Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining carrier based air power?

Except ditching the WWII new builds for an all new CV fleet and just uprating the decks of a few Colossus and Majestic CVs to 30,000lb hits the decision for Sea Vixen. Especially once weight growth kicks in.
Starting in 1948 and getting worse by 1953.
Had DH abandoned the effort and refocused on the DH.116....
Or had Supermarine's Type 556 prototype been funded.....
Or the Type 576 in 1958.....
I'm not sure what you mean. However, if I have interpreted you correctly. No it doesn't.

The Nine Year Plan, Revised Restricted Fleet & Rearmament Programme were for 6 new fleet carriers and 6 Colossus/Majestic as first-line carriers plus other CVLs of those classes serving in second-line roles in peace that would operate the 12 RNVR (Air Branch) squadrons in war. Then the Radical Review of 1954 still cuts the force to 6 ships, but instead of 3 CV & 3 CVL its the 6 new strike carriers plus a handful of Colossus/Majestics in second roles in both "Versions of History". Then the Sandys Review of 1957 keeps the 6 strike carriers and converts the 2 or 3 CVLs serving in second-line roles to commando carriers. The decision to turn the DH.110 into the Sea Vixen happened in January 1955 after the CVLS had been removed from the front-line carrier force.

Furthermore, if I remember my Friedman correctly the RN was forced into developing a heavy night fighter that could operate from the Standard A to C aircraft carriers and a lighter night fighter that could operate from the Standard D to F ships & the merchant ships that it planned to covert into CVEs and for export. The former was the DH.110/Sea Vixen and the latter was the Sea Venom. If I remember correctly that was also the logic behind the Gannet and Seamew. It's the same situation in my "Version of History".

I've my own ideas about British naval aircraft development 1945-60 and if I wasn't such a slow typist I'd have uploaded some posts explaining them by now. Regarding the Sea Vixen as I've "gone big or gone home" with the aircraft carriers I've decided to do the same with naval fighters. That is from 1948 develop a supersonic twin-engine heavy fighter equivalent to the Phantom II that is built instead of the Sea Vixen for the RN & the Lightning for the RAF and a supersonic single-engine lighter fighter for the RAF instead of the Hunter FGA.9 & FR.10. If that sounds familiar to you, it should, because I've suggested it on other threads here and on alternatehistory.com.

It might not be necessary to upgrade the Colossus/Majestic (and surviving Illustrious class) to operate 30,000lb aircraft because the aircraft that I have in mind for them have loaded weights that were less than 20,000lbs.

Re the DH.116 do you know what it's dimensions were? Then I can do an estimate of the folded wingspan using the drawings online.
 
The final settled cost for the Victorious rebuild was £19 million, the figure given in Hansard having been rounded up. The £30 million stated by Brown is erroneous.

Unfortunately, Brown's section on the medium carrier also confuses matters. In actuality, the ship estimated at £18 million is from 1953 and was almost certainly a two shaft design, probably a modernised Hermes in concept, not a three shaft medium carrier of the variety that made its way in to long-term planning in late 1954.
Do you know if the £18 million quoted in Hansard as the cost of Hermes is a rounding too? I ask the question because for many years I ranted about Hermes costing nearly twice as much to build as the rebuild of Victorious due to Marriott saying that she cost £37.5 million, which I now think is a typo for £17.5 million. Therefore, the £18 million that Hansard quotes could be a rounding of £17.5 million.

The 35,000 ton medium ship was effectively a modernised Victorious concept, so I can see your logic in regarding the smaller design study as effectively a modernised Hermes concept. However, I suspect that there would be little difference in the costs due to them having the same overheads.

If the £18 million in 1954 for the medium ship was for the smaller two-shaft version that works out as £21.2 million and if we work backwards the £18 million that Hermes cost in 1959 was worth £15.3 million in 1954.

Another problem with working with these costs is that they might have been calculated on completely different bases so I'm not making like-for-like comparisons. If I remember correctly the cost for Tiger's conversion into a helicopter was so much more than the cost of Blake's conversion because the former included the cost of the helicopters and the latter didn't.
 
In my "Version of History" the Admiralty decides to "Go big or go Home" in 1946 by cancelling all the aircraft carriers that hadn't been launched and using the money saved to build new ships for the "Year of Maximum Danger".

Do you think that would make the NM copy the RN and build a pair of PA58 size carriers instead of Clemenceau and Foch? I've shown that the dimensions of the 1952 Aircraft Carrier and PA58 were similar. The "steel is cheap and air is theory" doesn't apply only to British warships, it applies to French warships too so they might not cost 50% more in spite of being 50% larger.

