Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining carrier based air power?

Okay, bringing this back because I just got a copy of David Hobbs' The British Carrier Strike Fleet after 1945, and while it's definitely biased to hell and back it still has some good information. And overall I think I have something that can work within the political drivers of the 1950s RN.

So one thing that became very clear to me in reading Hobbs and refreshing my information from my Friedman books on the same period is that 1954 is the pivot point for all of this. It's where politics, will, and economics converge to make new carrier construction viable, and we pretty much all agree that new carrier construction is a must for the subject. Anything before runs into the weakness of the British economy and British conceptions of the next war. After, well, that's a subject that's been litigated to death at this point.

1954, meanwhile, is:
- The point at which the plans of the late 1940s assumed the economy would be in good enough shape to resume new construction
- The new "Year of Maximum Danger" during Korea, when it looked like WW3 was imminent
- The year the prior two plans were discarded after the Korea experience, replacing the "imminent World War 3" force structure with the "warm war Korea 2.0" force structure
- When the medium carrier studies were done
- After the rock fight in 1953 the RN went through to keep the carriers in the first place

So you have a new strategic doctrine that better emphasizes the value of carriers, all sorts of momentum towards resuming new construction from prior plans (and, notably, the wartime stocks almost entirely in the water now), a design in hand, and a short-term force structure that actually needs such a ship.

The 1954 Radical Review set a 6-carrier fleet: three fleet carriers (Eagle, Ark Royal, Victorious) and three light carriers (Centaur, Albion, Bulwark). The obvious candidates for replacement in this lineup are the Centaurs - Centaur is stuck in an axial-deck configuration while all three still have hydraulic catapults. And without the modifications done during construction on Hermes there isn't really any way to bring them up to Hermes standard. They need to be replaced, and they did excellent work as commando carriers so it's not like their young age is an impediment when other work can be found for them. The 35,000 medium carrier is a good fit for replacing them as fixed-wing carriers.

So you get, ideally two, laid down ASAP, the first completes in 1962, and when the decision to draw down the carrier fleet comes you have one and if you're lucky two brand-new ships you can point to for maintaining the carrier fleet without the expensive of beat-up WW2 ships or buying four CVA-01s.

Now, this part I've known for a while, but the fly in the ointment is the 1957 Sandys Review, which pared down the carrier fleet to four ships[sup]1[/sup]. A fleet of Eagle, Ark Royal, Hermes, and Victorious is, in 1957, all less than ten years old and aside from Eagle not terribly deficient as carriers. There's not really any room for new carriers before the 70s in that force structure.

However, I think I've come up with a point of divergence to keep this going, and surprise surprise it's Victorious, the RN alt-history community's favorite white whale.

Anything to do with Victorious has to circle back to why she was rebuilt in the first place, and I don't think I've seen a really detailed explanation on this site yet[sup]2[/sup]. Remember that 1948 strategic plan, the source for the whole "the year of maximum danger is 1957" thing? Yeah, that's where this originated. It's often forgotten that the rebuild was authorized all the way back then and design work done over the next two years. Given the angled flight deck was not conceived of until 1951, I have to assume the rebuild was initially designed for an axial-deck configuration. And we know that the Royal Navy piled on additional changes beyond just the headline machinery replacement during the rebuild, that's why it ballooned out of control like it did.

The POD I have in mind is that someone with enough pull decides, during the design process for the rebuild, that "We need these carriers rebuilt by 1957 and we can't do that if Victorious takes too long. Freeze the design, no changes during construction, if it's a less capable ship so be it".

So instead of the OTL boondoggle, Victorious comes out of drydock in late 1953 or early 1954, not too horribly overbudget but also in a SCB-27C-style axial-deck configuration with her original hull lines and machinery, steam catapults, and no Type 984. By then it's clear that the layout is obsolete and that her aging hull and machinery won't last terribly long into the 1960s. And so one of the medium carriers goes through, paid for by not having to spend all that extra money on Victorious. She enters service in 1962, and sticks around for a while because being new she significantly reduces the pressure on the RN to build new ships ASAP.

I also have dreams of a second ship being funded by screwing over the escort cruiser program, and by extension the Tigers - Hobbs makes an IMO credible argument that they're a big reason the carrier fleet got shafted, for all the same reasons the USN was vociferously opposed to the SCS. The basic idea is that moving the ASW helicopters to the escort cruisers in the first place was a mistake, since it was expensive extra construction for capabilities that the carriers could replicate with minimal impact on their air wings. And, well, the escort cruiser did wind up replacing the carriers as the Invincibles. Still, this part of things is pretty half-baked.

  1. People have cited five in the past here, but four is what's in all the secondary sources I have and digging into it I have to agree with four. Centaur was not long for this world after Eagle's rebuild even without the 1966 decision; she was only modernized at all to keep four carriers active while Eagle was rebuilt.
  2. I could also be completely forgetting.
 
Scott Kenny said:
@CV12Hornet , I dig it, but I'm somewhat concerned that even 35kton carriers are too small for 1960s jets.
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It's been claimed earlier that the ships would've been able to handle Phantoms, and the 42,000-ton medium carrier, which would likely be mostly wider to get the extra mass, would've been able to operate OR.346 aircraft.

The air wing isn't going to be very big, but they can handle 60s jets.

Plus, if you're lucky you can parlay the extra momentum into a CVA-01 - and if you're unlucky Eagle is still viable to the 80s.
 
CV12Hornet said:
It's been claimed earlier that the ships would've been able to handle Phantoms, and the 42,000-ton medium carrier, which would likely be mostly wider to get the extra mass, would've been able to operate OR.346 aircraft.

The air wing isn't going to be very big, but they can handle 60s jets.

Plus, if you're lucky you can parlay the extra momentum into a CVA-01 - and if you're unlucky Eagle is still viable to the 80s.
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Are we talking the heavily modified F-4K/Ms or bog standard F-4s?
 
CV12Hornet
I can certainly agree '54 is sort of a key year. Arguably '54 to '55.
It's also around this time there was the call for new 30" diameter jet engines and sadly DH Gyron Junior won that for cost reasons.
It was the period of N/A.39 (Buccaneer) selection.
And I'll have to check but it could be relevant to crucial F.177.
I know it's the period of NA.38 (Type 556 the FAW Scimitar variant).
I dimly reccal it's relevant in the DH.110 process to become Sea Vixen (and was the original ISD I think).
 
The best case for the RN would have been entering 1960 with four Eagle sized carriers.
This would have made it less urgent to build new ships so more work could have been done before CV01 was ordered in 1970.
With the withdrawal from East of Suez the situation becomes more straightforward. The two older ships are sold to Australia and India.
Phantom enters service with one operational and one OCU sqn. Eagle alternates with a sistership until CV01 is ready in 1978. CV02 is ordered in 1974 and joins the fleet in 1982. The lead ship is Queen Elizabeth and the second Duke of Edinburgh.
The 1981 Nott review considers selling the newly completed D of E to Australia but she is mothballed instead.
Queen Elizabeth and her airgroup leave Portsmouth after the Argentine invasion. D of E is undergoing trials with OCU aircraft and joins her sistership in May.
Buccaneer strikes from QE on Port Stanley airport with Martels succeed in neutralising the air defences. Durandals supplied by France en route are used to put the runway out of commission.
The 80s see the new carrier DoE in service more often than QE which tends to be the reserve carrier. By 1991 both ships are due for replacement when the Gulf War starts.
Only one ship is deployed (QE) as DoE's final refit has been delayed by questions about the role of the RN post 1989.
CV01 and 02 are much simpler ships than CVA01. They have the same radar fit as the real life Invincible CVS. As with Ark Royal no Seacat launchers get fitted. If they have gas turbines rarher than steam they will use steam aux to power the cats.
At least one ship survives into the 90s with its Phantoms and Buccaneers replaced by F18s.
After inertia under the Major government, the John Smith government in 1997 orders two new carriers to be built in Scotland.
 
