Could HMAS Australia have been saved from scrapping ?

[Oberon_706]

Yes, she would have made a very handy bombardment platform for the coastal fights in New Guinea (Lae, Salamoa, Finchaffen etc.) and the island-hopping campaign thereafter - shell supply (particularly HE for NGFS) becomes a big logistics issue in that circumstance.

 

[Dilandu]

Be sunk, most likely. But had the battlecruiser survived, see above for a worthy task she could have performed in 1943-45 for her country.

If not significantly refitted, she would most likely stay in port all the war as guardship and training ship. Maybe escort convoys in Indian Ocean.

 

[EwenS]

RAN ops in the Med also included at least one of the light cruisers for most of the first two years of the war (they did some of their best work west of Suez), plus at various times, some of the sloops, members of the N-class Destroyer flotilla and a minesweeping flotilla of corvettes that were involved in the invasion of Sicily. In the context of the RAN as a whole, it wasn’t a small commitment. Between 7-9 ships at its peak (I think?). Losses: HMAS Parramatta, Waterhen & Nestor.

There is a distinction to be drawn between
1. Ships owned, controlled and manned by the RAN, like the cruisers (including Shropshire gifted to the RAN in 1943 as a replacement for Canberra), "Scrap Iron Flotilla", 3 Tribal class destroyers, pre-war sloops, 36 of the Bathurst class corvette / minesweepers and River class frigates built in Australia. The RAN agreed to place some of the 6in cruisers and the WW1 destroyers and sloops under RN control in the Med or IO for periods prior to PH.

AND

2. Ships owned and controlled by the RN but which Australia agreed that the RAN would man on their behalf, like 5 N class and 2 Q class destroyers, 20 Bathurst class corvette / minesweepers. These generally remained firmly under RN control, serving largely in the Med and IO from completion and then as part of the BPF in the Pacific in 1945.

With the Bathurst class the vessels for the Admiralty were given construction priority by Australia, so the RN lent at least 4 of the early ships back to the RAN pending delivery of their own ships. Another 4 were built in Australia for the RIN.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

This section of the Washington Naval Treaty was mentioned earlier in the thread.



As others have written it specifically says that Australia had to be scrapped and legally the Treaty included Australia because it says British Empire of which Australia was part as it was a several years before the British Commonwealth of Nations was created (Imperial Conferences of 1926 & 1930 and 1931 Statute of Westminster). Furthermore, as others have already written Australia sent a delegation to the Washington Naval Conference and Australia signed the Treaty.

. . . for the Commonwealth of Australia: Senator the Right Honourable George Foster Pearce, Minister for Home and Territories;

If the Australian Government really wanted a capital ship it could have asked the British Government to transfer one of the 20 capital ships that the British Empire was allowed to retain from the RN to the RAN. My guess is that it would be an Iron Duke. This would in turn be replaced by a Royal Sovereign when the First London Naval Treaty reduced the British Commonwealth's capital ships force from 20 ships to 15 ships.

However, if the British Government had agreed to the transfer would the Australian Government have spent the extra money needed to keep it in service? Or would spending on something else been cut to pay for it? E.g. not buying the cruisers Australia & Canberra. My guess is that it would have been the latter as (in per capita terms) Australia cut its defence expenditure even more than Britain did between the early 1920s and middle 1930s.

 

[Owens Z]

This works on the interesting concept that that both the RAN and RNZN consider themselves to be something more than just South Atlantic and South Pacific squadron of the Royal Navy.
The majority of the RCN decamped to UK Waters not long after war was declared.
Amongst other things leaving the Defence of the Pacific Coast to converted fishing boats and a couple of AMCs that lacked fire control systems aside from the Mk I eyeball.

The RCN (on the East Coast at least) naturally integrated with the RN on the Atlantic convoys and wasn't really capable of independent action, on the West Coast Canada had never really developed any strength in depth (perhaps hoping no one would risk annoying the USN by sailing into the Straits of Juan de Fuca to attack Vancouver?).

