They're either gonna buy a foreign vehicle or end up with a GDLS monopoly on AFVs. Not great.
On the topic of passengers, the Army has been insistent for the past few years that 6 is the way to go. Their last experience with trying to fit a 9 man squad resulted in an absolute behemoth that weighed up to 80 tons. There are merits to the 6 man approach, for instance, it reduces the risk of the whole squad being killed if one vehicle is hit. It also increases firepower by allocating two vehicles to a squad while also increasing vehicle protection for the same weight.
You do realize that weight was because the Army demanded enough armor to stop a 125mm main gun round and a 200lb IED charge under the vehicle, right?
 
It thought Hanwha was out along with BAE and Oshkosh?
They are. That article is from 2021.

only posted GD concepts article to show concepts believed not to have been posted previously.

PS: IMHO no proposed IFV has yet displayed technical justification for a new MICV program, rubber tracks and hybrid drives (really?). Thus the posting of the BAE Systems RB301 technology demonstrator which could be used as a M2-upgrade test vehicle
 
Heavy IFVs have been discussed for 50 yrs in the USArmy. They’re just lacking guts to go ahead with them. Heavy is good.
applique armor may need to be prepositioned (w/ those risks including all the Euro bridges rendered NO-GO) but an option to withstand 125mm APFSDS (pretty ambitious) deserves consideration
 
That's for two generations, maybe 3, before the GCV, but I will accept the analysis of (paraphrasing) "IFVs work in the same part of the battlefield as tanks and therefore need similar protection" as still applicable for sake of discussion.

Okay, 62 ton weight class. That's heavier than many bridges can take, but arguments can be made to build stronger bridges as part of general infrastructure upgrades. Probably upgrading to 75 ton bridges from 50ton. Upgrading to 100 or 150ton is likely to be seen as excessive, as no commercial trucks are that heavy. Though I could see longer bridges being rated for more, depending on their construction methods.

The GCV was 84 tons, which is heavier than most bridges in Europe can take. No bridges = either needing to swim/wade or have the engineers build a new bridge at each river in Europe. Of course, at this point the Abrams is in the same situation, weighing some 84 tons without the dozer blade. Again, most highway bridges are 50-75 tons, because no commercial truck is that heavy. You'd be reduced to tanks trying to use railroad bridges to cross rivers, and there are a lot less railroad bridges than road bridges.

I'd recommend aiming for ~40ton tank and IFV, simply because those size bridges are much easier to make and place, and all the US supporting vehicles are ~40 tons as well. Any bridge that can support a 40ton HEMTT can support a 40 ton tank. makes supporting work a lot easier.

Yes, assuming that we can make a 40 ton vehicle that can stop a 125mm sabot to the front. If not, the lightest possible vehicle that can stop a 125mm or M829A0 from the front.

The IED requirement is absurd, simply because the insurgents can make IEDs a lot larger than any vehicle can withstand. What was the largest roadside IED found in either Iraq or Afghanistan? over 1000lbs? When the explosion is launching an Abrams end over end, it's physically impossible to armor against that.

You need to stop the detonation, not try to stop the vehicle or crew from taking damage after the explosion. That means Jammers and decoys, not armor.
 
That's for two generations, maybe 3, before the GCV, but I will accept the analysis of (paraphrasing) "IFVs work in the same part of the battlefield as tanks and therefore need similar protection" as still applicable for sake of discussion.

Okay, 62 ton weight class. That's heavier than many bridges can take, but arguments can be made to build stronger bridges as part of general infrastructure upgrades. Probably upgrading to 75 ton bridges from 50ton. Upgrading to 100 or 150ton is likely to be seen as excessive, as no commercial trucks are that heavy. Though I could see longer bridges being rated for more, depending on their construction methods.

The GCV was 84 tons, which is heavier than most bridges in Europe can take. No bridges = either needing to swim/wade or have the engineers build a new bridge at each river in Europe. Of course, at this point the Abrams is in the same situation, weighing some 84 tons without the dozer blade. Again, most highway bridges are 50-75 tons, because no commercial truck is that heavy. You'd be reduced to tanks trying to use railroad bridges to cross rivers, and there are a lot less railroad bridges than road bridges.

I'd recommend aiming for ~40ton tank and IFV, simply because those size bridges are much easier to make and place, and all the US supporting vehicles are ~40 tons as well. Any bridge that can support a 40ton HEMTT can support a 40 ton tank. makes supporting work a lot easier.

