235 (Enriched to at least 93.5% U-235).



The W87 uses either natural Uranium or depleted Uranium (The US has hundreds of thousands of tons of the stuff) for the bulk of its' secondary's explosive yield, using Oralloy instead increases the yield by 50% from what I've read.

Did any other US active service weapon use U235 as the secondary tamper/casing besides the B41?

I suppose that would induce no additional weight or volume expense, since it would be about as dense as U-238, but it would drastically up the production cost to use that vice waste DU (as you point out; lots of it lying around).
 
Did any other US active service weapon use U235 as the secondary tamper/casing besides the B41?

The W88 uses Oralloy in its' secondary and I wouldn't be surprised at all if the W61 and W80 warheads use Oralloy to get fairly large yields out of a compact physics-package.
 
Isn’t W88 a lot bigger and heavier than W-76? Although admittedly drastically more bang as well. But with a 100 meter CEP I suspect the W76 is enough for most targets. Certainly the 350 of W87 seems adequate.

Is Orally a typo I assume? What material boost the secondary yield? Typically I think DU is used as a tamper/booster of the fusion stage but the B-41 actually used weapons grade U235 to get its extremely high yield : weight ratio. I think this was the only true three stage weapon (fission-fusion-fission) the US produced.
Great source of information IMHO.
 

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