The province of British Columbia was explicitly on Japan's wish-list during the victory disease musings, to occupy in triumph along with Australia, etc. after the Allied capitulation. The Canadian West was indeed vulnerable, with poor road communications before the completion of the Alaska Highway, and the country's manpower needed for the crucial Battle of the Atlantic and (in time) for service in France. As you point out, a few armed trawlers off Canada's Pacific Coast were little defense. But fortunately for Canada, the victory disease phase was ended by the victory at Midway, although the Japanese troops and planes in the Aleutians remained a worry till later, along with what turned out to be only mild Japanese submarine attention to the Vancouver/Seattle region.

Unlike the Royal Australian Navy, the Royal Canadian Navy never had a dreadnought capital ship, nor (to my knowledge) ever seriously considered one. The battleship HMS Canada, for example, was simply named that as a courtesy, and was manned like any other British warship before being returned to Chile and renamed after the First World War. From some of the comments in this thread pushing junk like the Courageous class battlecruisers, the RCN may have been fortunate in this lack.

 

[Owens Z]

This section of the Washington Naval Treaty was mentioned earlier in the thread.

Thanks, NOMISYRRUC. Your and EwenS's clear explanations of what the Washington Naval Treaty's agreed and ratified terms actually were have been very helpful to the conversation. The counterfactual histories that we have pondered here in Oberon's thread considered legal alternatives to those Treaty terms that would have allowed battlecruiser HMAS Australia to escape scuttling off Sydney, unlike in real life. Some of those legal alternatives seem plausible to me, assuming Australian government and navy interest at the time, and some do not. But by all historical accounts there was no (or very limited) interest at the time. The country did what it did, and (considered in hindsight) this was probably for the best. An extant HMAS Australia in WW2 would have probably been sunk in battle, taking a thousand young men to the bottom with her, if those were not blown to bits by a magazine explosion like that which destroyed her sister ship in an instant. Those Australians were needed elsewhere, for dangerous but survivable service.

I read with interest that the scuttled old battlecruiser has been found on the seabed and photographed. Unfortunately she is too deep for visits by recreational scuba divers, like those who visit the Great Barrier Reef northward. As NOMISYRRUC and EwenS know, the Treaty's terms stated that warships disposed of by scuttling had to be sunk in waters defined as too deep for salvage divers to visit for the foreseeable future, to obtain as true a finality for a warship as being dismantled in a scrapyard.

 

[DWG]

the Royal Canadian Navy never had a dreadnought capital ship, nor (to my knowledge) ever seriously considered one.

Under the Naval Aid Bill of 1912, Canada was to commit $35m to build battleships or armoured cruisers "of the most modern type". The usual assumption is three modified QEs (Churchill built the 1913 Estimates around that assumption), but the bill died in Parliament due to opposition from the Liberal majority in the Senate.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Are these of any use? They information comes from the Australian Yearbooks.

Australian Defence Expenditure 1924-38



Royal Australian Navy Personnel 1919-39



Royal Australian Navy Ships 1921-39

​

 

[Dilandu]

Unlike the Royal Australian Navy, the Royal Canadian Navy never had a dreadnought capital ship, nor (to my knowledge) ever seriously considered one.

Actually they do. The Naval Aid Bill of 1912, that came reasonably close to reality (passed the House of Commons, was defeated in Senate) called for three modern capital ships, battleships or battlecruisers - usually it's assumed that "Queen Elizabeth"-class battleships were planned to be ordered - to be constructed. On the other hand, the idea was mainly to donate those units to RN, instead of operating them themselves (which was one of the reason it was defeated).

 

[DWG]

Are these of any use? They information comes from the Australian Yearbooks.

Australian Defence Expenditure 1924-38

View attachment 755177

Royal Australian Navy Personnel 1919-39

View attachment 755178

Royal Australian Navy Ships 1921-39

View attachment 755179​

Handy, though for symmetry with Albatross it probably needs to to point out that Otway and Oxley were paid off within a year of arriving in Australia in 1930, and transferred to the RN in 1931. Defence budget as percentage of GDP would also be useful in the first table- I've seen claims the Australian budget was significantly lower than the British in terms of percentage of GDP, but I don't know how accurate that is.

 

[Volkodav]

Slightly off topic, well a mile off topic, Albatross was ordered in large part to maintain shipbuilding skills at Cockatoo after it was decided to build the two Counties offshore. I suspect it would have been cheaper to build the two cruisers locally and not bother with a seaplane carrier.

The skills acquired on those ships would have made building replacements for Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane locally more justifiable.

