Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining carrier based air power?

I played with the statistics for British steam catapults in David Hobbs British Aircraft Carriers book and this was the result.

Steam Catapult Capabilities from Hobbs..png

That's funny-peculiar because I expected the 151ft BS.5 to be more powerful than all versions of BS.4. (That is, with the possible exception of the 175ft stroke BS.4 fitted to Hermes 1964-66.) Instead (with the exception of Centaur) all varieties of BS.4 could launch aircraft that were just as heavy at slightly higher end speeds.

AIUI the bow BS.5s on Ark Royal & Eagle could launch a full-loaded F-4K.

If that's true and the information in the table is accurate the BS.4s on Hermes & Victorious could launch fully-loaded F-4Ks too. In fact they might do it more easily due to having slightly higher end speeds.
 
I played with the statistics for British steam catapults in David Hobbs British Aircraft Carriers book and this was the result.

That's funny-peculiar because I expected the 151ft BS.5 to be more powerful than all versions of BS.4. (That is, with the possible exception of the 175ft stroke BS.4 fitted to Hermes 1964-66.) Instead (with the exception of Centaur) all varieties of BS.4 could launch aircraft that were just as heavy at slightly higher end speeds.

AIUI the bow BS.5s on Ark Royal & Eagle could launch a full-loaded F-4K.

If that's true and the information in the table is accurate the BS.4s on Hermes & Victorious could launch fully-loaded F-4Ks too. In fact they might do it more easily due to having slightly higher end speeds.

From when I went into this in great detail these are British catapult capabilities.

BS4: 40,000lb@78kt; 30,000lb@101kt

BS4C: 35,000lb@99kt; 30,000lb@110kt

BS4A: 50,000lb@87kt; 30,000lb@120kt

BS5: 50,000lb@91kt; 42,000lb@110kt, 35,000lb@126kt

BS5A: 60,000lb@95kt; 50,000lb@105kt, 35,000lb@145kt

Anecdotally, although from a reliable source, the BS4 in HMAS Melbourne could launch a fully loaded A4G (~24,000lbs) in nil wind conditions despite widespread claims that it couldn't. The 9" extension (apparently BS4 cylinders come in 9' lengths) in 1971 didn't give the catapult any more power, it reduced the stress of each launch by ~9%.

IIUC the BS5A could launch a loaded Phantom in nil wind conditions, but the BS5 and BS4s could not.
 
I'm having serious problems with the cost of the RN 60s fighter, be that Spey Phantom or something else, and its impact on the RN. ~110 Spey Phantom would likely cost 300-400 million pounds over a period of 8 or so years.
  • The overall MoD budget in the 60s was about 2 billion pounds,
    • The RNs share of that would have been about 1/4 of that - 500m
      • Captial equipment acquisition would be about 1/3-2/5 of that - 166-200m
The Spey Phantom alone would take up ~1/4 of the RNs capital equipment budget 1964-71, leaving aside Buccaneers, helicopters and of course ships!
 
The Spey Phantom alone would take up ~1/4 of the RNs capital equipment budget 1964-71, leaving aside Buccaneers, helicopters and of course ships!
After 50 AH RN carrier threads and 24,856 posts we finally get to the nub of the RN carrier fantasy.
It costs a lot of money and there just isn't enough resource given all the other demands. The RN were fortunate that they didn't have to foot the Polaris bill at the same time.

I read the other day that if the Services combined spending plans for the 1980s had become reality that 18% of the entire population would have had to be employed in the MIC.
And when the Admirals said they needed half a billion quid to build a fleet that could last 4 days of combat it's not surprising that the politicians said "nah thanks".
 
After 50 AH RN carrier threads and 24,856 posts we finally get to the nub of the RN carrier fantasy.
It costs a lot of money and there just isn't enough resource given all the other demands. The RN were fortunate that they didn't have to foot the Polaris bill at the same time.

I read the other day that if the Services combined spending plans for the 1980s had become reality that 18% of the entire population would have had to be employed in the MIC.
And when the Admirals said they needed half a billion quid to build a fleet that could last 4 days of combat it's not surprising that the politicians said "nah thanks".

Hence my thread about almost MOTS Phantom, I suspect an RN spec F4J (folding nose, extended nosewheel oleo, drooping ailerons) would cost half of what the Spey Phantom cost.

My other interest, a Lighting FGA/FR from 1958, is ultimately for budget reasons. Not only is it cheaper than the Hunter-P1154-F4M (& Jaguar indirectly), but it spends the money in the early 60s, leaving room in the late 60s for the TSR2 and possibly the RNs fighter. The Buccaneer was in a similar position, IIUC all the sqns had converted to the S2 by 1966 leaving hre carrier plane budget line clear for the big fighter buy.

