Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining carrier based air power?

[uk 75]

Why, because of the rocket? I doubt it would last long in production or service.

The rocket and the awful Gyron of course, but also the Javelin configuration of delta wing and T tail. Saro were a typical firm out of its depth and probably unable to manufacture an advanced fighter in large scale production.
It could not have been a decent ground attack aircraft.
If it had been developed instead of the Javelin and been in service by 1957 it might have been worthwhile. But by 1961 it would have been as obsolete as the F102.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Why, because of the rocket?

Yes. Afterburners, baby!

I doubt it would last long in production or service.

And that's the problem. All those development funds directed into something dangerous (due to rocket fuels/oxidizer) and short-lived would be a disaster for the RN. High test peroxide is not safe. If you're lucky a leak just bleaches your hair. If you're not some of the exotic H-O-(many O)-O-H decide to dissociate into very hot oxygen and steam and blow up.

The RN needed a fast-climbing jet, sure, but an afterburning jet would solve their problem.

 

[zen]

Gyron Junior isn't awful, just lacking production numbers to get DH to solve things.
Only 86 built I think.
80 of the DGJ.2 producing 7,000lb.
And only 6 of the DGJ.10 producing 10,000lb dry thrust.

Now tack on 150 more of DGJ.10 or DGJ.20 and DH have plenty reason to get things sorted.

Get the whole 300 and we'd see DH push up the dry thrust further.

As for F.177.....it's not ideal, but it's what there was at the time.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

To join the civilised discussion about the merits and demerits of the SR.177 . . . My two penn'orth is that . . .

Before 1957 there were too many projects and not enough aircraft & engine designers. (It didn't help that there was a large number of small firms instead of a moderate number of medium sized or a small number of large firms and the anecdotal evidence is that they were rubbish at project management.) Therefore, some of the projects have to be cancelled sooner or not started in the first place.

British rocket aircraft programme (Avro 720, SR.53 & SR.177) shouldn't have been started in the first place. Instead the firms involved (Armstrong-Siddeley, Avro, De Havilland and Saunders Roe) should have put the resources into their missile projects. While I'm at it the Saro Princess flying boat should have been cancelled or not started in the first place too and the resources put into the Company's helicopter or missile projects. If that's using too much hindsight, I plead, guilty as charged.

It wouldn't have helped the UK to maintain carrier based air power. However, we might have got Blue Steel, Black Arrow and Black Knight a few years sooner sooner. On the helicopters side we might have got the Scout, Skeeter and Wasp sooner. Although having the Wasp sooner wouldn't help the UK to maintain carrier air power it would introduce helicopters into the surface fleet between half a decade and a decade sooner.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Saro were a typical firm out of its depth . . .

The impression I've go is that Saro (when it was independent and part of Westland) was one of the better ones.

. . . and probably unable to manufacture an advanced fighter in large scale production.

You're wrong about that too. You should have written . . .

. . . and certainly unable to manufacture an advanced fighter in large scale production.

Production of the SR.177 would have been subcontracted to another firm.

Wood in his Scenario 1957 had the aircraft side of Saro taken over by Hawker Siddeley and DH Engines absorbed into Rolls-Royce. His reason for Saro being taken over by Hawker Siddeley was that Armstrong-Whitworth was to have been the main UK production centre for the SR.177.

 

[alertken]

The Saro Business. Complicated, so confusion. AWA and DH involved.

S.Pearson&Son Ltd (L.Cowdray; Lazards; today's term would be Venture, or Investment House) owned Saro -7/59 when Westland bought helis and the rest came too. Sir Arthur Gouge, sacked by Govt when they bought Shorts, came in 3/43 as Vice Chair & Ch.Exec, when Shetland MR boat was great white hope. Ah, well. He "won" SR.45 Princess luxury liner, 5/46 and 22/1/51 bought Cierva/Eastleigh for factory space for it, to supplement our fond Govt's funding on Cowes Harbour of its Columbine assembly hangar. BOAC exited boats, so Saro became a Structures job shop (Vampire wing, Venom tail, Comet 1/2 parts from DH; Swift and Viscount wing, Valiant nose from V-A who would have assembled Duchess if it had won the aborted RAF MR). Saro's small Exptl team won SR.53, 23/10/52, but could not credibly take on SR.177 on offer early '55. AWA had also become a Structures jobshop in this time, inc chunks of another Experiment, Bristol T.188. MoS put SR.177 wing design in AWA and chose DH engine and rocket for it.