Such a move would likely have seen the yard still building cruisers once war became inevitable.

Australia, with a much more experienced, capable and efficient shipbuilding capability could have built cruisers and a greater number of destroyers through the war. Potentially even light fleet carriers could have been built locally.

 

[Oberon_706]

The excessive time and cost assoc. with building Albatross (and Adelaide before her, which apparently ended up costing over £1,200,000, over 50% more than sister ship Brisbane) was used after the fact to help justify the decision to order the 8" cruisers from Britain. Sir John Monash's naval shipbuilding review found that building the heavy cruisers at Cockatoo might cost up to £3,400,000. Interestingly, building Australia and Canberra in the UK is said to eventually cost around £1,900,000 per ship...

 

[Dilandu]

Sir John Monash's naval shipbuilding review found that building the heavy cruisers at Cockatoo might cost up to £3,400,000. Interestingly, building Australia and Canberra in the UK is said to eventually cost around £1,900,000 per ship...

Looks like pretty reasonable assumption. The Cockatoo shipyard wasn't exactly big or very experienced. A modern heavy cruiser would be a pretty big leap from the 5600-tons Town-class cruisers that were biggest units they build.

 

[Oberon_706]

Albatross was the largest navy vessel built in Australia until HMAS Stalwart some 40 years later. Even today, the future Hunter-class will be (by displacement value) the largest combatant vessels ever built in-country (Stalwart A215 and Success AOR304 were naval auxiliaries, not combatants, so don't really count. Neither do the LHDs as their hulls were built in Spain and only their superstructure sections were constructed at Williamstown).

 

[Dilandu]

Albatross was the largest navy vessel built in Australia until HMAS Stalwart some 40 years later. Even today, the future Hunter-class will be (by displacement value) the largest combatant vessels ever built in-country (Stalwart A215 and Success AOR304 were naval auxiliaries, not combatants, so don't really count. Neither do the LHDs as their hulls were built in Spain and only their superstructure sections were constructed at Williamstown

Yep. So the construction of heavy cruisers in Australia would be... problematic. Not impossbile, of course, but it clearly would took much more time and cost much more than building in Britain. Especially considering that:

* British shipbuilding suffered a serious decline after World War I and Washington Treaty, so shipbuilders would be eager for any contracts - and would try to offer best price
* A lot of components - like 8-inch guns, armor plates, fire control systems - weren't produced in Australia, and would need to be imported anyway

So the only reason why Australia might be interested in building a heavy cruiser aboard was to get experience in such kind of shipbuilding (in 1920s it was essentially a capital ship construction level). And most likely even in that case, such cruiser would be A - merely an addition to a British-build ships, and B - basically a variation of County-class.

 

[Dilandu]

P.S. Albeit there is one possibility to exploit. What if one of British major shipbuilder decided to open a branch in Australia to avoid rigid British export limitations? While the Royal Navy position was to discourage anything that might cause a new naval arm race (including building warships for export - RN admirals were paranoid that "if we build a cruiser for A, the B would want a cruiser too, and then those dastardly yankees would somehow use it to justify building more cruisers themselves!") the Australia was not under RN jurisdiction. The export cruiser build here would be formally build under Australian jurisdiction.

 

[EwenS]

Yep. So the construction of heavy cruisers in Australia would be... problematic. Not impossbile, of course, but it clearly would took much more time and cost much more than building in Britain. Especially considering that:

* British shipbuilding suffered a serious decline after World War I and Washington Treaty, so shipbuilders would be eager for any contracts - and would try to offer best price
* A lot of components - like 8-inch guns, armor plates, fire control systems - weren't produced in Australia, and would need to be imported anyway

So the only reason why Australia might be interested in building a heavy cruiser aboard was to get experience in such kind of shipbuilding (in 1920s it was essentially a capital ship construction level). And most likely even in that case, such cruiser would be A - merely an addition to a British-build ships, and B - basically a variation of County-class.

Both Australia & Canberra were built simultaneously by John Brown on the Clyde.

Having looked at the prices paid for destroyers in the 1930s when contracts were awarded to yards for pairs of ships, there was IIRC generally a price saving on the second ship. Things like only one set of yard drawings required etc. Economies of scale ordering 2 sets of everything. RN orders for cruisers and larger vessels were handed out singly in this period.

