Boeing 737 MAX family NEWS ONLY

[WatcherZero]

New setback in Max 7 and 10 certification.
In the event of a bird strike the CFM Leap mechanically disengages the fan to prevent further vibration damage (like shedding blades). However the fan also supplies the bleed air system to the cockpit and passenger cabin (Engine 1 cockpit, engine 2 cabin), when the fan blade disconnects from the bleed air system it allows noxious fumes to enter these compartments. This discovery has been prompted by an NTSB investigation into several incidents last year where the Max 8 aircraft cockpit filled with smoke from an unknown source, the load reduction device is another undocumented MAX aircraft feature. In the interim aircraft operators have begun independently writing procedures that in the event of a bird strike the bleed air system should be switched off.

737 MAX 7 and MAX 10 likely to be further delayed |

The latest setback to the Boeing 737 MAX 7 and 10 programs is a load reduction device on the CFM LEAP engine that engages after engine bird strike damage.

airinsight.com

 

[TomcatViP]

Any engineer would have had that case crosschecked during the design. Backflow are pretty standard and not something unknown.
I would guess that the failure here comes from the division of tasks, with people and projects structured around keywords and not much more. Here the bleed air manager never envisioned much of the engine failure cases. Not his domain.
Any rigorous analysis should have detected this. Noxious fumes are also often leaving traces and residues. It is concerning that tracking back their source took so much time.

 

[BlackBat242]

There is an old "war story" that was going around the USMC CH-53E community in the mid-1980s when the Super Stallion was first entering service.

During prototype and developmental testing there were several failures of the tail-fold mechanism (to reduce length when parked on/in a ship)... according to the story, the engineers who designed the hinged joint, the powered latch mechanism, and the drive-shaft mating coupling for the driveshaft to the tail rotor were not told what they were designing it for - they were just given a basic set of specifications.

As the company made all sorts of similar items for many different applications they assumed that it was for a boat to be able to fold the propeller up when in shallow water - something which had VERY different loads and strains than the tail boom of a large transport/cargo helicopter!

 

[TomcatViP]

FAA would not require drastic modification for the NOx cabin inflows problem:

The Seattle Times reported a design change could involve a software update to alter what happens to airflow valves when an engine fan blade breaks because of a bird strike or other reason.

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/faa-will-not-require-immediate-737-max-engine-action-after-bird-strikes-2024-11-27/

 

[DWG]

Meant to post this last week and forgot:

Judge rejects Boeing plea deal as 737 Max fraud case continues

A federal judge on 5 December rejected Boeing's guilty plea with the US Department of Justice (DOJ), a move that throws fresh uncertainty over the company's 737 Max fraud case and could require Boeing negotiate a new deal.

www.flightglobal.com

TLDR: Judge rejected the new 737 Max Boeing/DoJ plea deal, apparently because he's from Texas and the plea deal said that in selecting the independent compliance monitor proposed by the deal the race of the applicant* would be considered, plus he didn't get enough say in the decision, and the monitor's recommendations weren't mandatory. So now Boeing and DoJ have to negotiate a new plea deal.

Although the DOJ committed to picking monitors “solely based on merit and talent”, O’Connor says he is “skeptical”. He notes that the DOJ’s policies, and a 2021 executive order signed by president Joe Biden, “encourage consideration of race in hiring.”

* I suspect it was just a standard DEI clause - if you have two equal final candidates, pick the one from the disadvantaged community - and the judge is editorializing for his political base.

The attorneys for the families say the new deal must consider their interests, but I'm really not sure that anything the judge said says that.

 

[Scott Kenny]

* I suspect it was just a standard DEI clause - if you have two equal final candidates, pick the one from the disadvantaged community - and the judge is editorializing for his political base.

The application of that Biden EO has been consideration of race/other protected class FIRST, then competence later if ever.

And it's a screaming violation of the Civil Rights Act, which expressly prohibited the consideration of skin color, race, national origin, sex, or religion...

 

[DWG]

And it's a screaming violation of the Civil Rights Act, which expressly prohibited the consideration of skin color, race, national origin, sex, or religion...

