I have no doubt individual Brits went to Vietnam, they would have been on exchange postings with the US, Australia and NZ for starters. Also the FESR was fully integrated at the Brigade level so its likely the odd RAF transport plane went to Vietnam in support of the Anzac forces.

However that doesn't count, only openly sending units to the combat theatre counts.
 
Those rumours are probably a combination of £10 Poms, and the Cultivated Australian accent. An American might believe the latter was English.
I really could n't resist coming back with this image. But in fact having met my counterparts in the Australian and New Zealand Foreign Services their English was more cultivated than mine (not difficult) and they were fine friends and colleagues.
 

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Just as there is no cookie cutter reason to join the Vietnam War there is no cookie cutter contribution. South Korea feared the US pulling units out of their country so sent a couple of their own (2nd rate IIUC) divisions to keep the US troops in place, and got massive economic stimulus into the bargain.
They were nominally "2nd rate" in the sense that they were mostly put together from scratch rather than being experienced formations, I believe. However the South Korean troops overcame this handicap and quickly gained a good reputation on the ground in South Vietnam, being considered highly effective by the US and other forces.
 
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They were nominally "2nd rate" in the sense that they were mostly put together from scratch rather than being experienced formations, I believe. However the South Korean troops overcame this handicap and quickly gained a good reputation on the ground in South Vietnam, being considered highly effective by the US and other forces.
The "Rocks" were highly respected by the US forces in Vietnam.
 
I think the idea was to use the fact that the US was equipping and paying for these divisions to get a couple of divisions that otherwise wouldn't get first rate gear to get it from the US. SthK got a couple of extra first rate divisions that they wouldn't have otherwise gotten as a result of their Vietnam contribution.
 
I have no doubt individual Brits went to Vietnam, they would have been on exchange postings with the US, Australia and NZ for starters. Also the FESR was fully integrated at the Brigade level so its likely the odd RAF transport plane went to Vietnam in support of the Anzac forces.

However that doesn't count, only openly sending units to the combat theatre counts.
Ummm... no.

The UK made it very clear that UK pilots (indeed, ALL UK military members) on exchange duty with the US, Australia, etc were BANNED from operating in the Vietnam combat area - no exceptions.

Transport aircraft were also banned from supporting combat forces, they were to only support UK civilian/diplomatic establishments.
 
Considering the commitments we had at the time, PLUS the recent memory of the Suez intervention, this scenario is so unlikely as to have zero traction. Sorry.
 
Considering the commitments we had at the time, PLUS the recent memory of the Suez intervention, this scenario is so unlikely as to have zero traction. Sorry.
Oh, yes... I'm in agreement with you.

Pres. Eisenhower needed to have handled his reaction to the events of 1956 (including maybe more pressure on the USSR over Hungary and less criticism of the UK and France) differently in order for the UK to feel willing to support US efforts in Vietnam.
 
It is pretty difficult to come up with a way of saving the Tories in 1964…
Not really. A change of 238 votes across 5 constituencies would result in a hung parliament, a change of 3,656 votes across 14 constituencies would result in a mirror image of our timeline giving the Conservatives a majority of 5, and a change of 5,848 votes across 20 constituencies would give the Conservatives a majority of 17. That would be more than enough to see them through to 1969.
 
The Lightning minuscule range (even in the F6 variant) would be a giant PITA in Vietnam.
 
Not really. A change of 238 votes across 5 constituencies would result in a hung parliament, a change of 3,656 votes across 14 constituencies would result in a mirror image of our timeline giving the Conservatives a majority of 5, and a change of 5,848 votes across 20 constituencies would give the Conservatives a majority of 17. That would be more than enough to see them through to 1969.

With so few votes making the difference I can't help but think that better decisions in aviation and defence matters in prevous years would be enough to swing the 1964 election.
 
The Lightning minuscule range (even in the F6 variant) would be a giant PITA in Vietnam.

It depends on where it was based and what it was tasked to do. Based in Thailand and tasked to escort Thuds downtown, yes even with tanking that would be too much. If based near the DMZ and tasked with air superiority for B52 strikes in Route Package 1 that would likely be possible with tanking.
 
I have thought a bit more about this one.
Whether Wilson or Home is PM does not matter. In the 1964 to 68 timeframe the UK has too much on its plate (Indonesia, Cyprus, Aden, BAOR, financial black hole) to add Vietnam to its burdens.
Korea and Suez were recent memories and would influence media and parliamentary attitudes.
Maybe if Kennedy and Macmillan had still been in charge.

