Current Nuclear Weapons Development

[sferrin]

If there end up being more than 450 sentinels (which I doubt) then they would dig new silos. Mobile basing won't be a secure option by the time the new missile comes online. Better to at least force a double tap of every silo. Also much cheaper operational costs. SSBNs are the primary leg of the triad anyway.

How many resources do you think China has invested in keeping tabs of where US Boomers are? That's the frightening part with over-reliance on the boomers and where I disagree with those looking to tear down the ICBM arm of the Triad. We want to live in a world where the boomers are virtually undetectable but if the Fat Leonard scandal showed us anything, it's how compromised Navy leadership and some of our contractors can be. And that's not even counting the dedicated subsurface resources that China has tasked with tracking them down. The best comfort most Americans have right now is truly not knowing how compromised a lot of things are, we just take for granted that since we are a dominant power, that everything is peachy and we are untouchable.

Yep. Half a dozen VERY easy to sink baskets when located. And I guarantee you they'd be much more willing to sink an SSBN than attack 24 missile silos on US soil.

The key being destroyed with conventional weapons.

Given global geopolitics if the US lost its subs, sunk by conventional torpedoes, could they even contemplate using nukes in response?

Exactly.

 

[kaiserd]

Why is that key precisely?
By your own dubious reasoning what would it matter if a torpedo destroying a US SSBN happened to be nuclear tipped or not?
The US would have to decide if it retaliated after the intentional destruction of that critical asset and US lives irrespective of that aspect.

Similarly would it really matter if the US ICBM force was taken out by a conventional attack or nuclear attack, of, say hypersonic weapons deliver via an opponents ICBM force?

And what are the chances that a another nuclear power could simultaneously take out the entire US SSBN force?
And at the level of technical advance required to do that with any level of high probability - wouldn’t fixed or even mobile ICBMs have long since been subject to that same level of high probability of attack and destruction?

Some topics here appear more driven by individuals likes (ICBMs, love them, let’s have more) and dislikes (let’s pretend the US doesn’t have by far the most powerful SSBN force in the world, I hate them) than anything approaching a real rational discussion.

 

[Desertfox]

For the record the retaliatory-strike "survivable" portion (ie the road-mobiles) of Russia's strategic rocket forces is quite vulnerable to conventional strike as are China's road-mobile ICBMs. The US also has the ability to conduct conventional retaliatory strikes that no one else can match at this time.

 

[In_A_Dream]

Probably very few, given that almost nothing they have is suitable to the task. The PacFleet Ohios outnumber PLAN's SSNs, even were they acoustically and technically up to the task.

I'm not advocating for removal of ICBMs; I'm simply stating that 450 silos is an adequate number and form of basing.

Sorry Josh, that wasn't meant to be directed at you, mainly the anti-land based BM crowd.

 

[Forest Green]

SLBMs are good if you attack first but bad if your opponent does, which is why both SLBMs and ICBMs are needed.

 

[Forest Green]

For the record the retaliatory-strike "survivable" portion (ie the road-mobiles) of Russia's strategic rocket forces is quite vulnerable to conventional strike as are China's road-mobile ICBMs. The US also has the ability to conduct conventional retaliatory strikes that no one else can match at this time.

Do they? Because the last I looked they don't have MRBMs capable of hitting moving targets from ~4,000km away. Comments like this are 20 years old.

 

[Anduriel]

What are the odds that the conclusion of said new strategy will be: "we have to have as many nukes as Russia and China combined."

It'a a bad strategy. China has active Pu production, and I wouldn't be surprised if Russia can reactivate back their military reactor fast enough, or use LM breeders as a stopgap, not to mention whatever was left from USSR. Now USA have to compete against two major enrichment sources.

About SLBMs - I think over reliance on them is a bad thing, because you put too much eggs(missiles) on a single basket. As even if you count out possible combat damage, an accident can remove huge chunk of your capability to launch. Example - recent fire on US LA-class sub or recent Bonhomme Richard disaster. Now imagine if it was Ohio-class instead.

