Britain in Vietnam

[BlackBat242]

The proposal was Shorts build front ends in Belfast, so if Vought be done with F8 jigs, it's plausible to ship the lot to the UK and licensed/joint development.

That would be an excellent option - AI-23D in a 2-seat front fuselage with 2x30mm cannon - and either an Avon RA.29 turbojet (Mk 302 with the Swedish #67 reheat module for 12,690lbf [17,640 lbf]*) or a reheated Spey (this would require some improvement in the intake size & ducting for a 10%-15% increase in airflow, and the reheated Spey wouldn't be ready until 1965-66) for improvements in all specifications over the J57.



* Matches the heavier J57-P-20/22 in size, reheated thrust, and non-reheat fuel consumption (the Avon 302 has 2,000lb more non-reheat thrust and lower [1.85 vs 2.35] reheated fuel consumption). The Swedish version was flying in the JA35F Draken in 1961.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Random jottings on my part.
An Eagle sized simpler CVA01 seemed to be an easier sell (no new infrastructure).
The Spey F4 really necessary for 4 Sparrow and 4 Sidewinders?

On those postage stamps you call aircraft carriers? With their grossly undersized catapults? Yes.

The Phantom was so heavy that it needed massive upper surface blowing, more powerful engines, AND an extended nose gear strut to operate by RN's definition of "safely" off their carriers. IIRC by USN standards it couldn't operate safely off the RN carriers.

 

[CJGibson]

Re Nixon.

Am I misremembering, but did Eisenhower write a letter about Nixon that was to remain sealed for a period of time after both had died?

Chris

 

[CJGibson]

On those postage stamps you call aircraft carriers? With their grossly undersized catapults? Yes.

The Phantom was so heavy that it needed massive upper surface blowing, more powerful engines, AND an extended nose gear strut to operate by RN's definition of "safely" off their carriers. IIRC by USN standards it couldn't operate safely off the RN carriers.

Steam, flames, noise, poise...there is no finer sight than an FG.1 launch.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z6nVgoHvKEQ&t=28s



Chris

 

[Rule of cool]

In the Vietnam War timing is everything. When did LBJ make requests for British troops? When did Mac and Cabinet consider and reject them? How were other things going during these time periods?



FWIW Australia had a training team in SthV in 1962, a Caribou flight in 1964 but the first battalion group was deployed in mid-1965 with the US 173rd AB Brigade. Australia didn’t send a 2 btn Task Force with RAAF helicopters to operate independently until May 1966 and didn’t get a 3rd btn and tanks until late 67-early 68. RAAF Canberras and RAN Destroyers operated as integral parts of the US force structure, rarely supporting 1ATF-V directly. Australia was slower to withdraw than the US, not starting until 1971.



The carrier Melbourne made 3 escort runs to SthV in 1965 & 66 but never entered the ‘Market Time’ AO and conducted operations. The USN requested her as an ASW asset on Yankee Station in 1966 and again in April 1967 but these requests were rejected.



British involvement in Vietnam War wouldn’t have changed the course of the war much, but it might have significant impacts on Britain and Australia if they operated together.

 

[Siberia]

The most likely contribution would have been a Gurkha unit operating with the Australians and New Zealanders.

Johnson was offering major financial support for the pound the UK economy, and it would have to be a pretty generous to induce Douglas-Home to take him up on it. If that's the case then a single Gurkha regiment seems somewhat paltry, never mind in comparison to Australia's deployment.

I think it would probably require an infantry brigade to be seen as suitably sized. Find a small province without much enemy activity and have the UK take it over, similar to Australia and Phuoc Tuy. Its neighbour Bien Hoa perhaps.

So did Johnson. The victory condition he was seeking was a status quo ante and they had a shot of getting that until Nixon blew up the Paris talks behind the scenes.

For all the opprobrium that Nixon rightly receives for contacting the South Vietnamese government, in the scheme of things it probably wasn't all that consequential. It was patently obvious that they'd get a better deal from a new President like Nixon, even without Johnson trying to push things through for domestic political reasons.

... who would only be interim until a MP could be found acceptable.