AIUI CAA forbids discrimination, not consideration, you can't eliminate systematic discrimination without considering and neutralizing its effects. It's the difference between "All applications must be made in person at the office on the second floor", and "All applications must be made in person at the office on the second floor, the wheelchair accessible lift is to the right."

But off-topic.

 

[Scott Kenny]

AIUI CAA forbids discrimination, not consideration, you can't eliminate systematic discrimination without considering and neutralizing its effects. It's the difference between "All applications must be made in person at the office on the second floor", and "All applications must be made in person at the office on the second floor, the wheelchair accessible lift is to the right."

But off-topic.

If you cannot decide against a candidate based on (census categories), you cannot decide for a candidate based on those categories. Because that means you decided against the other candidates based on those categories.

Courts have ruled that way pretty firmly since the mid 1990s.

 

[DWG]

Boeing restarts 737 production

Boeing has restarted 737 production and intends within days to resume assembly of 767s and 777s, saying it is bringing its Pacific Northwest facilities back online after halting production for nearly three months due to a machinists' strike.

www.flightglobal.com

Following on from:

Boeing aims to fully resume Seattle-area production before year-end as safety review continues

Boeing aims this month to fully resume final assembly of commercial aircraft in the Pacific Northwest, having so far held off from rebooting the lines after machinists ended a 53-day-strike in early November.

www.flightglobal.com

 

[357Mag]

Boeing restarts 737 production

Boeing has restarted 737 production and intends within days to resume assembly of 767s and 777s, saying it is bringing its Pacific Northwest facilities back online after halting production for nearly three months due to a machinists' strike.

www.flightglobal.com

Following on from:

Boeing aims to fully resume Seattle-area production before year-end as safety review continues

Boeing aims this month to fully resume final assembly of commercial aircraft in the Pacific Northwest, having so far held off from rebooting the lines after machinists ended a 53-day-strike in early November.

www.flightglobal.com

All -

Same song, second verse.....

Boeing and the FAA keep referring to a nebulous rate of 38
B737/P-8 per month, ostensibly because that rate was reached briefly a few years ago.

A specified production rate can no longer be clamored for by management & supervision nor strived mightily to obtain by the workforce independent of ensuring and providing requisite production quality. Those former days are over, or else... Boeing Commercial Aircraft will be.

Neither investors, Boeing, the FAA, Congress, nor Wall Street know" fer sher " what the mothly rate will be. The true levels of quality production line workers can provide is something
that has to be proven and validated on a frequently recurring basis. Things like how well the new training regimine is going and whether it results in the positive quality impacts needed, will be revealed only over time. This reality will resist any attempts to cram production quality into being achieved within some pre-selected time frame, and by extension...production " rate ".

What / how much can be produced with proper Aviation-grade quality and conformity is and end number influenced by a host of variables... like training needs, daily workforce attendance; and supply chain shortages. As long as things like these remain in-flux and fairly unpredictable, skewering production to a punitory " rate " is stupidity beyond reason. The " rate " is going to flux, and in result...the numbers of planes that can be properly produced is going to flux or otherwise dip below pre-established goals. And, for responsible entities to even bring up the pipe dream of catching Airbus; beggars imagination.

The reality is more like:
" Hey... let's see what we can get done this shift... this workday ", and then find out the answer to the same question for the next day; and the next. THEN they can say what rate achieved.


With regards,
357 Mag

 

[DWG]

Same song, second verse.....

Boeing and the FAA keep referring to a nebulous rate of 38
B737/P-8 per month, ostensibly because that rate was reached briefly a few years ago.

Neither of the articles actually mentions productions rates: "The airframer is not more specific about production rates, but sources at the company say 737 output is proceeding at a very slow pace."

 

[Scott Kenny]

The reality is more like:
" Hey... let's see what we can get done this shift... this workday ", and then find out the answer to the same question for the next day; and the next. THEN they can say what rate achieved.

And then they will discover that Day Shift productivity is crap, Swings is not much better, and Nights are what is making up for it.

Why?

Because Upper Manglement holds bigass meetings all afternoon, so Days only works from 6 or 7am till noon, and Swings doesn't start their work till after Upper Manlgement leaves for the day, about 7pm, and works till 11pm.