IIUC the Polaris was a tri-service 'strategic' vote, in the overall Defence budget but not allocated to the RN directly in competition with things like carriers, SSNs and Spey Phantoms. But that was ages ago and I haven't seen it confirmed since.
 
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There is...another factor here.

G-limits.
The catapults could potentially accelerate an aircraft far faster than the airframe was rated for.

See Skyhawk from HMAS Melbourne.

During the 1952 discussions, it was asked if higher acceleration could be used. But this imposed on the structural weight of the aircraft and there were questions on how the pilot would handle such.

So there maybe a hidden coat factor in F4K......strengthening for higher G acceleration?

It's also not impossible to lengthen the forward catapult more....

And did someone answer the water injection question on J79?

Factor such things together and maybe J79 powered F4 might make the cut........?
 
Something that might be more significant that is recognised, if indeed if it is even known at all, is the thrust line of the Spey installation. Compared to the J79 the thrust line of the Spey is downward by 2 degrees.

The extended nose oleo gave the F4K an upward attitude of 9 degrees, more than the USN F4s already noticeable nose up attitude for launch (guessing 5 or 6 degrees?). The combination of the extended nose oleo and 2 degrees downward thrust line for the Spey might double the amount of lift the engine provides on launch compared to the standard J79 installation.

1737670585278.png


1737669948751.png
Photo from Wiki.
 
Something that might be more significant that is recognised, if indeed if it is even known at all, is the thrust line of the Spey installation. Compared to the J79 the thrust line of the Spey is downward by 2 degrees.

The extended nose oleo gave the F4K an upward attitude of 9 degrees, more than the USN F4s already noticeable nose up attitude for launch (guessing 5 or 6 degrees?). The combination of the extended nose oleo and 2 degrees downward thrust line for the Spey might double the amount of lift the engine provides on launch compared to the standard J79 installation.

View attachment 757153


View attachment 757152
Photo from Wiki.
yup... many, many things in these pages. We covered this.
 
RoC/Hood, #645/6. Labour torpedoed criticism of '65 US $ spend, claiming the total package (C-130/F-4K/M) cost little more, 1964-70, than the inherited Tory prog.. That had 5 SSBNs and upfront cash F-4Ks. Labour's package had deferred $ spend (at 4.75% interest).
 
RoC/Hood, #645/6. Labour torpedoed criticism of '65 US $ spend, claiming the total package (C-130/F-4K/M) cost little more, 1964-70, than the inherited Tory prog.. That had 5 SSBNs and upfront cash F-4Ks. Labour's package had deferred $ spend (at 4.75% interest).

Did that point bear out in practice?
 
Dunno. The reason cost numbers for UK F-4s are so...confusing is that the new notion of total ownership cost was being attempted without benefit of pocket calculators, forget clever Proj Mngt software. So, Hood, #646, nah thanks, half-a-billion: IIRC that same number would feature in 1966 EoS, "CV or land bases". What was in it? Schools for dependents based in Singapore? Pensions for widows of folk assigned there awhile? If you try to cost a land base you will get to half a billion very quickly.

The credit deal gave space in 1965-70 to do other things as well as SSBNs; we then paid, with interest, to 1979 for aeroplanes that might have been w/o in 1971. But at known cost* and actually delivered more or less on time, on Spec.
(* known, in that we were told of cost uplift during the event, not surprised downstream. Couldn't do much about it)
 
It's a good point on calculators.
Even into the late 70's my dad had to sign for a calculator at work and hand it back afterwards.
 
So, Hood, #646, nah thanks, half-a-billion: IIRC that same number would feature in 1966 EoS, "CV or land bases".
My "Nah thanks" comment was in relation to the implied bill in 1978-79 for the 1980s fleet.

But the situation then was much the same as 1963 - the RN only had so much cash to spend and wanted carriers, cruisers, helicopters, frigates, missiles, fighters, bombers, nukes, nuclear subs, torpedoes, sonars, radars, EW kit, commando carriers, commando helicopters, AEW aircraft, hovercraft, minesweepers, combat information systems, supply ships, depot ships, tankers global bases etc. Something had to give.
 
A lot of fascinating ideas and technical information from which I've learnt lots.