 

[Volkodav]

The excessive time and cost assoc. with building Albatross (and Adelaide before her, which apparently ended up costing over £1,200,000, over 50% more than sister ship Brisbane) was used after the fact to help justify the decision to order the 8" cruisers from Britain. Sir John Monash's naval shipbuilding review found that building the heavy cruisers at Cockatoo might cost up to £3,400,000. Interestingly, building Australia and Canberra in the UK is said to eventually cost around £1,900,000 per ship...

The build of Adelaide was used to justify not building ships locally but there are major issues with the narrative. Forgings and machinery that were not at that point able to be produced locally were lost in transit during the war, there were major design changes implemented during the build. On top of that, according to Freidman's British Cruisers, Adelaide was almost built as a very different ship a sort of a hybrid Town / Frobisher.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Post 92.

Sir John Monash's naval shipbuilding review found that building the heavy cruisers at Cockatoo might cost up to £3,400,000. Interestingly, building Australia and Canberra in the UK is said to eventually cost around £1,900,000 per ship...

Are they the Vote 8 costs? I.e. ex-guns?

Vote 8 refers to Vote 8 of the British Navy Estimates - "Shipbuilding, Repairs, Maintenance, &c." - the cost of the guns was in Vote 9 of the Navy Estimates - "Naval Armaments".

Sources like Brown and contemporary editions of Jane's say the County class cost about £2 million each, but they appear to be quoting the Vote 8 cost.

That's because I've got a copy of a Cabinet Paper from October 1937 on the British Rearmament Programme which includes a table called "Cost of Construction of Various Classes of Ships", which said the cost of a Kent class cruiser was £2,400,000.

EDIT - For what its worth, these are the "Approximate Total Costs" quoted in that table.

£2,350,000 Benbow​

£2,350,000 Iron Duke​

£7,500,000 Nelson​

£7,600,000 Rodney​

£8,000,000 King George V (including aircraft, £75,000)​

£2,400,000 Kent​

£2,175,000 Glasgow (including aircraft, £55,700)​

£2,200,000 Liverpool (including aircraft, £55,700)​

£1,400,000 Penelope & Aurora (including aircraft, £22,000)​

£420,000 Lowestoft & Nottingham (WWI Town class cruisers)​

£140,000 WWI "L" class destroyer​

£335,000 "A" class destroyer​

£380,000 "I" class destroyer​

£575,000 "K" class destroyer​

£595,000 Tribal class destroyer​

 

[Oberon_706]

Are they the Vote 8 costs? I.e. ex-guns?

Vote 8 refers to Vote 8 of the British Navy Estimates - "Shipbuilding, Repairs, Maintenance, &c." - the cost of the guns was in Vote 9 of the Navy Estimates - "Naval Armaments".

Sources like Brown and contemporary editions of Jane's say the County class cost about £2 million each, but they appear to be quoting the Vote 8 cost.

That's because I've got a copy of a Cabinet Paper from October 1937 on the British Rearmament Programme which includes a table called "Cost of Construction of Various Classes of Ships", which said the cost of a Kent class cruiser was £2,400,000.

can't confirm this - the costings I listed were sourced from a 1924 newspaper article ( Melbournes' Argus newspaper) quoting Sir John Monash's testimony in a senate estimates hearing, no such clarifications were made in the article.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

can't confirm this - the costings I listed were sourced from a 1924 newspaper article (Melbourne's Argus newspaper) quoting Sir John Monash's testimony in a senate estimates hearing, no such clarifications were made in the article.

For what it's worth I think the estimated cost of £3,400,000 for a County class cruiser built at Cockatoo is the total cost and the £1,900,000 each for Australia & Canberra is their Vote 8 cost. Therefore, it's not really a like-for-like comparison.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

can't confirm this - the costings I listed were sourced from a 1924 newspaper article (Melbournes' Argus newspaper) quoting Sir John Monash's testimony in a senate estimates hearing, no such clarifications were made in the article.

Another thing to take into account is whether the prices were in Australian Pounds or British Pounds. Because £A1 wasn't worth £1 Sterling.

Correction - £A1 was worth £1 Sterling until circa 1930.

According to the Wikipedia article on the Australian Pound.

