battlecruiser HMS Tiger survives til Second World War?

[zoeafr]

EwenS, thank you for your post # 155 (one hundred fifty-five? We are picking up steam here; good). As I had mentioned in my original post that started this thread (which see), I estimated that if Tiger had counterfactually survived, a two-year refit would have been best, roughly between mid-1937 and mid-1939. That is, when the gathering war clouds became obvious to all, but still in peacetime. My estimate is, of course, arguable, and others (e.g. Dilandu) have weighed in with tweaked schedules, as you can read above.



I certainly would not want my recommended "moderate middle way" of reconstructing HMS Tiger to delay the needed new King George V-class battleships in any way, which I agree would have been bad. I just doubt your assurance that "siphoning" would happen. The early order for such-and-such number of new 14-inch Mark VII guns in real history would have instead been an order for such-and-such number plus eight in the counterfactual history, with a busier factory no doubt happy for the extra work during the Depression.



Earlier you had a refitted Tiger bis as being "mediocre": now she is "near useless"? You assertion doesn't have arguments behind it. You have not, for example, directly engaged with my point that your and the Board of Admiralty's preferred vessels, the R-class battleships, spent the crucial year 1942, when Britain was desperately fighting around the world, anchored off Kenya, because they proved to be too slow.



You are mistaken; I never proposed any such gun. JFC Fuller did, and you are welcome to take these points up with him.



Your disapproval has never been concealed from us here, I assure you. I am indeed in an armchair, and (as I have always said) I have the benefit of hindsight. Professionals in the early 1930's said generally that appeasement and disarmament would prevent a future war, and peace would prevail as far as they could see. And they said specifically that HMS Tiger was no longer needed and should be scrapped despite her good condition. Those professionals were wrong.

Hi; I'm not so sure that their aim of disarmament was so noble; they might have given that excuse, but it was a way to save face. It was rather the realisation that if nothing happened, their navy superiority would be challenged successfully because of the budgetary restraints imposed by the governemnt who himself is trying to appease the grumblings of society. So knowing their ability to build and modify, research and develop new armaments, new ships new systems was hampered by the lack of funds, they feared they would not be able to recuperate that superiority in the future. Looking at America's growing economy of the twenties, their shipbuilding program, the writing was on the wall. the other important objective was to tame the Japanese shipbuilding ambitions, which had become worrysome. So, appeasement? not so much as trying to maintain a standing in the big navies of the world....

 

[Scott Kenny]

I understand most of that argument with some exceptions; the first being the the admiralty of the day priviledged protection over speed, and that influence remained throughout the twenties and early thirties. the issue od the 4.5/45 MKIII is that, contrary to the older guns, you could install them on the deck and not having the substructure and barbette logistics. That means a much quicker installation. with minumum alterations and manpower expenses.
It is a versatile high angle gun which would make sense in a low budget udate. As for a reconstruction or machinerie change, it would have been too expensive, and too long. even changing the turbines is a very intrusive endeavor. just moving the stacks means rethinking the compartments in the shelter decks to re-route the exhaust ducts, and that is a lot of manpower hours even if the material itself is affordable...Only in a deep reconstrution or refit can you install a hangar for an aircraft; the HMS Barham is a case and point on that; however it did carry an aircraft and plane which stayed parked on the catapult and covered, or partially covered with a tarp. While it does create discussions about the value of having one under this scenario, I think ( I'm still torn at the idea) the advantages overtake the disadvantages, but not by a big margin. I found some room for a crane, not centered, which would not intrude on the armaments; but it would only be able to pick the plane up from one of the ship's side.....Again, with minimal work...That's the fun of having restrictions Compromises...

If there's space for one small crane on one side that will be out of the way of the guns there's space for two such cranes, one on each side.

And having 1-2 aircraft for scouting and shell spotting would be well worth it for a battlecruiser. I would have sent any/all battlecruisers the RN kept to the Pacific and/or Indian Oceans, where their higher speeds would reduce transit times.

Not that the idea of "a ship fast enough to catch anything it can kill, and outrun anything that could kill it" worked since the end of the American 44-gun sailing frigates...

 

[zoeafr]

If there's space for one small crane on one side that will be out of the way of the guns there's space for two such cranes, one on each side.

And having 1-2 aircraft for scouting and shell spotting would be well worth it for a battlecruiser. I would have sent any/all battlecruisers the RN kept to the Pacific and/or Indian Oceans, where their higher speeds would reduce transit times.

Not that the idea of "a ship fast enough to catch anything it can kill, and outrun anything that could kill it" worked since the end of the American 44-gun sailing frigates...