President Kennedy did not want to send ground troops to Vietnam. The CIA had advisors there under MACV/SOG (Military Assistance Command Vietnam / Studies and Observations Group). After the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, Kennedy fired CIA Director Allen Dulles. He grew to distrust the CIA to the point that he no longer accepted their intelligence about Vietnam. That's why he sent General Taylor and Robert McNamara to Vietnam to get their assessment. Based on their report, Kennedy announced a pullout of all U.S. military personnel in October, 1963. He was eliminated.
 
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With so few votes making the difference I can't help but think that better decisions in aviation and defence matters in prevous years would be enough to swing the 1964 election.
I think you're massively overestimating the importance of aviation and defence matters to the average voter.

The three most likely ways of swinging the election are:
  • A better run campaign by the Conservatives
  • The planned moving of the broadcast time for Steptoe and Son as already mentioned gets picked up by the media, the BBC are forced to issue a denial and it goes out as normal
  • Home chooses a later date to hold the general election, this delay sees Khrushchev's removal from power and China's first nuclear test becoming known
 
I think you're massively overestimating the importance of aviation and defence matters to the average voter.

The three most likely ways of swinging the election are:
  • A better run campaign by the Conservatives
  • The planned moving of the broadcast time for Steptoe and Son as already mentioned gets picked up by the media, the BBC are forced to issue a denial and it goes out as normal
  • Home chooses a later date to hold the general election, this delay sees Khrushchev's removal from power and China's first nuclear test becoming known

I think you're underestimating the size of the aviation sector, the amount of good jobs it provided and the value it provided to the economy. We're talking 238-5,848 votes in 5-20 constituencies in a country of tens of millions of voters and over 600 MPs. If instead of the Sandystorm and controversies with the VC10 etc the Conservatives had made good calls for the industry and in the first half of the 60s the aviation sector had fat order books and busy factories I struggle to believe it wouldn't sway the votes of less than 1000 people in marginal constituencies.

This is stretching the British in Vietnam topic a lot.
 
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I think you're massively overestimating the importance of aviation and defence matters to the average voter.
If you're talking hundreds to thousands of votes in a handful of seats, it could plausibly be turned to the Conservatives purely on local issues by the candidates in those specific seats. Or simply the candidate being a little bit more likeable.

Down at that level of change, you probably need to look at the individual seats to see what was going on locally.
 
I have never seen the names of the "eight seats" but looking at the results gives some contenders (seats the Tories lost with Labour having a majority of less than 1,000). I've found what looks like seven of the seats.
South East Derbyshire - maj 873
Heywood and Royton - 816 (Greater Manchester)
Gravesend - 748
Dover and Deal - 418
Preston South - 348
Glasgow Pollock - 296

Only Preston can be described as an aviation sector, perhaps Heywood and Royton at a push. I'm still sceptical though of these claims, nearly all these seats in the 1966 election saw Labour's majority increased to 2-3,000. Preston South remained Labour until 1970.

Julian Amery - the serving Minister of Aviation, was MP for Preston North 1950-66, he held on by just 14 votes in 1964 and lost in 1966 to Labour with a 3% swing against him, Lab majority 2,418.
Not exactly a winning endorsement from the BAC workers of Preston and Warton for his policies....
 
I have never seen the names of the "eight seats" …
This is the thread where I originally came across the numbers.

The five constituencies to get a hung parliament are
01) Brighton Kempton 7 votes
02) Ealing Noth 27 votes
03) Wellingborough 47 votes
04) Norfolk North 53 votes
05) Kings Lynn 104 votes

The nine seats on top of those that would give a Conservative majority of five are
06) Birmingham Yardley 169 votes
07) Colne Valley 187 votes
08) Glasgow 296 votes
09) Preston South 348 votes
10) Meriden 363 votes
11) Dover 418 votes
12) Birmingham All Saints 470 votes
13) Clapham 556 Votes
14) Norwich South 611 votes

The final six constituencies that would give a Conservative majority of seventeen are
15) Luton 723 votes
16) Gravesend 748 votes
17) Heywood 816 votes
18) Derby South East 873 votes
19) Oldbury 917 votes
20) Brighouse 922 votes
 
From the Wiki article and in a similar vein:

The Conservatives ........... would have won if 900 voters in eight seats had changed votes. Labour won a very slim majority of four seats.........

The point being that the government that kept Britain out of Vietnam was not one with a large majority. 1966 was a different story.