 

[357Mag]

And then they will discover that Day Shift productivity is crap, Swings is not much better, and Nights are what is making up for it.

Why?

Because Upper Manglement holds bigass meetings all afternoon, so Days only works from 6 or 7am till noon, and Swings doesn't start their work till after Upper Manlgement leaves for the day, about 7pm, and works till 11pm.

Scott -
Howdy !
" In all humor, there is truth . "

With regards,
357Mag

 

[357Mag]

Neither of the articles actually mentions productions rates: "The airframer is not more specific about production rates, but sources at the company say 737 output is proceeding at a very slow pace."

DWG -
Howdy !

While I did not specifically cite the two articles you mentioned,
I can see how you might have taken it that way.

I DK whether you read " Aviation Week & Space Technology " ?
I have a subscription, and the ongoing travails of Boeing are a frequent topic. I had hoped to specifically re-quote comments made by ( responsible ) Boeing officials to Aviation Week.
I even rifled through our trash, to see if the 11Nov - 24 Nov
issue was still present. Alas, it was already gone.

In that issue ( and many other AW&ST issues from early
Spring - Nov 2024 for example ), there has been no shortage of
comments from multiple Boeing managers ( still ) , talking about rate increases; to include specific numbers of aircraft to be produced per month.

What I decry is rate increase talk from Boeing execs and production managers that is made without accompanying
valid comments about the need for steadfast quality in production ( i.e. flight worthy aircraft ). In other words... any
continued biasing by Boeing of the production "' when ".....
made without constant linkage to the Quality " how ".

Production " rate " is married to production " quality ".
It should not be a " shotgun wedding ".

In the future, I'll be sure to provide quotes and references in a timely fashion, should aforememtioned Boeing practices
continue. I have done so, in the past.

With regards,
357Mag

 

[snne]

Pegasus Airlines orders up to 200 737-10

https://twitter.com/x/status/1869795227596206437

View: https://x.com/BoeingAirplanes/status/1869795227596206437

https://simpleflying.com/pegasus-airlines-orders-two-hundred-737-max-aircraft/

 

[DWG]

Boeing needs another regulatory exemption prior to 737 Max 7 and 10 certification

Boeing is seeking temporary regulatory exemptions for a stall-management yaw damper (SMYD) system on the 737 Max 7 and Max 10, saying a classification change left it unable to demonstrate that the systems meet airworthiness standards.

www.flightglobal.com

TLDR: Boeing says it needs an exemption until October 2028 to certify the Stall Manager Yaw Damper on the Max 7 and Max 10, and if it doesn't get it it can't improve safety on every other Max. It's always developed the SMYD to RTCA Level B (Hazardous), but it's now been told it needs to be Level A (Catastrophic). And it says it can't roll out Enhanced AOA protection across the rest of the Max fleet without it.

I really don't know what Boeing are playing at, they should be able to develop an SMYD from scratch in four years, never mind certify an existing one. Could be we're looking at another Chinook HC.3, where Boeing have done safety critical development work without recording it. In which case they'll need to recreate every decision made and why it was made.

And as for holding the safety upgrade for the rest of the fleet hostage to FAA agreeing the exemption....

 

[Grey Havoc]

Someone's 'cunning plan' backfiring?

 

[Scott Kenny]

I really don't know what Boeing are playing at, they should be able to develop an SMYD from scratch in four years, never mind certify an existing one. Could be we're looking at another Chinook HC.3, where Boeing have done safety critical development work without recording it. In which case they'll need to recreate every decision made and why it was made.

No bet, I think that's exactly the issue.

There's a reason none of us that worked at Tramco would consider a job at Boeing.

Someone's 'cunning plan' backfiring?

Exactly.

 

[DWG]

No bet, I think that's exactly the issue.

There's a reason none of us that worked at Tramco would consider a job at Boeing.

It still seems bizarre to me having worked with Boeing QA on 777 PFCS when they were fine.

And then I remind myself that was 30 years ago, not 3 or 4.