Douglas-Home renounced his peerage in October of 1963 and successfully stood as an MP in the Kinross and Western Perthshire by-election the following month. If the Conservatives have won the 1964 general election with him as leader then he's going to continue be PM until the next one in 1969.

Even with only a single battalion, I shudder to think about what a Vietnam involvement cost and morale stain would have done to late 1970s Great Britain.

The 1970s? The UK would never be involved that long, it would be a short-term thing only. Assuming that the Conservatives win in 1964 and decide to deploy troops it's only going to be after the election, and they'd likely announce six months or so before the 1969 one a winding down of operations having successfully completed the job to keep it from being a live issue during it. Any UK troops would be gone by mid to late 1970.

 

[bobtdwarf]

Johnson was offering major financial support for the pound the UK economy, and it would have to be a pretty generous to induce Douglas-Home to take him up on it. If that's the case then a single Gurkha regiment seems somewhat paltry, never mind in comparison to Australia's deployment.

I think it would probably require an infantry brigade to be seen as suitably sized. Find a small province without much enemy activity and have the UK take it over, similar to Australia and Phuoc Tuy. Its neighbour Bien Hoa perhaps.



For all the opprobrium that Nixon rightly receives for contacting the South Vietnamese government, in the scheme of things it probably wasn't all that consequential. It was patently obvious that they'd get a better deal from a new President like Nixon, even without Johnson trying to push things through for domestic political reasons.



Douglas-Home renounced his peerage in October of 1963 and successfully stood as an MP in the Kinross and Western Perthshire by-election the following month. If the Conservatives have won the 1964 general election with him as leader then he's going to continue be PM until the next one in 1969.



The 1970s? The UK would never be involved that long, it would be a short-term thing only. Assuming that the Conservatives win in 1964 and decide to deploy troops it's only going to be after the election, and they'd likely announce six months or so before the 1969 one a winding down of operations having successfully completed the job to keep it from being a live issue during it. Any UK troops would be gone by mid to late 1970.

Vis a Vis Nixon... it was decisive.

He pressured the South to cut back on the usage of ammunition which ham strung their defense and then he would send to congress a bill for it that was four times what was used to try and force the Democrats to balk so he could blame them for the loss of the South.

Almost all of it is laid out fairly clearly in papers at his Library in Loma Linda, they have even done some presentations. He lured the South into derailing the peace process so that he could stab them in the back, and sell them down the river to get in with PRC...

 

[uk 75]

I have thought a bit more about this one.
Whether Wilson or Home is PM does not matter. In the 1964 to 68 timeframe the UK has too much on its plate (Indonesia, Cyprus, Aden, BAOR, financial black hole) to add Vietnam to its burdens.
Korea and Suez were recent memories and would influence media and parliamentary attitudes.
Maybe if Kennedy and Macmillan had still been in charge.

 

[Colonial-Marine]

Vis a Vis Nixon... it was decisive.

He pressured the South to cut back on the usage of ammunition which ham strung their defense and then he would send to congress a bill for it that was four times what was used to try and force the Democrats to balk so he could blame them for the loss of the South.

Almost all of it is laid out fairly clearly in papers at his Library in Loma Linda, they have even done some presentations. He lured the South into derailing the peace process so that he could stab them in the back, and sell them down the river to get in with PRC...

From what I've been led to believe the South Vietnamese government including Thieu himself was already quite predisposed against a peace deal at that time, even without Nixon's interference. But even if a deal was reached how likely was it that the conflict would resume again in a short time, as it did after the Paris Peace Accords? As with the later agreement I don't think there were many guarantees that reduced the North's ability to carry out a war south of the DMZ.

I haven't read that the ARVN had serious ammunition and other supply shortages until after the Paris Peace Accords, and by that time I don't see what Nixon would get out of letting South Vietnam fall. He didn't really have the ability to decide by then anyway, since congress had reigned in the president's authority and were generally very much against sending more aid.

 

[Rule of cool]

I have thought a bit more about this one.
Whether Wilson or Home is PM does not matter. In the 1964 to 68 timeframe the UK has too much on its plate (Indonesia, Cyprus, Aden, BAOR, financial black hole) to add Vietnam to its burdens.
Korea and Suez were recent memories and would influence media and parliamentary attitudes.
Maybe if Kennedy and Macmillan had still been in charge.

