Could HMAS Australia have been saved from scrapping ?

[Owens Z]

Although I have not travelled to the Southern Hemisphere, I have followed with interest the continuing arguments in Australia and elsewhere about the battlecruiser HMAS Australia, that she should not have been scuttled off Sydney in 1924 according to terms of the Washington Naval Treaty, but instead could have usefully stayed in service. The 2004 article "A Loss More Symbolic Than Material?" cited in the first post of this interesting thread gives an overview of the issues. Neither the article nor the posts in this thread quite say so, but of course the reason why this particular warship has been argued over is because during the Treaty's negotiations in February 1922, an Australian could have stood up and factually stated "in twenty years my country will be fighting for its life, with the city of Darwin in flames from enemy bombing, and we'll need every ship we can get". But while entirely truthful, such prescience seems implausible. And it appears from history that there wasn't a will in the Australian government or navy in the early 1920's to retain the obsolescent battlecruiser.

I don't think the lawyerly argument that this ship was now "really an armoured cruiser" would have passed the laugh test during the Treaty negotiations. More tenable is that Australia, had the will been present, could have presented itself as an independent country from the UK, and declared that the UK's signature on the Treaty didn't affect Australia's separate navy, founded in 1901 (with some added effort being made to reduce the large percentage of the ship's crew who were British). HMAS Australia would then not have been subject to the Treaty, just like the existing dreadnought capital ships of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Spain, Turkey, and the USSR were not.

I judge that a counterfactually surviving HMAS Australia was unlikely to have had a comprehensive reconstruction between the wars like, for example, Italy and Japan expensively gave their older capital ships. Instead it would have had something like the refits that Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Spain, Turkey, and the USSR gave their dreadnoughts: i.e. modest at best. In 1941-42 the ship would probably be unable to approach her 26-knot First World War full speed. Her main battery's 16-degree elevation would have been usefully increased, and had Australia foresightedly obtained and warehoused the Royal Navy's stocks of 12" Mark VIIa Greenboy shells, and spare barrels, at little expense when the RN put the 12"/45 Mark X gun out of service in the early 1920's, there would have remained a plentiful supply of ammunition for the ship (stocks of USN AP Mark 15s might have been made available had Greenboy deterioration in storage become a real problem). Her country has plenty of coal, for fuel. The battlecruiser would enter WW2 with an antiaircraft battery that was thought adequate at the time; i.e. inadequate. But had she survived 1942's savage fighting, the AA battery would have been greatly strengthened with US-supplied 20mm and 40mm cannon. And her probable lack of radar in 1942 would have been corrected with US equipment.

Assuming she was still in service at the start of WW2, how would HMAS Australia have contributed to the country's war effort, do you think? I discuss in another thread how a counterfactually surviving HMS Tiger would have seen worthwhile service for Britain during WW2. Tiger, about three years later in conception than the Indefatigable class of which Australia was a part, was a substantially larger and faster ship, with greater firepower, and she endured the German shells that exploded Indefatigable at Jutland. But in desperate times, every little bit can help. How decisive would the obsolete HMAS Australia have been? No matter how poor the crew's morale, a Royal Australian Navy warship, in her country's hour of need, would be unlikely to flee along with the British Eastern Fleet to Kenya, or escape to California. But the fighting old battlecruiser would not be able to match Japanese capital ships (or deal with airpower) and would probably have been sunk during the war, maybe with as heavy a loss of life as Indefatigable suffered, for a country with limited manpower.

 

[Owens Z]

It's interesting to speculate if Churchill and Fisher's pre-war concept of Dominion-funded fleets in Australia and Canada to form an Imperial Navy, whether Japan would have been so keen to have ignored Australia's contribution.
Let's not beat about the bush, in 1922 the Canadian and Australian navies were a motley collection of pre-war paid-for ships and wartime British cast offs. Numerically and on a tonnage basis they were probably smaller than most Latin American navies or minor European navies and so its no wonder that they were initially ignored.
Even if Australia had chosen to remain outside of the Washington Treaty, there is no doubt that had Britain tried to divest its tonnage to her, the other signatories would have kicked up a fuss.

Ahhh, but Britain did not "try to divest" Australia to Australia: that warship had legally always been part of the RAN, and in practice this was (more or less) the truth. Unlike, for example, sister ship HMS New Zealand, which had been funded by the taxpayers of her namesake but had no other connection to that country. I think that Australia's attorneys could plausibly argue (had the will been present) that UK-affiliated navies such as Canada's, India's, New Zealand's, and South Africa's were not relevant to her situation, because those had no capital ships.

C&G were largely freaks and its no surprise that they slipped under the net, for example Furious was already a proto-carrier. This probably explains why the Admiralty converted C&G; they were relatively young hulls useless for anything else and Furious had shown potential as a carrier and they could convert all three ships. Making use of the other clauses probably seemed of less value, Hermes was the experimental new-build and of course with Argus and Eagle converting too (not sure of Eagle's legal status, presumably the WT classified her as a British capital ship?).

Using that logic C&G would fall to be classed as capital ships as they exceeded 10,000 tons and had 15” guns. And, as pointed out earlier, they were NOT covered by the Treaty. So the definition of “capital ship” in the Treaty cannot have been intended to be retrospectively applied to existing ships. It can only be applied to ships “hereafter built”.

In every story of battlecruisers that I have ever read, the three Courageous-class ships are fully included. Jackie Fisher's dodgy "large light cruiser" designation was a euphemism to get around the Chancellor of the Exchequer's stricture that nothing above light cruisers would be funded in that fiscal year, as a war emergency measure. I don't defend their freakish design, but they were in fact battlecruisers, and I am surprised to learn that the postwar Washington Naval Treaty's negotiations, and its settled terms, did not treat the Courageous class as capital ships, assuming EwenS is indeed correct. I didn't know that.

 

[Owens Z]

How WWII Pacific campaign might have been different with those plans (grabs popcorn).

Let's get our popcorn ready and see. Perhaps a still-extant battlecruiser HMAS Australia, escorting Australian Army troopships across the Indian Ocean, drove off the intrusive attentions of the (substantially speedier) German pocket battleship Admiral Scheer in February 1941, or fought off warships of the Italian Red Sea Flotilla. If it was Australia that had approached and queried ex-freighter (and secret German raider) Kormoran on 19 November 1941 rather than light cruiser Sydney, then the raider's hidden guns could not have seriously damaged Australia before the German ship was blasted apart. If Australia had assembled with Force Z in Singapore, would she be haplessly sunk along with doomed HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse? No, Admiral Tom Phillips would probably have deemed the Australian warship to be too slow to join his intended quick foray against the Japanese amphibious landings in Malaya.

