Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining an independent strategic nuclear deterrent?

[uk 75]

It is fascinating to see how important politics was to this story.

Britain bases its nuclear deterrent on cooperation with the United States as a means of ensuring Washington stays commited to defending us and Europe.

France has the scars of Verdun and Sedan to ensure that it builds a force to dissuade anyone from invading it again. Every French President has lived up to that commitment.

I will now leave the technical side of the discussion, which is teaching me a lot, to continue as if a UK Prime Minister had persuaded his successors in 1951 to do what France does.

 

[zen]

Based on what I've read, UK efforts could have sustained a higher focus earlier from those 1950 studies and not divided efforts onto HTP. Which could actually have garnered Treasury approval.
Even though supply of fuel was not forthcoming in predictions until '54, it's arguable a lot of work could have been done in expectation of supply by the late 50's.

So in terms of getting a UK reactor earlier it is not impossible, by maybe a year or so to 1960 to even '59 say and an SSN by '61 to '62. Shifting matters vis-a-vis Skybolt and Nassau. Which could keep the potential SSBN order in '63 completed '69.

But it's possible to 'go French' and prioritise the SSBN from 1955 to '56. Most likely the latter (Teller), which could put first completed '62 instead.

Note that R class have external cross sectional maximum of 33ft by 30ft.
Close to '50 studies 31ft diameter.

This could only improve through time. The early 90ft monster missile reduced to 54" as technology improves and warhead gets smaller and lighter.
By '57 this is firming up with Granite and Acorn ('59 UK technology) later on aims for 700lb
Also '57 is Octopus, Super Octopus and Cleo.
We then know of PEANUT, GYPSUM and later Una, Ulysses and Ursula.

As an aside UK-Australian nuclear sharing scuppered by '58 agreement.

 

[zen]

as if a UK Prime Minister had persuaded his successors in 1951 to do what France does.

A reasonable point of departure really. Maybe a Healthy Eden winning the election? Churchill backing him on basis they agreed on revoking emergency restrictions of WWII.
Maybe no superpriority?

 

[Scott Kenny]

AIUI, the issue is supposed to have been with the safety system, which involved a boron wire inside the pit, which would be pulled out onto a spool when the warhead was armed. It was perfectly good at preventing a nuclear reaction. Unfortunately, the wire was brittle, so there was a high likelihood of it snapping, leaving much of its length inside the pit. Result, a nuclear warhead that fizzles about half the time.

It was resolved with time, and it's not like the UK didn't have its own dubious safety systems on nuclear weapons (looking at you, Violet Club!), but it does illustrate the issues that can arise with nuclear weapons design.

Combined response:

I meant the very poor reliability for initial model. If I recall correctly, less than 1/3 of them were considered workable. Later models were better.

Thank you both. Oddly enough, early issues with Polaris don't get mentioned on Trident subs...

This can be partially eased by convincing the Ministry that a rocket range in Benbecula is easier to get to than one in Woomera. You'd think that a map would do this, but seemingly the fact that Scotland was too far away was one of the arguments in favour of Australia.

That may have been a function of weather, not location per se. Rockets don't like bad weather at all.

You could have test stands in Scotland or wherever you have rail lines and not a lot of people around, but launching from there seems problematic.

I'm actually not sure. RN wasn't very eager about taking deterrence mission at least till late 1950s. In early-to-mid 50s, it was more likely "let's leave all this atomics to RAF and concentrate on catching Soviet surface raiders"

Yeah, deterrence is a very different mindset from the classic submariner "I'm going to sneak up on that Surface Target and get him"...

We called it "Hide with Pride"

I think the most realistic route may be for the UK to form a view, for some reason, that depending on US weapon systems isn't strategically sustainable. This probably needs a PM with a different view than Macmillan in 1962-1963.

Yes, that's how I see it as well.

Unfortunately British politicians are not as enthusiastic about the nuclear deterrent as French ones.
Perhaps because we have a weaker economy. Sir Alec Douglas Home, Harold Wilson, Edward Heath and James Callaghan would all have shared Macmillian's view based on Treasury and MOD advice.
Now I hear you say, what about Mrs Thatcher. Even she, although a strong supporter of Trident and the US relationship, privately admitted doubts about nuclear use and the deaths required.

No sane person wants to use the damn things.