In 1965 even little Australia had combat commitments to Malaysia/Confrontation (1 btn group, SAS sqn, 2 fighter & 1 bomber sqns, ~3 Navy surface ships). RAAF Sabre sqn in Thailand and the battalion group, training team and RAAF Caribou flight in Vietnam. We had to (maybe not?) introduce selective conscription for overseas service to make up the numbers, that was the real controversy.

 

[BlackBat242]

"Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it whether it exists or not, diagnosing it incorrectly, and applying the wrong remedy."

Nice quote... from Earnest Benn (often incorrectly attributed to Groucho Marx - who borrowed it if he ever said it.

 

[bobtdwarf]

From what I've been led to believe the South Vietnamese government including Thieu himself was already quite predisposed against a peace deal at that time, even without Nixon's interference. But even if a deal was reached how likely was it that the conflict would resume again in a short time, as it did after the Paris Peace Accords? As with the later agreement I don't think there were many guarantees that reduced the North's ability to carry out a war south of the DMZ.

I haven't read that the ARVN had serious ammunition and other supply shortages until after the Paris Peace Accords, and by that time I don't see what Nixon would get out of letting South Vietnam fall. He didn't really have the ability to decide by then anyway, since congress had reigned in the president's authority and were generally very much against sending more aid.

oh Thieu was PISSED about Tet! But without a let off valve he would have had to eventually accept a peace deal.

The Dems reauthorized his unrestricted use of American air power and never failed to pay the bills.. thing is Nixon was submitting inflated figures and the Dems contacts were giving them closer to correct amounts. They even were pushing for Nixon to bomb in support of the South.

 

[BlackBat242]

I wasn't expecting that...

 

[Rule of cool]

I've read that the Malaysia-Singapore split in August 1965 was a major blow to British plans and expectations in the far East. IIUC the British drastically downgraded their expectations after this, I suspect the Feb 66 White Paper that cancelled CVA01 and put a 1975 withdrawal date on the EoS commitment was influenced by this.

It's not really surprising that Britain didn't commit to the US war in a region that their expectations were downgraded as that war was starting.

 

[Rule of cool]

I was just thinking abut this.

The reasons the RAN rejected the 1967 USN request for HMAS Melbourne as an ASW asset on Yankee Station were:

• Difficulty in providing 2 dedicated escorts for the deployment.
• Incompatibility with US logistics in a British ship.
• The Melbourne could only stay on station for 10 days whereas USN carriers were on station for 30 days.

How ,long could the 1966 onwards Victorious, Hermes, Eagle stay at sea under active combat conditions? Was it so short that they would encounter the same problems as the little Melbourne, or would it be long enough that it wouldn't be raised as an objection?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I was just thinking abut this.

The reasons the RAN rejected the 1967 USN request for HMAS Melbourne as an ASW asset on Yankee Station were:

• Difficulty in providing 2 dedicated escorts for the deployment.
• Incompatibility with US logistics in a British ship.
• The Melbourne could only stay on station for 10 days whereas USN carriers were on station for 30 days.

How ,long could the 1966 onwards Victorious, Hermes, Eagle stay at sea under active combat conditions? Was it so short that they would encounter the same problems as the little Melbourne, or would it be long enough that it wouldn't be raised as an objection?

This is a quote from the Wikipedia entry on the Beria patrol.

On 28 Feb 1966 HMS Eagle had sailed from Singapore on passage to Beira and remained on station until 10 May 1966 (being relieved by Ark Royal), returning to Singapore on 10 May 1966. In 71 days Eagle flew 1,070 sorties, flying 600,000 miles, surveying 200,000 square miles daily, steaming a total of 30,000 miles.

However, she wasn't at sea under active combat conditions.

 

[Pirate Pete]

This is a quote from the Wikipedia entry on the Beria patrol.However, she wasn't at sea under active combat conditions.

This is a quote from the Wikipedia entry on the Beria patrol.However, she wasn't at sea under active combat conditions.

if I recall correctly, wasn’t HMS Eagle’s ‘record’ for continuous operation (for the R.N.) finally broken by Invincible as a result of the Falklands campaign?