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uk 75 said:
The best case for the RN would have been entering 1960 with four Eagle sized carriers.
This would have made it less urgent to build new ships so more work could have been done before CV01 was ordered in 1970.
With the withdrawal from East of Suez the situation becomes more straightforward. The two older ships are sold to Australia and India.
Phantom enters service with one operational and one OCU sqn. Eagle alternates with a sistership until CV01 is ready in 1978. CV02 is ordered in 1974 and joins the fleet in 1982. The lead ship is Queen Elizabeth and the second Duke of Edinburgh.
The 1981 Nott review considers selling the newly completed D of E to Australia but she is mothballed instead.
Queen Elizabeth and her airgroup leave Portsmouth after the Argentine invasion. D of E is undergoing trials with OCU aircraft and joins her sistership in May.
Buccaneer strikes from QE on Port Stanley airport with Martels succeed in neutralising the air defences. Durandals supplied by France en route are used to put the runway out of commission.
The 80s see the new carrier DoE in service more often than QE which tends to be the reserve carrier. By 1991 both ships are due for replacement when the Gulf War starts.
Only one ship is deployed (QE) as DoE's final refit has been delayed by questions about the role of the RN post 1989.
CV01 and 02 are much simpler ships than CVA01. They have the same radar fit as the real life Invincible CVS. As with Ark Royal no Seacat launchers get fitted. If they have gas turbines rarher than steam they will use steam aux to power the cats.
At least one ship survives into the 90s with its Phantoms and Buccaneers replaced by F18s.
After inertia under the Major government, the John Smith government in 1997 orders two new carriers to be built in Scotland.
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That would do interesting things to the Tornado purchase... Might even knock the UK out of Tornado entirely.
 
Britain did quite a bit toward maintaining its strike carrier capability as late as the 60s.


· Rebuilt the HMS Eagle to almost Phantom standard

· Bought fleet of Buccaneer S2

· Bought fleet of Spey Phantoms

· Ordered 3.5m worth of long-lead items for CVA01

· Rebuilt Ark Royal for Phantoms



The way I see it they were very close to maintaining a strike carrier fleet for a lot longer, it shouldn’t have taken fundamental changes to get them over the line.
 
Rule of cool said:
Britain did quite a bit toward maintaining its strike carrier capability as late as the 60s.


· Rebuilt the HMS Eagle to almost Phantom standard

· Bought fleet of Buccaneer S2

· Bought fleet of Spey Phantoms

· Ordered 3.5m worth of long-lead items for CVA01

· Rebuilt Ark Royal for Phantoms



The way I see it they were very close to maintaining a strike carrier fleet for a lot longer, it shouldn’t have taken fundamental changes to get them over the line.
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I obviously disagree, otherwise I would not have gone into detail in my timeline.
To be specific:
None of the 1960 big four (Eagle, Ark, Victorious and Hermes) were like my 4 Eagle sized ships.
CVA01 had to be joined by CVA02 as only Eagle/Ark Royal could be made Phantom capable for the 70s.
A later, simpler CVA01 and 02 are better value than the Invincible CVS but can only get built if we start in 1960 with four decent carriers, as my narrative explains.
In short Hermes and Victorious were a dead loss and only one working ship could be got out of Ark Royal and Eagle.
 
Recently I learned that a four Audacious class had been re-ordered as a Malta. Whatever the Audacious flaws, they were still better than non-existing Maltas, 1952 carriers or CVA-01. And just big enough for Phantoms if rebuilt the right way. Unlike all the other carrier classes - Illustrious, Centaurs, Colossus / Majestic.

Henceforth, I think - with perfect 20 / 20 hindsight - that a 4 x Audacious scenario is the best the RN can hope for: if all of OTL economic hardships still hit Great Britain.

So I'd like to ask : what could be sacrificed, late in WWII, to get two more Audacious class ? What would YOU sacrifice ?
1-Cruisers / battleships (Tiger / Vanguard) ?
2-Some Illustrious carriers ?
3-Some Centaur carriers ?
4-Some Colossus-Majestic ?
 
Well, Eagle (the real Eagle, not the renamed Audacious) was 23% complete when she was cancelled in January 1944.
Had the order for Africa not been transferred to the Malta-class, it's possible Fairfield might have been able to lay the keel in late 1944 once Theseus was launched (6 July 1944), so let's say in September-October. By the end of the war very little work would have been done on her (in contrast Eagle had been laid down in April 1944). But it might not have been a killer blow when you consider that Bulwark wasn't laid down until 10 May 1945 and was still completed.

So yes, if the Malta's had been deferred and the second pair of Audacious not been cancelled, its possible that all four could have been completed, probably Audacious first (Eagle as historical) with Ark Royal, Eagle and Africa forming the mid-50s improved sub-group with angled decks. It's possibly being the youngest ship that Africa completed as an 'A' Type carrier circa 1957 with Type 984 etc. taking resources that were spent on Victorious but probably saving money in the process.

It might mean Hermes was not rebuilt to the same extent, certainly with four Fleet carriers and four Light Fleets the carrier force would be very expensive, likely as not two or three of the Centaurs become Commando Carriers with one sold off. Defence cuts of the 60s are probably unavoidable but with lucky throw of the dice, a couple of the Audacious might survive into the late 1970s.
Dare I say given the likely retirement dates that CVA-01 doesn't happen, having been aimed for the mid-70s to replace Audacious, so is cancelled in 1966 while existing as a purely paper exercise as the lay down date would not have been until 1970-71.
 
Certainly 4 Audacious carriers entering service through the 50's is a significant relief on the need to modernise the Illustrious variations, fund the Centaurs, and would obviously take up the cash spent on those enterprises. As it might Hermes obviously.

There'd be a short period of new large carrier exploration for the Canberra-like naval bomber....until N/A.39 is resolved for the future, in '54 and Scimitar is adopted as the interim measure.

This means the next generation would effectively become just a series of technology projects, through the late 50's and early 60’s. Likely the scale up of the new steam plant at PAMETRADA (spelling check soon), as well as catapults and arrestor gear elsewhere......And of course resolving the drydock issue.

New carriers would be desired once '57 hits and the size of the multirole next generation aircraft hits their desks....so CVA-01 would happen as studies as per history.

But this can be put off in place of cheaper upgrading of the Audacious fleet.....Ark Royal needing a lot of work from '63.

However.....if that drydock is built, a major roadblock on new large carriers has been removed. Arguably such a secure military facility could be justified as providing somewhere USN carriers could securely drydock in Europe.

Just as the French did with theirs.
 
Had the order for Africa not been transferred to the Malta-class, it's possible Fairfield might have been able to lay the keel in late 1944 once Theseus was launched (6 July 1944), so let's say in September-October. By the end of the war very little work would have been done on her (in contrast Eagle had been laid down in April 1944). But it might not have been a killer blow when you consider that Bulwark wasn't laid down until 10 May 1945 and was still completed.
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Theseus was one of the 16 Colossus / Majestic no ? how about cancelling it to make room for that Audacious, earlier in time ?

@zen You hit the nail on the head. Very much what I thought: screw Hermes and Victorious massive rebuilds, pass the money to the additional Audacious.