 

[Dilandu]

So clearly, to me, the British had the technical capabilities to not be too far behind and mostly execute a similar missile development plan as the French did on the propulsive side (given that the British had a clear advantage on the guidance side of things by the late 50s), of course, this depends on adequate and sustained funding and good organisation.

They could, but what the reason they have to start working on solid-fuel ballistic missile in mid-1950s, when they aren't even sure they could made A - fusion warhead small enough to fit on its limited lifting capability, and B - guidance system accurate enough to knock out target (from mobile launch point) with a given warhead?

 

[Dilandu]

But it's possible to 'go French' and prioritise the SSBN from 1955 to '56. Most likely the latter (Teller), which could put first completed '62 instead.

How?

Again: in 1955, submarine-launched ballistic missiles are just a concept. US have virtually nothing here in terms of hardware. And USSR only started test launches of R-11FM missile (naval version of R-11) from refitted submarine in September 1955.

Not only that, but till 1956, Royal Navy still working under "broken-backed warfare doctrine", and did not even want nuclear deterrence role. It isn't USN; RN was perfectly fine with leaving everything atomic to RAF in 50s.

 

[uk 75]

Investment in the V force and the earlier Canberra bombers in the 1950s was colossal. But there were doubts about their ability to cope with Soviet fighters even before the appearance of missiles able to shoot them down.
These led to development of a supersonic bomber which contnues until 1957 and then in the Blue Steel stand off bomb and then the TSR2 as a theatre nuclear bomber able to go low and fast.
Without the US to provide technology for Blue Streak and later for Skybolt and Polaris the RAF will continue to want to develop its bomber force and be resistant to other systems. Given the investment already made in Bomber Command they would get Treasury support.
Mountbatten would not be able to use his links with Washington to counter this. Indeed if the UK is pursuing a go it alone policy he will be focussing on his aircraft carriers (see the parallel thread on UK carriers).
Added to the RAF the UK aircraft industry would lobby hard for supersonic bombers, supported by the Ministry of Supply.

 

[Archibald]

Stonechat

I keep reading that as stoned cat (catnip addiction is a real thing)
More seriously...

R-11 Zemlya - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Category:Submarine-launched ballistic missiles of the Soviet Union - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Interesting progression, really.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I think all the arguing would probably indicate that the broad answer to the OP is no.

In the case to a British equivalent to Polaris my interpretation of the discussion is yes and no.

• Yes, Britain had the technology or had the means & time to develop said technology.
• No, because the money spent on the OTL strategic weapons systems is insufficient to develop an equivalent to Polaris A-3 by the late 1960s.

At least without defining what "better" means? Cheaper, more reliable, more numerous, more destructive, more terrifying, more Union Jack on it?

I'd not thought of it in those terms, although they were equally valid to my criteria, which are.

• Worse = A SLBM with less range & destructive power than Polaris A-3.
• Same = A SLBM with equal range & destructive power than Polaris A-3.
• Better = A SLBM with greater range & destructive power than Polaris A-3.

In particular the range because it increases the number of targets the Resolution class SSBNs can attack or they can attack the same targets from further away which reduces their vulnerability.

The "best of better" is an equivalent to Poseidon C-3. The "worst of better" is a system with the same performance as Polaris A-3 and more development potential. That is its range and destructive power could be increased to produce an equivalent to Poseidon C-3 or Trident C-4.

 

[Dilandu]

In the case to a British equivalent to Polaris my interpretation of the discussion is yes and no.

• Yes, Britain had the technology or had the means & time to develop said technology.
• No, because the money spent on the OTL strategic weapons systems is insufficient to develop an equivalent to Polaris A-3 by the late 1960s.

Someone, please, explain to NOMISYRRUC that the question is NOT the money, it's impossibility for mid-1950s to formulate such fantastic goal as "equivalent to Polaris A-3 by late 1960s"! British aren't prophets; they could not see in crystal ball from 1950s what US would have by late 1960s.

 

[Dilandu]

Interesting progression, really.

Yep. A low-risk, guaranteed-results approach.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Mountbatten set the RN on the course for nuclear-armed submarines in 1957, something more akin to Regulus-equipped rather than SBLMs, which at that time did not really exist.

SSBNs didn't exist in 1955 when the USA began what became Polaris, yet they completed their first SSBN before the end of 1959 and had 5 by 31.03.61.