 

[Rule of cool]

This is a quote from the Wikipedia entry on the Beria patrol.However, she wasn't at sea under active combat conditions.

1070 sorties in 71 days is an average of 15 a day with minimal expenditure of ordnance. On Yankee station id expect a sortie rate at least double and to empty the magazines of bombs and rockets. A Buccaneer sqn might expend 80+ 1000lb bombs in a day or 2400 in 30 days at sea.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

1070 sorties in 71 days is an average of 15 a day with minimal expenditure of ordnance. On Yankee station I'd expect a sortie rate at least double and to empty the magazines of bombs and rockets. A Buccaneer sqn might expend 80+ 1000lb bombs in a day or 2400 in 30 days at sea.

Firstly, I acknowledged that it wasn't under active combat conditions. Secondly, 1,070 sorties over 30 days is an average of 36 a day which I freely admit is still with a minimal expenditure of ordnance. Thirdly, even the USN's supercarriers had to replenish at sea during their 30 days on Yankee station. That is where the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) which in the middle 1960s had ships that could replenish ships at sea with ordnance and air stores as well as oil will be able to show what it could do.

For example the Air Stores Support Ship RFA Reliant as described on Page 307 of Jane's 1965-66.

Built by Sir James Laing & Sons Ltd., Sunderland. Engined by Hawthorn Leslie. Completed in 1954. Former grain carrier which traded for two years, working between the Gulf of Mexico and the United Kingdom, before purchase from the Ropner Shipping Company. Converted for her now role at North Shileds. Sailed from Chatham on 4 Nov. 1958 for the Far East as the Royal Navy's first air/victualling stores issuing ship capable of replenishing aircraft carriers at sea. Has an endurance of 50 days’ steaming at 16 knots, and carries 40,000 different patterns of aircraft spares and general naval stores. Has six holds and the latest automatic tensioning winch for transfer of stores to aircraft carriers in unfavourable weather. Fully air conditioned for service in the tropics. Her conversion was based on the concept that aircraft carriers should be able to spend more time at sea, independent of shore bases. Originally named Somersby. Renamed Reliant in 1958.

At that time the RFA had another 8 support ships consisting of Resurgent & Retainer (stores support ships) and the 6 ships of the Fort class of which 2 were stores support ships, 3 were armament support ships & one was an air stores support ship. Under construction were 2 Regent class and 3 Ness class support ships.

While I'm at it the replenishment tanker force included 3 brand new Olna class, 2 nearly new Later Tide class and 3 Early Tide class (sisters of HMAS Supply) built in the 1950s and 4 smaller ships of the Wave class built at the end of World War II.

 

[Rule of cool]

71 days at sea and 1070 sorties over 30,000 miles steamed is pretty impressive, it included 1000 tons of dry stores in 12 dry RAS and 30,000 of FFO in 17 Liquid RAS.

In another thread about nuclear carriers it was said that the Kitty Hawk class could fight for 3 1/2 days from it's own stores. I don't know how the Rolling Thunder operations would be classed as 'fighting' days, but certainly the weather played a part in restricting fight ops, Essex class couldn't launch Crusaders when it was 90degF+ for example. So maybe half of a 30 day 'patrol' would involve heavy expenditure of ordnance?

HMAS Melbourne could also replenish at sea with fuel/liquids at least so I suspect the 10 day 'patrol' time was driven by other factors., possibly ordnance and crew In addition Australia was extremely conservative in the attitude to the Vietnam War; the highest ranked Armoured Corps officer was CO of 1ATF in 1967 and of all people pushed back on the need for tanks which later proved invaluable. Further when the RAN finally had to send a warship other than a DDG they raised a list of problems, but the USN said they were there to be solved and the Daring class HMAS Vendetta had a very successful Vietnam deployment.

My thinking is that as full sized fleet carriers, with appropriate RFA and USN support, Eagle and Victorious patrol cycles could mesh with the USN well enough, but the light-fleet Hermes might run into some of the issues the RAN raised with the Melbourne. However I suspect the British would be less 'negative Nancy' about them and would have made it work if needed.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

ANZUK task force on Yankee Station 1965.


It's actually Melbourne taking part in the Exercise FOTEX 65 in March 1965. The other aircraft carriers are Bulwark, Eagle & Victorious.