In 1929, as an emergency measure during the Great Depression, Australia left the gold standard, resulting in a devaluation relative to sterling. Britain devalued the pound sterling against gold in 1931. A variety of pegs to sterling applied until December 1931, when the government set a rate of £1 Australian = 16 shillings sterling (£1 and 5s Australian = £1 sterling).

 

[EwenS]

This works on the interesting concept that that both the RAN and RNZN consider themselves to be something more than just South Atlantic and South Pacific squadron of the Royal Navy.
The majority of the RCN decamped to UK Waters not long after war was declared.
Amongst other things leaving the Defence of the Pacific Coast to converted fishing boats and a couple of AMCs that lacked fire control systems aside from the Mk I eyeball.

The RCN (on the East Coast at least) naturally integrated with the RN on the Atlantic convoys and wasn't really capable of independent action, on the West Coast Canada had never really developed any strength in depth (perhaps hoping no one would risk annoying the USN by sailing into the Straits of Juan de Fuca to attack Vancouver?).

The province of British Columbia was explicitly on Japan's wish-list during the victory disease musings, to occupy in triumph along with Australia, etc. after the Allied capitulation. The Canadian West was indeed vulnerable, with poor road communications before the completion of the Alaska Highway, and the country's manpower needed for the crucial Battle of the Atlantic and (in time) for service in France. As you point out, a few armed trawlers off Canada's Pacific Coast were little defense. But fortunately for Canada, the victory disease phase was ended by the victory at Midway, although the Japanese troops and planes in the Aleutians remained a worry till later, along with what turned out to be only mild Japanese submarine attention to the Vancouver/Seattle region.

There were rather more Canadian forces deployed on the West Coast from 1940 than might be imagined. These were built up after Pearl Harbor but were reduced again from early 1943 as the Japanese threat reduced.

Ground forces

www.canadiansoldiers.com

www.canadiansoldiers.com

www.canadiansoldiers.com

RCAF

The RCAF Journal - 2018 Volume 7 Number 2 - RCAF Journal - Royal Canadian Air Force - Canada.ca

The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Royal Canadian Air Force RCAFJ Vol. 7, No. 2, Spring 2018

www.canada.ca

RCN
In the winter / spring of 1939/40 the RCN purchased 3 liners for conversion to AMCs. Their conversion was completed later in 1940 after which Prince Robert & Prince Henry were sent to patrol the Canadian West Coast and the South American coast looking for German merchant shipping seeking to return to Germany. The third vessel, Prince David, was deployed in the Caribbean until May 1942 when she was transferred to the Pacific. All three were re-roled during 1943.

HMCS PRINCE ROBERT F56 - For Posterity's Sake

HMCS PRINCE HENRY F70 - For Posterity's Sake

HMCS Prince David - For Posterity's Sake

The escort forces on the West Coast were rather more than "a few armed trawlers", being increased during 1942 and then reduced again in 1943 as the Japanese threat diminished. At its peak in mid-1942 the core of the escort forces were 7 Flowers and 13 Bangor class (the RCN used these as local escorts more than as minesweepers), all built on the West Coast yards. Even in Jan 1945 there were 4 Flowers and 7 Bangors still on the West Coast. These were split between Esquimalt & Prince Rupert.

In 1944 Canada was again looking to the active participation in the Pacific firstly via a contribution to the BPF which it was intended to build up from late 1945 to:-

2 light cruisers. Uganda was taken over in Oct 1944 while under repair in the USA. Ontario followed fresh from the builders in May 1945.
2 light fleet carriers. Intended to be in service by the end of 1945. Warrior & Magnificent were earmarked.
2 destroyer flotillas built around the modern 3 Tribals and 2 V class in RCN service plus the 4 Tribals building in Canada (the first completed in Sept 1945) and the 8 Cr class building in Britain (only Crescent & Crusader were transferred in late 1945 due to the end of the war).
Plus some 40 River class frigates and the AA cruiser Prince Robert.

And secondly via a contribution to Tiger Force with some 8 Lancaster squadrons in the final July 1945 plan.

 

[Scott Kenny]

It's still not looking good for preserving HMAS Oz Down Under.