• Yes, that was done by throwing money at the problem.
• Yes, it will be difficult (but not implausible) for HM Treasury to provide that much money if the R&D cost of Polaris on Astronautix.com is correct.
• On the other hand Britain has nearly 3 times more time to do it.
• Yes, the first George Washington class was armed with Polaris A-1 and I want the Resolution class SSBNs armed with a missile that's at least as good as Polaris A-3.
• On the other had Polaris A-3 entered service with the USN in 1964 which was 9 years after what became Polaris was begun and the British equivalent doesn't enter service until 1967 which is a third more time.

 

[Dilandu]

SSBNs didn't exist in 1955 when the USA began what became Polaris, yet they completed their first SSBN before the end of 1959 and had 5 by 31.03.61.

He just didn't understood the problem... again and again. It would be funny, if it wasn't so sad...

 

[Yellow Palace]

So building an experimental diesel-powered submarines for short-range missiles in late 1950 - early 1960s would be quite usefu

Neither the United States nor France felt the need for such an intermediate step. Yes, the United States had a lot more rocketry experience and a much bigger budget. The same was not the case for France, as noted by @Archibald and @TheKutKu . France developed the entire capability, from scratch, in ten to thirteen years. The UK should be capable of doing at least the same. And, in fact, ten years was roughly the timescale expected for Blue Streak.

There's also no reason why the UK would have made the decision to develop an indigenous submarine-launched ballistic missile in the mid-1950s. The V-bombers were considered entirely adequate at that time, and did serve until the late 1960s. The absolute earliest that the UK is likely to start pursuing this course is 1958, if it's done immediately when US/UK collaboration falls through compared to OTL. Prior to that, the UK's nuclear deterrent was already entirely independent. There's therefore no need for substantiative policy changes prior to this date.

Some time between 1960 and 1963 is more likely. The former is when it was decided to buy Skybolt from the US - which was seen as a stopgap to extend the V-bombers until a submarine force would be needed. Prior to this, the future was seen as RAF Blue Streak missiles in silos ashore. The latter date is when Polaris was ordered. This sidesteps your concerns about the RN being uninterested in the role in the 1950s - by 1960, Mountbatten was arguing that the deterrent should go to sea. It's also a timescale where the UK can perfectly plausibly point at American Polaris submarines and say 'we'd like some of those, but with more Union Jacks, please'.

At this point, the UK is already building nuclear submarines. So there's no need to mess around with diesels. A UK-only nuclear power plant adds a year or two onto the submarine timeline, which still makes the missile the long pole in the tent. And while the development of weapons technology without US involvement is hard to forecast, a British-developed lightweight warhead was considered for Skybolt, so was certainly considered feasible in the relevant timeframe.

Absolute quickest, then, is a UK-only capability in 1970, three years later than Polaris, if a viable missile can be developed in ten years and the decision is made in 1960. The slowest I think likely is 1976. Obviously that's a long time to ask the V-bombers to remain capable - but they're a heck of a lot more useful as a fallback than a missile that can only threaten the Kola Peninsula.

That may have been a function of weather, not location per se. Rockets don't like bad weather at all.

See, that argument makes sense. But it isn't the one that's been recorded. I don't have the reference to hand (it's in one of Nick Hill's books IIRC), but it's explicit that Benbecula was considered too remote.

 

[Dilandu]

Neither the United States nor France felt the need for such an intermediate step.

United States Navy have much more resources and could afford the bold jump into unknown with Polaris. Especially considering that they still have Regulus-II to fall back on in case of Polaris delays or failure. Also, they needed to be boldk since they were in direct competition with USAF - and the need somethig not merely workable, but superior to compete with USAF ICBM's.

France worked from already known parameters. Their SLBM program followed American, and was made on much better refined technology. And Francs both have more experience with rockets than Britain - first French liquid-fuel test rocket was launched in 1945! - and much better organized developmet program. By they way, they actually build diesel-electric submarine to work specifically as test ship for SLBM's (the failed first attempt into nuclear sub)

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

There's also no reason why the UK would have made the decision to develop an indigenous submarine-launched ballistic missile in the mid-1950s. The V-bombers were considered entirely adequate at that time, and did serve until the late 1960s. The absolute earliest that the UK is likely to start pursuing this course is 1958, if it's done immediately when US/UK collaboration falls through compared to OTL. Prior to that, the UK's nuclear deterrent was already entirely independent. There's therefore no need for substantive policy changes prior to this date.

You are absolutely correct that the V-bombers were considered entirely adequate at the time. The time being the mid-1950s.