On following this topic, I've come to the conclusion that Britain, if it wished to stay in the carrier game seriously needed to abide by:
- Britain seriously needed to come to terms that it was no longer the big player it was Post WWII. In saying this, I guess it was fortunate enough to not have it's empire forcefully taken from it, but instead seeded to the U.S., for which it was a strong ally.
- As much as Britain tried to hold onto the notion that it was/still could be a world leader in aircraft research, development and manufacturing, it perhaps should have bitten it's pride and read the writing on the wall, that it was not in an economical place to continue, let alone afford to design and build specialised carrier-based aircraft for the shrunken Navy it had, let alone what it could actually operate efficiently and effectively.
So how about Britain actively sorts to bring its indisputable talent and expertise to the table with the U.S. and say - 'how about we actively participate in joint development and manufacturing of carrier-based aircraft with you?'
This way Britain could participate and have input into the formulation of U.S. Navy aircraft Specifications and Request for Proposals.
This way, instead of the British government (and tax payer) being hamstrunged with the ever pressing costs of updating or building new carriers, compounded by the cost of developing and fielding RN-centric carrier-based aircraft [deciding one or the other, but not both], the British/RN could considerate on building carriers specific to it's needs, while sharing the R&D and building risks of specialised carrier-based aircraft with the U.S./USN.

For example, the RN could possibly more readily influence size and weight perimeters of some given USN aircraft or at least incorpate a British derivative - lighter, less sophisticated, less internal fuel tankage, etc...

After all, the modification (or considerations of modifications] the British/RN had to contend with U.S. carrier-based aircraft (the McDonnell F-4 Phantom II and Vought F-8 Crusader for example) usually equated to substantial modifications, additional costs and reduction in capabilities.

So the British/RN get GE J79-powered F-4 Phantoms, possibly bigger-winged F-4L's? Or
GE J79-powered two-seat F-8 Crusaders (in an initial purchase anyway. Wheather Britain wants to develop a more capable Rolls-Royce Spey-powered derivative later to extend the feasibility of the F-8 as it's principle carrier-based fighter-bomber, might be considered - perhapes in coordination with the French.....);
Possibly a turboprop-powered Grumman E-1T Turbo Tracer for AEW;
Possibly turboprop-powered S-2T Turbo Tracker for ASW;
Maybe Britian convinces the USN to run with it's Blackburn Buccaneer instead of the Grumman A-6 Intruder.....;
Britain/RN participate in the VFAX/NACF to gain the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18A/B Hornet to replace its F-4L's;
Britain/RN still get their derivative of the Sikorsky/Westland Sea King helicopter;
Instead of participating in the EH-101, Britain/RN participate and adopts the Sikorsky SH-60B Seahawk program for it's carriers, but continues with their participation in the development and fielding of the smaller and lighter Lynx as it's principle Cruiser, Destroyer and Frigate based ASW helicopter.

This way, with the money saved in development and costly small numbered manufacturing of specialised carrier-based aircraft, Britain/RN could more readily afford to build and operate the likes of modern and capable CVA-01 carriers.....

Sorry, just my thoughts....

Regards
Pioneer
 
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The three roles of carrier air power:
Offence against land targets (RAF challenge with Island bases and F111K)
Offence against maritime targets (SSNs offer more effective ship and sub killing power and blockade option)
But defence against air threats (missile and fixed wing) is not challenged effectively by the RAF or RN SAGW.
The F4 and supporting AEW are essential once Russia deploys Badgers and Bears then Blinders and Backfires with ASM.
But with only Eagle/Ark and CVA01 available to carry F4 and only CVA01 able to carry F111B the RN has not stepped up to meet this real threat and put all its eggs in the East of Suez basket.
Had CVA01 been offered sooner and F4 identified as the only solution the RN might have been able to build two ships during the 60s and even a third in the 70s. AFVG would then have permitted a single type to replace F4/Buc in the 70s.
The RN unlike the RAF did not do its staff work properly.
 
There is another spin off - during the negotiations the RN accepts Healey's (and the Treasury's) 35,000-ton carrier compromise (not so crazy when you consider CVA-01 was pushing the limits of shipbuilding capability and none of the yards were that keen on actually building it given the likely cost overruns and lack of profit).

This means a redesign, but its possible it may have been ordered by 1970, before Heath's government comes into power. Heath's 'suprcharged' economic growth plans that led to the glut of Type 21 and Type 22 orders and the first two Invincibles would instead include another pair of 35,000 tonners.

1976 - CVS-01 commissions as HMS Queen Elizabeth, replacing HMS Eagle
1979 - CVS-02 commissions as HMS Duke of Edinburgh, replacing HMS Ark Royal
1981 - CVS-03 commissions as HMS Ark Royal, replacing HMS Hermes (which becomes a commando carrier to replace Bulwark until its sold to India in 1986)

But you can't operate Phantoms from a 35,000 tonner I hear you shout...
No but Eagle and Ark can and would until 79, Bucc 2 runs on the same length, as does Gannet AEW.3.