HMAS Melbourne (II) | The Sea Power Centre

Royal Australian Navy

seapower.navy.gov.au

 

[Rule of cool]

The thing about the Vietnam commitment was that in general it was constant and ongoing; 1ATF was established in mid 1966 and expected to be maintained for years. As was 2sqn RAAF and the RAN destroyer, Australia was expected to provide these capabilities/commitments with no gap which is why the Daring class Vendetta did a war deployment. As such the Government seemed to set a manpower cap for the forces to work with, IIRC the big 1966 expansion was 6300 and it peaked at 8000 personnel from late 1967 with little thought to reduction until 1971 despite the US drawdown.

However it appears that the 1966 and 1967 requests for Melbourne were separate from these other commitments. The USN/MACV would have been aware that Australia only had 1 carrier and 10-11 escorts so couldn't commit to a permanent carrier presence. However the USN was stretched so my guess is a one-off 6 month deployment to Vietnam would have given the USN some space to clear a backlog of maintenance, temporarily slow down the rate of deployment for some key ships and other catch-up things.

Perhaps this could be what Britain's contribution to the Vietnam war is like? The PM promises 'no boots on the ground' in the sense of committing ground/RAF/RN units on rotation for an indefinite period. However they could offer an RN carrier task force for a 3-6 month detached deployment for the Far East Strategic Reserve. This could be limited to a single war cruise per-carrier per-2 year EoS deployment, meaning that for 3-6 months per year the USN only needed to provide 2 not 3 carriers on Yankee station which should take some of the pressure off.

Thoughts?

 

[GTX]

However they could offer an RN carrier task force for a 3-6 month detached deployment for the Far East Strategic Reserve. This could be limited to a single war cruise per-carrier per-2 year EoS deployment, meaning that for 3-6 months per year the USN only needed to provide 2 not 3 carriers on Yankee station which should take some of the pressure off.

So one would conceivably see the following make deployments:

• HMS Ark Royal - Audacious-class
• HMS Eagle - Audacious-class
• HMS Victorious - Illustrious-class
• HMS Hermes - Centaur class
• HMS Centaur - Centaur class

With airings comprising mixes of Sea Vixens, Buccaneers, Gannets, Scimitars, Phantoms depending upon exact year.

 

[zen]

There is this standing assumption that the British Military and Governments would perceive the issue of Vietnam the same as the US and agree with US solutions.

But what was US views on Malaya and Borneo?
For that matter Burma during WWII.

Because British experience differs from the US and British contacts in the region were still extent.

Australia had since WWII increasingly viewed the US as it's only guarantor and consequently made a conscious decision to agree with the US perspective and solutions. Vietnam being an example.

But what if the UK differs on this.

I do wonder if this was a factor in why the UK stayed out of Vietnam.

 

[Rule of cool]

Just as there is no cookie cutter reason to join the Vietnam War there is no cookie cutter contribution. South Korea feared the US pulling units out of their country so sent a couple of their own (2nd rate IIUC) divisions to keep the US troops in place, and got massive economic stimulus into the bargain. Thailand was directly concerned for it's own security against the Communists in the region, and the US paid for their contribution as well. Australia and NZ wanted to keep the US interested in the ANZUS alliance and contributed a smaller but combined force and paid for everything themselves. Taiwan and Phillipine also made their own contributions without major land forces.

Therefore it is possible Britain could contribute in a way that meets it's expectations, which is why I suggested an occasional carrier deployment as opposed to forming it's own Brigade or Commonwealth Brigade or Division.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Just as there is no cookie cutter reason to join the Vietnam War there is no cookie cutter contribution. South Korea feared the US pulling units out of their country so sent a couple of their own (2nd rate IIUC) divisions to keep the US troops in place, and got massive economic stimulus into the bargain. Thailand was directly concerned for it's own security against the Communists in the region, and the US paid for their contribution as well. Australia and NZ wanted to keep the US interested in the ANZUS alliance and contributed a smaller but combined force and paid for everything themselves. Taiwan and Phillipine also made their own contributions without major land forces.