DH chose in 1948 to put GW into DH Props and as its MD recruited ex-MAP C/R&D AVM Sir R.Sorley, who won the MRBM, 4/55. Saro, lithe for anyjob, 7/55 won its RV (UK-original, not Atlas-based) trials vehicle Black Knight. To protect all this, DH 9/56 bought 33% of Saro*: SR.177 would have been managed from Cowes, assembled at DH Christchurch and flown by DH from Hurn. AWA would have been assembly 2nd. source.

(* added 31/1: not co-incidentally: MoS ITP 4/9/56: R&D SR.177)​

 

[zen]

Cowes and Hurn
RNAS at Yeovilton not far away
Portland also nearby.
Portsmouth again close by.

So F.177 proceeds for RN, then RN staff and DH, and FR Wimborne (Cobham group) all deeply involved from Day1.

 

[Rule of cool]

In other threads I've learnt that an Essex class could steam at 19kts and each cat shot used 13% of the available steam and the Midways could steam at 23 knots and each cat shot used 10% of available steam (from memory, so it might be wrong in detail). This made the Essex class fundamentally unable to safely operate the Phantom in sufficiently large range of conditions.

Do we have the same or similar figures for the Ark, Eagle, Vic and/or Hermes? I've read that the Hermes struggled in the South China Sea in the 60s with low wind and hot weather due to it's low speed, but that's not as good as actual figures.

 

[Scott Kenny]

In other threads I've learnt that an Essex class could steam at 19kts and each cat shot used 13% of the available steam and the Midways could steam at 23 knots and each cat shot used 10% of available steam (from memory, so it might be wrong in detail). This made the Essex class fundamentally unable to safely operate the Phantom in sufficiently large range of conditions.

Do we have the same or similar figures for the Ark, Eagle, Vic and/or Hermes? I've read that the Hermes struggled in the South China Sea in the 60s with low wind and hot weather due to it's low speed, but that's not as good as actual figures.

Not sure myself, but IIRC it was @BlackBat242 who had that info. *ignites Bat-signal*

 

[uk 75]

A nice video from the 60s that goes well with this thread

View: https://youtu.be/IBu4Rcwpvgk?si=nEL2oPSfEXZqo4A9

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The villain of the piece in 1950s British Defence Procurement was Duncan Sands. The villain of the peace in 1960s the British Defence Procurement (such as the 1966 Defence Review) was Dennis Healey, Secretary of State for Defence (1964-70) in the First Wilson Government. He was Chancellor of the Exchequer (1974-79) in the Second Wilson Government and the (only) Callaghan Government where he acquired the soubriquet "the silly billy" for his handling of the British economy due to his impersonations by Mike Yarwood.

This is an excerpt from the "Mike Yarwood Christmas Show" 1977, which was broadcast on BBC One at 20:20. It was "bookended" by the "Bruce Forsyth Generation Game" at 19:15 and the "Morecambe & Wise Christmas Show" at 20:55 - the one that got 28 million viewers - half the population of the UK at the time. I couldn't find confirmation onlike, but AFAIK the Mike Yarwood Show got nearly as many viewers.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HsLrOKwU7VQ

For the benefit of fellow British TV historians (AFAIK) these were the last appearances of Bruce Forsyth, Eric Morcambe and Ernie Wise on the BBC before they left for ITV for more money, with "mixed" results. Morecambe & Wise were never the same again and "Brucie" made a bad start with "Bruce's Big Night", but recovered by doing game shows like "Play Your Cards Right". Mike Yarwood went over to "the other side" too, but not until the early 1980s.

 

[uk 75]

If the UK and France had recognised the brilliance of the Phantom/Buccaneer combination and agreed to build the AFVG as a EuroPhantom/Buccaneer for the 70s, perhaps the 70s could have seen a hybrid design capable of operating a sensible airgroup.
Instead of De Gaulle and the Invincibles, these ships could have been laid down at the end of the 60s and into service in 1974 onwards. But for the politics this would have given Europe at least three CVs, possibly five in the early 80s.
A simplified CVA01 Eagle sized carrier was well within the budgets of both countries.