Hi; the problem with two cranes is the weight limit imposed; and since that plane is parked on the catapult itself, I can't see where the second plane could be parked. The 1922 treaty limited the addition, all of what you can install on the ship, to 3000 tons; bulges alone weight 2000 tons apprx. and any significant extra plating for the decks and turrets is another 1000 tons if you make some compromises. The way would be to remove another set of 6 in. guns to provide sufficient tonnage leverage for an additional crane. and that doesn't solve the issue of where that second aircraft could be. As it is, the 4 6 in. removed make up for the weight of the 4 QF4.5/45s', the torpedo system removal make up for the first crane, plane and it's logistics, and the two pounder pom-poms', and the removal of 4 old slow 3 in. singles compensate for the 6 .5 quad AAs' With that, there's very little weight margin left for new installations or protection; removing 2 6 in. for a crane with no extra plane doesn't make sense. As with the HMS Barham, the ship is already wide so having the crane a bit on one side helps getting a slightly shorter arm and limit the weight of that crane. The only drawback is having the ship manoeuver to pick it up while covering for the wind, or making sure the plane sealands on the side of the crane.
The ship is also now a bit top heavy with the additions and convertions, but there is a boyancy(?) factor and it should stabilize the potential extra listing on turns as well as keep the ship steady upon firing. It would also help to keep the draft from getting deeper. The friction though is another matter. Maybe some more efficient parts could be installed on the engine, it's boiler fuel pumps and some small gains could work to liit the 2 knots loss of the ship mainly because of the drag of those bulges.
Restrictions complicate all the potential options, but that's the environment which they faced.

 

[EwenS]

Earlier you had a refitted Tiger bis as being "mediocre": now she is "near useless"? You assertion doesn't have arguments behind it.

Our views are clearly diametrically opposed. I go back to the quote from Friedman that I made in post #2:-

"Although the battlecruiser Tiger and the four Iron Dukes survived the Washington Treaty .....virtually nothing was invested in them. Tiger became a gunnery test and training ship. What money was spent went into the ships with lasting value, the 15in battlecruisers and battleships."

You have not, for example, directly engaged with my point that your and the Board of Admiralty's preferred vessels, the R-class battleships, spent the crucial year 1942, when Britain was desperately fighting around the world, anchored off Kenya, because they proved to be too slow.

Speed was only part of the issue as noted by Somerville. The other was their short endurance, driven more by their fresh water consumption than oil.

Just because little has been written about the activities of the Eastern Fleet after April 1942 does not mean that it, and in particular the R class battleships, were doing nothing.

After the Japanese Operation C at the beginning of April 1942, Somerville had lttle option but to turn the Eastern Fleet into a "fleet in being" to protect Britain's vital interests in the Indian Ocean. Part of that was withdrawing its headquaters and operational base to Kilindini in Kenya. But the western half of the Indian Ocean remained of vital importance to Allied interests throughout 1942/43 as through it passed all the reinforcements for the Middle East (for example 8th Armoured Div, 51st Highland, 44th Div in time for El Alamein) and Far East ( for example 2nd Div, 5th Div) as well as for the increasingly important Lend Lease route to the USSR via the Persian Gulf. So much Eastern Fleet time, and that of the R class battleships, was spent escorting those vital convoys from the Cape to Egypt & India. That was a function that RN capital ships had been carrying out in other theatres since the start of the War.


So the following activities of the Eastern Fleet come easily to mind from late April to Dec 1942:-

Operation Ironclad, the invasion of Madagascar on 5 May 1942. Resolution and Warspite were at sea 130-220 miles east of Madagascar to prevent any possible interference from the Japanese. Ramilles provided bombardment support for the landings. She was torpedoed by a Japanese midget sub at Diego Suarez on 30th and after repairs there and at Durban left the theatre in August for further repair and refit work in Britain. Resolution was refitted at Durban Nov-Dec 1942.

Revenge was in refit at Durban Aug-Nov.

Royal Sovereign left the Eastern Fleet at the end of August 1942 to sail to the USA to refit.

Warspite and the faster element of the fleet carried out a number of sweeps in the IO in the period to Sept, culminating in Operation Stab (an attempt to divert Japanese attention from Guadalcanal) in Aug and Operations Stream & Jane in Sept to cover follow up landings at Tamatave in Madagascar.

All the large ships, fast or slow, were forced into immobility at the beginning of Oct 1942 due to a lack of escorting destroyers, not the speed of the R class battleships. The problem was the arrival in South African waters of the Gruppe Eisbar U-boats at the beginning of Oct (they left France in mid-Aug) supported by a milch cow Type XIV. This came as a surprise to the Allies as they were unable to read the German Navy Enigma Codes at this time. Betwen Oct & Dec 1942, when they had to return home, these U-boats sank about 50 ships around the Cape. At the start of the campaign Somerville had just 16 destroyers spread between the Cape & Kilindini, with two of those due to leave for Freetown on convoy escort and others about to commence refits or in need of boiler cleaning. Just 6 were at Kilindini, with two Dutch vessels due to leave for Australia and only 2 available for fleet escort duty. With many refits and repairs cancelled, most of the available destroyers hurriedly detached to protect shipping around the Cape. Somerville had no choice other than to leave the bulk of the large ships of the Eastern Fleet swinging around their buoys at Kilindini for most of the time. Even the opportunities for sea time for training were exceptionally limited

With the crisis over by mid-Dec some kind of normality could return. On 3rd Feb 1943 for example Warspite, Revenge & Resolution and supporting ships sailed on Operation Pamphlet, an operation to provide distant cover for the convoy carrying the 9th Aus Div from the MIddle East back to Australia.