 

[Josh_TN]

If there end up being more than 450 sentinels (which I doubt) then they would dig new silos. Mobile basing won't be a secure option by the time the new missile comes online. Better to at least force a double tap of every silo. Also much cheaper operational costs. SSBNs are the primary leg of the triad anyway.

How many resources do you think China has invested in keeping tabs of where US Boomers are? That's the frightening part with over-reliance on the boomers and where I disagree with those looking to tear down the ICBM arm of the Triad. We want to live in a world where the boomers are virtually undetectable but if the Fat Leonard scandal showed us anything, it's how compromised Navy leadership and some of our contractors can be. And that's not even counting the dedicated subsurface resources that China has tasked with tracking them down. The best comfort most Americans have right now is truly not knowing how compromised a lot of things are, we just take for granted that since we are a dominant power, that everything is peachy and we are untouchable.

Yep. Half a dozen VERY easy to sink baskets when located. And I guarantee you they'd be much more willing to sink an SSBN than attack 24 missile silos on US soil.

The key being destroyed with conventional weapons.

Given global geopolitics if the US lost its subs, sunk by conventional torpedoes, could they even contemplate using nukes in response?

Probably not, but conventional weapons against PLAN boats would probably be a relatively easy retaliation.

 

[Josh_TN]

SLBMs are good if you attack first but bad if your opponent does, which is why both SLBMs and ICBMs are needed.

I don't understand this - SLBMs are the most survivable form of nuclear deterrent basing there is. Their greatest advantage is second strike capability.

 

[sferrin]

What are the odds that the conclusion of said new strategy will be: "we have to have as many nukes as Russia and China combined."

It'a a bad strategy. China has active Pu production, and I wouldn't be surprised if Russia can reactivate back their military reactor fast enough, or use LM breeders as a stopgap, not to mention whatever was left from USSR. Now USA have to compete against two major enrichment sources.

Yeah, not so much. It's not what you want, it's what's necessary.

 

[sferrin]

SLBMs are good if you attack first but bad if your opponent does, which is why both SLBMs and ICBMs are needed.

I don't understand this - SLBMs are the most survivable form of nuclear deterrent basing there is. Their greatest advantage is second strike capability.

At the moment. That could change any day and when (not if) it does it won't be gradual. Once they can be detected they may as well be sitting at the pier for all their survivability.

 

[Josh_TN]

SLBMs are good if you attack first but bad if your opponent does, which is why both SLBMs and ICBMs are needed.

I don't understand this - SLBMs are the most survivable form of nuclear deterrent basing there is. Their greatest advantage is second strike capability.

At the moment. That could change any day and when (not if) it does it won't be gradual. Once they can be detected they may as well be sitting at the pier for all their survivability.

Even if an SSBN was broadcasting its position constantly, sinking a submarine at depth several thousand miles off your coast is still a challenge for PLAN. They deployed their first MPAs what, two years ago? They have all of six SSNs, that presumably would be at least as vulnerable to any massive technology change that made the oceans invisible. An SSBN is still a moving platform under water, which is a lot more challenging then anything sitting at a pier.

Again, not advocating for ICBM removal, I just think people are being a little hyperbolic about SSBN vulnerability.

 

[sferrin]

SLBMs are good if you attack first but bad if your opponent does, which is why both SLBMs and ICBMs are needed.

I don't understand this - SLBMs are the most survivable form of nuclear deterrent basing there is. Their greatest advantage is second strike capability.

At the moment. That could change any day and when (not if) it does it won't be gradual. Once they can be detected they may as well be sitting at the pier for all their survivability.

Even if an SSBN was broadcasting its position constantly, sinking a submarine at depth several thousand miles off your coast is still a challenge for PLAN. They deployed their first MPAs what, two years ago? They have all of six SSNs, that presumably would be at least as vulnerable to any massive technology change that made the oceans invisible. An SSBN is still a moving platform under water, which is a lot more challenging then anything sitting at a pier.