This scenario would have been fun.
AFVG could have been the future of both the UK and French navies and air forces.
In the short term CVA01 is abandoned and Ark Royal is Phantomised. Hermes is retained with its Sea Vixen/Buccaneer airgroup.
A joint UK/French carrier is ordered in 1968. It looks a lot like CVA01 but has no CF299 and Broomstick.
The first ships take to the water in 1975.

 

[uk 75]

The UK is "lazy" about carrier aviation.
Relying on the subsonic cannon armed Seahawk for its fleet defence allows the small Centaur ships to be the main element of its carrier force (even then only three carriers are available for Suez in 1956).
The Wyverns of the Korean War are still the strike aircraft at Suez.
SR177 is grasped as a leap forward from these types but in the end the RN staggers forward with Sea Vixen and Scimitar.
The RN were lucky with the Buccaneer. Though it never gets the avionics or weapons of the A6 in RN service.
The failure of the F111B makes the Phantom seem modern, but had the F111B entered service in 1968 the relative laggardness of the RN would have been highlighted.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

From when I went into this in great detail these are British catapult capabilities.

BS4: 40,000lb@78kt; 30,000lb@101kt

BS4C: 35,000lb@99kt; 30,000lb@110kt

BS4A: 50,000lb@87kt; 30,000lb@120kt

BS5: 50,000lb@91kt; 42,000lb@110kt, 35,000lb@126kt

BS5A: 60,000lb@95kt; 50,000lb@105kt, 35,000lb@145kt

Anecdotally, although from a reliable source, the BS4 in HMAS Melbourne could launch a fully loaded A4G (~24,000lbs) in nil wind conditions despite widespread claims that it couldn't. The 9" extension (apparently BS4 cylinders come in 9' lengths) in 1971 didn't give the catapult any more power, it reduced the stress of each launch by ~9%.

The reason why I played about with Hobbs' information about the capabilities of the steam catapults was that I expected the 151ft BS.5 to be more powerful than the 151ft BS.4.

That was in relation to the posts I'd written about getting the steam catapult into service sooner. My thinking was that if the BS.4 could be put into service 4-5 years sooner, it would automatically follow that the BS.5 and BS.6 would come into service 4-5 years sooner too.

The result might be that Hermes & the rebuilt Victorious were completed with short BS.5 catapults instead of the BS.4 and (less likely) Ark Royal & Eagle fitted with short versions of the BS.6 so that all four ships could launch a less-heavily modified Phantom or even a MOTS Phantom with the required payload.

IIUC the BS5A could launch a loaded Phantom in nil wind conditions, but the BS5 and BS4s could not.

I think we're going round in circles.

I thought it had been established that a fully loaded MOTS Phantom could be launched by the 199ft version of the BS.5 but it couldn't be launched from the 151ft version. I thought it had also been established that the raison d'être for the Spey-Phantom (the extra BLC on the wings and longer nosewheel as well as the more powerful engines) were required to produce an aircraft that could be launched by the shorter BS.5. Furthermore, I also thought that the modifications to the MOTS Phantom that resulted in the Spey-Phantom were necessary to make it operable from Hermes and Victorious.

 

[Rule of cool]

The reason why I played about with Hobbs' information about the capabilities of the steam catapults was that I expected the 151ft BS.5 to be more powerful than the 151ft BS.4.

That was in relation to the posts I'd written about getting the steam catapult into service sooner. My thinking was that if the BS.4 could be put into service 4-5 years sooner, it would automatically follow that the BS.5 and BS.6 would come into service 4-5 years sooner too.

The result might be that Hermes & the rebuilt Victorious were completed with short BS.5 catapults instead of the BS.4 and (less likely) Ark Royal & Eagle fitted with short versions of the BS.6 so that all four ships could launch a less-heavily modified Phantom or even a MOTS Phantom with the required payload.

I think we're going round in circles.

I thought it had been established that a fully loaded MOTS Phantom could be launched by the 199ft version of the BS.5 but it couldn't be launched from the 151ft version. I thought it had also been established that the raison d'être for the Spey-Phantom (the extra BLC on the wings and longer nosewheel as well as the more powerful engines) were required to produce an aircraft that could be launched by the shorter BS.5. Furthermore, I also thought that the modifications to the MOTS Phantom that resulted in the Spey-Phantom were necessary to make it operable from Hermes and Victorious.