The RN says it can't operate Phantoms on its new carrier in 1969, but by then in the real world they saw the potential of the HS P.1179 MRCA contender as a Harrier successor.
Yes its almost a spruced-up P.1154 and its politically awkward to buy something like the very thing you previous rejected. But it gets the ball rolling.
A new spec is issued for a supersonic V/STOL to replace the Harrier for the RAF and RN in 1970 - effectively becoming a second-string alongside AST.396 which is now Jaguar replacement focused.

Kingston does some hard thinking and comes up with the HS.1205 in 1973 (a couple of years sooner than historical). Only it has Blue Fox, Skyflash and Sidewinders as well as Martel (later Sea Eagle) and WE.177A. It flies in 1976 as the HS Osprey FRS.2, operational in 1977 (the GR.1 is for the RAF). An improved FGR.3 and FRS.4 enters service in 1995 with the RAF and FAA with a new RR engine, new composite wing, Blue Vixen radar, AMRAAMs, Sea Eagle as a true multirole fighter.

You have Sea Kings aboard and later Merlins.

Wot no AEW? You cry. Well the CVS has 1 or 2 steam cats, an attempt to piggyback the Nimrod AEW.3's Marconi radar system ends in an HS.125-dervied airframe, which actually works out ok as there are no cars zooming around mid-ocean to confuse the radar. The HS.150 Marlet enters service in 1987, too late for the Falklands but the Osprey had no trouble mopping up down there aboard 'Queenie' and 'The Duke' as the ships became known. The fact the carriers had a decent L-band Type 1025 long-range radar helped matters.
The 'Ark' helped to stamp on Saddam's toys in '91 and did well against the Serb air defences in '95.

Oh, and the RN bought AEGIS in 1981 for its Type 44 destroyers and once the carriers were linked into the AEGIS system with the new Osprey Mk.4s in the early 1990s the RN had the most powerful naval air defence outside of the USN.

By 2000 the Blair government had committed to two new replacements, the CVF programme resulting in the 80,000-ton QE2 and PoW commissioning in the 2010s to replace the highly successful CVSes.
They get F-35Cs and E-3Ds - the all US air wing a sad reflection on how things have gone for the air industry but the bigger carriers can handle the CTOL types.
 
There is another spin off - during the negotiations the RN accepts Healey's (and the Treasury's) 35,000-ton carrier compromise (not so crazy when you consider CVA-01 was pushing the limits of shipbuilding capability and none of the yards were that keen on actually building it given the likely cost overruns and lack of profit).

This means a redesign, but its possible it may have been ordered by 1970, before Heath's government comes into power.

The Maritime Role Carrier, it wasn't Healey's idea. Ed Hampshire is a big advocate, I understand why, Healey would have accepted it and it could have solved the immediate issue of cost by getting a naval programme within the then proposed financial constraints. The Navy came up with a 40,000 ton concept that would have carried 12 Phantoms and 8 Buccaneers, but it didn't work out much cheaper than CVA-01.

However, the resultant small ship with a small air wing would have been an easy target for RAF lobbying. Come the need for further cuts in 1968 its easy to see a large cost item in the forward programme coming under sustained RAF attack for not being cost effective compared to land based aircraft in the maritime role, resulting in its cancellation.
 
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Does 35,000 tons impact on length and cats? If you just have F4s then AFVG and no Buc 2s.. Then add some Tracers off the shelf and you have a cut price carrier.
Even in 1968 RAF would have hard job claiming its Phantoms and Lightnings could protect RN ships in the N Atlantic better than F4s on a new carrier.
 
No Civil Lord cane up with 40,000ton CV with 24 Fast Jet airwing. Initially Sea Vixen and Buccaneer, to be succeeded by P.1154.

The 42,000ton comparing study was 18 OR.346 or 32 Buccaneer sized aircraft.

Does 35,000 tons impact on length and cats?
Well Victorious in tonnage, so there is nothing stopping a new design from having a 151ft at the bow and a 199ft at the waist and rated for aircraft upto 60,000lb.
 
Well Victorious in tonnage, so there is nothing stopping a new design from having a 151ft at the bow and a 199ft at the waist and rated for aircraft upto 60,000lb.

In the mid 1950s DNC thought that a 35,000 ton ship would have a maximum take-off weight limitation of 40,000lbs if a balanced design was to be maintained. Only by sacrificing other features such as ship armament, protection, speed and endurance could higher take-off weights be attained. Things would have moved on, but not dramatically, in the following decade. A 1950s 35,000 ton CV concept from DNC is attached, note the "or longer" for the waist catapult.