When did LBJ ask?
 
But...would a Tory Govt have retained all/any of the 3 cadavers?

* HS681 was very STOL only to support dispersed P.1154A, which was V/STOL only because 1961 NATO Plan was to disperse AW Tactical Strike off AW-deleted runways. Both relevant NBMRs had expired in 1963 and by 10/64 C-130 and conventional-TOL, maybe off tundra and autobahns, was back in favour. No-one deployed land VTOL combat types(bar RAFG Harrier, subsonic entirely acceptable for its niche Task).

* TSR.2: CAS urged fixed-$ F-111A: “accepted (canx of TSR.2: costs) escalating rapidly (quantity) steadily cut (he) feared it would run the whole (RAF budget) dry...albatross round our necks (Healey) took the decision which would have had to be taken by (a Tory Govt. MoD was) writing (it) would have (to go) just that (Labour) took the opprobrium” W.Jackson/FM.E.Bramall (ex-CGS), Chiefs, Brasseys, 92, P361.

But this thread has drifted hither only (RoC #139 When did LBJ ask?) because UK PM met LBJ 7/12/64 who asked for a UK presence in Vietnam: (US is) isolationist (others' effort has) great effect on what (US can do).SecDef:For.Rels,V.XII,W.Europe, UK 236,Memo.Conversation,Def. Probs.NARA,RG 59,Ball Pps.Lot74 D272,MLF. 4.95/09/11; For.Rel,648,Vol.13,Pres/PM9/12/6.

UK PM Wilson mooted a UK AW umbrella for India and to deter PRC from Malaysia, so maybe assigning RN SSBN No.5 to join USN on Guam, but LBJ sought Brit boots “all we needed was a Regt. The Black Watch would have done.”
Later “a platoon of bagpipers would be sufficient. It’s the Br. flag that’s needed” LBJ-HW, 21/7/66. S.Ellis,Britain, America and the Vietnam War,Greenwood,,2004,P7.

Due to UK's dire economic position a Tory Team would have faced the same LBJ request. I posit:
* maybe retaining No.5 SSBN (HW chopped 29/2/65) for EoS patrols, but:
* declining boots on the ground, stressing our contribution down the road in Singapore, over the water in Brunei;
* and very happily making a very similar credit, fixed price Defence package - C-130K, option F-111, many F-4s.
 
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Oh there was a fair few, maybe couple of dozen brit personnel during SEA, exchange personnel, ex pats in Australian Defence Force, Royal New Zealand Air Force. More action was seen by SAS personnel on exchange.

Under Personnel Exchange Program with USAF, US Army, US Navy, US Marine Corps definitely with the aircrew side, there was the odd pilot or backseater that had gone into South Vietnam either on delivery flight such as a VF-121 F-4B Phantom turned up with a Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm exchange pilot who landed at Da Nang, and proceeded to unfold the Union Jack as their cockpits opened and taxied to a stop. There is a story of our 28 (Army Co-operation) Squadron, RAF based then at RAF Sek Kong in Hong Kong when they operated the Westland Whirlwind (and then later on Westland Wessex) who seconded a pilot to one of the US Army gunship companies. There is also a tragic tale of a RAF Squadron leader or Wing Commander who was from the RAF Support Helicopter Force (SHF) who accompanied an ill fated Huey mission.

Plenty of RAF then Transport Command assets went into Saigon -such as the hulking Bristol Beverley, to Bristol Britannia, and then new Lockheed C-130 Hercules CC1 into likes of Than Son Nhut Air Base and with the smaller Hawker Siddley Andover CC1 beyond even in country highlands.

But Her Majesty's man on the ground was the Saigon Air Attache and his trusted steed, a DeHavilland Devon



1729017723468.png
cheers
 
But...would a Tory Govt have retained all/any of the 3 cadavers?

* HS681 was very STOL only to support dispersed P.1154A, which was V/STOL only because 1961 NATO Plan was to disperse AW Tactical Strike off AW-deleted runways. Both relevant NBMRs had expired in 1963 and by 10/64 C-130 and conventional-TOL, maybe off tundra and autobahns, was back in favour. No-one deployed land VTOL combat types(bar RAFG Harrier, subsonic entirely acceptable for its niche Task).

* TSR.2: CAS urged fixed-$ F-111A: “accepted (canx of TSR.2: costs) escalating rapidly (quantity) steadily cut (he) feared it would run the whole (RAF budget) dry...albatross round our necks (Healey) took the decision which would have had to be taken by (a Tory Govt. MoD was) writing (it) would have (to go) just that (Labour) took the opprobrium” W.Jackson/FM.E.Bramall (ex-CGS), Chiefs, Brasseys, 92, P361.