The reason I asked earlier about how the Essex and Midway speed and steam per cat shot is because the Hermes had a 78,000shp powerplant, Victorious 111,000shp and Ark/Eagle 152,000shp. I doubt the powerplants of Hermes or Vic could generate enough steam to launch Phantoms even if the catapults could do it in theory, they're probably much worse than the 150,000shp Essex doing 19 knots and each shot using 13% of the steam.

I suspect the idea of using the Phantom from Hermes and Vic was an idea that vanished quickly upon serious investigation. Like we've discussed the thought bubble was the Spey Phantom would cost 25m to develop but less than a year into the actual project that estimate had gone to 45m.

 

[uk 75]

The US Navy demonstrates with Forrestal and then with Nimitz that power and size matter for carriers.
France has tried with the nuclear powered De Gaulle to learn some of these lessons. But the resulting ship has been underpowered and too small.
The RN cheated itself over the F4 into thinking it could have F4s on Victorious and Hermes.
CVA01 was the closest the RN could get to its own Forrestal. But it would have relied on old fashioned powerplant and a cramped hull design. Once the US had the F111B (sorry F14) could the RN follow with its limited budgets.
As I keep suggesting the only potential answer was AFVG which evolved out of the over ambitious Vickers VG designs of the early 60s.
Able to carry out the roles of both the F4 and Buccaneer in the 70s it could have flown from Eagle/Ark and Hermes until something simpler than CVA01 entered service.
But by 1966 the RAF and Treasury had outnegotiated the RN. East of Suez and Earl Mountbatten were on the way out.
The Command Cruiser did offer a lifeline. Had it been a simple cruiser design like Italy's Veneto with Seadart forward and a handful of Seakings aft, which was all that was really needed, then Sea Harrier and its ski jump could never have happened.
Fortunately enough Seakings were needed to justify a through deck.

 

[BlackBat242]

In other threads I've learnt that an Essex class could steam at 19kts and each cat shot used 13% of the available steam and the Midways could steam at 23 knots and each cat shot used 10% of available steam (from memory, so it might be wrong in detail). This made the Essex class fundamentally unable to safely operate the Phantom in sufficiently large range of conditions.

Do we have the same or similar figures for the Ark, Eagle, Vic and/or Hermes? I've read that the Hermes struggled in the South China Sea in the 60s with low wind and hot weather due to it's low speed, but that's not as good as actual figures.

Not sure myself, but IIRC it was @BlackBat242 who had that info. *ignites Bat-signal*

In this forum I have learned that Hermes' maximum speed during catapult operations in 1963 was 25 knots - in ideal conditions. The "practical" max was 24 knots or less.

The letter mentions "a minimum boiler fuel input of 20% is required for catapult charging", which leaves just enough boiler fuel input for 24 knots power (needs 75%-80%).

1963 letter from Hermes' Captain:





I don't have anything for Ark/Eagle or Vic.

 

[Rule of cool]

Thanks @BlackBat242, that's more akin to Midway performance than Essex performance.

The Wiki page for Hermes re the Phantom says:

Hermes's flight deck was too short, her arresting gear as well as her catapults were not powerful enough to recover or launch the F-4Ks, even though they were slightly lighter, more economical and higher performing than their US Navy counterparts[citation needed].

Despite the lack of citation, the letter you provided suggests the assertion in Wiki has some merit.

Presumably the Ark/Eagle with double the powerplant but still only 2 catapults, albeit more powerful and likely demanding more steam per shot, could do better than Hermes. Maybe a knot or two more speed and a percent or two less boiler fuel for catapult charging.

 

[BlackBat242]

Presumably the Ark/Eagle with double the powerplant but still only 2 catapults, albeit more powerful and likely demanding more steam per shot, could do better than Hermes. Maybe a knot or two more speed and a percent or two less boiler fuel for catapult charging.

Hermes' book max speed as built is supposed to be 28 knots - Ark/Eagle's max speed as built was 32 knots, reduced to 31 after their modernizations.