• No heavy foundries able to reline gun barrels. Not sure if there are even foundries able to make army artillery gun tubes...
• No industrial chemical plants to make HE shell filling, whatever type you choose.
• No shipyard able to build a similar ship, which likely means no drydocks large enough to hold her. I stand corrected, there is at least one drydock large enough to hold her.
• No political will to build such industries. (Note that the chemical plants could easily make fertilizer when not making a run of picric acid or TNT, or in addition to if it's better to keep all those processes running continuously)

As good as it would be for Oz to have a capital ship (ideally a battlecruiser, IMO), there's just nothing down there to support it until the WW2 construction/expansions.

 

[Oberon_706]

Sunderland Dock (Cockatoo Island) = 635’ (later increased to 690’)
HMAS Australia = 590’

 

[Scott Kenny]

Sunderland Dock (Cockatoo Island) = 635’ (later increased to 690’)
HMAS Australia = 590’
View attachment 755393

Okay, so there's a drydock big enough. Sweet, that's half that problem right there.

But there's still no large number of workers who are building and maintaining warships that size. Which is equally important to having a place to do the work.

 

[Oberon_706]

There is no argument that there weren't significant obstacles to be overcome before retaining the battlecruiser would have been a practicable possibility (the least of which was a monetary one), but I don't believe shipyard capacity or capability would have been one of them. Larger tasks than basic seaworthiness and engineering maintenance would have initially been beyond CoDock, requiring a trip to, at least, Columbo or Malta for dry-docking, but the yard would have grown and matured with the necessity. The real challenge would have arisen when tasks requiring infrastructure the yard didn't possess in the 20's and 30's came along, as Sunderland Dock never had an attendant large capacity cranage sufficient to, say, unship a tripod masthead or change a 12" gun barrel. Only the floating crane, Titan (lift cap. 150 tonnes), was remotely capable of such work, requiring the ship to be afloat and alongside at the time. Major refit or modernisation work would likely have required a trip to the UK, or at a minimum, Malta, Gibraltar or (from 1938 - if she was still in commission) Singapore. Not necessarily a problem, but not ideal either.

Whichever way you look at it, retention of Australia I or allocation of a replacement battle cruiser like, say, Princess Royal or Tiger would have required significant investments in Australia's military-industrial complex across the board. From shipyards and machine shops to steelmaking and fabrication, armaments/explosives production and beyond.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The real challenge would have arisen when tasks requiring infrastructure the yard didn't possess in the 20's and 30's came along, as Sunderland Dock never had an attendant large capacity cranage sufficient to, say, unship a tripod masthead or change a 12" gun barrel. Only the floating crane, Titan (lift cap. 150 tonnes), was remotely capable of such work, requiring the ship to be afloat and alongside at the time.

Good point, I had forgotten about the need for cranes as a separate item!

Whichever way you look at it, retention of Australia I or allocation of a replacement battle cruiser like, say, Princess Royal or Tiger would have required significant investments in Australia's military-industrial complex across the board. From shipyards and machine shops to steelmaking and fabrication, armaments/explosives production and beyond.

For where I sit (obviously not Down Under), the entirety of the investments required to support a capital ship in Oz would have been far too expensive for Oz to support.

And that's probably the real reason Oz was willing to give up HMAS Australia, they couldn't afford the upkeep.

 

[Dilandu]

And that's probably the real reason Oz was willing to give up HMAS Australia, they couldn't afford the upkeep.

That, and the lack of any definite military role for her in new conditions.

 

[EwenS]

It's still not looking good for preserving HMAS Oz Down Under.

• No heavy foundries able to reline gun barrels. Not sure if there are even foundries able to make army artillery gun tubes...
• No industrial chemical plants to make HE shell filling, whatever type you choose.
• No shipyard able to build a similar ship, which likely means no drydocks large enough to hold her. I stand corrected, there is at least one drydock large enough to hold her.
• No political will to build such industries. (Note that the chemical plants could easily make fertilizer when not making a run of picric acid or TNT, or in addition to if it's better to keep all those processes running continuously)

As good as it would be for Oz to have a capital ship (ideally a battlecruiser, IMO), there's just nothing down there to support it until the WW2 construction/expansions.