But this thread has drifted hither only (RoC #139 When did LBJ ask?) because UK PM met LBJ 7/12/64 who asked for a UK presence in Vietnam: (US is) isolationist (others' effort has) great effect on what (US can do).SecDef:For.Rels,V.XII,W.Europe, UK 236,Memo.Conversation,Def. Probs.NARA,RG 59,Ball Pps.Lot74 D272,MLF. 4.95/09/11; For.Rel,648,Vol.13,Pres/PM9/12/6.

UK PM Wilson mooted a UK AW umbrella for India and to deter PRC from Malaysia, so maybe assigning RN SSBN No.5 to join USN on Guam, but LBJ sought Brit boots “all we needed was a Regt. The Black Watch would have done.”
Later “a platoon of bagpipers would be sufficient. It’s the Br. flag that’s needed” LBJ-HW, 21/7/66. S.Ellis,Britain, America and the Vietnam War,Greenwood,,2004,P7.

Due to UK's dire economic position a Tory Team would have faced the same LBJ request. I posit:
* maybe retaining No.5 SSBN (HW chopped 29/2/65) for EoS patrols, but:
* declining boots on the ground, stressing our contribution down the road in Singapore, over the water in Brunei;
* and very happily making a very similar credit, fixed price Defence package - C-130K, option F-111, many F-4s.

Thanks for the dates, they’re very early so Britain will be mired in the Indonesian Confrontation and Aden rebellion, with the Beira Patrol beginning in early 1966 soaking up a couple of RN escorts once the carriers left in May 1966. As such I don’t think a small change, such as Wilson being more amenable or the Tories winning a tiny majority would change the decision to commit to Vietnam. Even great procurement policy and decisions (as I see them) starting from the 57 DWP likely wouldn’t be sufficient to change things enough to get a Vietnam commitment.



As an aside was Britain able to lock in a fixed price contract for the F111K, or was that just a pipe dream in 1965?
 
F-111K prices: no simple A. You ask because RAAF F-111C, selected 1963, proved not to be at a fixed price, though Oz-icisation was not to be so deep as Anglicisation.

MoA Mulley told, HoC 10/3/66 that at canx.6/4/65 MoA assumed TSR.2 (ontop of sunk cost) would cost a further >£475Mn. R&D+50, cf. £125Mn. {+£25Mn. interest on 10 years' credit) for 50xF-111; and that10 yrs.TSR.2 ownership was guessed (they then had no way of knowing) as >£300Mn. >F-111. (Grunts of Approval from upright Members).
Upto canx 16/1/68, DoD committed to $400Mn. Offset and professed interest in Allison TF41 Spey to displace TF40 in later USAF batches. MoD Healey told HoC 19/2/69 that canx charges were “likely to be c.£16Mn.” But...

DoD's Option numbers were always to "USAF-standard", but that was not F-111K and for >a year MoA funded Spey 36 R&D: we now know the cost/time of putting a UK engine in a US airframe. There were more UK peculiars to erode any DoD price. My A to your Q is simply...No.
 
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… maybe retaining No. 5 [Resolution-class] for East of Suez patrols…
Bit expensive though. Might nuclear sharing do the job at a reduced cost? The UK signs a limited defensive treaty with India, deploys some nuclear armed bombers to the sub-continent in the short-term, India purchases suitable aircraft and works them up into service to take over, the bombs remain in British custody until such time as needed. The only major complication I can see is the British weapons not having permissive action link (PAL) like the American ones. Couch it in terms of keeping China in check and avoiding nuclear proliferation you might be able to get the US to fund it.
 
Bit expensive though. Might nuclear sharing do the job at a reduced cost? The UK signs a limited defensive treaty with India, deploys some nuclear armed bombers to the sub-continent in the short-term, India purchases suitable aircraft and works them up into service to take over, the bombs remain in British custody until such time as needed. The only major complication I can see is the British weapons not having permissive action link (PAL) like the American ones. Couch it in terms of keeping China in check and avoiding nuclear proliferation you might be able to get the US to fund it.
The US made PALs freely available to all nuclear armed states, within about a year after deploying them ourselves.

Because they make it a lot harder to get a rogue launch.
 