At said time it was thought that they'd be adequate until the mid-1960s. The reason why they did serve until mid-1969 wasn't because they were still considered to be adequate. It was because it took nearly half-a-decade longer than planned (in the mid-1950s) to produce a replacement.

That is, Blue Streak was begun in 1955 to replace the V-Force in 1965. Then it was cancelled in 1960 because it would be obsolete sooner than expected due the USSR developing ballistic missiles sooner than expected. The replacement for Blue Streak was the American Skybolt ALBM which McNamara cancelled in 1962. The replacement for Skybolt was Polaris, which wasn't cancelled and the 4 Polaris A-3 armed SSBNs entered service 1967-69. If any of you share my sense of humour, Polaris was the replacement, for the replacement, for the replacement of the V-bombers.

I don't understand why British defence planners can't have a modicum of extra foresight. That is, in 1955 realise that at best land-based missiles will have a short "shelf life" and submarine based missiles are the best solution by far. They may cost more and may take longer to develop, but they will be effective weapons for longer than land-based missiles and therefore offer more value for money in the long run.

 

[zen]

Let's agree '58, as it's a critical moment on US-UK nuclear sharing.

 

[Hood]

Royal Navy is not much interested.

Mountbatten certainly was interested and the RN followed the progress of Polaris closely from early 1959, from a time when it was very crappy with no success (the first successful test launch was April 1959). The RN was interested but feared two things: deterrence would squeeze out funding for its 'warm war' forces and that an RN Vs RAF turf war with Sandys around might lead to more axes.
Mountbatten argued for the cheapest and simplest deterrent and he felt replacing V-Bombers and Blue Streak in the 1970s would be too expensive. The MoD rapidly concluded only mobile systems would be effective. By 1960 the RN knew it wanted Polaris, it was just waiting for the right moment to approach the issue in relation to inter-Service politics, British politics and American politics. The killing of Skybolt by MacNamara opened the door. Even if the Skybolt had been purchased, Polaris/SSBNs offered the better longer-term solution (Skybolt was only ever a stopgap).

It seems that Oberon-class submarine would most likely be the one that from mid-1950s point of view could be considered as prototype of 1960s missile-armed one.

No, the RN wanted a nuclear-powered platform for any SLBM and in 1960 it estimated by 1965-66 that they might be building at least 2 subs a year, ample to meet the SSN and SSBN demand.
At the very least they could do a 'cut 'n' shut' job on a Valiant hull (which was effectively Resolution anyway).

 

[Hood]

They could, but what the reason they have to start working on solid-fuel ballistic missile in mid-1950s, when they aren't even sure they could made A - fusion warhead small enough to fit on its limited lifting capability,

Don't forget that it doesn't necessarily have to have a 3-warhead MRV like the A-3 had. Could just be a 1MT warhead.

 

[Hood]

Benbecula and rocketry:

https://www.secretscotland.org.uk/index.php/Secrets/SouthUistMissileRange

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Yes, the United States had a lot more rocketry experience and a much bigger budget. The same was not the case for France, as noted by @Archibald and @TheKutKu. France developed the entire capability, from scratch, in ten to thirteen years. The UK should be capable of doing at least the same. And, in fact, ten years was roughly the timescale expected for Blue Streak.

Absolute quickest, then, is a UK-only capability in 1970, three years later than Polaris, if a viable missile can be developed in ten years and the decision is made in 1960. The slowest I think likely is 1976. Obviously that's a long time to ask the V-bombers to remain capable - but they're a heck of a lot more useful as a fall-back than a missile that can only threaten the Kola Peninsula.

I have yet to be persuaded that developing a British equivalent to Polaris from 1955 is impossible on technological, military and/or political grounds. If the decision is made in 1955 and your estimate of 10-16 years to develop a viable missile is accurate (I think it is) it would enter service between 1965 and 1971. My target is 1967-69 which happens to be in the middle of that estimate.

 

[Dilandu]

don't understand why British defence planners can't have a modicum of extra foresight. That is, in 1955 realise that at best land-based missiles will have a short "shelf life" and submarine based missiles are the best solution by far. They may cost more and may take longer to develop, but they will be effective weapons for longer than land-based missiles and therefore offer more value for money in the long run

Because in 1955 it was impossible to say if submarine-launched long-range missile is even feasible, far less how long it would took. Again and again; SLBM required advances in SEVERAL non-connected areas; storable fuels, compact warheads, precise guidance and big enough submarines. Of which UK have significant progress in none.