Next question is, by carefully managing those four Audacious, can that fleet useful lifetime been stretched into the 1980's ?
Eagle could have made it OTL, unlike Ark Royal.
There is a silver lining there: whatever carrier can handle Phantoms, can easily handle Hornets.
[Unfortunately for France and the Clems, that rule doesn't work for Crusaders (and even less when Dassault anti- Hornet lobbying effort has one foot planted on the Right - PM Chirac - and the other on the left - President Mitterrand)]
 
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Archibald said:
Theseus was one of the 16 Colossus / Majestic no ? how about cancelling it to make room for that Audacious, earlier in time ?
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Theseus was laid down on 6 January 1943 after Implacable left the slip in December 1942. Africa's order was 12 July 1943. The other three were all ordered March-August 1942, so I suppose there is nothing against swapping the orders and assigning Africa to lay down in January 1943 instead. That would make her the second ship of the class to lay down and would have been launch ready in early 1946.

So in theory, on this basis Audacious and Africa could be completed circa 1950 as axial deck ships with Eagle and Ark Royal as the angled deck ships in 1955-56.
 
What would be easier to update - an Audacious design hull or a Malta design hull?
 
Hood said:
Well, Eagle (the real Eagle, not the renamed Audacious) was 23% complete when she was cancelled in January 1944.
Had the order for Africa not been transferred to the Malta-class, it's possible Fairfield might have been able to lay the keel in late 1944 once Theseus was launched (6 July 1944), so let's say in September-October. By the end of the war very little work would have been done on her (in contrast Eagle had been laid down in April 1944). But it might not have been a killer blow when you consider that Bulwark wasn't laid down until 10 May 1945 and was still completed.

So yes, if the Malta's had been deferred and the second pair of Audacious not been cancelled, its possible that all four could have been completed, probably Audacious first (Eagle as historical) with Ark Royal, Eagle and Africa forming the mid-50s improved sub-group with angled decks. It's possibly being the youngest ship that Africa completed as an 'A' Type carrier circa 1957 with Type 984 etc. taking resources that were spent on Victorious but probably saving money in the process.

It might mean Hermes was not rebuilt to the same extent, certainly with four Fleet carriers and four Light Fleets the carrier force would be very expensive, likely as not two or three of the Centaurs become Commando Carriers with one sold off. Defence cuts of the 60s are probably unavoidable but with lucky throw of the dice, a couple of the Audacious might survive into the late 1970s.
Dare I say given the likely retirement dates that CVA-01 doesn't happen, having been aimed for the mid-70s to replace Audacious, so is cancelled in 1966 while existing as a purely paper exercise as the lay down date would not have been until 1970-71.
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A few years back I tried to look at what Fairfield were building, on what slip and when. The longest, slip 1, was 900+ft long. Slip 1 was the one that the Admiral class, Rodney was laid down on in WW1 and on which the Howe was built in WW2. That was the slip that the company demonstrated to the Admiralty that they could build a Malta on in its original armoured carrier, stretched Audacious design from 1943/44, but only after they carried out some realignment work on it.


The next longest, slip 2 was 750+ ft long. Slip 2 was used for Implacable then Theseus.

The remaining 4 were under 650ft. This seems to have been the waterline length of ships able to be accomodated.

The problem however with using either of these slips is that they never lay empty for long. There were other programmes competing for the shipyard space. Programmes that were considered vital for the war effort. If you accelerate the laying down of Africa you disrupt something else. What sacrifices do you make?

Slip 1
After Howe was launched from slip 1 in April 1940, it was turned over to buiding destroyers, sloops and then LST(3), two at a time, side by side. At the beginning of 1944 Camperdown & Finissterre (from 1942 programme) were under construction, followed by LST 3037 & 3038 from July 1944, to be followed more Battles. Those vessels filled the slip through to Oct 1945.

Slip 2
After the launch of Implacable in Dec 1942, Theseus was laid down in Jan 1943 and launched in July 1944. She was followed by LST 3039 & 3040 from Oct 1944 which occupied the slip until mid-late 1945.

Destroyers
Fairfield was a big destroyer builder. It was only bigger yards like Fairfield that could build Battles. Fairfield got orders for 5 Battles in 1942, all of which completed between June 1945 & Dec 1946. That was followed by another 4 in 1943, 3 of which were laid down in WW2 but all of which were cancelled in Oct 1945.

LST(3)
This was given a high priority when the ships were ordered between Dec 1943 and Feb 1944. They were required for Far East campaigns in 1945. They were ordered because it was clear that no more Lend Lease LST(2) would be made available after Aug 1943. As it turned out the USN was persuaded to turn over another 35 between Oct & Dec 1944 that had already seen service in European and Med waters, but that could not have been predicted in 1943. 28 of the 45 ordered in Britain had to be built in the big naval shipyards because the merchant yards didn't have the capacity. In Nov 1944 these were being allocated Priority One status.

Monmouth & Bulwark
Back in 1943 it was Monmouth ordered from Fairfield that was one of the 4 Centaur class whose construction was chosen to proceed. By July 1944 it was to proceed slowly for completion around 1949. In early 1945 the yard had so much work in hand that little work had been done in relation to her other than gathering some materials. So the decision was made to suspend Monmouth and order H&W Belfast to proceed with Bulwark. Materials gathered at Fairfield were transferred to Belfast to speed construction of Bulwark. She was laid down in May 1945 on the slip Powerful had been launched from in Feb.

Digging into the shipbuilding programmes in Britain is enlightening. New ships required and ordered. Priorities change frequently. Shortages of labour. Strikes. MOve one pice on the chessboard and others have to move around it to keep things moving forward.

Fairfield was always at capacity. At one point around 1941 it supposedly had an order book at least the size of John Brown just downriver, but only half the workforce. Two of the R class destroyer orders had to be transferred to JB just for them to be able to be progressed. If you want a fourth Audacious started in WW2 I think you need to look at an alternative yard, but that won't be easy. Remember the original Eagle was initially to be built by Swan Hunter, but the contract had to be transferred to Vickers (Tyne) when the beam was increased in late 1942 to accomodate the increase in hangar height. It then was too wide to fit between the cranes on the SH slip.
 
Many thanks EwanS, that's the kind of detail I was lacking. I assumed Implacable and Theseus had used the same slip and that Africa (as an Audacious) would have too. The Malta-class Africa probably would have been too much for the yard given it was that hard pressed.

I think its clear that the carrier programme was maxing out the shipbuilding industry. I suspect none of the Maltas would ever have been built - even if the design had been nearer to completion - given that the war would never last long enough to justify laying the ships down. It would probably have been 1948 at least before they could have been laid down in wartime conditions and no way would WW2 have lasted that long.
 
Hood said:
Theseus was laid down on 6 January 1943 after Implacable left the slip in December 1942. Africa's order was 12 July 1943. The other three were all ordered March-August 1942, so I suppose there is nothing against swapping the orders and assigning Africa to lay down in January 1943 instead. That would make her the second ship of the class to lay down and would have been launch ready in early 1946.

So in theory, on this basis Audacious and Africa could be completed circa 1950 as axial deck ships with Eagle and Ark Royal as the angled deck ships in 1955-56.
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But remember how the original 3 Audacious came about.

Irrisitible started life as the modified Implacable in the 1940 Supplementary Programme. Due to other pressing priorities it couldn't be laid down and the design underwent constant revision. It was finally ordered in March 1942 named Ark Royal IV. Then, after Audacious & the original Eagle were ordered as part of the planned 2 fleet carrier 1942 Programme (ordered May & Aug 1942), it was decided that Ark Royal should be built, not as intended as a much modified Implacable, but as a third Audacious class instead.

Africa was always part of the 1943 4 fleet carrier Programme . The Memo to Cabinet on this Programme wasn't made until 26 March 1943. In it the First Lord pointed out in his second paragraph, that "the industrial capacity of this country in certain vital aspects which affect shipbuilding is now so fully occupied that production must be planned far ahead if ships are not to be delayed for such items as turbine castings and heavy forgings. Thus some of the heavy ships for which I seek approval will not be laid down until the next financial year, but must be ordered this if the components are to be ready to time. The Treasury have authorised the placing of such orders as have been necessary to secure continuous and economical use of the production facilities available."