However, even if France had the extra money required to build more expensive ships, did they have the infrastructure to build them? Recently, I learned that the Charles de Gaulle class were the same length as the Clemenceau class because they had to fit the existing facilities (though I can't remember whether it was the slipways or dry docks or something else).

As a solution could the USA have paid for the necessary expansion of the facilities through the Marshall Plan or MDAP?
 
DH was contracted Oct 1948 for DH.110 to N.40/46 (OR.246) and proceeded for RN and RAF.

November naval aircraft dropped through economic pressure
RAF was to carry the weight with DH on F.4/48 while the RN preferred Fairey and this now proceeded instead.
By 5 April 1949 the final form was shaping up when on 2 November work was held up and then embargoed by the Treasury.
Fairey offered a single engined derivative design in December that year, then delays as the Admiralty revised the very basis of requirements and ultimately in January 1951 issued N.114T (NR/A.14). By December this was dead and in May 1952 N.114T.2 was raised.
Then in July N.131T
DH.116 Super Venom was to be ordered when in November DH admitted they hadn't the staff to realise the project.

DH.116
Span 34ft / 16ft folded
Length 44ft
Wing Area 370 sqft
All-up weight 21,405lb
Single Avon RA.14/9
9,500lb dry, 14,000lb reheated
2 by 30mm ADEN
Mach 1.01 at 30,000ft
 
DH was contracted Oct 1948 for DH.110 to N.40/46 (OR.246) and proceeded for RN and RAF.

November naval aircraft dropped through economic pressure
RAF was to carry the weight with DH on F.4/48 while the RN preferred Fairey and this now proceeded instead.
By 5 April 1949 the final form was shaping up when on 2 November work was held up and then embargoed by the Treasury.
Fairey offered a single engined derivative design in December that year, then delays as the Admiralty revised the very basis of requirements and ultimately in January 1951 issued N.114T (NR/A.14). By December this was dead and in May 1952 N.114T.2 was raised.
Then in July N.131T
DH.116 Super Venom was to be ordered when in November DH admitted they hadn't the staff to realise the project.

DH.116
Span 34ft / 16ft folded
Length 44ft
Wing Area 370 sqft
All-up weight 21,405lb
Single Avon RA.14/9
9,500lb dry, 14,000lb reheated
2 by 30mm ADEN
Mach 1.01 at 30,000ft
For what it's worth Philip Birtles in "Postwar Military Aircraft: 5 De Havilland Vampire, Vixen and Sea Vixen" claims that 13 DH.110 prototypes were ordered in April 1949.
To Specification F.4/48.​
7 night fighters for the RAF.​
2 long-range fighters for the RAF.​
4 Gloster G.A.5 Javelin prototypes were ordered at the same time as a backup.​
To Specification N.14/49.​
2 night fighters for the RN.​
2 strike fighters for the RN.​
Except that I've only found serials for 5 of them (WG236, 240, 247, 249 & 252).​
However, 11 DH.110s and 2 G.A.5s were cancelled in November 1949.

The specifications for the DH.116 reminds me of a navalised Hawker P.1083 "Super Hunter" which did reach the prototype stage, but as we all should know was cancelled before it was completed.

You mentioned the navalised Swifts in an earlier post. Friedman says that the Admiralty ordered 24 "Swifts with hooks" for swept-wing familiarisation trials, which is a repetition of the single-seat Sea Vampires & the cancelled pre-production batch of Attackers that was ordered for jet familiarisation trials. If I remember correctly (because I haven't checked the book) they were victims of the Radical Review of 1954.

I'm planning to substitute them with a batch of 24 fully-navalised Hunters (including folding wings) in my timeline, which leads me on to this section of Post 279.
The swept wing Sea Hawk that evolved into ultimately the Hunter was seriously looked at. If nothing else it was bring developed for Australia.
The order for 'minimal' navalised Swifts to trial out such. Potentially a stepping stone to a order for full navalised versions (with reheat).
The P.1040 version of Sea Hawk had straight wings that folded to 13ft 4in. Navalised versions of the swept-wing P.1052 & P.1081 would have had wings that folded to 13ft 4in. Navalised Hunters would have had wings that folded in the same place. I've done a measurement of the line drawing of a F.6 in my Putnams RAF aircraft book and it reduces the wingspan from 33ft 8in to 11ft 10in, which seems like too much, so I'm sticking to the 13ft 4in of the P.1040.
 
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This alt history is continuing in great and interesting detail.
The construction of batches of new aircraft carriers throughout the postwar period in UK with a gap in the 1960s (as in real world) raises a couple of questions:

What would be the impact on Royal Navy design offices and on other major programmes like Polaris and the escort fleet?