 

[Dilandu]

Don't forget that it doesn't necessarily have to have a 3-warhead MRV like the A-3 had. Could just be a 1MT warhead.

Yes, but this warhead must be compact and durable enough to fit in. And the rocket must be powerful enough to carry such. In mid-1950s the first was far from certain (Teller claimed it was possible, but existing fusion devices were large and heavy), and the second wasn't associated with solid fuels at all.

For 1955 UK the "realistic" approximation of SLBM would most likely be "storable liquid-fuel missile, big enough for heavy boosted fusion warhead of Green Bamboo or Violet Club design". I.e. MUCH heavier than W47 for Polaris.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Don't forget that it doesn't necessarily have to have a 3-warhead MRV like the A-3 had. Could just be a 1MT warhead.

I thought that was one of the British designed & built parts of Polaris. Therefore, it takes no more time to develop and doesn't cost more whether it's fitted to a Lockheed-built Polaris A-3 or the British analogue which is probably built by the Saunders Roe Division of Westland.

P.S.

For what it's worth I think the stumbling block is the solid-fuel rocket engine. As far as I can see the UK developed everything else a British Polaris analogue needed in the OTL Black Knight & Blue Streak programmes and the UK-built portions of Polaris.

 

[Dilandu]

I have yet to be persuaded that developing a British equivalent to Polaris from 1955 is impossible on technological, military and/or political grounds

Considering that you refuse to listen any criticism of your ideas, its kinda hard for you to be persuaded even that Earth is not standing on the turtle.

 

[Archibald]

Admiral Rickover's famous (for nuclear submarines) "The French will certainly never do anything with enriched Uranium" (which purpotedly enabled the American transfer of Enriched uranium in 1959) and "The French will never have a credible deterence force".

The development of the FdF was spectacular, but the recent history, and historiography indeed eclipses just how much was still in flux around 1957-1960;
looking at late 4th and even early 5th Republic (first 1-2 years of de Gaulle) documents and studies, showing that yes, large collaboration with the US on the strategic arsenal like the British would do was seriously considered and discussed, it's unbelievable now.
For missiles, French Polaris and Thor had preliminary accords... And as late as 1960 SAGEM was in official cooperation with Kearfott for long range missile inertial guidance development.

I have a few pdf supporting this. Just as you said: it started 18 months before De Gaulle return to power (May 1958) so - late 1956... you guess, a spinoff of the Suez crisis. Some future Gaullists (like Chaban Delmas) were already there, in the politics and governments of the agonizing Fourth Republic - it agonized because of the Algerian War morasse that pushed France to the brink of civil war - one year, one major political crisis. The 1958 one at least got De Gaulle back to power.
Before De Gaulle return was a pretty wild scheme which had France, Germany and Italy (F.I.G) working together on an IRBM force - hopefully with Minuteman, and not yet NATO dual-key MLF. De Gaulle canned the effort ASAP as he already felt US aid would come only with strings attached: the MLF proved him right.
And there were plenty of wild schemes like that until 1963. If you think NATO MLF was bold (or bonkers) there are at least half a dozen similar concepts.
"An off the shelf European nuclear missile force: maybe, but: what missiles, and what strings attached ?"

Meanwhile France went all out trying to squeeze missile data from the cancelled Blue Streak. De Gaulle EEC promises to (poor) MacMillan are well known, but that was merely the tip of the iceberg. Just like ELDO and Europa prehistory, 1960-1963.

Long story short: between 1960 and 1963 (when Europa was definitively secured as a CIVILIAN rocket and satellite launcher) France, UK and USA played a very complicated game, related to Blue Streak.

MacMillan clearly saw that Blue Streak apealed to the French as a large rocket to help Force de Frappe. He tried to bargain things like EEC with De Gaulle.
But the Americans were furious, and they had a deadly clause, related to Blue Streak. Not only the 1958 nuclear agreement, but also the very Blue Streak agreements from 1954-56.
Blue Streak was a spinoff of Atlas ICBM : Convair had helped De Havilland. Hence the Americans often remembered MacMillan he couldn't throw Blue Streak under the french bus, not without severe diplomatic repraisals...
So French tried it differently: ELDO and a Blue Streak satellite launcher.
Once again the Americans were not duped and ensured no critical missile tech would be transfered that way. Same for the ELDO partners, Germany first.