When the order was placed with Fairfield, the company directors minuted it as an order for a "fleet carrier" of a type unspecified. The orders placed in July 1943 for 4 fleet carriers were little more than placeholders for the yards pending a design being drawn up for the Malta class or a decision made about whether Fairfield could physically build one. It was standard practice for a yard to demonstrate that they could build any ship being ordered. That proof, for the original Malta class, was something that they supplied to the Admiralty in mid-late 1943 or early 1944.

So no, I don't see how Africa could have been laid down as an Audacious in Jan 1943 when it wasn't even part of Admiralty planning at that point.
 
EwenS said:
Digging into the shipbuilding programmes in Britain is enlightening. New ships required and ordered. Priorities change frequently. Shortages of labour. Strikes. MOve one pice on the chessboard and others have to move around it to keep things moving forward.
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In the middle of a war?!?

Pretty sure that would have resulted in charges of straight up Treason in the US, even with the extremely restrictive US definition.
 
The years 1945-48 are basically a write-off for long-term planning, which began again in 1948 or 49. IIRC (from David Hobbs' The British Carrier Strike Fleet after 1945 ?) that the threat was Soviet subs and the British had 2 options. A defensive strategy like the Battle of the Atlantic with convoy escorts and light carriers (instead of cruisers) for trade protection, or an offensive strategy like the BPF in the Pacific from 1944, going after Soviet subs in their home bases with carrier strike forces.

IIUC they chose the former, so put their meagre resources into convoy escorts and trade protection light carriers that could also cover global commitments. Then after the release of the Global Strategy Paper in 1953 the RN began to pivot toward a strategy using fleet carriers, hence the 1954 plan to have 6 carriers.

I suspect the RN would have been better served in the longer term if they had chosen the offensive strategy and prioritised offensive forces, even if it was the 'wrong' decision for 1948-53. It would focus on building up 'fleet' assets, as building a fleet is a peacetime task, escorts can be churned out in numbers during the war itself.

I don't know what ships could be worked on in this period, but it does seem from a carrier perspective that these 5 years were 'wasted'.
 
There could be interesting consequences to adopting that path from '49.
A number of aircraft proposals date back to between '49 and '51 that seem better suited to such a path.
 
On numerous occasions the British have been ahead of the others in the use of naval innovations, they were the first to naval land-based fighters such as the Hurricane and the Spitfire, the first to use Corsair fighters from aircraft carriers, the first to carry out experiments with flexible decks and aircraft without landing gear, the first to build aircraft carriers with oblique decks... If at one point in their naval history they decided to do without aircraft carriers, I would follow their lead.
 
It's arguable that Malta slots at various yards could have been retasked to build Audaciouses. Once the Audacious design was finalised and in build, dropping Malta as per history and just switching to another Audacious seems quite plausible.

People do need to be reminded that outside of shafts, props, gearboxes and steam plant, nothing of Malta continued after it was cancelled.

The problem is such a decision is hitting the needs of new carriers increasingly visible by 1945. Which is why although Malta is dropped, the idea of new larger carriers is not and resurfaces in '47.

Which takes us back to the choice in AH.
Either pre-war a military drydock in the UK over 1000ft by 130ft making such carriers practical OR...during WWII to accept Davenport No.10 limitations and design Scheme Y or later Davenport limited carriers.

The thing is, we don't need to actually have Malta types built during or postwar in if such a drydock exists. Because it permits the 1952 and the CVA-01 schemes to get upto the sort of sizes needed without such compromises or innovations.
 
zen said:
It's arguable that Malta slots at various yards could have been retasked to build Audaciouses. Once the Audacious design was finalised and in build, dropping Malta as per history and just switching to another Audacious seems quite plausible.

People do need to be reminded that outside of shafts, props, gearboxes and steam plant, nothing of Malta continued after it was cancelled.

The problem is such a decision is hitting the needs of new carriers increasingly visible by 1945. Which is why although Malta is dropped, the idea of new larger carriers is not and resurfaces in '47.

Which takes us back to the choice in AH.
Either pre-war a military drydock in the UK over 1000ft by 130ft making such carriers practical OR...during WWII to accept Davenport No.10 limitations and design Scheme Y or later Davenport limited carriers.

The thing is, we don't need to actually have Malta types built during or postwar in if such a drydock exists. Because it permits the 1952 and the CVA-01 schemes to get upto the sort of sizes needed without such compromises or innovations.
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While switching from building one design to another may not be that difficult, again you need to be careful about the workloads in the various yards allocated contracts for Maltas before they can even begin to consider building more Audacious class.

Gibraltar - Vickers Tyne
Malta - John Brown
New Zealand - Cammell Laird but transferred to H&W Belfast on 22 July 1944
Africa - Fairfield

In mid-1944 it was planned to lay down Malta at JB in late 1944. Again the yard only had 2 slips capable of taking either an Audacious or a Malta. Late 1944 coincided with the launch of the Priority 1 Vanguard from their slip 3 (30 Nov 1944). Slip 4 on which the RMS Queen Elizabeth was built was longer. But then the availibility of labour needs taken into account. The yard had about 4,000 workers in 1944/45 (down from around 5,000 at its peak in 1941-43). Roughly 25% were engaged in building destroyers (virtually all on Battles by the end of 1944), with the next biggest chunk on the Vanguard (1-2,000 over the 1944/45 period due to its status) followed by the cruiser Bellerephon / Tiger. The deferment of the Malta was only predicted to save the labour of a few hundred by spring 1945. When the plan for these ships changed, the yard was probably happy that it never received an order for LST(3) (it had been considered) and that the Malta was then being deferred, given the priorities it faced

In mid-1944 it was expected that with the transfer of New Zealand to H&W then she might be laid down in April 1945, following the launch of Eagle. Of course the launch of Eagle was delayed to March 1946 (resources diverted to LST(3)? H&W had contracts for 8).

By mid-1944 the other pair were being deferred.
 
I've written this before and I'll say it again, which is that the angled flight deck is such an obvious idea, that I'm surprised that it was 1952 (IIRC) before someone had the "Eureka Moment" and thought of it.