Supposing she wasn't caught by surprise in Darwin Harbour and sunk by carrier planes on 19 February 1942, then one can envision Australia accompanying the small ABDA fleet into the fierce Battle of the Java Sea on 27 February. Her eight 12" guns could have devastated the two Japanese heavy cruisers (although with all the Long Lance torpedoes in the water, Australia might still have been in trouble). But of course in our counterfactual history, the aging battlecruiser's existence would be known to the Imperial Japanese Navy, and therefore they could have easily allotted a capital ship to the convoy escort that night. The brave ABDA fleet would still have been wiped out, most likely. A surviving Australia would have been forced to retreat to Sydney or Perth/Fremantle to avoid air attack, and might have been found and attacked there by a Japanese midget submarine.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Acknowleged the possibility - Yes; in a position to do anything about preparing for the possibility??... Probably not.
The French (like the British) were nigh-on-bankrupt after the most destructive and murderous conflict in human history to date - and weren’t really in the position to be able to spend significant sums on rebuilding their fleet to face either Britain or the US - they also remained largely land-centric in their defensive thinking, despite their global colonial interests and the global nature of the Great War. Neither potential protagonist had designs on French colonial posessions in Africa or the Far East anyway.

Japan was quite interested in the French Colonial possessions in the Far East... Siam, Indochina...

But what to do then? When the old British shells became dangerous to use, and RAN would be stuck with efficiently disarmed battlecruiser?

Any foundry-and-forge capable of making ~12" diameter billets could make new shell bodies, then you need to fill them with explosive. I'm sure there's somewhere in Aus in the 1930s making TNT that could be used to fill the shells. Molten TNT is reasonably safe to work with, after all.

Use the same fuze threads as those used on artillery base-detonating fuzes, or those used by the ~4-6" guns used by the RAN.

 

[Dilandu]

Any foundry-and-forge capable of making ~12" diameter billets could make new shell bodies, then you need to fill them with explosive. I'm sure there's somewhere in Aus in the 1930s making TNT that could be used to fill the shells. Molten TNT is reasonably safe to work with, after all.

Yeah, but it would cost a lot, to order a new 12-inch shells after RN stopped to order such at all. The small-scale production of 12-inch shell for Australia - they would not order a lot, because they only have limited need - would not exactly be attractive to manufacturers. So the price of 12-inch shells would be at very least several times than of mass-produced shells.

Use the same fuze threads as those used on artillery base-detonating fuzes, or those used by the ~4-6" guns used by the RAN.

I rather doubt that those fuzes would work efficiently on large-caliber AP shells.

 

[Dilandu]

I judge that a counterfactually surviving HMAS Australia was unlikely to have had a comprehensive reconstruction between the wars like, for example, Italy and Japan expensively gave their older capital ships. Instead it would have had something like the refits that Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Spain, Turkey, and the USSR gave their dreadnoughts: i.e. modest at best. In 1941-42 the ship would probably be unable to approach her 26-knot First World War full speed. Her main battery's 16-degree elevation would have been usefully increased, and had Australia foresightedly obtained and warehoused the Royal Navy's stocks of 12" Mark VIIa Greenboy shells, and spare barrels, at little expense when the RN put the 12"/45 Mark X gun out of service in the early 1920's, there would have remained a plentiful supply of ammunition for the ship (stocks of USN AP Mark 15s might have been made available had Greenboy deterioration in storage become a real problem). Her country has plenty of coal, for fuel. The battlecruiser would enter WW2 with an antiaircraft battery that was thought adequate at the time; i.e. inadequate. But had she survived 1942's savage fighting, the AA battery would have been greatly strengthened with US-supplied 20mm and 40mm cannon. And her probable lack of radar in 1942 would have been corrected with US equipment.

There would be several serious problems limiting the efficiency of HMAS Australia if she did not get the massive reconstruction.

1) The max speed of 26 knots or below would put her in rather... clumsy position; she can't operate with modern cruisers, and she is far too weak to operate with any kind of battleline.

2) Her armor - especially deck one - is extremely vulnerable to plunging fire

3) Her torpedo protection is not adequate even by WW1 measures

Essentially without massive reconstruction she would be stuck in rather unfortunate position when she can't do anything useful. Too slow, too weak, too vulnerable - all in one hull, and the one too expensive to operate.

 

[Volkodav]

A slight tangent but this video is both interesting and relevant.

Tiger Cubs - RN actually builds dreadnought armoured cruisers with 9.2in guns alongside HMS Tiger...​

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZaLdj6KBZ_8


In an earlier comment in this thread I queried why Australia ordered an Indefatigable rather than a more modern type, I found the answer, the Indefatigable were built to a price as station flag ships, they really were evolved armoured cruisers, rather than Battle Cruisers (cruiser end of the scale) or Battlecruisers (fast battleship end of the scale).

This raises the question on whether an actual evolved armoured cruiser, with 9.2" guns may have been a better option.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Yeah, but it would cost a lot, to order a new 12-inch shells after RN stopped to order such at all. The small-scale production of 12-inch shell for Australia - they would not order a lot, because they only have limited need - would not exactly be attractive to manufacturers. So the price of 12-inch shells would be at very least several times than of mass-produced shells.

I was assuming running down the British-sourced shells and then ordering a fairly large and long-term buy of Aus-made shells.

Large enough to make it worth setting up whatever tooling you'd need (I have no idea what specific tooling there even is, but I'm sure there's some) and running an assembly line making a couple hundred shells a month for a couple of years to build a new stockpile.

I rather doubt that those fuzes would work efficiently on large-caliber AP shells.

12" AP has a similar sized bursting charge to 155mm, 7.2" or 8" Army HE, though. 12" MkVIa has a 27lb bursting charge, MkVIIa has a 20lb charge, while 155mm HE has a charge of about 15lbs. I don't have a good reference for the 7.2" or 8" Army gun bursting charge sizes, but I expect those to be roughly proportional to the 155s, ~15% or so of shell weight (actually, I expect the larger HE shells to be a proportionally greater fill weight).

Might get weird with the 12" HE shells, as those had over 100lbs of bursting charge. I know there's a limit to how much TNT will detonate from one fuze/primer/detonator, I just don't remember where that is.

 

[Dilandu]

I was assuming running down the British-sourced shells and then ordering a fairly large and long-term buy of Aus-made shells.

The standard ammo supply for Indefatigable-class battlecruiser is 80 shells per gun. I.e. 640 shells would be ship full load. The barrel life is about 220 shots, i.e. about 2.5 times of full load.

Let's assume that Australians wanted to have five full loads (two barrel lives). It's about 3200 shells. It's a small party, frankly.

12" AP has a similar sized bursting charge to 155mm, 7.2" or 8" Army HE, though. 12" MkVIa has a 27lb bursting charge, MkVIIa has a 20lb charge, while 155mm HE has a charge of about 15lbs. I don't have a good reference for the 7.2" or 8" Army gun bursting charge sizes, but I expect those to be roughly proportional to the 155s, ~15% or so of shell weight (actually, I expect the larger HE shells to be a proportionally greater fill weight).