Therefore it is possible Britain could contribute in a way that meets it's expectations, which is why I suggested an occasional carrier deployment as opposed to forming it's own Brigade or Commonwealth Brigade or Division.

Running a UK carrier group as one of the 3 carriers at Yankee Station might be viable.... Like you said, 3-6 months out of 2 years spent East of Suez and cruising around.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Steam, flames, noise, poise...there is no finer sight than an FG.1 launch.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z6nVgoHvKEQ&t=28s
Chris

All aviation enthusiasts are fools. And what makes them so is beauty like what the FG.1 has got.

One of the things that made the FG.1 beautiful (and better looking than any other Phantom) is the dark sea grey colour scheme.

Second place to a Buccaneer S.2 being launched. The 1970s FAA Buccaneers (also painted dark sea grey) were the best looking Buccaneers.

 

[Rule of cool]

The RN didn't get their Phantoms until 1968 and realistically wouldn't be able to get a sqn to sea until 1969, too late for Rolling Thunder. The fighters the RN would have to use for war cruises 8n the 1965-68 period would be Sea Vixens. The USN met more Mig17s than Mig 21s, especially in the early years, so maybe this won't be a huge problem.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

What difference (if any) would the Type 984 radars on Eagle, Hermes & Victorious and the associated ADA & CDS systems make? If they do make a significant difference would Ark Royal receive the solid-state version of Type 984 and ADA?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The RN didn't get their Phantoms until 1968 and realistically wouldn't be able to get a sqn to sea until 1969, too late for Rolling Thunder. The fighters the RN would have to use for war cruises 8n the 1965-68 period would be Sea Vixens. The USN met more Mig17s than Mig 21s, especially in the early years, so maybe this won't be a huge problem.

IIRC the American fighters deployed early in the war didn't have guns because they been made obsolete by Sidewinder . . . or so they thought. Is that correct?

The Sea Vixen didn't have guns either, but it could be armed with air-to-air rockets. If the statement above is correct would that make it a better dogfighter than the "gunless" American fighters?

Similarly, would the ADEN cannon fitted to the RAF's Javelins & Lightnings make them better dogfighters than the "gunless" American fighters? My guess is that the RAF will want to deploy at least one fighter squadron to Vietnam to get some combat experience (and not be upstaged by the FAA) or failing that second some personnel to USAF units operating in Vietnam.

How well will Bloodhound, Firestreak, Red Top & Seaslug perform? And if they perform less well than expected, will that be a blessing in disguise? That is will money be spent on them to "get well" like the USN did for its 3-T missiles.

AFAIK in the middle 1960s only a handful of USN ships had NTDS, but the first 4 County class (which were in service) had CDS and the next 4 ships (which were coming into service) had ADAWS Mk 1. However, the Type 965 was AFAIK nowhere near as good as SPS-39 and SPS-48. On the other hand they did have access to the Type 984 radars on the aircraft carriers via the DPT data links.

Which is a long winded way of asking . . . How well would the County class have performed? I'm not a fan of them because of the small number of missiles they carried vis-à-vis the contemporary USN DLGs and only having one Type 901 radar. However, both may not be a problem in a "warm war" and AIUI contemporary 3-T missiles were just as unreliable.

IOTL the Batch 1 Counties had refits lasting several years from the late 1960s to the early 1970s. My guess is that they'd be refitted to a higher standard as discussed in this thread.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/rearming-the-county-class-missile-ships.41283/

Finally, the RN developed a small-ship version of ADA/ADAWS-1 for the Leander class Batch 2, but it wasn't fitted for financial reasons. If the USA does the persuade HMG to take part in the war is some of the (bribe) economic aid may be used to complete the Batch 2 & 3 Leanders with it.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The RN didn't get their Phantoms until 1968 and realistically wouldn't be able to get a sqn to sea until 1969, too late for Rolling Thunder. The fighters the RN would have to use for war cruises 8n the 1965-68 period would be Sea Vixens. The USN met more Mig17s than Mig 21s, especially in the early years, so maybe this won't be a huge problem.

I think Eagle stand's a very good chance of being properly Phantomised and that more Spey-Phantoms are built.