That's a 3 knot starting difference before you start to look at catapult use etc.

 

[Rule of cool]

Hermes' book max speed as built is supposed to be 28 knots - Ark/Eagle's max speed as built was 32 knots, reduced to 31 after their modernizations.

That's a 3 knot starting difference before you start to look at catapult use etc.

With Hermes doing 24kt and cats requiring 10% steam per shot it's starting to look less insane that the RN thought early on that it might be able to operate Phantoms. At the very least it was worthy of a closer look to close that option.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to the Opening Post.

Yes, it could and it would have helped, a lot, if the UK had managed the following more effectively:

1. The British shipbuilding industry.
2. The British steel industry.
3. The British defence industry. Particularly, the naval shipbuilding, military aircraft and military electronics sectors.
4. The British economy in general.

Doing points one-to-three, ipso facto, does some of point four.

 

[zen]

SR.177 would have been managed from Cowes, assembled at DH Christchurch and flown by DH from Hurn.

As an aside....
Do we see DH attempting both escape of HSA and building their military arm of Airco?

 

[alertken]

Yes. Airco was intended to be....BAC. About 1953 the DH Enterprise was second-to-none in UK. Then they...won the MRBM, which would destroy them. They bought into Saro, 1956, MRBM-centric. They won DH.121 as lead in a consortium, tried to parlay that into a Vickers deal which would have pre-empted the BAC that did emerge; failed due to their sporty MRBM valuation, so settled, in a few days, with HSGroup. That does suggest that Sir Roy Dobson, HS Group, did not know Blue Streak was for the chop, but that folk in Vickers knew better.

 

[Archibald]

Nuclear vectors went from B-29 to Polaris in barely 10 years, 1952 - 1962. No surprise Blue Streak ended being a loosy business.

 

[Yellow Palace]

Doing points one-to-three, ipso facto, does some of point four.

1 and 2 does a fair bit for 4. The main thing that 3 does (as @red admiral has been at pains to point out) is reduce the amount of waste acting as a drain on 4.

 

[zen]

Yes. Airco was intended to be....BAC. About 1953 the DH Enterprise was second-to-none in UK. Then they...won the MRBM, which would destroy them. They bought into Saro, 1956, MRBM-centric. They won DH.121 as lead in a consortium, tried to parlay that into a Vickers deal which would have pre-empted the BAC that did emerge; failed due to their sporty MRBM valuation, so settled, in a few days, with HSGroup. That does suggest that Sir Roy Dobson, HS Group, did not know Blue Streak was for the chop, but that folk in Vickers knew better.

So we come to this again and it effectively looms over the topic as The potential AH scenario.
DH Triumphant.
MRBM wasn't even a good fit for DH Props considering they specialised in tape recorders and other avionics paraphernalia.
Not a problem for AAMs or even guidance system (gyro INS etc) but they should have stayed away from MRBM.
Now with resources not tied into this, potential to realise DH.110 earlier and swing into action on next generation fighter.....

And Saro last minute did suggest options including a twin engined fighter.....less reliant on rocket. Which coupled with engine improvements obviates need for rocket.
Backed by DH......

 

[Archibald]

The mistake made on Blue Streak was that liquid oxygen is not responsive enough (15 minutes to load it outside the silo !) when WWIII breaks out and nukes comes screaming from space.
As a consolation however the same mistake was made with Thor, Atlas, Titan I and the Soviet SS-6 / R-7. Storable propellants (Titan II) were more responsive but in the end, the real breakthrough was solid-fuel: cheap and robust like fertilizers inside steel tubes. 54 Titan II were procured... against a thousand Minuteman.
So, Minuteman in silos ? Close, but Polaris inside nuclear subs is actually much less vulnerable...

Put otherwise: compared to the Cold War superpowers, Great Britain lacked resources to be wasted on the wrong nuclear delivery systems (the US military tried a dozen of them before fiding the right one - Navaho, Regulus, so many others !)

France was in a similar resources situation as the UK - post colonial medium power ! - but was lucky enough to built its nuclear deterrent in the 1960's rather than the 1950's... after Minuteman and Polaris showed which way was the right one. For example France went straight to S-3 and M-1 missiles: solid-fuel. There were no such things as a Blue Streak or a Titan II liquid fuel missiles. Even then, the Force de Frappe cost France an eye-watering amount of money : as if NATO and Algeria weren't money pits already... De Gaulle solution was "3% of GDP for defense : or bust." Another luxury France had and not Great Britain, was the 30 glorieuses booming economy. It helped.