They may have a similar size burster, but the shell is of different shape, walls of different thickness and subjected to different barrel pressure. Also:

12" AP has a similar sized bursting charge to 155mm, 7.2" or 8" Army HE

The AP shell fuze must survive contact with armor, did not fell away or break under impact, and work with high enough precision to explode shell after armor penetration. You can't just use a HE fuze on AP shell; the HE fuze is not designed to survive penetration.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The standard ammo supply for Indefatigable-class battlecruiser is 80 shells per gun. I.e. 640 shells would be ship full load. The barrel life is about 220 shots, i.e. about 2.5 times of full load.

Let's assume that Australians wanted to have five full loads (two barrel lives). It's about 3200 shells. It's a small party, frankly.

So buying another 3200 or so shells would be perfectly reasonable work for ONE foundry and an explosives plant to fill them. Not quite 3 years work at 100 rounds a month. The Foundry would probably end up with other work in addition to making the big shells if they're only making 5 a day.

The AP shell fuze must survive contact with armor, did not fell away or break under impact, and work with high enough precision to explode shell after armor penetration. You can't just use a HE fuze on AP shell; the HE fuze is not designed to survive penetration.

It's a naval AP shell. Base fuze, not nose fuze. Which means that the fuze is going to want to try to slam up into the middle of the HE filler if it rips out of the base of the shell. Your primary concern is shell timing, and a typical Army HE shell fuze with a relatively slow delay is ideal. Not like the usual 2-5ms super-quick fuzes people were using in smaller shells for rounds when you're trying to get a surface detonation, I'm talking the fuzes used in heavy shells for destroying bunkers with ~25-50ms delay.

 

[Dilandu]

So buying another 3200 or so shells would be perfectly reasonable work for ONE foundry and an explosives plant to fill them. Not quite 3 years work at 100 rounds a month. The Foundry would probably end up with other work in addition to making the big shells if they're only making 5 a day.

The shells required high precision to manufacture. To make 3000+ of high precision things, you need an accembly line, not hand-made manufacture. So basically the foundry would need to make an accembly line just for a one-time order. Most of foundries would not be interested, unless you would pay for such assembly line - but at this point you might as well start thinking about your own shells manufacturing.

 

[EwenS]

A few things to think about:-
1. Your guns are going to need relined periodically. At the very least you will need to be carrying out training shoots to keep your gun crews efficient as well as shoots to verify the quality of the shells you ar buying (or maybe you have other guns ashore dedicated to that role). Barrel life of the 12in / 45 was around 220 rounds (increased to 280 in 1915 with newer shells).

Relining them is not an easy task, requiring specialist foundry equipment and a lot of heat. And you are not going to be doing it that often in peacetime.

Maybe you can buy enough replacement guns pre-WNT to keep the ship going. How long do you need that to be? Might be better just to send them to one of the UK gun manufacturers.

2. The shell load-out at the end of WW1 consisted of 4 different types of shell. APC (Armour Piercing Capped), CPC (Common Pointed Capped) and HE (High Explosive) as well as Shrapnel. All with different lengths and different bursting charges. Peacetime loadout for Australia & her sisters was 24 APC, 24 CPC, 28 HE & 6 Shrapnel.

3. There were different methods of creating the shell bodies depending on the manufacturer. Shell bodies once created had to be "hardened, heat treated, tempered and annealed, providing a gradation of hardness from highest at head and shoulders to lowest at the lower walls and base". They would then often be left in the open for several months to reveal any flaws. Only after that could they be machined and grooved to take the copper driving band and prepared for fitting the cap (which had to be manufactured and precision enginerered separately). Then a streamlined nose was added. Only then could they be sent for filling.

4. Who is going to manufacture the fillings for these shells? And what will it be. By the end of WW1 Lyddite seems to have been the most common filling for the 12in shells but there seems to have been other options moving into the inter-war period.

And what about the propellant? Who is going to manufacture that to the required standard?

5. Then each batch of shells will require proof testing (back to 1 above)

6. And what is the shelf life of the of the fillings and propellant charges? How often does your stock need turned over as fillings and propellants deteriorate over time?

 

[Dilandu]

A few things to think about:-

A perfect summary.

 

[Dilandu]

Okay, let's summarize the problems about HMAS Australia capabilities:

* She is slow - the kind of "too slow to chase, too slow to escape". Her max speed is about 26 knots (likely it would be worse by 1930s), and this means that she is utterly incapable of both catching the enemy cruisers, and fleeing the enemy battlecruisers/fast battleships. And the main potential opponent - Japan - have at least six fast capital ships (four Kongo-class and two Nagato-class) that HMAS Australia could not escape from

* She is not armored enough to stand & fight - her side armor is vulnerable to Japanese 20-cm/50 cannons from at least 17.000 meters, and her decks could be penetrated by plunging hits from the same 20-cm/50 cannons from at least 18.000 meters. Without a significant armor upgrade, she would not exactly looks good even against second-generation heavy cruisers. And due to side turrets, it would be kinda hard to significantly increase vertical armor - they are vulnerable.

* Her main guns are short-ranged, and not exactly very powerful; they don't have much of deck penetration even assuming that angle would be increased. Most importantly, due to guns arrangement, it is pretty hard to actually use full broadisde.

* Her anti-torpedo defense is, by 1930s measures, nonexistent, so even a single torpedo or mine hit may be just fatal. While the problem could be remedied with the help of bulges, it would drop her speed even more, making her tactical niche even less understandable.

* Due to echelon arrangement of main guns, the increase in anti-aircraft artillery would be a major headahce; basically the only way would be to place DP guns and AA guns on superstructure or on turret's roofs. Which would increase the upper weight rather badly.

To summarize: to stay more or less viable during WW2, the HMAS Australia would require:

1) Installation of bulges

2) Complete powerplant replacement to be at least capable of 26 knots

3) Main guns angle increase

4) Deck armor increase

The cost of such reconstruction would probably be more than a cost of modern heavy cruiser which would NOT have all this problems in first place.

 

[Dilandu]

(P.S. Sorry for the third post, just got an idea) The main barrier against any kind of major reconstruction of HMAS Australia is that she is a single ship. Hardly worth of efforts. Now, if she wasn't the single ship...

What about the possibility, that HMS New Zealand would be donated not for Royal Navy, but actually for Royal AUSTRALIAN Navy? Let's say that New Zealand grew worried about the possibility that ship donated to RN would be used mainly in Europe (and thus not for the best of New Zealand defense) and decided to donate battlecruiser to Royal Australian Navy, so it would operate close to home?