Less need for artificial fertilisers in those days, especially around the Pacific rim. Much fertiliser came from phosphate mining (built up from thousands of years of bird guano). The island of Nuaru and Ocean Island were intensively strip mined for it in this period

Nauru - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Phosphate mining in Banaba and Nauru - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

 

[EwenS]

There is no argument that there weren't significant obstacles to be overcome before retaining the battlecruiser would have been a practicable possibility (the least of which was a monetary one), but I don't believe shipyard capacity or capability would have been one of them. Larger tasks than basic seaworthiness and engineering maintenance would have initially been beyond CoDock, requiring a trip to, at least, Columbo or Malta for dry-docking, but the yard would have grown and matured with the necessity. The real challenge would have arisen when tasks requiring infrastructure the yard didn't possess in the 20's and 30's came along, as Sunderland Dock never had an attendant large capacity cranage sufficient to, say, unship a tripod masthead or change a 12" gun barrel. Only the floating crane, Titan (lift cap. 150 tonnes), was remotely capable of such work, requiring the ship to be afloat and alongside at the time. Major refit or modernisation work would likely have required a trip to the UK, or at a minimum, Malta, Gibraltar or (from 1938 - if she was still in commission) Singapore. Not necessarily a problem, but not ideal either.

Whichever way you look at it, retention of Australia I or allocation of a replacement battle cruiser like, say, Princess Royal or Tiger would have required significant investments in Australia's military-industrial complex across the board. From shipyards and machine shops to steelmaking and fabrication, armaments/explosives production and beyond.

The was no RN dockyard at Colombo, and the facilities at Trincomalee were exceedingly limited (no dry dock at all). The latter was intended more as a fuelling stop inter-war for the fleet on its way east to Singapore. In Ceylon the RN used the commercial dry docks for regular docking of ships in the area and for limited refit work. Those were capable of taking ships up to cruiser size, probably just enough for Australia size wise.

There was also Hong Kong, but again the facilities were limited in size and capability. Larger RN ships generally went home for refits.

That was why Britain plowed its money into Singapore which finally opened in 1938.

 

[Oberon_706]

Thanks for the clarification. - for some reason I thought Colombo had at least a floating dock (although i may have been thinking of Ceylon.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Less need for artificial fertilisers in those days, especially around the Pacific rim. Much fertiliser came from phosphate mining (built up from thousands of years of bird guano). The island of Nuaru and Ocean Island were intensively strip mined for it in this period

Nauru - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Phosphate mining in Banaba and Nauru - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Naru was the other Whicker Island.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ME3V06GRK0

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

For what it's worth the Australian Government thought about acquiring one or more capital ships in the late 1930s. That's according to Chapter One of the official history of the RAN 1939-42, that can be downloaded from the Australian War Memorial website.

Chapter 1 – Between the Wars

www.awm.gov.au

See Page 39 onwards.

 

[EwenS]

Moore "Building for Victory" notes that the then First Sea Lord, Sir Roger Backhouse, commented in Feb 1939 that "Australia shies badly at the cost". Studies produced 3 alternatives at this time.

1. 2 turret Lion type, 34,000 tons, 2x3 16in. Cost £7.5m
2. 8x15in (4x2), 27.5-29 knots, 37,000 tons, protection as per KGV. Cost £7m which assumed that the guns and mountings would be gifted to Australia but that they would be responsible for the cost of their modernisation.
3. 6x15in (3x2), speed 29.5-31 knots, protection as per KGV, 33,500 tons. Turrets transferred as in 2. above. Cost £5.25m

The earliest that such a ship could be completed in the UK for Australia was then predicted to be 1943, even if it was given priority over a similar ship for the RN (i.e. a Vanguard). To fill the gap the loan of an existing capital ship was to be considered.

 

[EwenS]

AFD.1 was at Bermuda 1902-1947

AFD.2,3,4,6,7 & 11 were in Britain throughout the inter-war period.

AFD.5 was moved from Portsmouth to Alexandria in July 1939 as a precaution against Malta becoming unusable.

AFD.8 was taken over as war reparations from Germany after WW1 and was at Malta from 1925 until sunk there in June 1940.

AFD.9 built in 1928 went to Singapore and was sunk there in Jan 1942.

AFD.10 was a small (5,000 ton lift) cruiser dock built in 1924 and at Singapore until 1942.

Everything after that was WW2 construction. AFD.23 went to Trincomalee in 1944 and collapsed with the battleship Valiant in it in Aug (her very first lift).