The UK shipbuiding and metals building industry were weak and this imposed limits on the RN. Which yards would build the carriers?
 
Do you think that would make the NM copy the RN and build a pair of PA58 size carriers instead of Clemenceau and Foch? I've shown that the dimensions of the 1952 Aircraft Carrier and PA58 were similar. The "steel is cheap and air is theory" doesn't apply only to British warships, it applies to French warships too so they might not cost 50% more in spite of being 50% larger.

However, even if France had the extra money required to build more expensive ships, did they have the infrastructure to build them? Recently, I learned that the Charles de Gaulle class were the same length as the Clemenceau class because they had to fit the existing facilities (though I can't remember whether it was the slipways or dry docks or something else).

One thing is sure: PA58, just like CdG, max out the infrastructures you mentions (slipways). 45 000 tons and nothing more.

As for going PA58 straight ahead, instead of PA54/55 size: with or without the Britishs ?

-without them: Houston, we have a problem. Before the Clems was PA28 project, and it had been canned for a host of reasons circa 1950: think it was a matter of tight budgets, because Indochina.

- with them: would be better. Remember that circa 1953-54, some frenchmen naval engineers will come to UK to get BS-4 catapults. Also Sea Venoms ( = Aquilons) for Arromanches are being procured at the time. You could use all these elements, plus the Suez crisis where Arromanches fought with her sisters, to get anglo-french carriers.

In the end, without the British I can't see the french going headon to PA58 size, not in 1953 and not with PA28 failure fresh in their minds. PA58 was really a maxed-out PA54/PA55. Inflated to the slipways limits so that naval, shrunk Mirage IVs could play the role of A-5 Vigilantes.
 
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PA28 story, translated from a french forum.


The PA28, first Clemenceau: a blessing in disguise

In November 1947, the navy estimated that by 1960 it would need two ships of the line, four light aircraft carriers, three escort aircraft carriers, three cruisers, six anti-aircraft cruisers , thirty destroyers, thirty escorts and twenty-five to thirty submarines.

Aircraft carrier studies therefore continue with, in particular, in 1947, a protected aircraft carrier called PA31 of 38,000 tons including 10,300 tons for protection with a 50mm flight deck, a 100mm hangar deck and a 30mm main deck. without a real belt.

The “50” plan of April 9, 1948 provides for a first aircraft carrier (the PA28) in the 1948 phase with another 20,000-ton ship in the 1951 phase. A draft naval statute is presented on August 2, 1949, with four and six aircraft carriers of around 20,000 tons but it is not discussed.

The construction was not unanimous but the National Assembly authorized the construction by voting the credits on August 14, 1947. On September 1, 1947, the Ministry of the Navy entrusted the construction of the PA28 to the Brest Arsenal.

The start of construction was postponed following a decree of October 9, 1947 which prohibited any new commitment of expenditure on the extraordinary budget of National Defense. The cessation of work was ordered by the Minister of National Defense Paul Ramadier on March 7, 1949 and all work ceased except the receipt of the equipment already ordered.

The official cessation of the construction of this ship unofficially named Clemenceau was decided on May 31, 1949.

As compensation, the Americans lent France the aircraft carrier USS Langley renamed La Fayette on June 2, 1951.

Displacement: 15700 tW (20110 tonnes pC)

Dimensions: Length (overall) 229.50m (between perpendiculars) 215m Width (overall) 36m (between perpendiculars) 25m Draft: 6.50m

Propulsion: Two groups of turbines powered by four boilers developing a total power of 105,000 hp and driving two propellers

Performance: maximum speed: 32 knots range: 7,700 nautical miles at 18 knots 4,700 nautical miles at 24 knots

Protection: none

Armament: 16 cannons 100mm in eight double turrets distributed in four side groups (two to starboard and two to port) and 16 57mm guns in eight double turrets (one at the stern, one at the bow, three to starboard and three port) Aeronautical installations:

Bridge takeoff 220m long by 36m wide connected to the hangar (130m long by 24.40m wide and 8.50m high) by two 12-ton elevators. Two catapults at the front and 8 stops plus three barriers.

Air group: The number varies depending on the sources from 31 to 47 aircraft. The single hangar can permanently house 22 NC1070 or Nord 1500 twin-engine torpedo boats plus 5 SE582 heavy fighters, i.e. 27 aircraft. It was also planned that 22 SE582s could be hung from the hangar ceiling.

Crew: 1806 officers and sailors.