So by the end of the war, Australia have not one, but TWO battlecruisers of same type. And that's much more interesting, since two battlecruisers represent much more adequate force, worthy both of retaining & massive reconstruction.

 

[GK Dundas]

This works on the interesting concept that that both the RAN and RNZN consider themselves to be something more than just South Atlantic and South Pacific squadron of the Royal Navy.
The majority of the RCN decamped to UK Waters not long after war was declared.
Amongst other things leaving the Defence of the Pacific Coast to converted fishing boats and a couple of AMCs that lacked fire control systems aside from the Mk I eyeball.

 

[Scott Kenny]

A few things to think about:-
1. Your guns are going to need relined periodically. At the very least you will need to be carrying out training shoots to keep your gun crews efficient as well as shoots to verify the quality of the shells you ar buying (or maybe you have other guns ashore dedicated to that role). Barrel life of the 12in / 45 was around 220 rounds (increased to 280 in 1915 with newer shells).

Relining them is not an easy task, requiring specialist foundry equipment and a lot of heat. And you are not going to be doing it that often in peacetime.

Same problem exists for even the 6" guns on light cruisers. If Oz has the facilities for the smaller naval guns (or is building them, so as to be more independent), you scale said facilities to be able to work on 12" guns.

2. The shell load-out at the end of WW1 consisted of 4 different types of shell. APC (Armour Piercing Capped), CPC (Common Pointed Capped) and HE (High Explosive) as well as Shrapnel. All with different lengths and different bursting charges. Peacetime loadout for Australia & her sisters was 24 APC, 24 CPC, 28 HE & 6 Shrapnel.

Right. You can probably drop down to APC and HE (the USN certainly had by the 1930s). Not sure what the point of actual shrapnel/cargo shells in 12" caliber is, they'd be coming in at too steep an angle to get a good beaten zone.

Now you only need two types of shells.

3. There were different methods of creating the shell bodies depending on the manufacturer. Shell bodies once created had to be "hardened, heat treated, tempered and annealed, providing a gradation of hardness from highest at head and shoulders to lowest at the lower walls and base". They would then often be left in the open for several months to reveal any flaws. Only after that could they be machined and grooved to take the copper driving band and prepared for fitting the cap (which had to be manufactured and precision enginerered separately). Then a streamlined nose was added. Only then could they be sent for filling.

Yes, same applies to shells as small as 25pdr, maybe even 3".

Oz was making their own artillery ammunition, were they not?

4. Who is going to manufacture the fillings for these shells? And what will it be. By the end of WW1 Lyddite seems to have been the most common filling for the 12in shells but there seems to have been other options moving into the inter-war period.

I'm assuming TNT, Lyddite is okay for wartime use but not for building up in a peacetime arsenal. TNT is also friendlier to work with, both in terms of making it and in terms of using it industrially in quarries etc.

And what about the propellant? Who is going to manufacture that to the required standard?

Same place that makes propellant for the other naval and artillery guns. Which again, Oz is doing, right?

5. Then each batch of shells will require proof testing (back to 1 above)

Just like your artillery shells do.

Again, wasn't Oz making their own artillery ammunition? Didn't they have facilities to reline guns, or if not present post-war wasn't Oz building such?

6. And what is the shelf life of the of the fillings and propellant charges? How often does your stock need turned over as fillings and propellants deteriorate over time?

Lyddite, maybe 10 years, picric acid tends to react with the metal on the inside of the shell pretty quickly. Which is why it was dropped post WW1.

TNT is stable for at least twice that long in proper conditions, and IIRC the US was using Vietnam-production shells and bombs filled with TNT (or Composition B, 60/40 RDX/TNT) in Afghanistan, at least 30 years past time of manufacture.

 

[Oberon_706]

Thank you to ‘Owens Z’ for reviving this thread and for all the insightful contributions that followed—it’s made fascinating reading and has given us all plenty of food for thought!

To clarify, even with a complete reconstruction on the scale of what was done for Warspite or Renown, I always doubted that HMAS Australia could successfully face Japanese ships of equal or greater size and survive the encounter (as I mentioned in my initial post—see below). I gave little consideration to Submarine or Mine strike, neither had I considered the possibility that she might be vulnerable to a Japanese heavy cruiser like a Mogami, even in a rebuilt condition. I’m happy to concede those points. That said, modern (for early-war RN/RAN) radar-directed targeting and upgraded 12" turrets with an increased max. range would surely have made her a formidable opponent in a surface engagement, at least when pitted against anything less than a rebuilt Kongo.

retaining Australia (and at least partially reconstructing her in the interbellum), paired with a light cruiser force for defence of the northern approaches gives a deterrent value akin to a fleet in being due to the fact that a Japanese raiding force coming south towards the Malacca strait/Sunda strait and the trade routes to Suez now has to bring at least a Kongo to the fight or it's going to get a bollocking.

Considering CanisD’s speculative scenarios and several others' insights in this thread, is it worth exploring how a credible "large repair" for HMAS Australia could have been achieved?

For mine, a pre-1930 large repair is not overly worthwhile, although standard refits and potential upgrades to introduce some form of credible AA battery should be considered at a minimum to keep the ship marginally viable and 'showing the flag'. Perhaps effort could be made during this decade to add anti-torpedo bulges and improve command and control, the utility and ergonomics of the bridge and conning tower, gun direction etc. Little else would seem worthwhile without considering major work to the powertrain and guns/turrets. Would a Repulse-level refit be credible for Australia if done in the late 20's?

Assuming a proper 'Large Repair' process is undertaken post-1930, should arguably extend to?:

• Speed and Torpedo Protection: Maintaining/reattaining her designed top speed (or as close as possible thereto) while adding effective torpedo protection is a . This would require torpedo bulges and re-powering with small-tube boilers and modern turbines (at a minimum)—already so significant a task that (as previously discussed) it would jeopardise the feasibility of the whole show. Given this scope (assuming it went ahead, of course), further improvements would be logical.
• Armament Reconfiguration: A full re-engining would likely remove most of her topside superstructure and require significant internal reconfiguration as a matter of course, raising the question of deleting a wing turret and relocating the remaining turret to the centerline. Additionally, the main 12" armament could be re-engineered for greater range with improved elevation. Repowering, the deletion of one wing turret, and reconfiguring the topsides would free up space, weight, and crew for a secondary battery of 4.5" DP guns (e.g., six-eight guns in three-four turrets per flank). If possible, these should be the 'BD' turrets from the carriers and rebuilt battleships, to clear the firing arcs of the main battery and theoretically provide greater resilience against the concussion of the main battery firing. Additional batteries of lesser AA calibres would include 40mm Pom-Poms and, eventually, 40mm Bofors and 20mm Oerlikon mounts.
• Topsides and Funnels: Rebuilt topsides and funnels should optimise firing arcs for surface and AA gunnery while maintaining weight and stability margins. A “Queen Anne’s Mansion”-style forward superstructure, similar to London, could include a hangar for spotter planes, with cranage fitted afore of Q turret, which would host a catapult on its roof.
• Modernization: Fit the most advanced radar and communication systems available at the time, with strong masts and topsides designed to accommodate future upgrades. Ensure a topside weight margin is preserved.
• Armour Upgrades: Improve protection on an all-or-nothing basis, reinforcing magazines, decks, and turret barbettes against plunging fire and providing sufficient side armour to resist 8" fire, with limited protection against 12".