 

[zoeafr]

Hi; the problem with two cranes is the weight limit imposed; and since that plane is parked on the catapult itself, I can't see where the second plane could be parked. The 1922 treaty limited the addition, all of what you can install on the ship, to 3000 tons; bulges alone weight 2000 tons apprx. and any significant extra plating for the decks and turrets is another 1000 tons if you make some compromises. The way would be to remove another set of 6 in. guns to provide sufficient tonnage leverage for an additional crane. and that doesn't solve the issue of where that second aircraft could be. As it is, the 4 6 in. removed make up for the weight of the 4 QF4.5/45s', the torpedo system removal make up for the first crane, plane and it's logistics, and the two pounder pom-poms', and the removal of 4 old slow 3 in. singles compensate for the 6 .5 quad AAs' With that, there's very little weight margin left for new installations or protection; removing 2 6 in. for a crane with no extra plane doesn't make sense. As with the HMS Barham, the ship is already wide so having the crane a bit on one side helps getting a slightly shorter arm and limit the weight of that crane. The only drawback is having the ship manoeuver to pick it up while covering for the wind, or making sure the plane sealands on the side of the crane.
The ship is also now a bit top heavy with the additions and convertions, but there is a boyancy(?) factor and it should stabilize the potential extra listing on turns as well as keep the ship steady upon firing. It would also help to keep the draft from getting deeper. The friction though is another matter. Maybe some more efficient parts could be installed on the engine, it's boiler fuel pumps and some small gains could work to liit the 2 knots loss of the ship mainly because of the drag of those bulges.
Restrictions complicate all the potential options, but that's the environment which they faced.

By the way, the American frigates were also called ''ironsides'' because of the thickness of their sides; Their wood structure was thick enough to have most equivalent ship canonballs bounce on it...That's protection, not speed...

 

[Owens Z]

Our views are clearly diametrically opposed. I go back to the quote from Friedman that I made in post #2:-

"Although the battlecruiser Tiger and the four Iron Dukes survived the Washington Treaty .....virtually nothing was invested in them. Tiger became a gunnery test and training ship. What money was spent went into the ships with lasting value, the 15in battlecruisers and battleships."

Speed was only part of the issue as noted by Somerville. The other was their short endurance, driven more by their fresh water consumption than oil.

Just because little has been written about the activities of the Eastern Fleet after April 1942 does not mean that it, and in particular the R class battleships, were doing nothing.

Early this year I read with profit Charles Stephenson's book The Eastern Fleet and the Indian Ocean 1942–1944: The Fleet That Had To Hide (Pen & Sword, 2022). Note the subtitle. Those professionals you had mentioned chose, in Britain's hour of need, to hide the tired, slow R-class battleships as far from danger as could be, on the east coast of Africa. The fact that, as you detail, Africa wasn't quite far enough to avoid Japanese and German submarines doesn't affect my point, that a surviving HMS Tiger, rebuilt like I conjectured or not, wouldn't have been sitting off Africa, but would instead be fighting in the thick of things during the desperate year 1942. And in 1943, in 1944, and in 1945, had she survived ferocious and determined enemies. To sum up, Tiger = useful. As for your argument-from-authority, I did see that quote, and I am a longtime Norman Friedman fan: like many on this website I own a heavy stack of his fine books. I would welcome Dr Friedman's informed thoughts after he read this thread. I agree that your and my views on this matter are diametrically opposed. To be clear, I welcome this. Contrary arguments keep my views evidence-based, and lively discussion keeps threads fresh and interesting.

 

[Dilandu]

"Although the battlecruiser Tiger and the four Iron Dukes survived the Washington Treaty .....virtually nothing was invested in them. Tiger became a gunnery test and training ship. What money was spent went into the ships with lasting value, the 15in battlecruisers and battleships."

The problem is, that the situation viewed from 1922 was significantly different from the situation viewed in 1930 and drastically different from the situation viewed in 1938. The ship with "no lasting value" in 1922 would be viewed quite differently if she survived till 1938.

 

[zoeafr]

The problem is, that the situation viewed from 1922 was significantly different from the situation viewed in 1930 and drastically different from the situation viewed in 1938. The ship with "no lasting value" in 1922 would be viewed quite differently if she survived till 1938.