PA54 / PA55 Clemenceau

The abandonment of the construction of the PA28 is of course very badly received by the supporters of the aircraft carrier in France and in particular Admiral Nomy, former aviator who became chief of General Staff on October 26, 1951. With hindsight, this abandonment was an excellent thing because the PA28 would have been outdated as soon as it was put into service since it would have been very difficult to adapt the steam catapult and the oblique track to what readily recognizes Admiral Nomy who described the first Clemenceau as a “bad copy of the Arromanches”.

In July 1952, a naval statute was passed providing for a 450,000-ton navy with four aircraft carriers, three to serve within NATO. The construction of national aircraft carriers is considered urgent because the French cannot use the light aircraft carriers loaned by the Americans as they wish.

The Higher Council of July 15, 1952 went further and concluded that it was necessary to have five aircraft carriers, including two light aircraft carriers of 12,500 tons reserved for missions within the framework of the French Union.

In June 1953, Admiral Nomy proposed a three-year program to achieve 60% of the objectives provided for in the 1952 statute which must not be completed until 1970.
The problem of the aircraft carrier was examined during the High Council of the Navy of July 16, 1953 which quickly ruled out the idea of buying an aircraft carrier from the United States which would necessarily be reluctant to part with a ship and could require certain limitations in its use. The CSM proposes to include an aircraft carrier in the 1954 tranche.

On March 16, 1954, the special rapporteur of the Finance Committee, Henri Dorey, announced the construction of an aircraft carrier to the National Assembly as part of the 1954 tranche which must include in addition to the protected 23,000-ton aircraft carrier, three 1,000-ton escorted avionics, five 325-ton escorts and two Narval-type submarines, i.e. 30,025 tons, the 1955 and 1956 tranches are similar but without aircraft carriers .

The details of the sections were revised in November 1954 with still an aircraft carrier, three advisory-escorts and four submarines. In the end, the tranche adopted by Parliament included the PA54, two escorts (called "fast" in 1955, they were named L'Agenais and Le Béarnais) and four submarines (Espadon, Morse, Amazone and Ariane).

Originally, the 1955 tranche did not include an aircraft carrier but a second building was planned in the 1956 tranche. The end of American aid in 1954 precipitated things and the 1955 tranche provided for an aircraft carrier, four Union Française escorts and two fighter submarines.
A true miracle occurred: Parliament agreed to renew the 1954 budget in 1955.

The 1955 tranche therefore ultimately includes an aircraft carrier (in place of the cruiser initially envisaged)
, a Union Française advisory (the future Commandat Rivière), three fast escorts (the future L'Alsacien, Le Provencal and Le Vendéen). and three submarines (Daphné, Diane and Doris).

Two aircraft carriers were therefore financed successively, the PA54 being named Clemenceau and the PA55 Foch.

Let's return to the technical design of the Clemenceaus.

It all started on July 28, 1952 when the Secretary of State for the Navy, Jacques Gavini requested the study of a preliminary project for a 12,500 ton aircraft carrier. This ship must be versatile and capable of being engaged in ASW missions, territorial air defense or providing support for an expeditionary force as was carried out by French aircraft carriers at the time. in Indochina.

The first project was established at the beginning of 1953 with a straight bridge and a powerful DCA composed of 24 57mm cannons in twelve double turrets grouped three by three at each corner of the building.

From March 25, 1953, the project increased in weight to 18,000 tons due to the embarkation of 15-ton jet planes and a desired maximum speed of 32 knots, which required a propulsive power of 120,000 hp. Two sub-versions are studied: a protected ship (PAX) and an unprotected ship (PAXp). The appearance of the oblique runway forces French engineers to integrate it into the aircraft carrier project and the project presented on the 25th March 1953 revealed to us a ship weighing 19,900 tonnes, 228m long (at the waterline), a 245m long flight deck with an oblique runway 164m long oriented at 7°.

It is equipped with two British steam catapults, two elevators. No protection other than tight compartmentalization is planned and the island, the removal of which was once considered, is ultimately maintained but in a lighter version. The propulsion unit develops a total power of 120,000hp and drives two propellers and as for the DCA, it is made up of four groups of three double 57mm mounts.

A protected version called PAX-P is also presented. Displacing 23,000 tonnes, it has a 50mm armored flight deck and a 30 to 60mm armored box but the propulsive power remaining the same, the speed drops to 31 knots.

Another version called PAX-P2 was also presented on June 20, 1953, but it was far from unanimously accepted due to its heavy weight, which required four shaft lines to be considered.

The CSM of July 16, 1953 therefore studies the different projects and it is the PAX-P2 project which is chosen by the minister on August 8, 1953. The project will, however, further evolve and in the end, is closer to the PAX-P than to the PAX-P2.

