bobbymike said:No worries :
STRATCOM: US Nuclear Deterrent Nearly “Zero Percent” Modernized
The rationalizing is painful.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y8OOp5_G-R4
bobbymike said:No worries :
STRATCOM: US Nuclear Deterrent Nearly “Zero Percent” Modernized
The asteroid Bennu, a boulder the size of a village, is circling the sun at 63,000 mph, now a comfortable 54 million miles from Earth.
But on Sept. 21, 2135, there is a 1 in 2,700 chance that it will hit us. What would we do?
Government scientists now have an official plan, just in case: They’ve designed a spacecraft to hit any large oncoming asteroids with a nuclear explosion.
The Hypervelocity Asteroid Mitigation Mission for Emergency Response (HAMMER) spacecraft — a collaboration between the National Nuclear Security Administration, NASA, and two Energy Department weapons labs — would either steer its 8.8-ton bulk (called an “impactor”) into a small asteroid, or carry a nuclear device to deflect a big one.
“If the asteroid is small enough, and we detect it early enough, we can do it with the impactor,” physicist David Dearborn of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory told BuzzFeed News. “The impactor is not as flexible as the nuclear option when we really want to change the speed of the body in a hurry.”
“We took a procurement holiday for almost 30 years and stopped modernizing our force.” That’s what Gen. Garret Harencak, the former Air Force assistant chief of staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Matters, told one of my nuclear seminars in 2013.
America’s nuclear force is aging: U.S. land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are now 47 years old, the B-52 strategic bomber is approaching 50 years, and the submarines are approaching 40 years — the longest any U.S. submarine has ever been at sea.
The new Nuclear Posture Review is a restrained and well-thought out roadmap for the future development and modernization of U.S. nuclear forces as well as a strategy for maintaining and improving America’s deterrent capability.
“We must modernize and rebuild our nuclear arsenal, hopefully never having to use it, but making it so strong and powerful that it will deter any acts of aggression,” President Donald Trump asserted in his February 2018 State of the Union address.
“Perhaps someday in the future there will be a magical moment when the countries of the world will get together to eliminate their nuclear weapons,” he continued. “Unfortunately, we are not there yet.”
Weapons Engineering and Experiments (ADW) Capability Overview M, J, Q
and W Divisions February 7, 2018
“All this would require us to reserve the last X number, tens of warheads, and instead of doing a full [life extension], do the primary only. It doesn’t require additional capacity,” Soofer said of developing the capability. On the Navy side, the service would “just take that warhead and make sure they can qualify” an SLBM on a sub.
The Pentagon has argued that developing low-yield nuclear weapons is needed to counter threats from China and particularly from Russia, which has invested significantly in its own low-yield weapons in what U.S. officials believe is part of its “escalate to deescalate” strategy. Under that concept, Russia would be willing to use a small nuclear weapon, assuming NATO allies — when faced with using a strategic nuclear weapon or not responding at all — will back down in a conflict.
WASHINGTON — The agency in charge of managing America’s nuclear warheads is in discussions with the Office of Management and Budget about getting funding to start work on two new nuclear capabilities sought by the Trump administration.
The National Nuclear Security Administration, a semiautonomous agency within the Department of Energy, is a key player as the government seeks to create both a low-yield warhead for its submarine-launched ballistic missile and a new sea-launched, nuclear-capable cruise missile.
But while the Pentagon has identified those two systems as vital to national interests, and has set aside $22.6 million in fiscal 2019 for a low-yield ballistic warhead, the NNSA’s budget request for FY19 doesn’t contain any funds to support that work.
“We are leaning as far forward as we possibly can, working with OMB and [the Department of Defense]” on the question of FY19 funds, said Lisa Gordon-Haggerty, the NNSA head, during congressional testimony Tuesday.
WASHINGTON — During a congressional hearing, the head of U.S. Strategic Command defended the Trump administration’s view that the United States will need new low-yield nuclear weapons to help deter Russia.
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review recommends building two new “low-yield” nuclear weapons for the U.S. Navy: a low-yield warhead for existing submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or SLBM, and a nuclear-capable cruise missile that could be used by subs.