Yes, assuming that we can make a 40 ton vehicle that can stop a 125mm sabot to the front. If not, the lightest possible vehicle that can stop a 125mm or M829A0 from the front.

The IED requirement is absurd, simply because the insurgents can make IEDs a lot larger than any vehicle can withstand. What was the largest roadside IED found in either Iraq or Afghanistan? over 1000lbs? When the explosion is launching an Abrams end over end, it's physically impossible to armor against that.
yes
You need to stop the detonation, not try to stop the vehicle or crew from taking damage after the explosion. That means Jammers and decoys, not armor.
lets get wack.
this is why a (forward and to a reasonable distance on either side) a armored vehicle mounting a multi phenomenon Aensor/DEW (X-ray, MMW, Laser Guided Energy {LGE}/Laser Induced Plasma channel {LIPC} UWB etc whatever R&D says is the right optimum mix. it will be expensive way to clear any potential threat road/likely avenue of approach route. This armored vehicle must include a DEW APS and a fairly deep magazine, backup KE APS, including especially a "revenge shot" KE APS. This vehicle will be the only tgt of an adversary. This armored vehicle will have to advance under severe fire and clear at at least 25MPH.

--or start clearing w/ numbers of A-10s firing 30mm ball bearing canister and HEI rounds onto every route.

If other vehicles are off central cleared route in threat areas, they might be on their own.

This is why TACOM is so much into NO-GO/GO terrain analysis and DARPA GXV-T ie no road dependence.
 
yes

lets get wack.
this is why a (forward and to a reasonable distance on either side) a armored vehicle mounting a multi phenomenon Aensor/DEW (X-ray, MMW, Laser Guided Energy {LGE}/Laser Induced Plasma channel {LIPC} UWB etc whatever R&D says is the right optimum mix. it will be expensive way to clear any potential threat road/likely avenue of approach route. This armored vehicle must include a DEW APS and a fairly deep magazine, backup KE APS, including especially a "revenge shot" KE APS. This vehicle will be the only tgt of an adversary. This armored vehicle will have to advance under severe fire and clear at at least 25MPH.
What's the Russian monstrosity that escorts their road-mobile ICBMs? Listva?

Basically one of those.

--or start clearing w/ numbers of A-10s firing 30mm ball bearing canister and HEI rounds onto every route.
Or those kinetic cluster bombs and similar from artillery.
 
What's the Russian monstrosity that escorts their road-mobile ICBMs? Listva?

Basically one of those.


Or those kinetic cluster bombs and similar from artillery.
another one for the mix on Bradley sized
vehicle.


 
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The IED requirement is absurd, simply because the insurgents can make IEDs a lot larger than any vehicle can withstand. What was the largest roadside IED found in either Iraq or Afghanistan? over 1000lbs? When the explosion is launching an Abrams end over end, it's physically impossible to armor against that.
Needs to be remembered that tge IED requirements is folded into tge MINE PROTECTION requirements in a Hand in Hand deal. It basically a more robust set of standards to help cover the non standard nature of IEDs.

And Anti tanks mines are still a major thing for everyone who actaully expects to fight on the Defense. Then you have the like of the Artillery Drop AT Mines.

Which as seen recently in ukraine are scary frakers since they turn "clear" ares into "not clear" areas within seconds.

So making sure that you vehicle can take up to 100 pound contact mines and the new famcy EFP mines is a pretty useful and smart thing.

And it needs to be remembered that the Abrams Yeeters 1000s were RARE and easily spotted once people learned what to look for.*

The 100 to 200 pounders were far more common. And making sure you are protected against those stop a whole lot of pain for you people.

Throw in being able to stop 155 shells at point blank range means you can do a whole lot more when enemy arty in play.

And stopping enemy Arty from hurting you men is a massive deal.

So eyeah IED protection is here to stay.

*it under estimate how good the US soldiers got finding IEDs. Its so borderline supernatural that the US Volunteers been gaining a rep as human explosive finding dogs in Ukraine.
 
This DEW equipped vehicle must perform its own CRAM.
The Israelis have faced up to 7 stacked AT mines and 1klb IEDs including off route, 'in serial' EFPs, yes, are the new standard. Vehicles can not be built to w/stand these threats. V shaped (best practical) armor like that of new Strykers is all one can do.. 'on the move' even off-route detection/neutralization is the only option.