Again, not advocating for ICBM removal, I just think people are being a little hyperbolic about SSBN vulnerability.

Not really. Once you know how to detect them easily and reliably you park a pair of "watchdog" destroyers on each one and follow them wherever they go. A few dozen VL-ASROC analogs on your head at the push of a button will ruin your day.

 

[bobbymike]

What are the odds that the conclusion of said new strategy will be: "we have to have as many nukes as Russia and China combined."

It'a a bad strategy. China has active Pu production, and I wouldn't be surprised if Russia can reactivate back their military reactor fast enough, or use LM breeders as a stopgap, not to mention whatever was left from USSR. Now USA have to compete against two major enrichment sources.

Yeah, not so much. It's not what you want, it's what's necessary.

The last article I read (2017?) about Russian warhead production is they have active lines capable of hundreds of new weapons a year. I’ll try and find it was the LANL magazine.

 

[Desertfox]

For the record the retaliatory-strike "survivable" portion (ie the road-mobiles) of Russia's strategic rocket forces is quite vulnerable to conventional strike as are China's road-mobile ICBMs. The US also has the ability to conduct conventional retaliatory strikes that no one else can match at this time.

Do they? Because the last I looked they don't have MRBMs capable of hitting moving targets from ~4,000km away. Comments like this are 20 years old.

Who else can do massed cruise-missile strikes? No one can conduct massed conventional strikes on US soil at this time.

 

[Forest Green]

I don't understand this - SLBMs are the most survivable form of nuclear deterrent basing there is. Their greatest advantage is second strike capability.

Assuming the enemy hasn't found them. The silos they can easily find, but it takes more time for a missile to arrive at them then it does for a torpedo to hit a sub a few km away. And silo missiles can be launched much faster and the communications is far more secure. Sure the subs might not have been found, but if they have been they're screwed. That's why you need both SLBMs and ICBMs.

Who else can do massed cruise-missile strikes? No one can conduct massed conventional strikes on US soil at this time.

Russia and China could, especially if working together. And they could do so from further away.

Not really. Once you know how to detect them easily and reliably you park a pair of "watchdog" destroyers on each one and follow them wherever they go. A few dozen VL-ASROC analogs on your head at the push of a button will ruin your day.

And that's the problem, once there's a vulnerability they're reachable without telegraphing your intent. And even if the submarine get's to surface and fire the missiles, the potential for a relatively simple boost-phase intercept, wiping out multiple warheads at once, is much greater than for ICBMs. I'd also wager that trying to communicate a strike to a submarine is more complicated than for ICBM silos, although I admit not knowing the full details.

 

[Desertfox]

Finding the sub is half the battle, sinking them isnt easy either. Parking a "watchdog" destroyer but signals to everyone you know where the subs are and is incredibly expensive to maintain if they are in the middle of the Pacific.

Communication for both subs and ICBMs is about the same. They have pre-programmed targets in a series of strike packages, you just tell them what strike-package to execute.

China doesnt have any bombers, ships, or subs that can get close to the US to launch a massed cruise missile attack, and Russia's stock of precision strike cruise missiles isn't exactly large.

 

[Forest Green]

Finding the sub is half the battle, sinking them isnt easy either. Parking a "watchdog" destroyer but signals to everyone you know where the subs are and is incredibly expensive to maintain if they are in the middle of the Pacific.

Communication for both subs and ICBMs is about the same. They have pre-programmed targets in a series of strike packages, you just tell them what strike-package to execute.

China doesnt have any bombers, ships, or subs that can get close to the US to launch a massed cruise missile attack, and Russia's stock of precision strike cruise missiles isn't exactly large.