 

[Dilandu]

thought that was one of the British designed & built parts of Polaris. Therefore, it takes no more time to develop and doesn't cost more whether it's fitted to a Lockheed-built Polaris A-3 or the British analogue which is probably built by the Saunders Roe Division of Westland.

Facepalm. So now he want to design MRV missile - miniaturized warheads, advanced navigation system - right from 1950s. Somebody, explain to him that in 1950s electronics was still vacuum-tube based.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I'd not thought of it in those terms, although they were equally valid to my criteria, which are.

• Worse = A SLBM with less range & destructive power than Polaris A-3.
• Same = A SLBM with equal range & destructive power than Polaris A-3.
• Better = A SLBM with greater range & destructive power than Polaris A-3.

In particular the range because it increases the number of targets the Resolution class SSBNs can attack or they can attack the same targets from further away which reduces their vulnerability.

The "best of better" is an equivalent to Poseidon C-4. The "worst of better" is a system with the same performance as Polaris A-3 and more development potential. That is its range and destructive power could be increased to produce an equivalent to Poseidon C-4 or Trident C-5.

I don't see getting your first SLBM, when you don't even have a big rocket available yet, to be Poseidon.

As is, getting a close parallel to Jupiter is the likely route (ugly liquid fuels but the Brits did have small liquid fuel rockets to scale up), and Polaris beats that hands down for range and accuracy.

As I've said, the really significant area the UK was lagging behind isn't rockets or warheads, it was guidance.

Yep. A low-risk, guaranteed-results approach.

Based on other programs, I'd go so far as to say "Stereotypically Russian."

Which I really wish the US would do... Like how the Japanese do their ship builds. Build a moderate number of Class A, 1 ship a year at alternating shipyards for 5-10 years. While class A is building, design class B that is like class A but better in one or two limited areas. Now build class B and design class C.

See, that argument makes sense. But it isn't the one that's been recorded. I don't have the reference to hand (it's in one of Nick Hill's books IIRC), but it's explicit that Benbecula was considered too remote.

Dafuq were those people ON?!?

 

[Dilandu]

Which I really wish the US would do... Like how the Japanese do their ship builds. Build a moderate number of Class A, 1 ship a year at alternating shipyards for 5-10 years. While class A is building, design class B that is like class A but better in one or two limited areas. Now build class B and design class C.

Chinese now following generally the same philosophy for their military shipbuilding, but this is offtopic a bit)

 

[TheKutKu]

They could, but what the reason they have to start working on solid-fuel ballistic missile in mid-1950s, when they aren't even sure they could made A - fusion warhead small enough to fit on its limited lifting capability, and B - guidance system accurate enough to knock out target (from mobile launch point) with a given warhead?

My point is that they probably could start a SLBM program in (early, at the time of the skybolt decision) 1960 and not be more than 2 years behind the French (1 year max technically + 1 year max in setting up the organisations) in the development of Solid SLBM

- first French liquid-fuel test rocket was launched in 1945!

Barré’s work was definitely interesting, a rocket reaching 60km launched in the first half of 1945, that’s comparable to and slightly earlier than the WAC Corporal, and considering none of the launches worked perfectly and the rocket was designed for 100km, there’s probably an alternate history where one works a bit better and France upstages the USA as the second nation to send a rocket to space...
(Which is also impressive considering his work was delayed by 2 years because of operation Torch,)

Except it had no legacy, as french space historian J. villain Said "Barre was on the fringes of everything, and that’s why his work didn’t continue" (IFHE, 2002); his work had virtually no impact on, and used different technologies from the main French liquid propulsion efforts at the LRBA and SEPR

 

[Dilandu]

Based on other programs, I'd go so far as to say "Stereotypically Russian."

Well, planned economy likes to, well, plan) Planning for steady improvement is always simpler than for something revolutionary new. And slow progress is preferable from the planning point of view than risk of total failure.

 

[Dilandu]

My point is that they probably could start a SLBM program in (early, at the time of the skybolt decision) 1960 and not be more than 2 years behind the French (1 year max technically + 1 year max in setting up the organisations) in the development of Solid SLBM

In 1960 - possible, yes. But not from 1955 as author wanted.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I don't see getting your first SLBM, when you don't even have a big rocket available yet, to be Poseidon.

FWIW the UK doesn't have four small solid-fuelled rocket engines for a Polaris A-3 equivalent either.

As I've said, the really significant area the UK was lagging behind isn't rockets or warheads, it was guidance.