So, we are now in 1922; the war has been over for a while and with the new financial requirements there are choices to make; the treaty is now signed and most of the older ships will be dismantled and sent to recycling, but that will take a while as there are many. The funds saved from the maintenance of some of those ships ( a lot of them had been in reserve after the end of the war and were scheduled for dismissal in the next few years). So, in a nutshell; we have the QE class, the Revenge class, the iron duke class, the renown class, the future hood,the lion class ( the ones left after WWI), the centurion class and the future Rodney/Nelson. Choices have to be made because the navy won't fund all of those ships' maintenance, and intend to use those funds toward reconstructions and refits of different levels.
What you know is that some of them were already on the list for a future reserve and were gradually going to be ''parked''; of those, you have a choice to keep a few for training purposes, others for targeting and experimentations.
You also know about the division in the thinking within the admiralty; one side, the majority of them lean toward protection over speed, and a minority, the Fisher advocates, thinking that having a combinaison of battleships and fast battlecruisers is a better way to have flexibility. You know that what happened during the past war has nothing to do with the battlecruisers themselves, but rather the lack of the basic operational security steps for two, and a badly trained crew for one; and that has had quite a negative effect on the perception of the efficiency of a ship of the type.
It already has been decided that the Centurion would be doing several secondary duties, the Iron Duke had been assigned training duties, and so did the Tiger, though that did vary. The rest will be ''parked'' for now.
The admiralty is somewhat satisfied with the treaty's agreement as it will allow them to do some cleanup, though they wished they could have kept a few more ships. Worries about losing the Royal Navy's suppremacy haunts some of them.
So, would you have traded a ''revenge'' class ship for the Tiger? it isn't so easy if you put yourself at that time.....
All the ''revenge'' ships did get some form of investments; their bridge had some small rework, a couple of AA armaments were installed gradually, and they were the first to get the torpedo bulges. Many types were experimented on them; there were four early types, some with wood chips ( oh, how dum!) some with cruchable steel tubes, some with combinaisons of air, water and oil in seprarated baffles ( the Italian pugliese system(?) ), some larger and more protusive, some others flatter, and some with nothing inside. And combinaisons of all those types; the best ones were to be installed on the QE class, and the Repulse class. They didn't try anything on the Tiger to check and calculate the resistance to flow which they probably did on the slower ''R''s' The result was a steady 1.5 to 2 knot loss... Maybe more for the sleeker Tiger? Very important when choosing a ship. Only during the thirties will they find a better and less restritive bulge system, which ended first on the rebuilt Warspite.
So, is keeping the tiger really keeping an asset, and invest in?

 

[zoeafr]

So, we are now in 1922; the war has been over for a while and with the new financial requirements there are choices to make; the treaty is now signed and most of the older ships will be dismantled and sent to recycling, but that will take a while as there are many. The funds saved from the maintenance of some of those ships ( a lot of them had been in reserve after the end of the war and were scheduled for dismissal in the next few years). So, in a nutshell; we have the QE class, the Revenge class, the iron duke class, the renown class, the future hood,the lion class ( the ones left after WWI), the centurion class and the future Rodney/Nelson. Choices have to be made because the navy won't fund all of those ships' maintenance, and intend to use those funds toward reconstructions and refits of different levels.
What you know is that some of them were already on the list for a future reserve and were gradually going to be ''parked''; of those, you have a choice to keep a few for training purposes, others for targeting and experimentations.
You also know about the division in the thinking within the admiralty; one side, the majority of them lean toward protection over speed, and a minority, the Fisher advocates, thinking that having a combinaison of battleships and fast battlecruisers is a better way to have flexibility. You know that what happened during the past war has nothing to do with the battlecruisers themselves, but rather the lack of the basic operational security steps for two, and a badly trained crew for one; and that has had quite a negative effect on the perception of the efficiency of a ship of the type.
It already has been decided that the Centurion would be doing several secondary duties, the Iron Duke had been assigned training duties, and so did the Tiger, though that did vary. The rest will be ''parked'' for now.
The admiralty is somewhat satisfied with the treaty's agreement as it will allow them to do some cleanup, though they wished they could have kept a few more ships. Worries about losing the Royal Navy's suppremacy haunts some of them.
So, would you have traded a ''revenge'' class ship for the Tiger? it isn't so easy if you put yourself at that time.....
All the ''revenge'' ships did get some form of investments; their bridge had some small rework, a couple of AA armaments were installed gradually, and they were the first to get the torpedo bulges. Many types were experimented on them; there were four early types, some with wood chips ( oh, how dum!) some with cruchable steel tubes, some with combinaisons of air, water and oil in seprarated baffles ( the Italian pugliese system(?) ), some larger and more protusive, some others flatter, and some with nothing inside. And combinaisons of all those types; the best ones were to be installed on the QE class, and the Repulse class. They didn't try anything on the Tiger to check and calculate the resistance to flow which they probably did on the slower ''R''s' The result was a steady 1.5 to 2 knot loss... Maybe more for the sleeker Tiger? Very important when choosing a ship. Only during the thirties will they find a better and less restritive bulge system, which ended first on the rebuilt Warspite.
So, is keeping the tiger really keeping an asset, and invest in?