 

[Rule of cool]

Before looking at the technical aspects I'd point out that they will be drastically impacted by the nature of any involvement in the Vietnam conflict. As the OP stated keeping the UK out of Vietnam was an accomplishment, and an alternative decision to commit by Mac in a minimum way such as a couple of carrier cruises will specifically undertaken because it doesn't heavily commit Britain and therefore would not result in many changes to equipment.

To create the sort of environment where Britain commits to Vietnam with some enthusiasm would likely lead to a somewhat different equipment in the British military in the first place. A Vietnam commitment would destroy the 'Island Base Strategy' and definitively prove there is a role for strike carriers.

 

[Rule of cool]

IIRC the American fighters deployed early in the war didn't have guns because they been made obsolete by Sidewinder . . . or so they thought. Is that correct?

The Sea Vixen didn't have guns either, but it could be armed with air-to-air rockets. If the statement above is correct would that make it a better dogfighter than the "gunless" American fighters?

I think the Sea Vixen would be used in the ground attack role. Perhaps some AAM armed planes would be sent as escorts for Buccaneers and attack Sea Vixens, but they likely would be only used defensively rather than go Mig hunting.

Similarly, would the ADEN cannon fitted to the RAF's Javelins & Lightnings make them better dogfighters than the "gunless" American fighters? My guess is that the RAF will want to deploy at least one fighter squadron to Vietnam to get some combat experience (and not be upstaged by the FAA) or failing that second some personnel to USAF units operating in Vietnam.

How well will Bloodhound, Firestreak, Red Top & Seaslug perform? And if they perform less well than expected, will that be a blessing in disguise? That is will money be spent on them to "get well" like the USN did for its 3-T missiles.

The state of play for the Lightning force in the mid 60s was F1/F1A/F2 had Firestreaks and guns but only ~4,200l of fuel. The F3 had no guns, Red Tops but only about ~4,200l of fuel. The F3A/F6 had no guns, Red Tops but ~6,000l of fuel.

The handful of remaining Javelins in 1965-67 had guns and Firestreaks, but were hopelessly outclassed by then. Of course the RAF did have 9 sqns of Hunter FGA/FRs that might be sent and maybe tangle with NthV Migs.

I'd expect the British missiles to perform about as well as the US did, and the French R530 for that matter. However for fighters to be committed Britain would need a vastly different political environment.

AFAIK in the middle 1960s only a handful of USN ships had NTDS, but the first 4 County class (which were in service) had CDS and the next 4 ships (which were coming into service) had ADAWS Mk 1. However, the Type 965 was AFAIK nowhere near as good as SPS-39 and SPS-48. On the other hand they did have access to the Type 984 radars on the aircraft carriers via the DPT data links.

Which is a long winded way of asking . . . How well would the County class have performed? I'm not a fan of them because of the small number of missiles they carried vis-à-vis the contemporary USN DLGs and only having one Type 901 radar. However, both may not be a problem in a "warm war" and AIUI contemporary 3-T missiles were just as unreliable.

IOTL the Batch 1 Counties had refits lasting several years from the late 1960s to the early 1970s. My guess is that they'd be refitted to a higher standard as discussed in this thread.
https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/rearming-the-county-class-missile-ships.41283/
Finally, the RN developed a small-ship version of ADA/ADAWS-1 for the Leander class Batch 2, but it wasn't fitted for financial reasons. If the USA does the persuade HMG to take part in the war is some of the (bribe) economic aid may be used to complete the Batch 2 & 3 Leanders with it.

I doubt the environment off NthV would stretch ADAWS very much; there would be controlling the air activity, surface search and some NGS and almost no opportunity to fire a Sea Slug.

Something that might be interesting is how RAN DDGs performed much better ELINT (I think) than identically equipped USN ships. The difference as the RAN conformed to British practice and had someone dedicated to that station whereas USN practice was to rotate people from the CIC through the station.

My guess is that different British equipment and practices would provide Task Force 77 with some niche capabilities that could be exploited when the RN carrier was on station.

 

[Yellow Palace]

To create the sort of environment where Britain commits to Vietnam with some enthusiasm would likely lead to a somewhat different equipment in the British military in the first place. A Vietnam commitment would destroy the 'Island Base Strategy' and definitively prove there is a role for strike carriers.