Gen. John Hyten, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday that he “strongly agrees” the Pentagon should procure those weapons.
“That capability is a deterrence weapon to respond to the threat that Russia in particular is portraying,” he said. “[Russian] President [Vladimir] Putin announced as far back as April of 2000 that the Russian doctrine will be to use a low-yield nuclear weapon on the battlefield in case of a conventional overmatch with an adversary.”
March 20 (UPI) -- Lockheed Martin has been awarded a contract for production and support of the Trident II D5, a submarine-launched ballistic missile.
The deal, announced Monday by the Department of Defense, is valued at more than $522.3 million under the terms of a fixed-price-incentive, cost-plus-incentive-fee, and cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, which is a modification to a previous award by the U.S. Navy.
“We have to devote considerable effort to war gaming this problem and ensure that existing systems, both conventional and nuclear, cannot meet this doctrinal challenge of ‘escalate-to-deescalate.’ ”
Reed later asked why the Defense Department simply couldn’t use lower-yield, air-launched weapons such as the Long Range Standoff Weapon, a cruise missile currently under development that will be able to be outfitted with either a nuclear or conventional warhead.
The reason, Hyten said, is that the United States needs a greater amount of variety in the low-yield weapons available in the nuclear arsenal.
The U.S. military is concerned that the government isn’t moving quickly enough to ramp up American production of the plutonium cores that trigger nuclear warheads, as the Trump administration proceeds with a $1 trillion overhaul of the nation’s nuclear force.
Energy Secretary Rick Perry, the Cabinet official who oversees the nation’s nuclear labs, promised in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday that he would meet the Pentagon’s demands, even though the only lab capable of producing the triggers hasn’t made one suitable for a nuclear weapon in years.
“It is important for us to be able to send a clear message that we can get it done, we can get it done on a timely basis and get it done in a way that taxpayers respect is thoughtful about their concerns,” Perry said in a rare appearance by the nation’s top energy official at the Senate body overseeing the military.
The U.S. Navy is going to have its Virginia-class attack submarines be armed with nuclear warheads, marking a history shift in how the submarines are used.
“While Virginia-class submarines can use conventional deterrence to keep adversaries in check, a sub-launched cruise missile with a nuclear warhead would be incorporated into Virginias and give national command authority additional escalation control,” Rear Adm. John Tammen, Director, Undersea Warfare Division, told Congress.
The new weapon, part of the Trump administration's recent Nuclear Posture Review, is likely to bring a new element to the Pentagon’s current nuclear weapons deterrence posture. Currently, only the Ohio class and the emerging Columbia-class are capable of firing nuclear weapons.
WASHINGTON — The number of nuclear warheads kept in U.S. stockpiles decreased by nearly 200 since the end of the Obama administration, according to information released by the Defense Department in response to a Freedom of Information Act request from the Federation of American Scientists. This reduction brings the total number of warheads down to 3,822 as of September 2017.
While this downsizing may seem to contradict the Trump administration’s position on U.S. nuclear posture, these reductions reflect “a longer trend of the Pentagon working to reduce excess numbers of warheads while upgrading the remaining weapons,” according to Hans Kristensen, director of the nuclear information project at FAS.
Much to the disarmers’ chagrin, however, studies in and out of government showed that the U.S. and Soviet leadership rarely, if ever, developed and deployed a nuclear weapon system only because the other side had it. Instead, leaders weighed a number of factors such as domestic political support, budget commitments, arms control priorities, allied support, development time, deterrent effect and more.
The dynamic was perfectly summarized by U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown’s famous quip about the Soviets: When we build, they build. When we cut, they build.
This reality has only come into starker contrast within the last month as the newly published U.S. Nuclear Posture Review revealed “Russia is modernizing an active stockpile of up to 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons” including short-range ballistic missiles, depth charges, anti-ship missiles and anti-submarine torpedoes. The United States got rid of all such systems before or at the end of the Cold War, including the anti-submarine torpedoes, which U.S. submariners joked had a kill probability of two — the target and them.