Hi; Well with all those different replies(?)) I think I will ''motivate'' this a bit further....
It is now 1930, the London treaty is about to be signed, and you asked for further fleet reductions ( British side);
Your real intent is to keep the U.S. and Japan form becoming leaders in the navy world. You now need to make a choice for your only training ship since it will be the only extra one you could potentially fall back on in case of an emergency situation; your choices, the Iron Duke, or the Tiger are the only logical options you have; you know that the Iron Duke has more staying power, even after 18 years than the Tiger, but it is hopelessly slow and the Revenge class already has that same issue; the Tiger is a faster ship, potentially being able to keep up woth the QE class, and maybe some aircraft carriers, but it is a much less protected ship; if the Iron Duke is chosen, it will have to lose 2 turrets and barbettes, its main belt, it conning tower and some of its boilers, althought not that many since it wasn't fast to begin with; if the Tiger is chosen, it will lose only one of the turrets and barbettes, its conning tower and its thinner belt, bu it will lalso lose many of its boilers.....
In this scenario, you choose the Tiger, because at 18 years and going on, it will need new boilers at some point anyway; the turret and barbette will be stored, the conning tower dismantled anf its main belt removed....It is quite rusted anyway....Your goal will be to maintain this ship in its present condition, and repair when needed so you can have a chance at re-activating it in the futur, within the next 5 to 10 years; if not, simply scrap it.
1936 comes along, and politically things are getting charged; you negotiated some compromise with germany for a coastal defense fleet, Japan has just left the negotiations for the prolongation of the London treaty and its navy capability ratios for the signatories. Not good....The british navy turned around and tried a negotiation with the remaining 4, but Italy has reservations and also leaves. The U.S. has just decided to invoke the escalation clause and it will allow them to build ships of up to 45000 tons and 16 in. guns. So any agreement which was in the works is now getting peeled out and it is clear now that the whole thing has fallen apart. The british navy pushes for the King George class to be laid down as soon as possible, the re-constructions of the ships scheduled ( the Queen Elizabeth and the Valiant), the Warspite having just finished its re-construction. There isn't much money left for any kind of substantial re-construction, and you want the tiger to be re-activated in order to have as many ship available, as soon as possible.
You have an option; re-boil it with similar boilers, install the latest bulges, slap some horizontal platin on and add AAs'. But, what's cheap, will not cause the ship to become slower, will give it a bit more resilience in combat and have a decent anti aircraft capability......
Thing that will slow the ship down are : weight, resistance to the flow, engine power. it also needs to be stable and not to have a roll over center too low through the top weight.
You laso have some opportunities; the old fuel-only boilers from the warspite have been removed recently, and the QE's are in the process of being removed; your barbette and turret are still in storage; the rest you will need to purchase. A quick calculation tells you that with an extra 3000 tons of weight, you will need 20% to 25% more power just to keep the actual speed, and any restructuring of the hull or inner parts of the ship will become too much, too long and too expensive....
Some data...
Boilers from the Tiger made 2682 steam horsepower each with coal sprayed with fuel the Tiger had 39 of them
Boilers from the QE class made 3197 steam horsepower on fuel-only system; each ship had 24 of them
Pom-poms weight 75 tons each, including storage and munitions
Bulges add an extra 2000 tons apprx.; but there is a boyancy factor to consider
Twin QF45/4 in are lighter than the 6 in. in casemates with their barbettes and logistics

Can you make a Tiger useful with that?
Mister Ewen....I educated myself...So can you fill in the blanks?

 

[zoeafr]