I've heard the reason GB didn't got the 1943-1973 boom was because its industry had pioneered steam and coal a few decades ahead of the rest of the world, back in the 1800's. So when coal & steam went away, GB was the first to be hit, a few decades before the rest of the world. They had started it ahead of the pack, they would finish it, ahead of the pack.

 

[zen]

Yes.
However again......quite possible that solid could have been done. The scientific capacity was there, as was the potential for production....

It's just a series of minor choices saddled the UK with a development that was obviously going to be inadequate by the time they would start production of the total system.

And again this reaches to the problems of information sharing in highly secret, secure and difficult topics.

Consider how the by '57 RR and Fairey were talking about no need for rockets if RB.128 was produced. Delta III would climb just fine and in time, with such engines.

It's highly likely RR were getting to this view earlier. Maybe even in '55.

 

[red admiral]

About 1953 the DH Enterprise was second-to-none in UK. Then they...won the MRBM, which would destroy them.

Do you have any idea whether anyone else bid for OR 1139?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

1 and 2 does a fair bit for 4. The main thing that 3 does (as @red admiral has been at pains to point out) is reduce the amount of waste acting as a drain on 4.

IMO the money saved by reducing the waste would have been spent on more kit. Therefore, 3 is as big a drain on 4 in ITTL as it was IOTL.

I think 3 would help 4 by improving the balance of payments. That is imports of military equipment would have been reduced and exports of military equipment would have been increased.

I thought of putting Civil Aviation in as a separate point rather than including it in 4. That's by selling more airliners and having larger airlines. One would increase the UK's visible earnings and the other would increase it's invisible earnings.

 

[Yellow Palace]

That is imports of military equipment would have been reduced and exports of military equipment would have been increased.

I thought of putting Civil Aviation in as a separate point rather than including it in 4.

I suspect both are rounding errors in a generally healthier UK economy.

 

[alertken]

RA #709
UK GW in 1954 did not award jobs in open tender, pre-priced. No-one had a clue on £.

Because all jobs would be NATO SECRET, except for those, like the MRBM, that would be UK Eyes Only, Top Secret Atomic, very few people had access. This was not attractive business, high timescale risk for low volume. The down side of cost-plus (so no £ risk to the firm) was the rubbish profit margin on offer. All electricsl firms much preferred to build TVs and radios, so none was interested in any form of Prime Contractor. MoS passed the first pile of US ICBM data (secured by Sandys/Wilson GW Data MoU, 14/6/54,, to the EE Thunderbird team.to Study and Report by 1/55. That they did and declined any further involvement. So MoS asked the Bristol Bloodhound team, who said ditto, llikewise. AM Sorley at DH Props said I'm your man and won ITP 4/55 for "co-ordination of weapon system and design". Which they never did, because MoS thought that waa their job...but they didn't do it, either.

 

[Didix1]

RA #709
UK GW in 1954 did not award jobs in open tender, pre-priced. No-one had a clue on £.

Because all jobs would be NATO SECRET, except for those, like the MRBM, that would be UK Eyes Only, Top Secret Atomic, very few people had access. This was not attractive business, high timescale risk for low volume. The down side of cost-plus (so no £ risk to the firm) was the rubbish profit margin on offer. All electricsl firms much preferred to build TVs and radios, so none was interested in any form of Prime Contractor. MoS passed the first pile of US ICBM data (secured by Sandys/Wilson GW Data MoU, 14/6/54,, to the EE Thunderbird team.to Study and Report by 1/55. That they did and declined any further involvement. So MoS asked the Bristol Bloodhound team, who said ditto, llikewise. AVM Sorley at DH Props said I'm your man and won ITP 4/55 for "co-ordination of weapon system and design". Which they never did, because MoS thought that waa their job...but they didn't do it, either.