Anyway, enough of my brain farts, as I'm sure I've missed something or proposed something that some might think is laughable...
___

As for the main topic of this thread (her hypothetical retention under the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty rather than a side debate on her viability or the ability of Aust. industry to manufacture shells), my thoughts leaned towards the strategic concept of a "threat-in-being." This idea, while more theoretical than practical, suggests that simply having her in service during the interbellum could have influenced Japanese—or other potential aggressors'—threat assessments in ways that her absence would not. I’ve never viewed Australia as anything more than a ‘cruiser killer’, and in this context, her retention and modernisation make sense pre-LNT. Her existence is predicated on being the last word in deterring a campaign against sea lines of communication. A deterrent that renders IJN's impressive gaggle of cruisers vulnerable at a stroke (much as it did von Spee's German East Asiatic Squadron) and causes a strategic rethink amongst the IJN admirals, even more so if, as ‘Dilandu’ suggests, HMS New Zealand is also retained and modernised to a similar or common standard, OR, as 'Volkodav' suggested, Tiger is acquired post-1931 to replace Australia and subjected to a limited 'Large Repair' for that purpose (perhaps incl. fitment of 14" guns!).

Of course, this is all counterfactual and fart-in-the-wind stuff, but it’s been great to dive into the possibilities (which is the whole point of this forum in any event)!

To carry this discussion forward, acknowledging the issues and possibilities we have discussed already in this thread, does anyone care to explore what a fit-for-purpose interwar RAN should have looked like by the time Hitler invaded Poland? What could the RAN reasonably field to provide a credible deterrent to Japan?? Most importantly, can we ground any such theories in reality by citing hypotheticals and hitorical plans that were for whatever reason, never actioned?

Cheers

 

[Dilandu]

Anyway, enough of my brain farts, as I'm sure I've missed something or proposed something that some might think is laughable...

It's perfectly reasonable plan - it's only problem would be that it's pretty costly. It would at least cost as much as a new heavy cruiser.

does anyone care to explore what a fit-for-purpose interwar RAN should have looked like by the time Hitler invaded Poland? What could the RAN reasonably field to provide a credible deterrent to Japan??

Hm! A good question! As far as I know, Australian never seriously assumed that they would be fighting Japanese without RN involvement, so their role was always defined as "protect the communications till RN would dealt with the main problem". The scenario in which Australia decided to took more proactive attitude toward its defense - maybe fearing that Singapore strategy would fail, mabye being worried that RN could be distracted by tensions in Europe - looks... interesting to explore

 

[Scott Kenny]

To carry this discussion forward, acknowledging the issues and possibilities we have discussed already in this thread, does anyone care to explore what a fit-for-purpose interwar RAN should have looked like by the time Hitler invaded Poland? What could the RAN reasonably field to provide a credible deterrent to Japan?? Most importantly, can we ground any such theories in reality by citing hypotheticals and hitorical plans that were for whatever reason, never actioned?

I think that the best fit-for-purpose refit would start by converting the ship to oil-fired boilers (despite Oz's large coal reserves) and reduction geared turbines.

This frees up the former coal bunkers (and whatever new fuel tanks are used) to become part of the underwater protection scheme, and also saves a LOT of manpower in the stokers.

This would be a massive refit, taking a lot of time and money, no way around that.

Probably a massive enough refit to relocate the turrets to the centerline and get them superfiring. (at least one of them, giving you the same 6-gun broadside firepower as before) Now you have that huge midships area where P and Q used to be to use for AA guns and aviation.

 

[Dilandu]

I think that the best fit-for-purpose refit would start by converting the ship to oil-fired boilers (despite Oz's large coal reserves) and reduction geared turbines.

Actually... coal slurry, maybe? It's not as good as oil, but it's a kind of liquid fuel that Australia could provide in large quantites.

Probably a massive enough refit to relocate the turrets to the centerline and get them superfiring. (at least one of them, giving you the same 6-gun broadside firepower as before) Now you have that huge midships area where P and Q used to be to use for AA guns and aviation.

I'm not exactly sure such reconstruction is viable. Wouldn't it affect the hull weight & stress distribution?

 

[Scott Kenny]

Actually... coal slurry, maybe? It's not as good as oil, but it's a kind of liquid fuel that Australia could provide in large quantites.

I'm not very fond of that, but it might work.

I'm not exactly sure such reconstruction is viable. Wouldn't it affect the hull weight & stress distribution?

Weight, not so much, but it would change the stress distribution. To a more balanced and otherwise improved condition.

 

[Dilandu]

Some good HMAS Australia blueprints to better understood the design and problems with reconstruction:

 

[Scott Kenny]

Thank you for that, @Dilandu

Looks like the hardest part would be making space for a second forward turret. Rebuilding the aft superstructure for a pair of turrets aft would be easier.

IIRC, oil-fired boilers are significantly smaller volumetrically than coal boilers, and a smaller number of oil boilers can generate an equal amount of steam. If the second part is correct, I would remove the forward set of boilers entirely, and re-route the uptakes aft to go from 3 funnels to 2 funnels. This would put the forward funnel more or less in line with where the number 2 barbette is in the plans, and the aft funnel more or less in line with where the number 3 barbette is. That'd give let you shove the whole forward superstructure aft by about the length of the turret plus guns.


Nope, nevermind, that'd be way too involved as a rebuild. It'd be cheaper to jack up the old ship's crest and roll a whole new ship under it. You'd have to rebuild basically everything between A and Y turrets...

 

[Dilandu]

Looks like the hardest part would be making space for a second forward turret. Rebuilding the aft superstructure for a pair of turrets aft would be easier.

Frankly, I seriously doubt such reconstruction would be possible. It would SERIOUSLY increase the weight on stern.

The most promising solution would be to:

* Remove the rear boiler room
* Replace forward and middle boilers with modern ones
* Replace turbines with the geared ones from County-class cruisers (circa + 45% of h.p. added)
* Elongate the bow, so the lines would allow 28 knots with bulges installed

 

[EwenS]

Same problem exists for even the 6" guns on light cruisers. If Oz has the facilities for the smaller naval guns (or is building them, so as to be more independent), you scale said facilities to be able to work on 12" guns.