Hi; Well with all those different replies(?)) I think I will ''motivate'' this a bit further....
It is now 1930, the London treaty is about to be signed, and you asked for further fleet reductions ( British side);
Your real intent is to keep the U.S. and Japan form becoming leaders in the navy world. You now need to make a choice for your only training ship since it will be the only extra one you could potentially fall back on in case of an emergency situation; your choices, the Iron Duke, or the Tiger are the only logical options you have; you know that the Iron Duke has more staying power, even after 18 years than the Tiger, but it is hopelessly slow and the Revenge class already has that same issue; the Tiger is a faster ship, potentially being able to keep up woth the QE class, and maybe some aircraft carriers, but it is a much less protected ship; if the Iron Duke is chosen, it will have to lose 2 turrets and barbettes, its main belt, it conning tower and some of its boilers, althought not that many since it wasn't fast to begin with; if the Tiger is chosen, it will lose only one of the turrets and barbettes, its conning tower and its thinner belt, bu it will lalso lose many of its boilers.....
In this scenario, you choose the Tiger, because at 18 years and going on, it will need new boilers at some point anyway; the turret and barbette will be stored, the conning tower dismantled anf its main belt removed....It is quite rusted anyway....Your goal will be to maintain this ship in its present condition, and repair when needed so you can have a chance at re-activating it in the futur, within the next 5 to 10 years; if not, simply scrap it.
1936 comes along, and politically things are getting charged; you negotiated some compromise with germany for a coastal defense fleet, Japan has just left the negotiations for the prolongation of the London treaty and its navy capability ratios for the signatories. Not good....The british navy turned around and tried a negotiation with the remaining 4, but Italy has reservations and also leaves. The U.S. has just decided to invoke the escalation clause and it will allow them to build ships of up to 45000 tons and 16 in. guns. So any agreement which was in the works is now getting peeled out and it is clear now that the whole thing has fallen apart. The british navy pushes for the King George class to be laid down as soon as possible, the re-constructions of the ships scheduled ( the Queen Elizabeth and the Valiant), the Warspite having just finished its re-construction. There isn't much money left for any kind of substantial re-construction, and you want the tiger to be re-activated in order to have as many ship available, as soon as possible.
You have an option; re-boil it with similar boilers, install the latest bulges, slap some horizontal platin on and add AAs'. But, what's cheap, will not cause the ship to become slower, will give it a bit more resilience in combat and have a decent anti aircraft capability......
Thing that will slow the ship down are : weight, resistance to the flow, engine power. it also needs to be stable and not to have a roll over center too low through the top weight.
You laso have some opportunities; the old fuel-only boilers from the warspite have been removed recently, and the QE's are in the process of being removed; your barbette and turret are still in storage; the rest you will need to purchase. A quick calculation tells you that with an extra 3000 tons of weight, you will need 20% to 25% more power just to keep the actual speed, and any restructuring of the hull or inner parts of the ship will become too much, too long and too expensive....
Some data...
Boilers from the Tiger made 2682 steam horsepower each with coal sprayed with fuel the Tiger had 39 of them
Boilers from the QE class made 3197 steam horsepower on fuel-only system; each ship had 24 of them
Pom-poms weight 75 tons each, including storage and munitions
Bulges add an extra 2000 tons apprx.; but there is a boyancy factor to consider
Twin QF45/4 in are lighter than the 6 in. in casemates with their barbettes and logistics

Can you make a Tiger useful with that?
Mister Ewen....I educated myself...So can you fill in the blanks?

To further on that, the weight of the bulges on this includes steel pipes and the torpedo bulkhead which could only be installed during a reconstruction of the ship; by themselves, including the top frame and all the required parts for installation, the weight is 1200 tons empty; anything added inside is added weight.

The weight of cemented armor plating is 40.85 lbs for a 1 ft x 1 ft x 1 ingh thick plate, or 40 pounds for a 305mm x 305mm 25mm thick plate.

I have attached diagrams and a quick scenario piece as an avenue for the Tiger.
The two first pics are diagrams and a sketch of the ship as was seen circa1924
The two next ones are the diagrams and sketch modified for a visualisation of the modifications
of the scenario written.
This is done for discussions, and by no means an absolute scenario, so you are welcome to discuss,
state your objections, or your approvals, and give your own view of what the ship should have and not have.
The only thing which should be a constant is the introduction
You can also re-draw your views on the sketch and diagram to visualize your ideas...

 

[Owens Z]

My first thought was: "get her functional, then put Hood in drydock for her planned modernization".

My second thought was "or get her functional, then put Repulse in drydock to bring her up to Renown's fit".

Even so, I still think that the UK would be better off using her to enable either of the unmodernized 15" battlecruisers to be modernized. Hood would likely survive her encounter with Bismarck with improved armor, but Repulse would still fall victim to the IJN torpedo bombers in my opinion, so unless Tiger is sent to Singapore instead of Repulse, then Hood should be the one modernized.

As BlackBat242 pointed out, a refitted Tiger back in service by mid-1939 could have allowed hard-used HMS Hood to go in for a much-needed thorough refit and update in 1939-41, and therefore perhaps change history during the 24 May 1941 Battle of the Denmark Strait against Bismarck.

 

[Owens Z]

Zoeafr helpfully reminds us of the refitting and renewal options had HMS Tiger not been towed to a Scottish scrapyard in 1932 to comply with the London Naval Treaty, an act that I and others believe was an unfortunate mistake, seen in hindsight. I have read all the posts since I began the thread last June, and I thank everyone for their contributions to this lively what-if discussion. As some of you may have seen on a different thread, I expressed doubt that the First World War battlecruiser HMAS Australia would have been much of an asset to her country had she not been scuttled in 1924 due to the Washington Naval Treaty. Australia, however, was a distinctly smaller, slower, less hit-tolerant warship of older design conception than the graceful Tiger, which was a peer of the Kongo class battlecruisers designed in Britain.