While the Russians are apparently modernizing these battlefield nuclear weapons, nobody in the U.S. is scrambling to put an atomic warhead on everything, striking another blow to the action-reaction model.
Faced with a nonexistent quantitative arms race, disarmament activists and even former Secretary of Defense William Perry, who incidentally helped develop the technological superiority that the United States enjoys today, now warn of a qualitative arms race.
If the U.S. makes better nuclear weapons or more effective missile defenses, so the thinking goes, the Russians will just make better penetrating missiles in response.
The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), released on February 3, 2018, follows the steps of the National Security Strategy 17 (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy 18 (NDS), confirming China, together with Russia, as U.S. main strategic competitors. According to them, the re-emersion of inter-state strategic competition is the main threat for U.S. national security in the global environment since Beijing and Moscow are striving to limit Washington’s power projection in their areas of influence. In addition, the NPR points that while the U.S. was seeking a smaller, less dangerous and less powerful atomic stockpile, the PRC moved in the opposite direction, increasing and modernizing its own.
SAN DIEGO (NNS) -- The Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine USS Nebraska (SSBN 739) along with the U.S. Navy's Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) conducted successful test flights of two Trident II D5 Missiles, March 26.
The unarmed test missiles were launched as part of Demonstration and Shakedown Operation (DASO) 28 in the Pacific Test Range off the coast of Southern California.
The missiles were launched as a double mission test and were the key element of DASO 28, which marked the 166th and 167th successful test flights of the Trident II D5 missile since its introduction to the fleet in 1989. The primary objective of the DASO is to evaluate and demonstrate the readiness of the SSBN's strategic weapon system and crew before operational deployment following midlife refueling overhaul.
Panel One: Nuclear and Strategic Issues
10:00am-11:30am
Moderator: Robert Jervis, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Affairs, Columbia University
Matthew Kroenig, Associate Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Olga Oliker, Senior Adviser and Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Pavel Podvig, Director of the Russian Nuclear Forces Project
n the wake of February’s release of the Department of Defense’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the Navy must undertake tough reflections on its nuclear identity. Specifically, the NPR recommends augmenting the nuclear arsenal with low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) as well as nuclear-armed submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). To understand the potential impact of these and other tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) requires a look at their history—to evaluate how the United States has attempted to use technological developments to offset adversaries’ perceived advantages—and knowledge of how TNWs repeatedly have challenged the critical balance between nuclear and conventional forces. An understanding of how potential adversaries can use TNWs disruptively can help identify ways the United States can enhance its own TNW capabilities to improve both deterrence-by-denial and management of the ladder of escalation. Before developing new TNWs, however, the Navy must comprehend fully the consequences of such a course.
WASHINGTON, D.C. — The director of the Navy’s Strategic Systems Programs was confident that the first of a new class of ballistic missile submarine, the planned USS Columbia (SSBN-826), would be ready for its first patrol in 2031. That will be just before the current Ohio-class nuclear-deterrent boats are too old to submerge.
The major components of what will be on Columbia are “on schedule and on track to support” a 2028 launch and a 2031 patrol, SSP director Vice Adm. Terry J. Benedict said.
Meeting that deadline is critical because the Ohio-class submarines will be reaching the absolute limit of their ability to submerge for a patrol, Navy officials have warned.
WASHINGTON ― The Trump administration has requested $65 million be repurposed for the Department of Energy’s budget in order to start work on a new low-yield nuclear warhead design.
In a reprogramming request sent to Congress last week, the Office of Management and Budget requested shifting $65 million to the National Nuclear Security Administration for “engineering development, and any subsequent phases, of a low-yield nuclear weapon.”
The creation of a submarine-launched, low-yield nuclear warhead was announced in February with the launch of the Nuclear Posture Review. But because of the timing of the NPR and the release of the fiscal 2019 budget request, the NNSA didn’t receive any funding for that program.
In March, NNSA head Lisa Gordon-Haggerty said her office was working with OMB to try and find the money for the warhead design.
The U.S. nuclear triad is an aging collection of weapons, many of which were designed before today’s policymakers were even born. Because of modernization program cancellations, the average age of a Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is climbing into the mid-40s, while the air-launched cruise missile weapons system has aged more than 20 years past its original intended service life.