Right. You can probably drop down to APC and HE (the USN certainly had by the 1930s). Not sure what the point of actual shrapnel/cargo shells in 12" caliber is, they'd be coming in at too steep an angle to get a good beaten zone.

Now you only need two types of shells.



Yes, same applies to shells as small as 25pdr, maybe even 3".

Oz was making their own artillery ammunition, were they not?



I'm assuming TNT, Lyddite is okay for wartime use but not for building up in a peacetime arsenal. TNT is also friendlier to work with, both in terms of making it and in terms of using it industrially in quarries etc.




Same place that makes propellant for the other naval and artillery guns. Which again, Oz is doing, right?



Just like your artillery shells do.

Again, wasn't Oz making their own artillery ammunition? Didn't they have facilities to reline guns, or if not present post-war wasn't Oz building such?



Lyddite, maybe 10 years, picric acid tends to react with the metal on the inside of the shell pretty quickly. Which is why it was dropped post WW1.

TNT is stable for at least twice that long in proper conditions, and IIRC the US was using Vietnam-production shells and bombs filled with TNT (or Composition B, 60/40 RDX/TNT) in Afghanistan, at least 30 years past time of manufacture.

Wiki article on Australian explosives industry. Appears well referenced.

Defence Explosive Factory Maribyrnong - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Pre-WW1 little more than explosives for rifle bullets was being produced, expanding to artillery shells during WW1. Production of TNT fillings was a 1920s expansion. And they were having to build an entire national chemical industry to supply the necessary precursor chemical elements.

But note it was 1933 before Australia invested in plant for the production of solventless cordite for naval guns and 1935 before production actually began. Until that point the RAN had been reliant on imports from Britain.

So no you can't just assume that Australia had the capability to produce the necessary explosive fillings and propellants for its naval shells.

 

[EwenS]

Same problem exists for even the 6" guns on light cruisers. If Oz has the facilities for the smaller naval guns (or is building them, so as to be more independent), you scale said facilities to be able to work on 12" guns.

Seems like Australia didn't have the relining facilities for RAN naval guns.

This is the tale of how they had to set up a new facility during WW2 to reline the 8in guns in HMAS Australia. Prior to that they would replace guns from stocks held, returning the old guns to Britain for relining.

1982 Article from the Naval Historical Society of Australia explaining what happened.

Occasional Paper 170: The Eight Inch Gun Relining Programme - Naval Historical Society of Australia

June 1982 edition of the Naval Historical Review (all rights reserved) When the Second World War broke out the RAN possessed two 10,000 ton County class cruisers armed with BL

navyhistory.au

 

[Owens Z]

does anyone care to explore what a fit-for-purpose interwar RAN should have looked like by the time Hitler invaded Poland? What could the RAN reasonably field to provide a credible deterrent to Japan??

This one is easy, Oberon: nothing. If the United States and UK combined did not deter the Japanese Empire from its December 1941 onslaught, then nothing Australia could have done differently in the 1920's and 30's would do so, no matter how much foresight you give its leaders. No more than, say, Belgium could have deterred Hitler. Early 1942 was the time of what the Japanese themselves retrospectively called "victory disease", when Tojo was mulling over which cronies to assign as military governors of Australia, India, and California. Deterrence and fleets-in-being did not work—they're coming.

 

[Owens Z]

Thank you to ‘Owens Z’ for reviving this thread and for all the insightful contributions that followed—it’s made fascinating reading and has given us all plenty of food for thought!

Glad to help, Oberon. I think the survival of battlecruiser HMAS Australia beyond 1924 was improbable (not due to the Washington Naval Treaty, which I believe could have been avoided had Australia so desired, but due to the limited budgets of the 1920's and early Depression). Had that warship nevertheless continued in service, a lavish total reconstruction along the lines of what Dilandu and Oberon summarize (which couldn't be accomplished in an Australian shipyard) during the 1920's or early Depression appears so unrealistic budget-wise as to be fantastical. Not happening! Such a total reconstruction becomes a bit more conceivable when the coming world war was palpable in the late 1930's and defense budgets expanded, but the country's armed forces then had more pressing things to spend money on. However, remember that it wouldn't be impossible for HMAS Australia to stay in service until the beginning of WW2 with only mild refits—the capital ships of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Turkey of similar age did so. I don't like the flawed Indefatigable class's thin belt, thinner deck armor, frail torpedo defense, and magazine-explodes-killing-entire-crew proneness any more than you all do. But whatever the aging warship's limitations, you go to war with what you have. Spain's two dreadnoughts España (ex-Alfonso XIII) and Jaime I, with four twin 12-inch turrets arranged like Australia's, fought in the Spanish Civil War before being lost, albeit with no great distinction. The USSR's elderly Gangut-class dreadnoughts, two in the Baltic and the third in the Black Sea, served in WW2 with their 12-inch guns, also with no great distinction. But those five ships did fire in anger during their nations' time of dire need. An overage and plodding HMAS Australia would have too.

I agree that building a costly design and manufacturing capability Down Under for new shells only to arm a mere eight guns seems like a non-starter. The navies of Spain and Brazil used British-manufactured 12-inch shells older than the postwar Greenboy projectiles that we posit for the counterfactually surviving battlecruiser, and I haven't heard of Spain's or Brazil's shells becoming unsafe before WW2 due to deterioration in storage. In fact I recall that a few of Spain's 12-inch guns, moved to coast fortifications, were kept in service until the 1990's, firing occasional test shots (Spain's British-manufactured coastal 15-inch guns fired their last shell in 2008!). The USN's 1940's stock of 16-inch AP Mark 8 Mod 6 shells remained in use off Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, and Kuwait until the Iowa class were retired in 1992 (though the supplies of propellant were remixed after forty years, for tighter shot grouping). It seems big shells age like fine Bordeaux rather than spoil like milk. I wonder whether Dilandu's and EwenS's fears about this matter might be overblown.

Concern was expressed that HMAS Australia didn't have enough firepower or protection to be fit to "join the battle line". But the Royal Australian Navy never had a battle line to join. And during 1942 the USN Pacific Fleet's battle line was gutted from the Pearl Harbor attack, and the British Eastern Fleet's battleships had fled to Kenya. The old lady would be on her own, with the RAN's few cruisers and destroyers. Had she somehow survived the ferocious naval battles of early 1942 around Indonesia, there was a not-yet-mentioned role for which HMAS Australia could have been useful in 1943-45: shore bombardment in support of Australian Army units along the coasts of New Guinea and New Britain and elsewhere in the South West Pacific Theater. Perhaps with new American HC Mark 16 shells to supplement the AP Mark VIIa Greenboys. As mentioned above, the battlecruiser's light antiaircraft artillery would be greatly strengthened in time for this duty.