It sounds like the whole process in 1954 was a bit chaotic, with UK firms avoiding involvement due to the high risks, tight security, and low profit margins. The Ministry of Supply (MoS) had trouble finding contractors willing to take on the Prime Contractor role, and it ended up with a lot of miscommunication and lack of coordination. Despite the efforts to pass data and find solutions, it seems like the roles and responsibilities were never fully sorted out. Classic case of too many cooks not doing the job

 

[Rule of cool]

This was not attractive business, high timescale risk for low volume. The down side of cost-plus (so no £ risk to the firm) was the rubbish profit margin on offer. All electricsl firms much preferred to build TVs and radios, so none was interested in any form of Prime Contractor.

I think this is likely true of most military gear of the period, which is why I believe that the better VC10 Super 200 and Medway Trident getting much greater sales is important for the aviation industry's health. Such sales could gain commercial level profit margins, making it worthwhile for the supplier base, rather that the MoS trying to squeeze blood from a stone.

 

[zen]

It sounds like the whole process in 1954 was a bit chaotic, with UK firms avoiding involvement due to the high risks, tight security, and low profit margins. The Ministry of Supply (MoS) had trouble finding contractors willing to take on the Prime Contractor role, and it ended up with a lot of miscommunication and lack of coordination. Despite the efforts to pass data and find solutions, it seems like the roles and responsibilities were never fully sorted out. Classic case of too many cooks not doing the job

It's worse.
Government was asking for things that should have stayed in house at Royal Ordinance. As with missiles generally.
EE and Bristol looked at the problem and Government....

and said "no thank you".

DH Props got lured into saying yes for the company on the basis of personnel relationships. Saving Sandys 'face'.

Saying No would force Sandys to either give up or return RO to prime Deterrent System provider.
With that move I suspect ICI would talk them round to solid fuel and we'd have affordable silos.

The whole HTP saga is a massive distraction and waste. A product of pre-war understanding of then technology.

 

[Hood]

I'm not sure what would have happened had DH said "no". I suppose the MoS might have strong-armed someone into taking the job (another "let's bung it Shorts to keep them in work" solution!). I can't see anyone outside the aircraft industry being let loose as prime contractor, unless Rolls-Royce takes it on and sub-contracts the rocket body to one of the aircraft firms.

 

[alertken]

France saw GW as ordnance; US brought in Auto (Ford, Chrysler, Willys-Overland), electricals (Philco), consumer appliances (Raytheon), ordnance (Redstone Arsenal) and, spectacularly, academia (e.g Johns Hopkins U) to absorb the uncommercial Research phase.

When rockets split from RAE as RPE, its first Director lobbied for GW as ordnance, so Westcott as Royal Airthings Factory. Oddly, the Labour Govt said don't be silly and chose to put GW into Aero because these things flew.

(This is drift from OP, but..) The verdict, failure, that I attach to early UK GW is not because the wrong teams were involved, but because UK did not grasp that silo-Management in separate, Trappist cells just won't work in a novel techno field with no relevant precedent to guide. Neither airframe, nor guidance, nor propulsion should lead a GW project. One Manager should (US settled on SPO), Authorised to do what he judged right in the interests of the project. On the remarkable Polaris that was the (today: Responsible Owner), Adm Rickenbaker*, supported by the ultimate paymaster, POTUS. I spent awhile involved in Skyflash: BAe. and MSDS had a hate-hate relationship.

(17/2 *oops. see #727)

 

[Archibald]

What's GW ?

 

[Rule of cool]

What's GW ?

Guided Weapons?

AW is Atomic Weapons.

 

[Archibald]

Okay thanks. De Gaulle government gave GW to
- Matra (a singular company, only partially aerospace: J.L. Lagardère was a smart millionaire and polymath)
and
- Aérospatiale (Nord & Sud merge up, state-owned, losers to Dassault combat jets).

They did pretty well...

Matra - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

For fighter A2A radars, Thomson CSF was in competition with Dassault EMD (Electronique, Marcel Dassault). Cyrano was CSF, Aida was Dassault.

Thomson-CSF - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

This is a fantastic resource.

COMAERO - EUROSAE

Sorry, this entry is only available in French. For the sake of viewer convenience, the content is shown below in the alternative language. You may click the link to switch the active language. LE COMITE POUR L’HISTOIRE DE L’AERONAUTIQUE Au cours de la période 1945-1995, l’aéronautique française...

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