I found myself wondering last night whether 737 itself is part of the issue. A programme so old it predates modern development standards, encouraging people to think "Well, if all they wrote down originally was this, then it'll draw too much attention to it if I do this to modern standards".

Are the foundations of the project now so old and shaky that everything inevitably ends up shaky, no matter how many patches you slap on it?

 

[TomcatViP]

And what if they have used some derived mil tech that can't be legally compromised?
A high AoA yaw damper is still a sensitive tech today ( see the vid where that poor Rafale pilot is unable to quick roll onto his target while Bitching Betty screams "release stick... release stick").

Given that the SH was already the uncontestable Alpha king 20 years ago, I would seriously doubt that Boeing nowadays is unable to come around a functional damper.

Also, being based on an old airframe is hardly a sign of a compromised design. To take a similar example as above, the Falcon series business jets root to a 1980 paper design. Good practices and manufacturing methodologies made traceability unimpaired throughout all those years while continuing delivering performances.

 

[Foo Fighter]

I believe this ^ demonstrates the degree of difficulty faced by Boing going forwards. No way they should get deferrments etc but they seem to favour going around the houses to obfuscate rather than face the music and fix the issues properly.

Not someTHING to garner faith in the company/management imho.

 

[BlackBat242]

Also, being based on an old airframe is hardly a sign of a compromised design. To take a similar example as above, the Falcon series business jets root to a 1980 paper design. Good practices and manufacturing methodologies made traceability unimpaired throughout all those years while continuing delivering performances.

Try a bit before then...

Envisioned in 1964, the initial 737-100 made its first flight in April 1967 and entered service in February 1968 with Lufthansa. The lengthened 737-200 entered service in April 1968, and evolved through four generations, offering several variants for 85 to 215 passengers.

 

[TomcatViP]

@BlackBat242 : The Falcon 20 is from 1965 and fathered all other bigger Falcons. Same generation

I was referring to the Falcon 900 but somehow the 3 digits went missing in my post.
I had to dig lengthly into the 900 paper sketches, Microfilmed or not. Aside of the fun for a Fana, I was amazed that everything was there at hand reach for who's willing to take the time to search for the right information.

I also think Boeing went from paper to CAD with CATIA software... built by Dassault.

 

[BROF]

@BlackBat242 : The Falcon 20 is from 1965 and fathered all other bigger Falcons. Same generation

I was referring to the Falcon 900 but somehow the 3 digits went missing in my post.
I had to dig lengthly into the 900 paper sketches, Microfilmed or not. Aside of the fun for a Fana, I was amazed that everything was there at hand reach for who's willing to take the time to search for the right information.

I also think Boeing went from paper to CAD with CATIA software... built by Dassault.

Beside a deliberately similar nose contour as a trademark, new Falcon models since Falcon 50 do not have a single structural or aerodynamic component nor a single system in common with Mystère 20. 737 is a completely different case.

 

[TomcatViP]

They both evolved from a central formula. 50 years of evolution and a variety of requirements makes
that many components differ obviously.

 

[WatcherZero]

Wow, Boeing lost a staggering $11.8bn in 2024 up from a loss of $2.2bn in 2023.
There was a $12bn reduction in liquidity compared to $5.9bn in 2023.
The strikes cost it $3.8bn while Defense lost $5.41bn

I am starting to wonder whether the company can ever turn itself around.

 

[Grey Havoc]

United 737 Max aborted take-off with wheel fire after long taxi to burn excess fuel

US investigators have determined that a Boeing 737 Max 9 aborted take-off with a damaging wheel fire, the result of its brakes overheating as the crew attempted to burn excess fuel while taxiing. Denver is a high-altitude airport and the air temperature was high, which left the heavily-laden...

www.flightglobal.com

(Subscription or registration may be required)

 

[TomcatViP]

Imbeciles need to be pointed out as such. When SOP and GRD ctrl fail, thankfully, sometimes, there is God.
With shredded tires, burning brakes, those people are very lucky to be alive after a rejected takeoff at MGTOW.

Boon for the lawyers. For once, I fully concur...