Following requests for modifications from Admiral Nomy, the aircraft carrier project evolved into a 24,000-ton ship Washington with a 50mm armored flight deck, an armored box, two shaft lines and a speed of 32 knots , an air group of 60 aircraft (24 Sea Venom type fighters that France will build under license under the name Aquilon, 24 assault aircraft and twelve ASM aircraft), a DCA composed of twelve double 57mm mounts in four groups and a flight deck 245m long by 28m wide with a 7° inclined runway and capable of accommodating 15-tonne aircraft.

The aeronautical installations planned by the STCAN do not satisfy the aviators who do not hesitate to say so and the project must be revised: the oblique runway sees its angle of obliquity increased, the island is offset by one meter to starboard, the volume of the holds is increased as is the size of the elevators, the arrangement of the catapults is revised with one on the oblique runway and one in the axis in place of two axial catapults.

The DCA at one time made up of twelve 57mm guns was ultimately made up of twelve then eight 100mm guns in four double groups installed on the front port, rear port, front starboard and rear starboard.
 
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The final settled cost for the Victorious rebuild was £19 million, the figure given in Hansard having been rounded up. The £30 million stated by Brown is erroneous.

Unfortunately, Brown's section on the medium carrier also confuses matters. In actuality, the ship estimated at £18 million is from 1953 and was almost certainly a two shaft design, probably a modernised Hermes in concept, not a three shaft medium carrier of the variety that made its way in to long-term planning in late 1954.

We will never know what a 1952 carrier would have cost if built, but for a more or less educated guess, assuming the costings are apple to apple:

On Victorious rebuild from Hobbs (million L):
Initial estimate 5.4
After start 7.7
march 1952 during work 11
reboilering+radar added 14.16
1958 "a little over 30" - may well be 19 as the large jump would need explanation
So leaving reboilering out and taking the 19 million as final cost, ~50% over estimate 1952, at worst 100+%.


On Eagle:
Estimate 1955 16.5
Estimate 1959 during work 23.5 despite modified rebuild
Final 31 (which may include other costs?)
at least ~50% over estimate 1955, maybe 90% or worse

I think a 50% rise over the initial estimate from early 1950s is the lower bound, giving about 40 million. 90 % would be about L50 million.
The increases are compared with estimates done after work had started.
The low end is still much closer to Clemenceau (~35) than Forrestal (~70), both cost points would indicate something around L50 million for a 53k t carrier.
 
One thing is sure: PA58, just like CdG, max out the infrastructures you mentions (slipways). 45 000 tons and nothing more.

As for going PA58 straight ahead, instead of PA54/55 size: with or without the Britishs ?

-without them: Houston, we have a problem. Before the Clems was PA28 project, and it had been canned for a host of reasons circa 1950: think it was a matter of tight budgets, because Indochina.

- with them: would be better. Remember that circa 1953-54, some frenchmen naval engineers will come to UK to get BS-4 catapults. Also Sea Venoms ( = Aquilons) for Arromanches are being procured at the time. You could use all these elements, plus the Suez crisis where Arromanches fought with her sisters, to get anglo-french carriers.

In the end, without the British I can't see the french going headon to PA58 size, not in 1953 and not with PA28 failure fresh in their minds. PA58 was really a maxed-out PA54/PA55. Inflated to the slipways limits so that naval, shrunk Mirage IVs could play the role of A-5 Vigilantes.

Foch was started at St Nazaire and PA58 would have been built there. Parallel to Foch, the liner France (~315m overall) was built there. Later, this... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Batillus
CdG was limited in size as it had to be built at Brest for political reasons.
Size limits for fitting out, repairs etc I do not know. But as PA58 was planned with 280+m should be no insurmountable problem.

As for anglofrench "PA 52", how about his: The launch of the project gets delayed into the late 1950s. Cost, disputes about design, who builds what, the usual stuff with international projects.

First ship is inscribed into the budgets of 1960 and 1961, each time cancelled due to the war in Algeria. Then, the SSBN program starts, no room in the navy budget. The Marine Nationale gets two additional Jeanne d'Arcs instead, for a fleet of three halfthroughdeckcruisers...
 
What would be the impact on Royal Navy design offices and on other major programmes like Polaris and the escort fleet?
Since the carriers are in essence 1950s designs, the 60's would be fairly low pressure on that front.
Nuclear Submarine is low intensity through the 50's until late 50's at best and early 60’s. Which fortunately is when staff would become available.
Escort fleet is still likely to loose the Cruiser effort and with carriers aplenty the pressure to design a ASW Cruiser is much less.