If the trials had been done in 1948 on Warrior (instead of the flexible-deck trials) rather than in 1952 on Triumph then I think.
  • Eagle would have been completed in 1951 (as IOTL) with an interim angled flight deck.
  • Ark Royal would have been completed in 1955 (as IOTL) with a fully angled fight deck making her a Standard B ship instead of a Standard C ship. That might have knocked a few million Pounds off her Phantomisation refit.
    • As an aside what did Vickers (Barrow) do to preserve Hermes while she was suspended (that allowed her to serve well into the 2000s) that Cammell Laird didn't do to preserve Ark Royal while she was suspended?
  • Albion, Bulwark & Centaur might have been completed (1953-54 as IOTL) with an interim angled flight deck and deck edge lift.
    • That would have allowed Centaur to be fitted with a pair of 151ft stroke BS.4 steam catapults (instead of 139ft) in her 1956-58 refit. That would have made her a Standard B-Star ship instead of a Standard C ship or put another way the same standard as Hermes in 1959 less the AC electrical system, Type 984 radar, CDS & DPT. At least she'd be able to carry the same number of aircraft as Hermes.
    • Maybe it would have been worth refitting her the same standard as Hermes in 1959 ITTL.
    • However, I suspect that @EwenS will say 1948 was too late to fit Albion, Bulwark and Centaur with a deck edge lift à la Hermes.
  • Maybe Hermes would have been completed in 1955 as a Standard B-Star ship. But I suspect that she would still have been delayed until 1959 so she could be fitted with the Type 984 radar, CDS & DPT (as IOTL) making her a Standard A-Star ship.
  • The rebuild of Victorious would have included a fully angled flight deck from the start instead of being added in 1953 so she could be completed (as originally planned) in 1954 to Standard B. However, I think that (in common with OTL) her completion would still be delayed until 1958 so the Type 984 radar, CDS and DPT could be fitted.
    • For what it's worth Leo Marriott wrote in "Royal Navy Aircraft Carriers 1945-1990" that Victorious had to be reboilered because they were damaged by a fire while she was being rebuilt, rather than not realising that new boilers were required in the first place.
    • It's the only place where I've read that, but if it's true it means that had new boilers been fitted in the first place they'd have been damaged in the fire and requiring their replacement by "new" new boilers.
    • He also wrote that one of the reasons the refit took so long was a shortage of skilled labour at Portsmouth dockyard, which may also be a reason why some of the other major refits/rebuilds that were done there (such as Triumph's conversion to a heavy repair ship) took so long.
  • There would have been knock-on effects on the aircraft carriers being built/modernised for other navies too. For example.
    • All 15 Essex class that had SCB.27 refits would have had angled flight decks installed in concurrent SCB.125 refits instead of (IIRC) 3 SCB.125s that were concurrent with the SCB.27s, 11 (including one SCB.125A) that were after their SCB.27 and Lake Champlain whose SCB.125A refit was cancelled.
    • Maybe the Forrestal class, some or all of the SCB.125 Essex class and Clemenceau & Foch might have had their port deck edge lift moved aft so it didn't interfere with their angled flight decks.
The other one is to "wank" the development of the steam catapult. However, that's a lot harder to do because that requires putting more men and material on the job when Austerity Britain's limited scientific and industrial resources were (correctly) being concentrated on the export drive and rebuilding the country.

I'd love to be able to say that the steam catapult trials on Perseus were brought forward from 1951 IOTL to 1947 ITTL with the following results.
  • Eagle was completed in 1951 to Standard C or 1954 to Standard B.
  • Ark Royal was completed in 1952 (as planned when she was launched IOTL) to Standard C or 1955 to Standard B.
  • Albion, Bulwark & Centaur were completed 1953-54 to Standard B-Star
    • That would have at least avoided the need to fit Centaur with steam catapults 1956-58 so she may have been available to serve in the Suez War.
    • Except, that ITTL she might have been having a refit to bring her to Standard A-Star like Hermes.
    • However, as 1948 may be too late to include a deck edge lift (à la Hermes) they may be completed to Standard C.
  • The original plan ITTL would still have been to rebuild Victorious to Standard B (1950-54) and complete Hermes to Standard B-Star (in 1955) and then in 1953 be amended to complete them to Standard A and Standard A-Star respectively.
  • The 1951 Rearmament Programme was for 6 light fleet carriers.
    • They were initially Glory, Ocean, Theseus, Triumph, Vengeance & Warrior the 6 Colossus class that hadn't been completed as aircraft maintenance ships or sold to foreign navies.
    • Glory Ocean, Theseus, Triumph & Vengeance were to be paid off or relegated to second-line duties when Albion, Bulwark, Centaur & Hermes were completed.
    • Some of this plan came to fruition because Triumph became the cadet training ship, while Ocean & Theseus joined the Home Fleet Training Squadron 1953-54, which is when Albion, Bulwark & Centaur were completed.
    • I don't know, but suspect that the plan was that they'd embark some of the 12 RNVR (Air Branch) squadrons in wartime.
    • I don't know, but suspect that this was still the plan after the Radical Review cut the first-line aircraft carrier force from 12 aircraft carriers (6 fleet & 6 light fleet) plus some in second-line roles to 6 ships (3 fleet & 3 light fleet) plus some in second line roles.
    • ITTL the earlier invention of the angled flight deck and rapid development of steam catapults might mean that the plan at 1951 was to fit as many of the 6 Colossus class as possible with steam catapults and interim angled flight decks (i.e. the same standard as Melbourne) as possible by 1957.
    • However, as British industrial resources were still limited, they won't be available for conversion until the Centaurs are completed and the Radical Review of 1953-54 still happens.
    • Therefore, I think the best that happens is that Warrior (the only RN Colossus to get an interim angled flight deck IOTL) also receives a steam catapult in her OTL April 1952 to October 1953 refit or her OTL December 1954 to August 1956 refit. The latter was when she had her interim angled flight deck fitted IOTL, but she might have had one since 1948 ITTL because the POD is that the angled flight deck trials are done by her in 1948 instead of by Triumph in 1952. It depends upon how extensive the modifications for the TTL angled flight deck trials were.
  • Melbourne would have been completed a few years earlier, possibly as early as 1951 and if so Vengeance wouldn't have been lent to the RAN 1952-55.
  • Sydney (as was planned IOTL) might have been refitted to the same standard as Melbourne. In which case the RAN still has Vengeance 1952-55 while Sydney was refitting or depending upon when Bonaventure is completed (see below) they might get Magnificent instead.
  • Bonaventure might have been completed as early as 1953.
  • It doesn't automatically mean that the Dutch rebuild Karel Doorman 4 years earlier than IOTL. However, it may mean that the French are able to install a steam catapult on Arromanches which would enable her to operate the Aeronavles Aquilons which were licence built Sea Venoms.
  • All 15 Essex class refitted to SCB.27 standard would have been fitted with steam catapults as part of the refit instead of 6 as part of their SCB.27 refits and one (Oriskany) as part of her SCB.125A refit.
There are only two ways that I can think of doing it. The first is for the Austerity Era to be less austere, which can't be done with a POD of 1945, especially as the crucial period is 1945-47. The other is to transfer the project to the USN on VJ Day and obtain as many American built steam catapults as possible through MDAP.

Another thing that would have helped is to complete Albion, Ark Royal, Bulwark, Centaur and Eagle (along with the first 4 Darings) with AC instead of DC electrical systems. However, with a POD of 1945 that (along with wanking the development of the steam catapult) is probably a lot easier said than done.
 
NOMISYRRUC said:
I've written this before and I'll say it again, which is that the angled flight deck is such an obvious idea, that I'm surprised that it was 1952 (IIRC) before someone had the "Eureka Moment" and thought of it.
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It may seem obvious in hindsight but first there has to be a problem to solve to which the angled deck is the solution. You might ask the USN why in the early 1930s in their flight deck cruiser designs they didn't separate the landing and take off areas instead of just making the whole axial deck layout angle a few degrees to port so that all aircraft could miss the island to starboard. Until carrier aircraft had the prospect of becoming heavier and approaching faster there wasn't a problem with the axial deck. And it certainly wasn't some "Eureka moment". The key date was Oct 1951 but the problem had been under investigation before that.

The Naval Aircraft Dept at the RAE Farnborough had been looking into the problem of landing on aircraft with the prospect of ever increasing landing speeds and increased aircraft weights leading to longer pull out distances on the arrester gear being required, and leading to a reduction in the parking area forward. Various solutions had been examined without materially increasing the size of the carrier including:-
1. two decks, an upper one for landings and the lower for take-offs (shades of the inter-war carriers)
2. construction of a deck in a Z shape (one arm for landings and another for take-offs)

So in 1948 the flexible deck trials were being run on Warrior with Vampires at roughly 7,800lb, IAS 96-110 knots at touchdown (61 knots entry speed to the wire). But the operational aircraft being envisaged for operation off the flexible deck at this time was the Supermarine Type 505/508 with an empty weight of 12-14,000lb and by 1947 an estimated approach speed of 105 knots

The head of the NAD, Boddington, while working on the flexible deck concept suggested in a report in Oct 1951 that a "skew deck" with the landing area angled 7-8 degrees to port, leaving a wedge shaped area for parking, might be a solution. The problem was that aircraft landed on faster than they could be struck below resulting in a deck park forward, in an area that was set to shrink as aircraft grew heavier and needed a longer landing area. It was believed that this problem would get worse with a flexible deck (5 mins was thought to be the time to clear the flexible deck in the early days), hence his seeking a solution. (Rereading "Farnborough and the Fleet Air Arm" it seems that flexible deck trials at the RAE didn't end with the sea going Warrior trials in 1948. A larger shore based rig was set up by the RAE and further trials took place up to early 1955. The USN also set up a flexible deck in 1953). There was even a model of Illustrious at the RAE produced around Oct 1951 with a painted on angled deck .