I'm not entirely sure that it would, actually. After all, there was heavy land-based air support to the war in Vietnam, some of it at fairly considerable ranges. The carrier-based air was required only because the scale of the operation was beyond what could be supported from the land bases - or at least so the RAF might argue.

Since the British requirement was only to support a brigade East of Suez, as opposed to multiple divisions, the requirement for air support would be considerably less and therefore wouldn't require strike carriers. Combined with a thorough hit job detailed cost assessment, the RAF might be able to argue that Vietnam supports the Island Strategy.

That said, I think if the UK does provide maritime power to support the war in Vietnam, it becomes politically difficult to withdraw from East of Suez while that's ongoing. Which likely means the decision to scrap the carrier fleet can't be taken until 1973 or so, forcing expenditure to keep it active. That creates an interesting situation post-1973; either:

1. New carriers are ordered circa 1966, with all that implies, or
2. ARK ROYAL, HERMES et al are worked so hard off Vietnam that they're completely worn out, and the RN ditches carriers faster than in OTL.

 

[Rule of cool]

The February 1966 decision to end carrier aviation when Eagle and Ark Royal expired was because the only role carriers were required for was opposed amphibious operations. It would be pretty difficult to argue this was true if there was an RN carrier conducting strikes on Yankee station and RAF aircraft were unsuitable or not allowed.

 

[CJGibson]

All aviation enthusiasts are fools. And what makes them so is beauty like what the FG.1 has got.

In that case I am happy to be a crewmember of this ship of fools.

Chris

 

[Rule of cool]

In Rolling Thunder the US only employed the B-52 in route package 1, immediately north of the DMZ, as the administration thought their use would be an unnecessary escalation to use them further north. I assume the same restriction would apply to the British if they wanted to use Vbombers.

The other bomber were late model Canberras, B15 and B16 were stationed in the Mid and Far East. The B15 had AS30 missiles and the B16 had the Blue Shadow sideways looking radar. These might be suitable to operate north of the DMZ, but probably not as far as Hanoi.

 

[BlackBat242]

IIRC the American fighters deployed early in the war didn't have guns because they been made obsolete by Sidewinder . . . or so they thought. Is that correct?

The Sea Vixen didn't have guns either, but it could be armed with air-to-air rockets. If the statement above is correct would that make it a better dogfighter than the "gunless" American fighters?

Similarly, would the ADEN cannon fitted to the RAF's Javelins & Lightnings make them better dogfighters than the "gunless" American fighters? My guess is that the RAF will want to deploy at least one fighter squadron to Vietnam to get some combat experience (and not be upstaged by the FAA) or failing that second some personnel to USAF units operating in Vietnam.

The only US fighter in Vietnam without guns were the F-4 Phantoms and F-102s.

The USAF's F-100s, F-105s, and F-5s all had 20mm cannons (F-100 had 4 M-39, F-5 had 2 M-39, F-105 had 1 M61 Vulcan).

The USN's F-8 Crusaders had 4 Mk 12 20mm cannon.


The Sea Vixen FAW.2 was fitted for Firestreak & Red Top missiles, as well as several different sizes of rockets.

 

[Ilsa Gutrune]

One of Harold Wilson's achievements as Prime Minister was to resist President Johnson's pressure for Britain to make some visible military contribution to the Vietnam War.
Wilson had only narrowly beaten a Conservative Government in 1964. The Conservatives may well have resisted Johnson too on the grounds that Britain was involved in too many commitments already.
The most likely contribution would have been a Gurkha unit operating with the Australians and New Zealanders.
The SAS were rumoured to have had some people in Vietnam and RAF transport aircraft did visit Saigon. Some UK military personnel may have served briefly with American units.
UK forces were pretty stretched in the 1964 to 1973 period. For example it would have been hard to find a spare aircraft carrier to serve on the Yankee Station.

There is a great book about the British contributions. It is titled like “Britain in Vietnam”… it is by and large a sensationalist title as the reality is it is 99% about indicate post WWII occupation

 

[Sheriff]

The SAS were rumoured to have had some people in Vietnam and RAF transport aircraft did visit Saigon.

Those rumours are probably a combination of £10 Poms, and the Cultivated Australian accent. An American might believe the latter was English.