RN 1950s 35k CV.png
 
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In the mid 1950s DNC thought that a 35,000 ton ship would have a maximum take-off weight limitation of 40,000lbs if a balanced design was to be maintained. Only by sacrificing other features such as ship armament, protection, speed and endurance could higher take-off weights be attained. Things would have moved on, but dramatically, in the following decade. A 1950s 35,000 ton CV concept is attached, note the "or longer" for the waist catapult.

View attachment 757467
Ok first many thanks for your contribution and sharing that picture.

Second where did you get that picture!!!???
 
In the mid 1950s DNC thought that a 35,000 ton ship would have a maximum take-off weight limitation of 40,000lbs if a balanced design was to be maintained. Only by sacrificing other features such as ship armament, protection, speed and endurance could higher take-off weights be attained. Things would have moved on, but not dramatically, in the following decade. A 1950s 35,000 ton CV concept from DNC is attached, note the "or longer" for the waist catapult.

View attachment 757467
I think that a longer Cat can put in the other side. Like the Ark. her instalation do not interferes with the lift.
the waist said 151. So 2 x 151 or 1x 199 and 151
RN 1950s 35k CV.png
 
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The Maritime Role Carrier, it wasn't Healey's idea. Ed Hampshire is a big advocate, I understand why, Healey would have accepted it and it could have solved the immediate issue of cost by getting a naval programme within the then proposed financial constraints. The Navy came up with a 40,000 ton concept that would have carried 12 Phantoms and 8 Buccaneers, but it didn't work out much cheaper than CVA-01.

However, the resultant small ship with a small air wing would have been an easy target for RAF lobbying. Come the need for further cuts in 1968 its easy to see a large cost item in the forward programme coming under sustained RAF attack for not being cost effective compared to land based aircraft in the maritime role, resulting in its cancellation.
No, not Healey's idea but he allowed it to be offered and didn't crush the idea and he was running the show.

I think it could have lived - it would have meant the death of the CCH/CAH/CVS/CVSG - call it what you will - but having a commitment to it might have protected it. It wouldn't be much cheaper but it might have prevented some of the bloat in CVA-01 and ultimately we can't say how much CVA-01 would have cost over its estimates.

It would have been less impressive than CVA-01 in terms of capabilities but by the time these ships would have completed in the mid to late 1970s it would have mattered far less given the other V/STOL options open by then. And yes I can imagine it would grow to something like 40,000 tons - the Command Cruiser underwent a similar metamorphis.
 
I think it could have lived - it would have meant the death of the CCH/CAH/CVS/CVSG - call it what you will - but having a commitment to it might have protected it. It wouldn't be much cheaper but it might have prevented some of the bloat in CVA-01 and ultimately we can't say how much CVA-01 would have cost over its estimates.

It would have been less impressive than CVA-01 in terms of capabilities but by the time these ships would have completed in the mid to late 1970s it would have mattered far less given the other V/STOL options open by then. And yes I can imagine it would grow to something like 40,000 tons - the Command Cruiser underwent a similar metamorphis.

I was too subtle in my previous post, it would not have stood a chance. It would have required a completely new detailed design and I don't see how it could have been ordered prior to 1968. For both Healey and Mayhew the Maritime Role Carrier was still an East of Suez ship, it would have been cancelled in 1968 when the decision was made to withdraw from East of Suez and wind down the carrier fleet immediately.
 
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Bear with me while I draw a long bow, from things I read ages ago and have just remembered.
  1. The loss of Suez was a massive shock to Britain, it caused major problems with Defence policy and procurement.
  2. Suez failed because it took too long to mount, world opinion turned on Britain etc because the shock had died down and the canal was working.
  3. Musketeer took too long because Britain only had a single carrier in commission at home, it took months to get 3 available.
  4. There was only a single carrier available in 1956 because the 1948 Defence strategy focused on escorts to defend against the Soviet sub threat.
The counter to this is Britain selects carrier strike warfare to deal with the Soviets in 1948-49. The 1953 global strategy paper is released, the RN is well placed to quickly meet the new requirements. In 1956 3 carriers are off Egypt within a month, and the canal is seized within 5 weeks with little international opposition, no run on the pound etc. Britain enters the late 50s full of confidence, with countries in the Mid East and elsewhere clamouring to buy its kit and be its ally. The 1957 Defence White Paper is a measured document, incorporating the lessons of Korea and Suez while reflecting the financial realities of the day and includes a carrier replacement programme to begin at short notice.
 
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