In the summer of 1951 Capt Campbell & Boddington discussed the problem, with Campbell reportedly first proposing the angled deck idea on 7 Aug for general carrier use. Meanwhile he discussed it with visiting USN officers in Sept and briefed Eric Brown on it before he departed on an exchange tour as a test pilot at Pax River that month. From that led:-

1. Oct 1951 Campbell presented his paper "High Speed Aircraft - The Arresting Problem" to the Aeronautical Research Council
2. the approach trials to a painted deck on Triumph in Jan / Feb 1952 (deemed too small for touch and goes)
3. approach and touch and go trials on USS Midway in May 1952
4. Sept-Dec 1952 USS Antietam fitted with a portside sponson and realigned arrester gear for angled deck trials
5. May 1953 Antietam visits UK to demonstrate the angled deck.
6. Aug 1953 RN sought quote from builders to modify Albion with an angled deck before completion, delayed to May 1954.


NOMISYRRUC said:
If the trials had been done in 1948 on Warrior (instead of the flexible-deck trials) rather than in 1952 on Triumph then I think.
  • Eagle would have been completed in 1951 (as IOTL) with an interim angled flight deck.
  • Ark Royal would have been completed in 1955 (as IOTL) with a fully angled fight deck making her a Standard B ship instead of a Standard C ship. That might have knocked a few million Pounds off her Phantomisation refit.
    • As an aside what did Vickers (Barrow) do to preserve Hermes while she was suspended (that allowed her to serve well into the 2000s) that Cammell Laird didn't do to preserve Ark Royal while she was suspended?
  • Albion, Bulwark & Centaur might have been completed (1953-54 as IOTL) with an interim angled flight deck and deck edge lift.
    • That would have allowed Centaur to be fitted with a pair of 151ft stroke BS.4 steam catapults (instead of 139ft) in her 1956-58 refit. That would have made her a Standard B-Star ship instead of a Standard C ship or put another way the same standard as Hermes in 1959 less the AC electrical system, Type 984 radar, CDS & DPT. At least she'd be able to carry the same number of aircraft as Hermes.
    • Maybe it would have been worth refitting her the same standard as Hermes in 1959 ITTL.
    • However, I suspect that @EwenS will say 1948 was too late to fit Albion, Bulwark and Centaur with a deck edge lift à la Hermes.
  • Maybe Hermes would have been completed in 1955 as a Standard B-Star ship. But I suspect that she would still have been delayed until 1959 so she could be fitted with the Type 984 radar, CDS & DPT (as IOTL) making her a Standard A-Star ship.
  • The rebuild of Victorious would have included a fully angled flight deck from the start instead of being added in 1953 so she could be completed (as originally planned) in 1954 to Standard B. However, I think that (in common with OTL) her completion would still be delayed until 1958 so the Type 984 radar, CDS and DPT could be fitted.
    • For what it's worth Leo Marriott wrote in "Royal Navy Aircraft Carriers 1945-1990" that Victorious had to be reboilered because they were damaged by a fire while she was being rebuilt, rather than not realising that new boilers were required in the first place.
    • It's the only place where I've read that, but if it's true it means that had new boilers been fitted in the first place they'd have been damaged in the fire and requiring their replacement by "new" new boilers.
    • He also wrote that one of the reasons the refit took so long was a shortage of skilled labour at Portsmouth dockyard, which may also be a reason why some of the other major refits/rebuilds that were done there (such as Triumph's conversion to a heavy repair ship) took so long.
  • There would have been knock-on effects on the aircraft carriers being built/modernised for other navies too. For example.
    • All 15 Essex class that had SCB.27 refits would have had angled flight decks installed in concurrent SCB.125 refits instead of (IIRC) 3 SCB.125s that were concurrent with the SCB.27s, 11 (including one SCB.125A) that were after their SCB.27 and Lake Champlain whose SCB.125A refit was cancelled.
    • Maybe the Forrestal class, some or all of the SCB.125 Essex class and Clemenceau & Foch might have had their port deck edge lift moved aft so it didn't interfere with their angled flight decks.
The other one is to "wank" the development of the steam catapult. However, that's a lot harder to do because that requires putting more men and material on the job when Austerity Britain's limited scientific and industrial resources were (correctly) being concentrated on the export drive and rebuilding the country.
Click to expand...
The steam catapult depended on the slotted tube type launcher. While Colin Mitchell conceived this in 1936 and patented it in 1938 it lay there unconsidered until late 1944/45 when the RAE got its hands on the catapults used to launch the V-1s which used the same principles. Mitchell, who had worked at the NAD RAE in WW2 but by then back in civvy street, was given the task of developing a working steam catapult while the NAD RAE worked in parallel on the project.

One driver for the development of the slotted tube catapult in Britain was, yet again, the flexible deck ("Farnborough and the Fleet Air Arm" again). Undercarriageless aircraft would need a launching mechanism when ashore and with increasing aircraft weights something more powerful than existing hydraulic catapults was required. Note while everyone refers to a "steam catapult", the "slotted tube catapult" would work just as well with anything else that produced a propellant gas, for example cordite or the chemicals used by the Germans.

Along the development line there were a number of engineering challenges that needed to be overcome before a shipboard installation was made on HMS Perseus during 1949. Trials of it then began in July 1950 which lasted until March 1952. But it was Nov 1950 when it was decided to fit steam catapults in Ark Royal. Perseus spent Jan / Feb 1952 in the USA demonstrating it to the USN, who insisted Eric Brown undertook the first launch there.

In 1951 the USN decided it needed a more powerful catapult than the hydraulic H-8 fitted in the SCB-27A Essex class conversions. The plan for the SCB-27C conversions was to fit a single H-8 but also a slotted tube catapult powered by explosive powder. Development of that had been delayed due to various problems including stowage and protection of the charges in the forward end of the ship. When they saw the Perseus rig they adopted the steam powered catapult, buying 4 from Britain for installation in Hancock & Ticonderoga whose SCB-27C modernisations completed in may and Sept 1954.

So in theory we could have seen the steam catapult during WW2, but where is the need when existing hydraulic catapults are perfectly adequate. The need comes post-war with increasing aircraft weights. I don't know how much it could have been speeded up by throwing more men and material at the project.