 

[1635yankee]

Before deciding how to upgrade HMAS Australia, there's a lot to consider. The first, and most important, is will it be worth the effort. Here, I think the consensus answer is "no." The ship is old, obsolete, poorly protected, too poorly armed to be a capital ship, highly expensive to run, and Australia doesn't seem to have the industrial base to upgrade and support her. Next, what would the Commonwealth be willing to sacrifice in the Washington Treaty to keep her? Australia was bound to that.

If Australia is willing and able to spend the money to support a capital ship, perhaps arranging the transfer of one of the R's would be a better option. I believe that the Washington Treaty forbade transfers, but I think that since all the Commonwealth navies were lumped together as far as the treaty was concerned, I think this could be negotiated. While a faster ship would be better, the British are less likely to release one of the Quueen Elizabeths.

 

[EwenS]

And during 1942 the USN Pacific Fleet's battle line was gutted from the Pearl Harbor attack, and the British Eastern Fleet's battleships had fled to Kenya.

It is a bit of an exaggeration to describe the US Pacific battleline as "gutted" in 1942. Much of the damage done to it at Pearl Harbour was quickly repaired and ships returned to service.

Colorado - missed PH altogether due to being in West Coast refit
Pennsylvania - repaired and back at sea by end of Feb 1942
Maryland - salvaged & repaired / modernised by end of Feb 1942
Tennessee - repaired & back at sea by end of Feb 1942. Full modernisation undertaken Oct 1942-May 1943
Nevada - salvaged before end of April 1942 and back in service by end of the year.
California - salvage and repairs / modernisation took until Jan 1944
West Virginia - salvage & repairs / modernisation took until July 1944
Oklahoma - total loss
Arizona - total loss

It was mostly those battleships that were single moored or had been moored outboard on Battleship Row at PH that came off worst.

The 3 New Mexicos were transferred from the Atlantic to the Pacific in Jan 1942 to bolster the Pacific Fleet's 4 available old battleships from Feb 1942.

You don't hear much about the old BB in 1942 because they spent much of their time patrolling off the West Coast as a backstop against a Japanese attack getting past the carriers. The other issue was that there were not enough replenishment oilers to keep them with the fleet in the South Pacific.

That left only the oldest 3, Arkansas, New York & Texas, in the Atlantic plus new ships working up.

 

[DWG]

I think that the best fit-for-purpose refit would start by converting the ship to oil-fired boilers (despite Oz's large coal reserves) and reduction geared turbines.

This frees up the former coal bunkers (and whatever new fuel tanks are used) to become part of the underwater protection scheme, and also saves a LOT of manpower in the stokers.

This would be a massive refit, taking a lot of time and money, no way around that.

Probably a massive enough refit to relocate the turrets to the centerline and get them superfiring. (at least one of them, giving you the same 6-gun broadside firepower as before) Now you have that huge midships area where P and Q used to be to use for AA guns and aviation.

I'm away from my Friedmans at the moment, but ISTR there's a paragraph right at the end of the WWI chapter (or one of the other WWI headed for Washington chapters) in the Battleships book where DNC (Tennyson d'Eyncourt) has one of his constructors look at re-engining Repulse and Renown with small tube boilers and is told there'll be more than enough room freed to add a fourth turret if desired.

 

[DWG]

WRT keeping Australia in 12" shells (not that I see reconstruction as reasonable), the first question to ask is whether she'd been re-equipped with the new 4CRH Greenboy shells post Jutland, prior to sailing south. 12" APC/CPC Mark VIIa was issued from 1918, so it's likely that she would have had newly built shells, and that a large number would potentially have been available in depot storage given the retirement of the 12" battleships.

And then in 1930, after continuously flirting with the idea during the 1920s, the RN begins design of the 12"/50 Mk XIV, with a 6CRH shell design, so a 12" production line could have been funded, even if Australia might have needed a variant with a 4CRH head.

 

[Dilandu]

The old lady would be on her own, with the RAN's few cruisers and destroyers

So what exactly she would do?

 

[DWG]

This works on the interesting concept that that both the RAN and RNZN consider themselves to be something more than just South Atlantic and South Pacific squadron of the Royal Navy.
The majority of the RCN decamped to UK Waters not long after war was declared.

The RCN (on the East Coast at least) naturally integrated with the RN on the Atlantic convoys and wasn't really capable of independent action, on the West Coast Canada had never really developed any strength in depth (perhaps hoping no one would risk annoying the USN by sailing into the Straits of Juan de Fuca to attack Vancouver?). The RAN did send the Scrap Iron Flotilla to the Med, but it was on its way home for refit when hostilities opened in the Far East, and the rest of the RAN was largely retained in Home Waters or the Indian Ocean, and occasionally the South Atlantic, as raider cover for the troop convoys running into the war zone. On the other side of the Tasman Sea, until 1941 there was no RNZN, only the New Zealand Division of the RN.

 

[DWG]

In every story of battlecruisers that I have ever read, the three Courageous-class ships are fully included. Jackie Fisher's dodgy "large light cruiser" designation was a euphemism to get around the Chancellor of the Exchequer's stricture that nothing above light cruisers would be funded in that fiscal year, as a war emergency measure. I don't defend their freakish design, but they were in fact battlecruisers,

If you consider the mission they were built for, Fisher's Baltic Project, then I think there's a case to be made that they are in fact fast monitors, particularly Furious with her two gun broadside leaving her incapable of any form of laddering against a manoeuvring target.

 

[Oberon_706]

The RCN (on the East Coast at least) naturally integrated with the RN on the Atlantic convoys and wasn't really capable of independent action, on the West Coast Canada had never really developed any strength in depth (perhaps hoping no one would risk annoying the USN by sailing into the Straits of Juan de Fuca to attack Vancouver?). The RAN did send the Scrap Iron Flotilla to the Med, but it was on its way home for refit when hostilities opened in the Far East, and the rest of the RAN was largely retained in Home Waters or the Indian Ocean, and occasionally the South Atlantic, as raider cover for the troop convoys running into the war zone. On the other side of the Tasman Sea, until 1941 there was no RNZN, only the New Zealand Division of the RN.

RAN ops in the Med also included at least one of the light cruisers for most of the first two years of the war (they did some of their best work west of Suez), plus at various times, some of the sloops, members of the N-class Destroyer flotilla and a minesweeping flotilla of corvettes that were involved in the invasion of Sicily. In the context of the RAN as a whole, it wasn’t a small commitment. Between 7-9 ships at its peak (I think?). Losses: HMAS Parramatta, Waterhen & Nestor.

 

[Atomic Coyote]

This raises the question on whether an actual evolved armoured cruiser, with 9.2" guns may have been a better option.

