The answer to what question? They all have different fuselage lengths with different seating capacities and are consequently optimised for different routes. They all have the high-and-forward engine installations and MCAS.So is the MAX 9 and MAX 10 the answer for the MAX 8. Drop the MAX 8 entirely and replace with the other two.
The answer to what question? They all have different fuselage lengths with different seating capacities and are consequently optimised for different routes. They all have the high-and-forward engine installations and MCAS.So is the MAX 9 and MAX 10 the answer for the MAX 8. Drop the MAX 8 entirely and replace with the other two.
So is the MAX 9 and MAX 10 the answer for the MAX 8. Drop the MAX 8 entirely and replace with the other two.
I took a quick look for that comment but couldn't find it again. I think it was based on a misunderstanding of the design principles involved. The pitch sensitivity issue arises from the introduction of the MAX engine/wing arrangement and is common across all models. Fuselage length is irrelevant.further up the thread it was said that stretching the fuselage would have made the MAX 8's problem much less, even no problem at all (unless I misunderstood what was written). The MAX 9 and 10, being already stretched, seems to me to solve the problem.
There are key differences between sensitivity, stability, trim and control authority. Yes, in the normal course of events moving the tail back does reduce static sensitivity (i.e. throughout the flight regime). But the MAX engine cowlings introduce a non-linear dynamic destabilisation tendency which only significantly enhances sensitivity at high angles of attack, and this requires a different solution. With both fore and aft aerodynamic surfaces in play, it all gets very complicated.Thanks SP. The comment was something along the lines that the further away the tail plane was, the easier it was to control pitch sensitivity. It just seemed to me that the 9 and 10 covered that ---
Well further up the thread it was said that stretching the fuselage would have made the MAX 8's problem much less, even no problem at all (unless I misunderstood what was written). The MAX 9 and 10, being already stretched, seems to me to solve the problem.
Grounding means newly produced airframe can't fly
c390 Maxs in service at grounding.
But first line of argument is reciprocal:
c390 Maxs in service at grounding.
It was such a simple extrapolation. Why didn't you include it in your numbers?
Commestical, commestical... ah! Cosmetical! "the lack of flight worthy personnel" - if the pilots are to blame, grounding hundreds of aircraft makes complete sense. Or is that about the airworthiness of pilots floating around the cockpit during a terminal dive?Boeing is a profit making organisation like billion other in the world... Yes time and delay matters to them and the pressure build is on the schedule. Hundreds of airframe have been delivered and flown around the world safely. The minimal changes in software are commestical mainly and relate more to the lack of flight worthy personnel (once again MCAS and alike are old as the jet plane).
So posturing indignity doesn't help the case. If that is not most of it.
Well, if you make too many "cosmetical" changes to a piece of software which is expected to drive over a hundered planes into the ground during the MAX expected service life, you have to requalify all pilots. I guess that qualifies as lack of flight worthy personnel.Commestical, commestical... ah! Cosmetical! "the lack of flight worthy personnel" - if the pilots are to blame, grounding hundreds of aircraft makes complete sense. Or is that about the airworthiness of pilots floating around the cockpit during a terminal dive?Boeing is a profit making organisation like billion other in the world... Yes time and delay matters to them and the pressure build is on the schedule. Hundreds of airframe have been delivered and flown around the world safely. The minimal changes in software are commestical mainly and relate more to the lack of flight worthy personnel (once again MCAS and alike are old as the jet plane).
So posturing indignity doesn't help the case. If that is not most of it.
The minimal changes in software are commestical mainly and relate more to the lack of flight worthy personnel (once again MCAS and alike are old as the jet plane).
Low Pilot ratings pointed out here by the FAA (25th of November) :
Also the Final JATR document enclosed (see the introduction).
Once again, the specific pilots that day are not singled out as individuals but as a certain type of professional lacking the abilities to cope with a relatively simple problem that generations before them have faced in often more stressful situation (nuclear delivery for exemple).
Training is one of more accute problem as are transport regulating organisations that left basic flight knowledge slip out of qualification requirements.
I will try to add more material latter.
I have not noticed much criticism of the airlines sticking, only of Boeing and the FAA. Do you have any sources for that?Boeing and airlines at fault
Boeing and airlines at fault
I have not noticed much criticism of the airlines sticking, only of Boeing and the FAA. Do you have any sources for that?
You misunderstand my question. The FAA is not an airline. I look around and I see no evidence that airlines are to blame. Do you have any?Just look through this thread, the FAA allowing Boeing to self certify the aircraft as nothing new here folks and moving to have MCAS not included in pilots manuals etc. Look around you.