TRL6 prototypes of detection and neutralization technologies that provide effective standoff detection and neutralization of roadside threats
•Standoff forward looking sensors: multi-sensor suite includes forward looking radar, harmonic radar, thermal infrared (IR) sensors and other forward looking technologies
•Precision Grenade: collaborative effort with ARDEC to mature a shape charge penetrator round for the existing 40mm grenade launcher
• Effective system concepts for route clearance
Payoff: Enhanced survivability of US vehicles and forces from roadside threats. Higher rates of advance in route clearance. 1688991040173.png

1688989556459.png 1688989656835.png 1688989750513.png
 
So eyeah IED protection is here to stay.
Never intended to say it wasn't, but don't be stupid about the requirements.

7x stacked AT mines? will yeet that Abrams.

100lbs of boom you can build for. much more than that isn't doable for a ground vehicle.
 
Never intended to say it wasn't, but don't be stupid about the requirements.

7x stacked AT mines? will yeet that Abrams.

100lbs of boom you can build for. much more than that isn't doable for a ground vehicle.
...

Boss the average average anti tank mine is bout 20 pounds.

With the average explosive filler weight being bout half that.

So 140 pounds of mines with 70 pounds of explosive.

The IED standards as they are is a very much doable with the 200 pound of high explosive standards. Even against Serial EFPs since those actually do poorly verse ERA and Space type armor.

The IEDs that actually thrown Adrams were all 20 plus counts of 155mm shell. Or over 1 ton of High Explosive. Which no one is trying to protect against.
 
I've read that the contract allowed the Army to choose up to three vendors to down-select to. With that in mind I'm very surprised they didn't also include the BAE entry.
 

..dont hear a decent onboard preventative maintain-- net even mentioned..the long poll in the tent for all these things and apparently never completed on M2.
 
the western combined arms strategy and technology writ large is shown to be in question ..that would obviously include IFVs and tanks and their usage.
 
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the western combined arms strategy and technology writ large is shown to be in question ..that would obviously include IFVs and tanks and their usage.
Attacking a well dug in defense line that’s heavily mined and under constant surveillance. Without air superiority and insufficient numbers of breaching vehicles and heavy vehicles.
Yes, western combined arms strategy is in doubt because Ukr is forced to fight in ways the West *cough the US cough* hopefully doesn’t have to?
 
Attacking a well dug in defense line that’s heavily mined and under constant surveillance. Without air superiority and insufficient numbers of breaching vehicles and heavy vehicles.
Yes, western combined arms strategy is in doubt because Ukr is forced to fight in ways the West *cough the US cough* hopefully doesn’t have
US ASup aint gonna stop hunter/killer drones or & pervasive tens of kms of mines w/ arty knowing/threatening everything as fast as heat.. If u masses it is ur a..es. The Aussie General has right the West is not ready for this and ASup wont help much.. Dispersed largely independent vehicles w. advanced APS to even CRAM + advanced counter mine. A few plows and few rollers doing "proofing" aint gonna cut it.
 
US ASup aint gonna stop hunter/killer drones or & pervasive tens of kms of mines w/ arty knowing/threatening everything as fast as heat.. If u masses it is ur a..es. The Aussie General has right the West is not ready for this and ASup wont help much.. Dispersed largely independent vehicles w. advanced APS to even CRAM + advanced counter mine. A few plows and few rollers doing "proofing" aint gonna cut it.
Misunderstood me. The enemy having months to prepare linear defenses & observation are the problem. A more robustly furnished Ukr Army may have been able to hound the Russians and not give them time to dig in. Ukr War has some unique characteristics that don’t necessarily apply to all future scenarios.
 
the western combined arms strategy and technology writ large is shown to be in question ..that would obviously include IFVs and tanks and their usage.
That is a gross misinterpretation of what is being said and more so, is an extremely tenuous link to including this in this particular topic.

stay-on-topic-5c0a85.jpg
 
IMO, the question isn't how the drones will be shot down, the question is how they will be detected.

And I'm not sure that having your APS radiating all the time is a good idea.
Against current drone threats a passive system could do it, especially if a well-designed AI is doing the looking. But against complex threats coming in the future, it's going to take layers of detection and layers of defense to keep vehicles safe on the front line.
 
Against current drone threats a passive system could do it, especially if a well-designed AI is doing the looking. But against complex threats coming in the future, it's going to take layers of detection and layers of defense to keep vehicles safe on the front line.
At least a passive drone datalink detector that can tell you if drones are in the area, so APS needs to switch modes or whatever.
 

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