And an obvious question. If the USN were developing a slotted tube type using explosive powder, why didn't they think of using steam until it was demonstrated to them on the Perseus?
NOMISYRRUC said:
I'd love to be able to say that the steam catapult trials on Perseus were brought forward from 1951 IOTL to 1947 ITTL with the following results.
  • Eagle was completed in 1951 to Standard C or 1954 to Standard B.
  • Ark Royal was completed in 1952 (as planned when she was launched IOTL) to Standard C or 1955 to Standard B.
  • Albion, Bulwark & Centaur were completed 1953-54 to Standard B-Star
    • That would have at least avoided the need to fit Centaur with steam catapults 1956-58 so she may have been available to serve in the Suez War.
    • Except, that ITTL she might have been having a refit to bring her to Standard A-Star like Hermes.
    • However, as 1948 may be too late to include a deck edge lift (à la Hermes) they may be completed to Standard C.
  • The original plan ITTL would still have been to rebuild Victorious to Standard B (1950-54) and complete Hermes to Standard B-Star (in 1955) and then in 1953 be amended to complete them to Standard A and Standard A-Star respectively.
  • The 1951 Rearmament Programme was for 6 light fleet carriers.
    • They were initially Glory, Ocean, Theseus, Triumph, Vengeance & Warrior the 6 Colossus class that hadn't been completed as aircraft maintenance ships or sold to foreign navies.
    • Glory Ocean, Theseus, Triumph & Vengeance were to be paid off or relegated to second-line duties when Albion, Bulwark, Centaur & Hermes were completed.
    • Some of this plan came to fruition because Triumph became the cadet training ship, while Ocean & Theseus joined the Home Fleet Training Squadron 1953-54, which is when Albion, Bulwark & Centaur were completed.
    • I don't know, but suspect that the plan was that they'd embark some of the 12 RNVR (Air Branch) squadrons in wartime.
    • I don't know, but suspect that this was still the plan after the Radical Review cut the first-line aircraft carrier force from 12 aircraft carriers (6 fleet & 6 light fleet) plus some in second-line roles to 6 ships (3 fleet & 3 light fleet) plus some in second line roles.
    • ITTL the earlier invention of the angled flight deck and rapid development of steam catapults might mean that the plan at 1951 was to fit as many of the 6 Colossus class as possible with steam catapults and interim angled flight decks (i.e. the same standard as Melbourne) as possible by 1957.
    • However, as British industrial resources were still limited, they won't be available for conversion until the Centaurs are completed and the Radical Review of 1953-54 still happens.
    • Therefore, I think the best that happens is that Warrior (the only RN Colossus to get an interim angled flight deck IOTL) also receives a steam catapult in her OTL April 1952 to October 1953 refit or her OTL December 1954 to August 1956 refit. The latter was when she had her interim angled flight deck fitted IOTL, but she might have had one since 1948 ITTL because the POD is that the angled flight deck trials are done by her in 1948 instead of by Triumph in 1952. It depends upon how extensive the modifications for the TTL angled flight deck trials were.
  • Melbourne would have been completed a few years earlier, possibly as early as 1951 and if so Vengeance wouldn't have been lent to the RAN 1952-55.
  • Sydney (as was planned IOTL) might have been refitted to the same standard as Melbourne. In which case the RAN still has Vengeance 1952-55 while Sydney was refitting or depending upon when Bonaventure is completed (see below) they might get Magnificent instead.
  • Bonaventure might have been completed as early as 1953.
  • It doesn't automatically mean that the Dutch rebuild Karel Doorman 4 years earlier than IOTL. However, it may mean that the French are able to install a steam catapult on Arromanches which would enable her to operate the Aeronavles Aquilons which were licence built Sea Venoms.
  • All 15 Essex class refitted to SCB.27 standard would have been fitted with steam catapults as part of the refit instead of 6 as part of their SCB.27 refits and one (Oriskany) as part of her SCB.125A refit.
There are only two ways that I can think of doing it. The first is for the Austerity Era to be less austere, which can't be done with a POD of 1945, especially as the crucial period is 1945-47. The other is to transfer the project to the USN on VJ Day and obtain as many American built steam catapults as possible through MDAP.

Another thing that would have helped is to complete Albion, Ark Royal, Bulwark, Centaur and Eagle (along with the first 4 Darings) with AC instead of DC electrical systems. However, with a POD of 1945 that (along with wanking the development of the steam catapult) is probably a lot easier said than done.
Click to expand...
 
bobtdwarf said:
that info on an engine room fire is amazing!
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I don't know whether it's true. To my knowledge Marriott is the only person that mentions it.

For what it's worth this is the relevant paragraph in full.
The actual rebuilding was a major engineering task which involved literally cutting the ship in two so that the hull could be lengthened by 30ft and beam increased by 8ft. The hull was stripped to he hangar deck and rebuilding of the flight deck already underway when it was decided that an angled deck would be incorporated; this was achieved by building a sponson structure 120ft long projecting 35ft out from the port side. Work on this was was proceeding when it was retrospectively decided to replace the old Admiralty pattern units, some of which had been damaged in an accidental fire. This involved undoing some of the work already carried out and meant further delay.
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He's the only person I know of who says that the ship was cut in two so the hull could be lengthened. Everyone else I know of says that the length of the flight deck was increased, but the between perpendiculars and waterline lengths of the ship remained the same.
 
PMN1 said:
What would be easier to update - an Audacious design hull or a Malta design hull?
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According to Conway's 1922-46 and except where I say otherwise the statistics for the Malta design come before those of the Audacious design (in its original form).
  • Displacements were:
    • 46,900 tons standard and 56,800 tons deep load - Malta class.
      • Versus.
    • 36,800 tons standard and 46,000 tons deep load - Audacious class.
    • However, Ark Royal & Eagle displaced more than that as completed and a pair of Malta's built in their place may have displaced more than the above.
  • The Malta design was 100ft longer and 3 feet beamier than an Audacious.
    • 820ft pp v 720ft pp.
    • 916ft 6in oa v 803ft 9in oa
    • 115ft 8in wl v 112ft 9in wl
  • As a result the Malta had a bigger flight deck.
    • 909ft 0in v 795ft 0in length.
    • 136ft 0in v 102ft 6in width.
    • However, Conway's specifically says that width of the Audacious class flight deck was 102ft 6in clear abreast the island, but it doesn't way whether the width of the Malta class flight deck was 136ft 0in clear abreast the flight deck.
  • Due to having a single deck hangar the flight deck of the Malta design was a few feet closer to the water line than the flight deck on the double-deck Audacious design.
    • 51ft 10in v 55ft 0in, both at deep load.
  • The floor area of Malta design's single-deck was larger than the combined floor areas of the two hangars of the Audacious design.
    • 57,000 sq ft v 52,100 sq ft.
    • The hangars of both designs had clear heights of 17ft 6in.
  • Both designs had a pair of centreline lifts of nearly the same dimensions.
    • 54ft x 46ft v 54ft x 44ft
    • But the Malta design also had 2 deck-edge lifts of 56ft x 35ft and the Audacious class design (in its original form) didn't have any.
  • Both designs had a pair of hydraulic catapults, which I presume were BH.5s in both designs.
  • Both were designed to operate aircraft weighing 30,000lbs.
  • Both carried about the same number of aircraft.
    • 81 v 78.
  • Conway's didn't say what the petrol stowage for the Malta class was, but my guess is that due to the longer and beamier hull it would be more than the 103,300 gal that Audacious was designed more.
  • It didn't say what the ammunition stowage of either ship was, but my guess is that Malta could carry more than Audacious on account of the larger hull.
  • The gun armament was similar.
    • Both had sixteen 4.5in in eight twin turrets.
      • But Malta had Mk V guns in Mk VII mountings.
        • And.
      • The Audacious design had Mk III guns in Mk II mountings.
        • However.
      • My guess is that Maltas build instead of the Audacious class would have had Mk III guns in Mk II mountings.
    • The close range armament planned for the Audacious was heavier than that planned for the Malta.
      • 64 Bofors (8x6, 2x2 & 12x1) and 18 Oerlikons on the Audacious in December 1945.
        • Against.
      • 55 Bofors (8x6 & 7x1) and no Oerlikons on the Malta.
  • The machinery produced a third more shaft horse power - 200,000shp v 152,000shp.
  • The crews were about the same size 2,780 v 2,740.
The short answer to your question is that the longer hull probably allows longer stroke steam catapults to be fitted and the third more shaft horsepower may mean that more powerful steam catapults can be fitted. However, that's updating them to a better standard rather than being easier to update to the same standard.