 

[WatcherZero]

Judge has approved to go to trial the class action lawsuit brought by Boeing shareholders led by the state of Rhode Island for damages that Boeing misled investors that it had become safety focussed after the MAX crashes when it hadn't. The judge has set the eligible shareholder participation period as January 7, 2021 to January, 8, 2024. The shareholders wanted it to be after the second crash in 2019 but the Judge decided the period would commence after the plea bargain deal with the Department of Justice was signed.

https://finance.yahoo.com/news/boeing-must-face-shareholder-class-001446918.html

 

[Scott Kenny]

It still seems bizarre to me having worked with Boeing QA on 777 PFCS when they were fine.

And then I remind myself that was 30 years ago, not 3 or 4.

I was only 5 years later than that... Worked at Tramco in 1998-99.

I found myself wondering last night whether 737 itself is part of the issue. A programme so old it predates modern development standards, encouraging people to think "Well, if all they wrote down originally was this, then it'll draw too much attention to it if I do this to modern standards".

Are the foundations of the project now so old and shaky that everything inevitably ends up shaky, no matter how many patches you slap on it?

Well, seems part of the Max issues are something that should have been seen in the design phase.

You know those reports of thick acrid smoke in the cabin or cockpit from 2023? Seems that part of the LEAP Load Reduction Device safety system deliberately dumps oil out of the fan center into the compressor. This oil fog is then heated as the air is compressed in the engine and is then bled out via pressurization system. Engine 1 feeds the cockpit, engine 2 feeds the cabin pressurization system, in 737s.

A bird strike or other major engine fault resulting in a broken fan blade or other major out-of-balance condition will cause the LRD to dump oil out of the main sump to allow the center shaft more movement inside the engine, trying to limit how much vibration has to go out into the pylon. (Engine is done after a bird strike, so there's no reason to try to save anything inside. This is strictly trying to keep the engine from causing more damage like departing from the aircraft.)

Note that this issue applies to ALL AIRCRAFT fitted with LEAPs, not just MAXs. A320neos, 777s too. Mentour Pilot isn't willing to say how the LRD would impact other aircraft, but as long as the plane uses bleed air for pressurization it's an issue. 787s use LEAPs, but don't use bleed air for pressurization.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=swlVkYVSlIE

 

[TomcatViP]

Interesting. Confirm a safety valve is only what was missing then.
Also, I would assume that switching pressurization away from the damaged engine is in the recommended action in case of an emergency. Did the pilots forgot? Wouldn't have been something sensible to think of by themselves as a crew? (and why didn't they pull the fire system earlier? - I can see an engineering team assuming that with (oil) fumes pooring into the cockpit, this will trigger this action anyway).

Last but not least, IMOHO, there is bit of sensationalism here as, dumping oil to damp the vibration resulting from an unbalanced shaft, is not new.

Anyhow, this reach the philosophical dichotomy that I tried to highlight, some years ago in my thread "Let's bring Back the Stuntman" on Keypub: the fact that part of the pilot industry (from airlines to regulators) are not cognisant with the de-facto evolution of aircraft systems that has turned pilots responsibilities away from what they are today, very basically saying, from aircraft system managers, to Situational Safety Experts.

But that's requires another kind of training other than checking boxes in a series of yes or no questionnary.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Interesting. Confirm a safety valve is only what was missing then.

In the sense of "if LRD activates, must close bleed air from the engine immediately" yes, that's missing.

Also, I would assume that switching pressurization away from the damaged engine is in the recommended action in case of an emergency. Did the pilots forgot? Wouldn't have been something sensible to think of by themselves as a crew? (and why didn't they pull the fire system earlier? - I can see an engineering team assuming that with (oil) fumes pooring into the cockpit, this will trigger this action anyway).

Pulling the fire handle was delayed in the second event due to the crew needing to don masks. As to changing pressurization source, I'm not sure that's actually possible.

Last but not least, IMOHO, there is bit of sensationalism here as, dumping oil to damp the vibration resulting from an unbalanced shaft, is not new.

I believe the exact implementation is new, and it's that implementation that is the issue. Dumping the oil sump into the compressor that supplies bleed air for all the things is not good.