Some time ago in springsharp I made a rough guess at a 4x2x9.2in cruiser from 1913; if you gave it oil-fired engines you could get a pretty good speed on a ~12-13k displacement.

The version in the spoiler is a hypothetical late 30s refit with original engines but a bunch of light AA added (I think the original draft had a couple more 4 inch guns and one or two 3 inch for AA).

Spoiler: HMAS Australia (9.2 in) late 1930s refit

HMAS Australia, Australia Large Cruiser laid down 1913

Displacement:
11,394 t light; 11,972 t standard; 12,764 t normal; 13,399 t full load

Dimensions: Length (overall / waterline) x beam x draught (normal/deep)
(497.32 ft / 480.00 ft) x 62.00 ft x (27.00 / 28.06 ft)
(151.58 m / 146.30 m) x 18.90 m x (8.23 / 8.55 m)

Armament:
8 - 9.20" / 234 mm 50.0 cal guns - 380.01lbs / 172.37kg shells, 150 per gun
Breech loading guns in turret on barbette mounts, 1913 Model
4 x Twin mounts on centreline, evenly spread
2 raised mounts
8 - 4.00" / 102 mm 45.0 cal guns - 39.99lbs / 18.14kg shells, 300 per gun
Dual purpose guns in deck and hoist mounts, 1937 Model
4 x Twin mounts on sides, evenly spread
16 - 1.57" / 40.0 mm 50.0 cal guns - 3.00lbs / 1.36kg shells, 600 per gun
Anti-air guns in deck mounts, 1937 Model
4 x Quad mounts on centreline, evenly spread
4 raised mounts
Weight of broadside 3,408 lbs / 1,546 kg

Armour:
- Belts: Width (max) Length (avg) Height (avg)
Main: 5.50" / 140 mm 350.00 ft / 106.68 m 9.45 ft / 2.88 m
Ends: 3.50" / 89 mm 130.00 ft / 39.62 m 9.45 ft / 2.88 m
Upper: 3.50" / 89 mm 350.00 ft / 106.68 m 8.00 ft / 2.44 m
Main Belt covers 112% of normal length

- Torpedo Bulkhead - Additional damage containing bulkheads:
2.00" / 51 mm 350.00 ft / 106.68 m 24.43 ft / 7.45 m
Beam between torpedo bulkheads 54.00 ft / 16.46 m

- Gun armour: Face (max) Other gunhouse (avg) Barbette/hoist (max)
Main: 6.00" / 152 mm 4.00" / 102 mm 6.00" / 152 mm
2nd: 1.00" / 25 mm 1.00" / 25 mm -
3rd: 0.50" / 13 mm - -

- Armoured deck - multiple decks:
For and Aft decks: 2.50" / 64 mm
Forecastle: 1.50" / 38 mm Quarter deck: 1.50" / 38 mm

- Conning towers: Forward 5.00" / 127 mm, Aft 5.00" / 127 mm

Machinery:
Oil fired boilers, steam turbines,
Direct drive, 2 shafts, 66,496 shp / 49,606 Kw = 28.00 kts
Range 6,000nm at 12.00 kts
Bunker at max displacement = 1,427 tons

Complement:
599 - 780

Cost:
£1.237 million / $4.947 million

Distribution of weights at normal displacement:
Armament: 885 tons, 6.9%
- Guns: 885 tons, 6.9%
Armour: 3,754 tons, 29.4%
- Belts: 1,316 tons, 10.3%
- Torpedo bulkhead: 633 tons, 5.0%
- Armament: 786 tons, 6.2%
- Armour Deck: 901 tons, 7.1%
- Conning Towers: 118 tons, 0.9%
Machinery: 2,606 tons, 20.4%
Hull, fittings & equipment: 4,149 tons, 32.5%
Fuel, ammunition & stores: 1,371 tons, 10.7%
Miscellaneous weights: 0 tons, 0.0%

Overall survivability and seakeeping ability:
Survivability (Non-critical penetrating hits needed to sink ship):
14,470 lbs / 6,563 Kg = 37.2 x 9.2 " / 234 mm shells or 2.2 torpedoes
Stability (Unstable if below 1.00): 1.07
Metacentric height 2.8 ft / 0.8 m
Roll period: 15.6 seconds
Steadiness - As gun platform (Average = 50 %): 43 %
- Recoil effect (Restricted arc if above 1.00): 0.90
Seaboat quality (Average = 1.00): 1.02

Hull form characteristics:
Hull has a flush deck,
an extended bulbous bow and a cruiser stern
Block coefficient (normal/deep): 0.556 / 0.562
Length to Beam Ratio: 7.74 : 1
'Natural speed' for length: 21.91 kts
Power going to wave formation at top speed: 61 %
Trim (Max stability = 0, Max steadiness = 100): 37
Bow angle (Positive = bow angles forward): 30.00 degrees
Stern overhang: 0.00 ft / 0.00 m
Freeboard (% = length of deck as a percentage of waterline length):
Fore end, Aft end
- Forecastle: 20.00%, 30.00 ft / 9.14 m, 24.00 ft / 7.32 m
- Forward deck: 30.00%, 24.00 ft / 7.32 m, 22.00 ft / 6.71 m
- Aft deck: 35.00%, 22.00 ft / 6.71 m, 22.00 ft / 6.71 m
- Quarter deck: 15.00%, 22.00 ft / 6.71 m, 22.00 ft / 6.71 m
- Average freeboard: 23.18 ft / 7.07 m

Ship space, strength and comments:
Space - Hull below water (magazines/engines, low = better): 107.3%
- Above water (accommodation/working, high = better): 149.2%
Waterplane Area: 20,886 Square feet or 1,940 Square metres
Displacement factor (Displacement / loading): 102%
Structure weight / hull surface area: 122 lbs/sq ft or 595 Kg/sq metre
Hull strength (Relative):
- Cross-sectional: 0.89
- Longitudinal: 2.92
- Overall: 1.00
Adequate machinery, storage, compartmentation space
Excellent accommodation and workspace room

 

[DWG]

Some time ago in springsharp I made a rough guess at a 4x2x9.2in cruiser from 1913; if you gave it oil-fired engines you could get a pretty good speed on a ~12-13k displacement.

Why start from a hypothetical when you have the actual E2 and E3 ACR designs? Plus E from 1911

E: 15,750 tons, 4x2 9.2in, 16x 4in, 25kts, 6in belt, c£1.45 million
E2: 15,500 tons, 4x2 9.2in, 8x 6in, 28kts, 6in belt, c£1.35 million
E3: 17,850 tons, 4x2 9.2in, 8x 6in, 28kts, 6in belt+4in upper belt, c £1.5 million

 

[Owens Z]

So what exactly she would do?

Be sunk, most likely. But had the battlecruiser survived, see above for a worthy task she could have performed in 1943-45 for her country.