Whether its easier (and cheaper) to install new equipment in a Malta than an Audacious my guess is that it's no easier and costs just as much to make and install a steam catapult (of the same length and power) on an Malta than it did on an Audacious. My guess is that it would be no easier and cost just as much to install new arrester gear, a fully angled flight deck, new electronics (Type 984 radar, CDS or ADA, DPT, et al) or convert the electrical system from DC to AC on a Malta than an Audacious.

But I'm a low-grade enthusiast, not a naval architect or a project manager. However, it stands to reason that say a Type 984 radar installed on a Malta would cost just as much to make and install as the one that was fitted to OTL-Eagle.

Having written that the larger hull probably allows more "stuff" or more powerful "stuff" to be fitted like say a CDS capable of tracking more targets. Except that more or more powerful "stuff" increases the cost and may require more crew which the RN may not be able to recruit and even if it could the Treasury might not be able to raise the extra money to pay them.

The OTL redesign of the Phantom probably wasn't required. That is because I think that catapults powerful to launch MOTS Phantoms could have been fitted. That in turn may mean that the Maltas didn't need to have blast deflectors fitted (which the Audacious class did need). The larger hull might mean it was easier (i.e. quicker and cheaper) to design and install arrester gear that could handle the MOTS Phantom than the arrester gear required to operate the Spey-Phantom.

Plus being able to operate the MOTS Phantom avoids the R&D cost of the Spey-Phantom and because it's the MOTS Phantom costs less to make than the Spey-Phantom. So it's easier to update the air group rather than easier to update the ships themselves. Also with a POD of 1964 the RN would have got its MOTS Phantoms ITTL sooner than it got its Spey-Phantoms IOTL due to not having to redesign the aircraft and develop the reheated Spey engine.

I've written before that my guess was that Maltas built instead of the OTL-Ark Royal and Eagle would have required Phantomisation refits along the lines of the one OTL-Royal had IOTL and was planned for OTL-Eagle. I've changed my mind and now think that ALT-Ark Royal would have been completed with steam catapults and arrester gear powerful enough for MOTS Phantoms (but would still have been completed with an interim angled flight deck which would have to be replaced with a fully angled flight deck in the 1960s) and that ALT-Eagle would have been refitted to operate MOTS Phantoms in the TTL version of her 1959-64 refit.

By the same token now I think that if the Malta laid down instead of the third Audacious hadn't been cancelled she'd have been completed in the late 1950s with steam catapults and arrester gear capable of handling MOTS Phantoms. But she'd also have a fully angled flight deck, a Type 984 radar, CDS, DPT and unlike her sisters an AC electrical system.

The larger flight deck of the Malta class means that there'd be space for a larger deck park. Similarly the hangar had more floor space than the Audacious class which means more aircraft. Plus it might be easier to arrange the aircraft in a Malta's single deck hangar than the double deck hangars than the double deck hangars on an Audacious because it's wider. The longer hull might mean that the (longer) catapults don't interfere with the forward lift and (if both can be fitted in the bows) the angled flight deck.
 
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EwenS said:
Link to Post 225.
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So without a POD before 1945 and without a plausible problems requiring the solutions that I want we can't get steam catapults and angled flight decks sooner.

It's not what I wanted to hear, but fair enough.
EwenS said:
In 1951 the USN decided it needed a more powerful catapult than the hydraulic H-8 fitted in the SCB-27A Essex class conversions. The plan for the SCB-27C conversions was to fit a single H-8 but also a slotted tube catapult powered by explosive powder. Development of that had been delayed due to various problems including stowage and protection of the charges in the forward end of the ship. When they saw the Perseus rig they adopted the steam powered catapult, buying 4 from Britain for installation in Hancock & Ticonderoga whose SCB-27C modernisations completed in may and Sept 1954.
Click to expand...
For what it's worth I'd no idea that the UK sold some steam catapults to the USN.
EwenS said:
And an obvious question. If the USN were developing a slotted tube type using explosive powder, why didn't they think of using steam until it was demonstrated to them on the Perseus?
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I think that a rhetorical question. And yes, why didn't they think of using steam until it was demonstrated on the Perseus?

For what it's worth I was clutching at straws when I suggested throwing more men & money at the steam catapult or passing the project onto the USN. However, do you know when the USN first learned of the RN's steam powered slotted tube catapult project? If it was literally when they saw it demonstrated on Perseus (which I very much doubt) then at least the USN could have introduced steam catapults several years sooner.

You didn't respond to this.
Another thing that would have helped is to complete Albion, Ark Royal, Bulwark, Centaur and Eagle (along with the first 4 Darings) with AC instead of DC electrical systems. However, with a POD of 1945 that (along with wanking the development of the steam catapult) is probably a lot easier said than done.
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My guess is that maybe it could have been done with the first 4 Darings but the other ships were probably too far advanced and therefore required too much work for it to be practicable.

They'd have to be laid down as AC ships (with PVC instead of lead insulated wring) in the first place, a change is probably too much to ask in the middle of a war and because the UK's OTL industrial capacity. However, if it was possible other ships like the Colossus & Majestic classes, the Swiftsure & Tiger class cruisers and the Battle & Weapon class destroyers would have been too.

Also as the thread is about making a better job of maintaining carrier based airpower in the postwar period, changes that require PODs before 1945 shouldn't be allowed. Because if they were, where do we stop?
  • Build the Colossus and Majestics as Centaurs? That should be permissible if the OTL Audacious class were built as Maltas ITTL.
  • Introduce fully-welded hulls, high-pressure boilers, double-reduction gears and AC electrical systems (with PVC insulated wiring) by the late 1930s. All were perfectly feasible and could have been incorporated into the Illustrious class onwards.
  • The Second London Naval Treaty doesn't reduce the maximum size of an aircraft carrier from 27,000tons (in the earlier treaties) to 23,000 tons so the Illustrious class could have larger hulls that would produce better rebuilds. It was the British who had that done in the mistaken belief that it would reduce the cost of aircraft carriers and therefore make it easier to build them in the numbers it required.
  • Don't stop work on helicopters for the first four years of the war. Don't intern Raul Hafner. Don't send him to the AFEE.
    • Instead send him to work at Bristol's in 1939 instead of 1943.
  • Put more effort into gas turbines in general before 1945 (and before 1939) so the RN can get jet powered fighters in the same class as the Attacker, Sea Hawk & Sea Venom sooner. E.g. Sea Hawk instead of the Sea Fury. Except, see below.
  • Do more work on high-speed aerodynamics before 1945 so a Sea P.1081 can be put into service in the late 1940s (instead of the Sea Fury), a Sea Hunter can be put into service in the early 1950s (instead of the Attack), aircraft in the Scimitar & Sea Vixen class can be put into service in the middle 1950s and a Mach 2 fighter in the Phantom class can be put into service circa 1960 (instead of the Sea Vixen).
    • That also gives us the reason to develop the steam catapult and angled flight deck sooner.
  • Put a lot more effort into turboprops before 1945 so the Wyvern & an ASW aircraft like the Gannet can be but into service sooner.
  • Put more effort into turboshafts before 1945 so they can be put on helicopters sooner.
See what I mean?
 
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If the RN started on the fleet carrier path instead of the trade protection path from 1949, before steam catapults and angled decks were ready, it should be better for the RN in the longer term. Burning through the lives of WW2 carriers and the A,B, C & H which were launched in 1947-48 and 1952 means they won't be on the RNs mind in the mid-late 50s when steam cats and angled decks had matured, and heavy jet aircraft were appearing. Instead the RN and Govt will have to be serious about getting a new carrier rather than rebuilding and refitting too small WW2 era ships.
 

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