FWIW they do have 12 years (1955-67) to develop it.

 

[zen]

Big submarines go back to big gun submarine studies, submarine aircraft carriers and a limited production of Cruiser Gun Submarine.
Big submarines are the conclusion of those 1950 studies.....

Warhead as Blue Granite is 20" and below 1ton (2240lb) by 1958. A massive downscale from 45" and 4,500lb or proof of science package.
By '58 plan for three RVs with 600lb warheads is already the future.
Acorn points the way forward.

Solid rocket fuel progress from Seaslug and increasing size of solid press manufacturing. Easy to see where things are going.

UK doesn't approach this 'Russian style', frankly the US did more empirical efforts. UK had more brains than money.
So UK theory was what US wanted access to in Bilateral deal on nuclear. Because UK theory was actually good.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

At the very least they could do a 'cut 'n' shut' job on a Valiant hull (which was effectively Resolution anyway).

If anything just adopting a pressure hull the same diameter as the Valiant for an all-UK-content Resolution would be cheaper and quicker than what actually happened, given the US Missile Compartment had a 3in narrower diameter pressure hull than the Valiant, hence some redesign was needed to repackage the contents into the narrower pressure hull of the Resolution.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

At least without defining what "better" means? Cheaper, more reliable, more numerous, more destructive, more terrifying, more Union Jack on it?

All of the above, and in particular, the last two because more terrifying & more Union Jack improves the British SNF's value as an instrument of diplomacy.

More terrifying may mean Her Majesty's enemies take the UK more seriously. And for that matter Her Majesty's friends may take the UK more seriously too.

As I understand it the SNF was valued for the influence it had over the US Government as much as for the influence it had over the Soviet Government. E.g. having a SNF gave the UK some influence over where the USA aimed its strategic nuclear weapons. A more terrifying British SNF may increase the influence that the UK had over where the USA aimed its strategic nuclear weapons.

It was also a guarantee of US support for the UK in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack. "You might as well nuke the USSR, because we will if you don't, and the Soviets will attack you in return, because they can't tell whether they're American or British missiles".

More Union Jack (and less Stars & Stripes) means the UK can sell more of the technology to third parties. E.g. to France as an incentive/bribe to France so it doesn't reject the UK's application to join the then Common Market.

More Union Jack (and less Stars & Stripes) means more of the money is spent in the UK and less in the USA. Which helps the British economy because the Treasury gets more of it back via taxes and it eases the UK's balance of payments problems.

More Union Jack (and less Stars & Stripes) is important for national self-respect and prestige abroad. France had Mirage, MSBS, SSBS, Diamant, Airane and Airbus. The UK had a long list of expensive and often embarrassing failures which includes (but is not limited to) Comet, Swift, TSR.2 & Blue Streak and a considerably shorter list of undisputed successes. Reducing the number of failures and increasing the number of successes is one of the aims of these threads.

 

[zen]

More independent may also mean an Australian Bomb and possibly a joint underground testing site.

More independent also reinforces the psychological idea of not only an independent Britain, but a Britain that has confidence in itself.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

More independent also reinforces the psychology idea of not only an independent Britain, but a Britain that has confidence in itself.

We can call ourselves great and not be laughed at.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

On costs, the problem with Derek Wood-esque price list cutting is that you are not saving costs. Fine to say, no Blue Steel, no Avro 730, no Blue Water, no PT.428, no Blue Steel, no TSR.2, no Concorde, but that means industry/science learns nothing. It's structures, aerodynamics, avionics knowledge remains circa 1955.

I'm rather sceptical about that and (unless you can produce a long list of lessons learned from those projects that were of financial benefit to Great Britain Ltd) the most important lesson from the above was how not to do it.

If you can, equally important lessons about structures, aerodynamics and avionics may have been learned from the projects that I propose to put in their place. With the bonus that there is more hardware to show for the expenditure.

For what it's worth I've not mentioned the Avro 730 or PT.428. However, if I remember correctly, they closed the factory when Blue Water was cancelled so all science/industry may have learned from that is how to write several thousand P.45s.

Also one saves money and reduces costs. A cost saving really means that more money was spent not less.

Good luck building an SLBM when the last rocket was.... Bloodhound?

In my timeline it's ALT-Black Knight. Was the UK's last rocket before Blue Streak IOTL . . . Bloodhound too?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

We can call ourselves great and not be laughed at.

@zen I hope you were laughing with me and not laughing at me.