Sinking them is more like 1% of the battle. The sub's main/only advantage is not being found until it's too late. What if they're not in the Pacific but the Arctic? What if routes have been compromised? There is always the unexpected. They are vulnerable because they're out there.

Define 'about'. Underwater communications are generally not about the same as above water communications.

Are you including Alaska in your assessment of the US? Be aware that the Earth is round, not flat as it appears on maps, and therefore distances aren't as great as they seem. Kh-101s can reach the US without even flying bombers outside Russian airspace. Suppose some country in South America decides to let Russia or China set up a base there?

 

[Josh_TN]

Russia probably doesn’t have an abundance of PGMs right now but presumably they have enough for a beefy strike or three. But the retaliation would be pretty hefty; Russia does not want to get into a conventional strategic bombing fight with the US. I think there are over several thousand AGM-158s in inventory with the goal of building to 10K.

 

[uk 75]

Comments about the US Triad's long serving elements (Minuteman, B52/B2, Trident) always remind me of this well-loved British comedy remark.

Triggers Broom

In this classic scene, Trigger claims that he's had his road sweeper's broom for 20 years. But then he adds that the broom has had 17 new heads and 14 new handles. "How can it be the same bloody...

foolsandhorses.weebly.com

I suspect even today Moscow and Beijing would give a lot to have such reliable and effective systems.

 

[kaiserd]

Russia and/or China deciding one day to “go after” the US SSBN fleet would be the equivalent of the US one day deciding to “go after” the Russian silo based ICBM force (i.e. the respective nations most powerful component of their nuclear forces).

What do you think happens?

The likelihood of simultaneously taking them out is low and you are forcing your opponent to use them before they loose them.

Other components of the respective nations nuclear forces are probably more vulnerable to attack (or become so in the context of a wider exchange) so you are similarly triggering a “use before loose” dynamic for them (running along aside a very predictable retaliatory spiral of reacting against launches against each other).

It would take a lunatic to even risk instigating such scenarios and bluntly the whole concept of deterrence doesn’t really work anymore if such a person ended up calling the shots for a major nuclear power.

Much of this discussion appears more to do with fantasies of winning a nuclear war but projected onto opponents rather than being massively grounded in reality or how parties would actually react.

 

[Trident]

Finding the sub is half the battle, sinking them isnt easy either. Parking a "watchdog" destroyer but signals to everyone you know where the subs are and is incredibly expensive to maintain if they are in the middle of the Pacific.

This. The perceived vulnerability of the SLBM force seems to be founded upon a rather preposterous "hand-waving" assumption.

"Once you know how to detect them easily and reliably" and "easy to sink baskets when located" amounts to a gross trivialization of the core sticking point in any attempt to preemptively hunt down the subs. Nobody has yet demonstrated a convincing method of doing so consistently, and even the longer term outlook appears doubtful. NATO was never able to do that to the USSR fleet to the extent that they could count on getting them all, and as time went on, what ability there was *eroded* instead of improving.

Even once you have reason to suspect such a capability exists, the US at least (UK and France may lack the resources) can always move to a posture more akin to Soviet SSBN bastions.

 

[Forest Green]

Russia probably doesn’t have an abundance of PGMs right now

Well no, not right now.

Russia and/or China deciding one day to “go after” the US SSBN fleet would be the equivalent of the US one day deciding to “go after” the Russian silo based ICBM force (i.e. the respective nations most powerful component of their nuclear forces).

What do you think happens?

The likelihood of simultaneously taking them out is low and you are forcing your opponent to use them before they loose them.

Other components of the respective nations nuclear forces are probably more vulnerable to attack (or become so in the context of a wider exchange) so you are similarly triggering a “use before loose” dynamic for them (running along aside a very predictable retaliatory spiral of reacting against launches against each other).

It would take a lunatic to even risk instigating such scenarios and bluntly the whole concept of deterrence doesn’t really work anymore if such a person ended up calling the shots for a major nuclear power.