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Handy, though for symmetry with Albatross it probably needs to to point out that Otway and Oxley were paid off within a year of arriving in Australia in 1930, and transferred to the RN in 1931.

It clearly shows that Australia had 2 submarines from 1926 to 1930 and none afterwards. The notes in the table say they arrived at Thursday Island on 25th January, 1929.

Defence budget as percentage of GDP would also be useful in the first table. I've seen claims the Australian budget was significantly lower than the British in terms of percentage of GDP, but I don't know how accurate that is.

I can't help you there. The source document didn't say what Australia's GDP was. I'd have put it in the table in the first place if it had.

 

[DWG]

Everything after that was WW2 construction.

Not entirely true, AFD.29 and AFD.30 were pre-war Italian docks scuttled at Massawa and salvaged in 1942. AFD.27 was an Italian-built dock seized in Iran and subsequently sent to Massawa,

AFD.23 went to Trincomalee in 1944 and collapsed with the battleship Valiant in it in Aug (her very first lift).

Worth mentioning that AFD.23 was built in Bombay (though designed in the UK by Braithwaites, who were specialists in dock design), then shipped to Trincomalee. Goodall is pretty scathing in his assessment of what happened - the dockmaster had never read the manual, the two senior constructors on site had also never read the manual and had gone to a show ashore.

"18 November: Finished AFD.23 report: Lessons are (i) Dockyard officers must have enough design knowledge of the ships they are using or repairing (ii) promoted foremen are not good enough for the RCNC without some sort of design course (iii) when CE or D of D cuts civilian staff, technical depts should nail them down. At Malta we did not get the staff we wanted for the Fl Dock, everything went all right [Goodall had been the constructor there when ex-German AFD.8 arrived in 1925]. At Trinco ditto but when everything went wrong, the Constr[uction] Dept got the blame tho’ understaffed."

Buxton, Ian. Diary of a Wartime Naval Constructor: Sir Stanley Goodall (p. 253). Pen & Sword Books. Kindle Edition.

"11 September: Curphey [E S, Assistant Director of Dockyards] looked into DNC’s office when I was working & we had a long yarn. Hill [S I, Acting Constructor Captain, Eastern Fleet] & Mutch are to be disrated to their substantive rank as a result of India Floating Dock disaster [AFD.23]. He thinks this is too harsh; it is certainly severe but they were to blame. [Goodall was right, the two senior constructors were culpable in leaving the lifting of Valiant, which was four times heavier than any previous ship docked, to inexperienced underlings without checking everything and supervising themselves – they had gone to a concert ashore."

Buxton, Ian. Diary of a Wartime Naval Constructor: Sir Stanley Goodall (p. 288). Pen & Sword Books. Kindle Edition.

AFD.24 (ex US YFD.6, ) was also due to go to Trinco, but was wrecked en-route, breaking her tow and grounding off Derna. AFD.25 also sank en route from the US to Freetown, though I'm not sure what her ultimate destination was. AFD.22 from Chatham made it to Trinco, but was only 2,750t lift.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I mean, there's a good argument for Oz to have a capital ship to use as the RAN Flagship. I'd want a battlecruiser, something that could outrun the Kongo-class if they couldn't outgun them.

They just don't have the infrastructure or economy to support it in the 1920s.

 

[Oberon_706]

Moore "Building for Victory" notes that the then First Sea Lord, Sir Roger Backhouse, commented in Feb 1939 that "Australia shies badly at the cost". Studies produced 3 alternatives at this time.

1. 2 turret Lion type, 34,000 tons, 2x3 16in. Cost £7.5m
2. 8x15in (4x2), 27.5-29 knots, 37,000 tons, protection as per KGV. Cost £7m which assumed that the guns and mountings would be gifted to Australia but that they would be responsible for the cost of their modernisation.
3. 6x15in (3x2), speed 29.5-31 knots, protection as per KGV, 33,500 tons. Turrets transferred as in 2. above. Cost £5.25m

The earliest that such a ship could be completed in the UK for Australia was then predicted to be 1943, even if it was given priority over a similar ship for the RN (i.e. a Vanguard). To fill the gap the loan of an existing capital ship was to be considered.

The third option sounds interesting - effectively an up-to-date Renown/Repulse built to KGV /Lion standards.