The RAF's Plan P of March 1964 planned to have 3 Vulcan B2 sqns until 1972 and 2 Victor B2 (Blue Steel) until 1975, apparently to deter China. I've also seen someone here say there were discussions that a single sqn of TSR2 was totally inadequate to deter China and more would be required for the FEAF.
 
With PRC/SE.Asia the issue would arise of how effectively to Deter? A Vulcan crewman posted on pprune that his SEATO Plan (from base Tengah) target appeared to be a cross-(?road) in the jungle. An RN SSBN out of Guam (so co-Tasked with USN) with Polaris A3T might hit Shanghai, but not Beijing. If UK was alone with its AW umbrella for India, Malaysia, Vulcan, then SSBN (out of Singapore) might be able to hit...ummm...

When UK decided to put Red Beard on RN and RAF platforms EoS the logic was (2/3/55 MoD Macmillan,HoC): “power of interdiction upon invading columns by (AW gives a) new aspect (to ME/FE) strategy” M.Navias, Nuc;ear Weapons &Br. Strategic Planning,Clarendon,91,P40. Do we defoliate atomically, so risk PRC (after 10/64, A-Bomb Test) taking out our Allies' capitals, which are rather closer to PRC's AW range, than theirs to ours?
 
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The RAF's Plan P of March 1964 planned to have 3 Vulcan B2 sqns until 1972 and 2 Victor B2 (Blue Steel) until 1975, apparently to deter China. I've also seen someone here say there were discussions that a single sqn of TSR2 was totally inadequate to deter China and more would be required for the FEAF.
FWIW . . .

Plan P actually said.
Three Vulcan B.2 (Free Fall) squadrons have an overseas re-inforcement commitment from October, 1964 to 1970. Thereafter this task will be undertaken by the Victor B.2 Squadrons in Serials 2 and 10.
Serial 2 was 2 Victor B.2 (Blue Steel) squadrons and Serial 10 was one Victor B.2 strategic reconnaissance squadron. NB it specifically said "Victor B.2" not "Victor" SR.2.

The significance of 1975 is that Plan P ended on 31st March 1975. So at March 1964 the RAF many have wanted to keep the 3 Victor B.2 squadrons for even longer.

The retention of the 3 V-bomber squadrons (after the introduction of Polaris) to contain (rather than deter) China and that more TSR.2s were needed for FEAF (20 instead of 10) was part of the Spotswood Report.

I presume that the swap from Vulcan B.2s to Victor B.2s was because the former could carry 21,000lb of H.E. and the latter could carry 35,000lbs of H.E. so it was more useful in the conventional bombing role.
 
The RAF's Plan P of March 1964 planned to have 3 Vulcan B2 sqns until 1972 and 2 Victor B2 (Blue Steel) until 1975, apparently to deter China. I've also seen someone here say there were discussions that a single sqn of TSR2 was totally inadequate to deter China and more would be required for the FEAF.
This is part of Post 52 from this thread.
. . . and it fits Plan P of March 1964 which were the squadron patterns in force at the 1964 General Election.

 
This, indeed Britain's whole EoS strategy, is fascinating.

I'm somewhat surprised and impressed by how heavily committed Britain was to the Indonesian Confrontation. In Borneo there were 4 Brigades with 9 battalions as well as the Brigade in Malaya which rotated units through the Borneo Brigades. Aside from the Hunrer and Canberra sqn with the FEAF here was a constant presence of V bomber sqn, a Canberra B(I)8 sqn was deployed from Germany and 2 Canberra B.15/B.16 sqns were deployed from the NEAF. It appears as if no Hunters were sent, there were 3 sqns of Hunter in Aden dealing with the uprising there.

I's suggest these are the units that could be selected for a Vietnam commitment after August 1966 when the Confrontation officially ended. However the combat conditions in Vietnam were very different to Borneo, as the Australians found out to their cost at the Battle of Long Tan in May 1966. The 60 rounds of ammo per rifle and 140 rounds per machine-gun were manifestly inadequate for this battle and others like it that occurred occasionally in Vietnam.

Similarly the FEAF conducted 3 airstrikes in the Confrontation, all in Malaya; 2 in 1964 and 1 in 1965. In contrast 2 sqn RAAF which had 8 Canberra B.2 in Vietnam from April 1967 flew 12,000 sorties and dropped 76,389 bombs in 4 years.
 
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Earlier today, while I was trawling through some of the vast quantities of images and other things that I have downloaded and saved over the years when commenting on the Tiger class Cruisers Thread, I stumbled upon this....I've converted it to pdf....
 

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