Much of this discussion appears more to do with fantasies of winning a nuclear war but projected onto opponents rather than being massively grounded in reality or how parties would actually react.

In one way it's the same on a matter of principles, but in practice it's a lot different. A strike against silos will be picked up by satellites, as will the launches to destroy them, a strike against submarines may or may not be detected.

Well, the purpose of a nuclear deterrent arguably is to dissuade the lunatics, since the non-lunatics don't need dissuading.

The purpose of a deterrent isn't to win a nuclear war, it's to be sufficiently robust to make an enemy pre-emptive strike fail at the planning stage.

 

[kaiserd]

In precisely how, in a theoretical world where opponents can readily locate, track and kill the US’s SSBN force and the US has similar levels of tracking and targeting capacity, does the US not have the ability to identify and track the method of killing?

And how would every other leg of the triad not be much more (not less) vulnerable to this kill chain than the SSBNs?

 

[Forest Green]

In precisely how, in a theoretical world where opponents can readily locate, track and kill the US’s SSBN force and the US has similar levels of tracking and targeting capacity, does the US not have the ability to identify and track the method of killing?

And how would every other leg of the triad not be much more (not less) vulnerable to this kill chain than the SSBNs?

There's always the potential for surprise attacks and attacks involving surprises. The point is that the SSBNs are in open water and hidden from view. That's useful when they haven't been found and very unuseful when they have. If a submarine is catastrophically destroyed underwater, how does that news get back quickly?

Bombers are always more vulnerable really, which I why I didn't even include bomber nukes in the 4,000 strategic warheads number I mentioned. They're more about posturing. Silos can certainly be detected, but there's no way of hiding an attack... yet. And an attack provides a finite visible warning even under worst case circumstances.

 

[kaiserd]

If the technology existed to continually globally track (and target) submerged ballistic subs wouldn’t countries track their opponents subs AND their own?
Plus other ships, aircraft etc.
So you’d know if anything happens to your subs (and who/ what was responsible) virtually the same time as your opponents, as everyone tries to continue living on with deterrence having evolved into a hair-trigger.

In comparison missile silos and mobile missiles would be easy…..

 

[uk 75]

Nuclear weapons are political not military weapons. This is even truer now that non nuclear weapons offer alternative ways of destroying most targets.
Politicians need to know that their people and countries cannot survive a nuclear exchange. This is harder if like Putin they do not assess risks and outcomes of their actions. Xi is still more cautious with any luck. Some would-be Western leaders may also not appreciate the dangers.

 

[Forest Green]

If the technology existed to continually globally track (and target) submerged ballistic subs wouldn’t countries track their opponents subs AND their own?
Plus other ships, aircraft etc.
So you’d know if anything happens to your subs (and who/ what was responsible) virtually the same time as your opponents, as everyone tries to continue living on with deterrence having evolved into a hair-trigger.

In comparison missile silos and mobile missiles would be easy…..

Not if there's an SSN tailing them. Or maybe some clown managed to sneak into a dock and attach a device to them that facilitates their tracking, or even destruction. Maybe communications with them is disrupted. I'm not saying these are likely, but they are possibilities. Both SLBMs and ICBMs are needed.

 

[bobbymike]

ICBMS and Nuclear Warfighting - Warrior Maven: Center for Military Modernization

Today, a much more limited Russian nuclear first strike is feared, as President Putin has explicitly threatened NATO with a nuclear attack some thirty five times.

warriormaven.com

 

[Flyaway]

Successful Minuteman III test flight took place on 16/08/2022 at 07:49 UTC from Vandenberg.