A lot of workforce was involved with completing and then reworking the Audaciouses, Centaurs and the rebuild of Victorious.
Arguably once the Colossuses and Majestics are completed there is quite a lot of the workforce available.
------
Archibald if I may ask, is it possible for you to dig up how the Clemenceaus shafts were tested?

Turns out it's not props but just RN shafts that couldn't test above 50,000shp.

Had the 50's Y300 plant shafts been testable to say 60,000shp, a ship of two sets for 120,000shp would deliver something close to Clemenceau size.

Edited in notes:
USS Forrestal has shafts able to handle 65,000shp.
USS Independent has shafts able to handle 70,000shp.

Had RN with French assistance developed 60,000shp plant, shafts and props, designs with 3 sets produce 180,000shp. Which is enough for a CV very close to the 190,000shp of the 1952 design.
 
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Thanks Zen as usual.
The replacement gas turbine CVs in the 70s fascinate me.
There were various problems with the powerplants for the Invincibles. These might be bigger with CTOL ships.
The catapult issue also interests me.
This is not a criticism I like the carrier programme set out by N.
 
If the RN had been able to build a three generation carrier force and remaining history had been unchanged (same governments etc) the impact might have been considerable.
1956 Two of the Argus class plus Ocean and Theseus take part in the Suez operation.
With a better airgroup than real world Eagle, Albion and Bulwark they do more damage to the Egyptians.
In 1957 the Royal Navy has a coherent case for a six carrier force by 1962 able to provide the second striking group for NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic and at Singapore a carrier and commando ship.
Mountbatten persuades Sandys to get the RAF and RN to use the same fighter and strike aircraft.
Sandys sees through the RAF attempt to resurrect a bomber force using TSR2 and tells them to focus on getting the V force to work. The Canberra replacement and RN maritime strike aircraft become the same requirement.
Replacing the V force will not involve new bomber aircraft and Mountbatten persuades Sandys that land based missiles in Conservative seats would be a vote loser. A mission is sent to Washington to look at their SLBM and SLCM work.
In 1961 Hermes and Courageous launch attacks on the Iraqi Air Force ending the Kuwait crisis in an afternoon.
In 1962 Macmillan and Kennedy sign the Nassau agreement for Polaris. RAF Valiants are withdrawn from service and replaced by Vulcan B1 in the strike and Victor B1 in the tanker role. Vulcan B2 and Victor B2 numbers will be reduced once Polaris enters service.
The new Labour Government from 1964 to 1966 is faced with a severe financial crisis.
Apart from cancelling the fifth Polaris submarine the main savings are found in reducing the size of the V force earlier than planned and disposing rather than refiting the first two Argus class ships. The remaining force will be reviewed.
1967 sees the decision to withdraw from East of Suez by 1971. This permits the RN to dispose of two of its remaining carriers.
1970 sees a new Defence Secretary, Lord Carrington. He is sympathetic to the Navy and ensures that two carriers will remain in service until 1980 with a third retained for spares.
Unfortunately the next five years still see the UK ecomomy and industry looking like 2023.

.
 
The replacement gas turbine CVs in the 70s fascinate me.
It's fairly reasonable to preheat the water with the exhaust of the gas turbines. Even if one was using donkey boilers for the steam catapults.
Biggest issue might be volume/weight.
 
So none in France tried to get the American to part... with an Essex or two in 1945-60?

No, for two reasons. First, we got two Independances CVL, out of nine build (Spain got another: hence Lafayette, Bois Belleau and Dedalo were all sisterships). Secondly, the said Independances seemingly came with some strings attached - related to France decolonization wars, Indochina and Algeria. Basically it was a matter of national pride and independance, to build our own carriers and use them as our will.

Also the Essex had high manpower requirements and were all very busy in USN service, also worn out.

Except perhaps for the two crippled, repaired, and mothballed: Franklin and Bunker Hill. I have TLs were they end either in French, British or Australian service; or as Zumwalt guinea pigs: proto -SCS or VSS or CVV. Or floating rocket base: for launch and recovery.
 
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Foch was started at St Nazaire and PA58 would have been built there. Parallel to Foch, the liner France (~315m overall) was built there. Later, this... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Batillus
CdG was limited in size as it had to be built at Brest for political reasons.
Size limits for fitting out, repairs etc I do not know. But as PA58 was planned with 280+m should be no insurmountable problem.
You beat me to it with the size limits, because SS France was 981ft wl x 110ft 7in and SS Normandie was 962ft pp x 117ft 10in.

Do you know what the political reasons for building CdG at Brest were?
 