I remain satisfied with my point that an extant Tiger would have seen intensive, worthwhile service in the Second World War, and basically content with what I recommended for her in my original post (which see): a moderately extensive, moderately expensive two-year refit in the late 1930's, with the six bullet points I had written. The reconstruction of the innards of the ship, to replace her boilers, direct-drive turbines, and coal storage, is the main driver of the schedule and the cause of the two-year spread. Anything done during the same time to the main armament and their hoists, magazines, etc. would not extend that term in the shipyard, especially since nothing I plan for the armament is radical. As Tallguy pointed out, the new 14-inch/45 Mark VII guns that I recommend could (with effort) be fitted into the existing turrets, with I believe only a modest, reasonable expansion to that new gun's real-world production schedule. In addition to the battlecruiser thus wielding a larger, more modern gun with more effective, more plentiful ammunition, this switch would also help ease supply hassles by allowing the stressed Royal Navy to transport three different capital ship caliber shells (14", 15", 16") around the globe rather than four.

I dislike the suggestions here to add floatplane capability to the original design of Tiger (which only briefly had simple wooden flying-off platforms above B and Q turrets for biplanes), but I seem to be in the minority on this matter.

 

[Owens Z]

When war comes, one fights with what one has. Elderly battleship USS Arkansas (BB-33) saw useful service through the end of WW2, escorting US Marines to Iceland, protecting transatlantic convoys, and then shore bombardment duties with her 12" guns off Omaha Beach, Cherbourg, Provence, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. She was sunk postwar in an atom bomb test. The last surviving battleship of the (earlier) King George V class, HMS Centurion, although stripped as a mere target ship back in 1926, was active after WW2 began, armed with light AA cannon: the equivalent of USS Utah (BB-31). In June 1942 Centurion, which had been given mocked-up turrets with wooden 14" guns to masquerade as a new battleship of the (later) King George V class and scare away Axis warships, escorted a Mediterranean convoy, fired her AA cannon at enemy planes, and withstood a 500kg bomb hit. Hard-pressed Britain was keeping the ship busy, more than for example the R-class battleships that during that same period were huddling in safety off Kenya. The much faster Tiger, erroneously deemed less valuable that the R-class, would have been kept even more busy, even had she not been extensively refitted. No-longer-seaworthy Centurion ended her days being intentionally scuttled off Omaha Beach as a breakwater.

 

[zoeafr]

When war comes, one fights with what one has. Elderly battleship USS Arkansas (BB-33) saw useful service through the end of WW2, escorting US Marines to Iceland, protecting transatlantic convoys, and then shore bombardment duties with her 12" guns off Omaha Beach, Cherbourg, Provence, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. She was sunk postwar in an atom bomb test. The last surviving battleship of the (earlier) King George V class, HMS Centurion, although stripped as a mere target ship back in 1926, was active after WW2 began, armed with light AA cannon: the equivalent of USS Utah (BB-31). In June 1942 Centurion, which had been given mocked-up turrets with wooden 14" guns to masquerade as a new battleship of the (later) King George V class and scare away Axis warships, escorted a Mediterranean convoy, fired her AA cannon at enemy planes, and withstood a 500kg bomb hit. Hard-pressed Britain was keeping the ship busy, more than for example the R-class battleships that during that same period were huddling in safety off Kenya. The much faster Tiger, erroneously deemed less valuable that the R-class, would have been kept even more busy, even had she not been extensively refitted. No-longer-seaworthy Centurion ended her days being intentionally scuttled off Omaha Beach as a breakwater.

I do agree with all that; but I'm not convinced about replacing an ''R'' battleship with the Tiger. instead, as I have mentioned in my posts, whe would have been a better asset reserve between 1930 and 1936 instead of the Iron Duke.
As the Japanese did with the Hiei, they kept her as a training ship, but kept her in good state, so that when the time came, all that was needed was to bring her back to fighting capability. even if they would not have done a full re-construction, the idea was a good one. So, when that moment came, they had an extra ship... No one will make me believe that the U.S. didn't do the same with the USS Arkansas, and most probably a couple of other ships, just in case......They knew what Japan was up to, and took measures to be prepared....

Zoeafr helpfully reminds us of the refitting and renewal options had HMS Tiger not been towed to a Scottish scrapyard in 1932 to comply with the London Naval Treaty, an act that I and others believe was an unfortunate mistake, seen in hindsight. I have read all the posts since I began the thread last June, and I thank everyone for their contributions to this lively what-if discussion. As some of you may have seen on a different thread, I expressed doubt that the First World War battlecruiser HMAS Australia would have been much of an asset to her country had she not been scuttled in 1924 due to the Washington Naval Treaty. Australia, however, was a distinctly smaller, slower, less hit-tolerant warship of older design conception than the graceful Tiger, which was a peer of the Kongo class battlecruisers designed in Britain.

I remain satisfied with my point that an extant Tiger would have seen intensive, worthwhile service in the Second World War, and basically content with what I recommended for her in my original post (which see): a moderately extensive, moderately expensive two-year refit in the late 1930's, with the six bullet points I had written. The reconstruction of the innards of the ship, to replace her boilers, direct-drive turbines, and coal storage, is the main driver of the schedule and the cause of the two-year spread. Anything done during the same time to the main armament and their hoists, magazines, etc. would not extend that term in the shipyard, especially since nothing I plan for the armament is radical. As Tallguy pointed out, the new 14-inch/45 Mark VII guns that I recommend could (with effort) be fitted into the existing turrets, with I believe only a modest, reasonable expansion to that new gun's real-world production schedule. In addition to the battlecruiser thus wielding a larger, more modern gun with more effective, more plentiful ammunition, this switch would also help ease supply hassles by allowing the stressed Royal Navy to transport three different capital ship caliber shells (14", 15", 16") around the globe rather than four.