Although every administration since the end of the Cold War has agreed that maintaining a triad of nuclear-capable weapons systems is critical to the nation’s security, most have nonetheless treated nuclear modernization as a second-tier concern. In an era of renewed great power competition, nuclear delivery systems should no longer receive low prioritization. It will be especially important in an increasingly competitive global threat environment to maintain a credible deterrent that underpins not only homeland defense, but also America’s numerous allied defense commitments. But for the U.S. to retain that credibility, its systems must receive timely modernization and capability upgrades, just as U.S. conventional forces do. For this reason, it is imperative to fully fund and deliver on schedule the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent and Long Range Standoff weapon (LRSO) programs to ensure that as the Minuteman III and air-launched cruise missile systems are retired in the coming decades, their capabilities will be replaced on schedule.
Chinese President Xi Jinping has declared that Chinese national defense and military modernization have entered a “new era.” He has called for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to become a (or perhaps even the) “world-class” military by mid-century. The “China Dream” that Xi seeks to advance—a quest for the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”—includes and is enabled by the “dream of a powerful military” (强军梦).
In this new era of Chinese military power, the PLA is seeking to develop new strategic arsenals that could enhance its future deterrence and war-fighting capabilities. In particular, the PLA recognizes the criticality of “assured retaliation” within its second-strike nuclear posture—and of advancing new capabilities in the space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains, which are seen as new “strategic frontiers” of warfare. Xi has also underscored the importance of new frontiers of military innovation in emerging technologies. Indeed, the PLA is pursuing next-generation capabilities, ranging from hypersonic missiles to counterspace weapons or military applications of artificial intelligence.
An informed debate about our nuclear deterrent policy is welcome, especially on an issue that is so critical to the nation’s security. Unfortunately, too much of today’s nuclear debate is characterized by critics of our nuclear deterrent policy endlessly repeating what I call the “seven deadly nuclear sins.”
These are commonly held assumptions about our nuclear policy that turn out to be largely mythical; nonetheless, because they are so often repeated by a misinformed media, they tend to drive the debate.
What are they?
The first sin is the characterization of the United States nuclear modernization program as creating an arms race.
The second sin is describing our nuclear modernization effort as “unaffordable.”
The third transgression is the claim that Russia’s buildup of nuclear weapons is a response to offset America’s building of missile defenses.
The fourth sin is the assumption that Russia’s adoption of an escalatory policy to use nuclear weapons early in a conventional conflict is simply a counter to America’s similar policy or is not Russian policy in the first place.
Fifth is the claim that newly proposed American low yield nuclear warheads would be highly destabilizing and lower the nuclear threshold.
Elsewhere, the strategic forces subcommittee instructs Elle Lord, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, to work with the Air Force to speed both the development and fielding of the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program and the Long-Range Standoff cruise missile program by at least a year. Strategic Command’s leader, Gen. John Hyten, has repeatedly bewailed the slow place of these programs. However, this may not attract bipartisan support. One Democratic aide said that the Democrats would be unlikely to support that measure, as there is no compelling national security reason to speed both projects up, and take funding from other urgent needs.
Kingston Reif, a missile defense expert at the Arms Control Association, Tweeted that “there is currently no military requirement for a conventional variant,” of the LRSO, and “that requirement is filled by the JASSM-ER. And a conventional variant would add to total program cost.”
According to a widespread conventional wisdom, there is a link between US nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation and, therefore, in order to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other states, the US government must first make changes to its own nuclear arsenal. This article challenges the notion that US nuclear posture has a significant bearing on the proliferation and non-proliferation behavior of other states. Contrary to the received wisdom in policy circles, this article maintains that state decisions on nuclear non-proliferation issues are driven by a range of other security, economic, and political factors and, once these considerations are taken into account, there is little if any remaining variance to be explained by US nuclear posture. Using a dataset on US nuclear arsenal size from 1945 to 2011, this article examines the relationship between the size of the US nuclear arsenal and a variety of nuclear non-proliferation outcomes.