Had the 50's Y300 plant shafts been testable to say 60,000shp, a ship of two sets for 120,000shp would deliver something close to Clemenceau size.

Edited in notes:
USS Forrestal has shafts able to handle 65,000shp.
USS Independent has shafts able to handle 70,000shp.
Forrestal's shp wasn't due to the amount of power the shafts were able to handle, it was due to the amount of power her boilers were able to produce, to speed up production the US Navy opted for less powerful boilers with lower pressures and temperatures. CVA-58 would have had 280,000shp total after all.

I don't think there is any practical 60,000shp limit for RN steam machinery, the problem is that machinery sets with fixed powers were designed as fully integrated sets designed to maximise efficiency. The 70,000shp total limit seems to be due to cavitation limits, given the RN was already designing low-cavitation propeller designs to reduce acoustic signature, I see no reason why a 70,000 shp per shaft steam plant couldn't be designed.
 
You beat me to it with the size limits, because SS France was 981ft wl x 110ft 7in and SS Normandie was 962ft pp x 117ft 10in.

Do you know what the political reasons for building CdG at Brest were?

Hmmm my bet is on Mitterrand left, in power from 1981-86 (government, Mitterrand himself had seven year mandate, so 1988 - and then he got another victory so 1995).
At government level however the left lost in march 1986, for the right - until Mitterrand victory in 1988 brought back the left there too (understand ?)
 
It's testing equipment limits. Props were fine going over 50,000shp but the shaft testing equipment wasn't, and you definitely needed to test a shaft do assure it was safe to impose that sort of load on it.

Getting to 65,000shp makes a twin plant ship have some 130,000shp, which is within 5,000shp of the three plant set when they are limited to 45,000shp.
 
You beat me to it with the size limits, because SS France was 981ft wl x 110ft 7in and SS Normandie was 962ft pp x 117ft 10in.

Do you know what the political reasons for building CdG at Brest were?

AFAIK workload for the Arsenal and regional politics. Two ships were planned, and so at least one would have to go to Brest, limiting the size of the sistership even if built at St Nazaire.
 
Is/was the yard in St Nazaire qualified to build nuclear power ships like the CdG?
 
They could/can build the ship, nuclear installation would have had to be done elsewhere as with PANG.


"Regarding the transfer from St Nazaire to Toulon: Since Chantiers de l’Atlantique is not a nuclear shipyard, fueling of the nuclear core and divergence (first power up of the reactor) will take place in Toulon. According to the DGA program manager, the plan is to temporarily fit several diesel generators in the hangar (or on the flight deck) of the aircraft carrier in order to provide the electric propulsion system of the carrier with enough power. In other words, this initial transit (which will not be a sea trial) will be conducted with the vessel’s own power, just not nuclear power."
 
The UK has looked at but never built nuclear surface ships for the RN. It would be difficult for a range of reasons, but could the UK have built nuclear aircraft carriers?
Given UK reliance/co-operation with US a British carrier would follow the Enterprise or Nimitz in needing a large number of reactors.
No details of any UK nuclear carriers has emerged. Once Polaris/Trident and SSN needs are taken into account it is hard to see the UK having the capacity for more.
 
When would it be built?
Enterprise had 8 A2W reactors with 150 mw thermal power each
Nimitz class 2 A4W reactors with 550 mw thermal power each
CdG 2 K15 with 150 mw thermal power each

So a nuclear CVA-1 would probably need 4 A2W.
Or a single A4W - which might not be a good idea.

More exotic:
2 A3W if JFK is a CVN.
4? submarine PWR1
 
The UK has looked at but never built nuclear surface ships for the RN. It would be difficult for a range of reasons, but could the UK have built nuclear aircraft carriers?
It was looked at in the early 60’s and would neatly follow on from the Submarine effort.
As JFCFuller dug up and kindly posted.
Of most relevance perhaps is:-
75,000SHP Destroyer Plant: Dating to 1958 this appears to have started out as a generic study into nuclear propulsion for warships that quickly focussed on a hypothetical plant for the Hampshire class, the report is incredibly detailed and culminates in a very detailed machinery space layout for a CONAG plant. However, the reactors are anything but detailed, there is discussion of different reactor types but the ultimate drawings just show empty boxes with the relevant SHP written in them. This study may have been where some of the nuclear propulsion configurations referenced by Friedman in relation to NIGS came from.
75,000shp is relevant for two sets or three to power a CVN
 
When would it be built?
Enterprise had 8 A2W reactors with 150 mw thermal power each
Nimitz class 2 A4W reactors with 550 mw thermal power each
CdG 2 K15 with 150 mw thermal power each

So a nuclear CVA-1 would probably need 4 A2W.
Or a single A4W - which might not be a good idea.