Minuteman III test launch showcases readiness of U.S. nuclear force's safe, effective dete

Air Force Global Strike Command Airmen launched an unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile equipped with a test re-entry vehicle from Vandenberg Space Force Base, California, Aug. 16

www.afgsc.af.mil

 

[uk 75]

Russia has imitated the US in using tactical and intermediate nuclear weapons to compensate for inferior strength in its conventional forces.
The Iskander systems in particular are designed to hit NATO airbases and command sites hard to stop an air campaign like the ones in Yugoslavia and Iraq.
NATO uses aircraft and sea launched missiles rather than ground launched missiles to fight.
The B61 bomb is the only nuclear theatre weapon available to NATO but US and UK Trident missiles at sea give NATO a wide range of nuclear targetting.
If Russia were to launch a demonstrative nuclear strike on either Ukraine or a NATO member Iskander seems the most likely weapon to be used.
Depending on the number used and the targets hit, NATO could probably destroy the Iskanders with conventional weapons. But the target suffering a nuclear strike would be key to how NATO reacts.
If civilian infrastructure is targetted then a B61 or even a Trident strike against Kaliningrad rather than metropolitan Russia might signal resolve.
However, it is almost certain that Russia would respond by going to a higher level of nuclear weapon against say London or NATO Headquarters.
Once the nuclear threshold is crossed, escalation to use all the weapons available seems unavoidable. It is this that should give reasonable politicians grounds not to use nuclear weapons.
But a nuclear power faced with conventional defeat on a large scale may not be in the mood for reason.

 

[Anduriel]

In precisely how, in a theoretical world where opponents can readily locate, track and kill the US’s SSBN force and the US has similar levels of tracking and targeting capacity, does the US not have the ability to identify and track the method of killing?

And how would every other leg of the triad not be much more (not less) vulnerable to this kill chain than the SSBNs?

Right now US SSN have it easy. Russian ASW is utter crap (i'd say more nonexistent), as most of ASW equipment are for USSR times or gone.
China yet to built proper ASW arm, as thy only started MPA production and while 70+ type 056s is significant number, they are not enough.
Though with idea of heavy UAV being a good platform for ASW (if not as carrier of buoys, then at leas as torpedo carrier/retranslator) I can see China boosting their ASW capability significantly faster.

 

[sferrin]

Air Force sees ‘incredibly’ large missile buildup by China

China’s military is engaged in a large-scale expansion of both nuclear and conventional missiles described by an Air Force Air University report as “incredibly” large and rapidly increasing.

www.washingtontimes.com

 

[indicisivedivide]

A lot of doom posting in this thread misses the fact that 3 US allies are nuclear powers and 3 others can build nukes.

 

[sferrin]

A lot of doom posting in this thread misses the fact that 3 US allies are nuclear powers and 3 others can build nukes.

Which doesn't change the fact that no US ally is guaranteed to back us up nor the fact that "can build" is not the same as "has".

 

[Desertfox]

The UK is alot more likely to back up the US than China or Russia is likely to back-up each other.

 

[Forest Green]

Depends on the scenario really.

 

[bobbymike]

Air Force sees ‘incredibly’ large missile buildup by China

China’s military is engaged in a large-scale expansion of both nuclear and conventional missiles described by an Air Force Air University report as “incredibly” large and rapidly increasing.

www.washingtontimes.com

That number of ICBMs is expanding rapidly with recent disclosures that as many as 360 silos for new multi-warhead DF-41 ICBMs are under construction in western China.
—————————
That’s up to 3600 warheads max capacity

 

[Forest Green]

Even assuming half capacity, that's 1800 warheads, plus all the other nuclear-armed ICBMS, SLBMs and IRBMs besides the DF-41. And that's with a lot of empty silos.

 

[sferrin]

Air Force sees ‘incredibly’ large missile buildup by China

China’s military is engaged in a large-scale expansion of both nuclear and conventional missiles described by an Air Force Air University report as “incredibly” large and rapidly increasing.

www.washingtontimes.com

That number of ICBMs is expanding rapidly with recent disclosures that as many as 360 silos for new multi-warhead DF-41 ICBMs are under construction in western China.
—————————
That’s up to 3600 warheads max capacity

Don't worry. I'm sure it's all imaginary.