More exotic:
2 A3W if JFK is a CVN.
4? submarine PWR1
You'd need more than that. PWR1 is basically an S5W in power, S5W is only about 15,000hp per reactor.

IF the UK decided to go play with nuclear carriers, they'd also need to go to highly enriched uranium fuel for all their cores. I'm not sure if the S5W used HEU or not. I suspect it did. Having to refuel a reactor every 5 years is inefficient for a ship, not with how much work it takes to do the refueling.
 
There was a brief look at nuclear power in the early 60s; Friedman mentions it in British Carrier Aviation but it was ruled out due to cost (building five CVNs was just too expensive to contemplate).
 
This french blog (with on-line translation) has lots of information. Related to Admiral Henri Nomy (already mentionned in my post)
ambitions for a nuclear fleet in the late 1950's.

Nomy was Chief of the Navy from 1951 to 1960 and was very good at the job. Before 1951 he had recreated and expended the french carrier fleet, buying first Arromanches from the british and then: Dixmude, Lafayette & Bois Belleau from the americans (the last two Independance carriers).




 
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We'd probably have a new UK designation for ship reactors.
LPWR perhaps (L for Large).

A planned CVN might be a 60's phenomenon, and would be part of a larger nuclear fleet concept. The likelihood is for DDGN as well.
 
When would it be built?
Enterprise had 8 A2W reactors with 150 mw thermal power each
Nimitz class 2 A4W reactors with 550 mw thermal power each
CdG 2 K15 with 150 mw thermal power each

So a nuclear CVA-1 would probably need 4 A2W.
Or a single A4W - which might not be a good idea.

More exotic:
2 A3W if JFK is a CVN.
4? submarine PWR1
The CVN version of JFK was to have four A3W reactors.
 
You'd need more than that. PWR1 is basically an S5W in power, S5W is only about 15,000hp per reactor.

IF the UK decided to go play with nuclear carriers, they'd also need to go to highly enriched uranium fuel for all their cores. I'm not sure if the S5W used HEU or not. I suspect it did. Having to refuel a reactor every 5 years is inefficient for a ship, not with how much work it takes to do the refueling.

Not sure about pwr1.
Nimitz: 1100mw thermal/210 shaft power
Cdg: 300/60

CVA-01 would have had ~100 mw, the US CVV ~75mw shaft power if I read that correctly. So the requirement is ~375-500mw thermal.

The nr for s5w around is 78 mw thermal, If pwr1 is a bit stronger it might just suffice for the lower end. But more likely maybe 6, but that would be an unusual arrangement?

UK would have stayed with HEU, I assume, but CdG works with LEU, so probably no dealbreaker. Refueling about every 7 years or so.
 
Yes, so 2 should suffice for a CVA-01 size ship with slightly lower speed.
FWIW, the UK was willing to accept rather lower speed than the US. one of the CVA-01 preliminaries was a FORRESTAL-sized ship with 180,000 shp for 30 knots, compared to 260,000 shp for 33 knots on the FORRESTAL itself.

British nuclear carriers are a nice flight of fancy, but not terribly likely in the real world. They certainly wouldn't help with maintaining carrier air power - if anything, they'd probably kill it off sooner!
 
FWIW, the UK was willing to accept rather lower speed than the US. one of the CVA-01 preliminaries was a FORRESTAL-sized ship with 180,000 shp for 30 knots, compared to 260,000 shp for 33 knots on the FORRESTAL itself.

British nuclear carriers are a nice flight of fancy, but not terribly likely in the real world. They certainly wouldn't help with maintaining carrier air power - if anything, they'd probably kill it off sooner!
Certainly think steam-powered CVAs are probably only just about viable for post war Britain. Steel is cheap and air is free, but nuclear reactors are very expensive despite their benefits.
 
Which brings me to my next question?
Including French carriers in this thread makes sense because they are the only other country apart from the US with postwar CTOL carrier design and build experience, but also might have been a partner in building them.

If the UK had been able to build a gas turbine powered CVV for the 80s would France have followed suit or would it still have gone nuclear?
 
Nuclear. Definitively. Since 1973 and PH75, it was seemingly not negociable. Because submarines, and because atomic powerplants.
 
Ah the wonderful PH75. I remember being fascinated by this ship when I first saw a drawing in "Aviation and Marine" carrying helos like Bulwark or Albion.
Did someone in the Ministry of Marine always have a cunning plan to turn her into an aircraft carrier?
In the gap after PA58 did France in its planning go straight to nuclear?
 
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