I dislike the suggestions here to add floatplane capability to the original design of Tiger (which only briefly had simple wooden flying-off platforms above B and Q turrets for biplanes), but I seem to be in the minority on this matter.

I'm of the same view, but mainly because the ship would be mostly involved with task forces and therefore, others having that capability would render a plane on the Tiger less useful; if acting as a fast escort for carriers, again, there are enough planes on the carrier for that need. Protection bring more well spent money to the ship than the equivalent crane, tank, workshop, and plane weights.....

 

[Dilandu]

I'm of the same view, but mainly because the ship would be mostly involved with task forces and therefore, others having that capability would render a plane on the Tiger less useful; if acting as a fast escort for carriers, again, there are enough planes on the carrier for that need. Protection bring more well spent money to the ship than the equivalent crane, tank, workshop, and plane weights.....

The cost of catapult and plane installation would be very little comparing to the overall scale of refit.

 

[zoeafr]

The cost of catapult and plane installation would be very little comparing to the overall scale of refit.

But the weight would have had to be taken from somewhere; it is an avenue, as I wrote on the little resume, but there would not be any room for a decent hangar from what I have seen in plans unless a full re-construction of the ship is done; I personally fail to see the big advantage since the ship would most probably be part of some task force. But that's only my opinion and you may find that having an aircraft catapult is worthwhile, and I can understand that since I'm not 100% convinced of either options. I do prefer a bit more protection than an aircraft though....

 

[Dilandu]

ut the weight would have had to be taken from somewhere; it is an avenue, as I wrote on the little resume, but there would not be any room for a decent hangar from what I have seen in plans unless a full re-construction of the ship is done; I personally fail to see the big advantage since the ship would most probably be part of some task force. But that's only my opinion and you may find that having an aircraft catapult is worthwhile, and I can understand that since I'm not 100% convinced of either options. I do prefer a bit more protection than an aircraft though....

A small one-plane hangar could be installed between the Q and Y turret - on the place of rear conning tower (which wasn't of much use and supposed to be removed during reconstruction into training ship anyway).

 

[EwenS]

The last surviving battleship of the (earlier) King George V class, HMS Centurion, although stripped as a mere target ship back in 1926, was active after WW2 began, armed with light AA cannon: the equivalent of USS Utah (BB-31). In June 1942 Centurion, which had been given mocked-up turrets with wooden 14" guns to masquerade as a new battleship of the (later) King George V class and scare away Axis warships, escorted a Mediterranean convoy, fired her AA cannon at enemy planes, and withstood a 500kg bomb hit. Hard-pressed Britain was keeping the ship busy, more than for example the R-class battleships that during that same period were huddling in safety off Kenya.

So you think that the Centurion, converted to a target ship in 1926 and stripped of all of her original armament, was a more useful ship in WW2 than all of the R class.

Let's see what Centurion's WW2 service life consisted of. Continued her target ship role and then used as a repair ship tied up alongside at Devonport Dockyard, while thought (another Churchillian mapcap scheme) was given to using her as a blockship at Tripoli. Converted to a dummy warship (to resemble the KGV class Anson which didn't complete her work up until Sept 1942) at some point in that period, being given a handful of pom-pom and Oerlikons for self defence. Sent to the IO and then loaned to the Med Fleet for Operation Vigorous in June 1942. Her entire role in this period was one of deception nothing more. Something thatv the RN wouldn't have bothered too much about losing. After that nothing, until she turns up in June 1944 as one of the ships to be sunk in the Goosberry breakwater off Omaha Beach.

Meanwhile the R class had quite an active war all the way through to mid/late 1943. Much of it in the boring stuff like convoy protection, rather than fleet actions that attract headlines. But no less important.

As for the R class being "huddled" off Kenya, go back and read my post #164. I explained therein why all the large ships of the Eastern Fleet ended up effectively tied up at Kilindini. But that was NOT in June 1942 during Operation Vigorous. That WAS between Oct & Dec 1942 and was due to their escorting destroyers having to be sent elsewhere to combat U-boats.

In June 1942, the Admiralty were still worried about another Japanese foray into the IO. Between May & July two Japanese AMCs were operating in the IO covering the area from South of Madagascar to South of Ceylon. IIRC the Japanese were planning a second foray into the Bay of Bengal like that of April 1942, until attention was diverted to the Solomons and Guadalcanal on 7 Aug 1942. So there were real threats to consider. At the same time the WS convoys were moving large numbers of troops to the Middle & Far East in readiness for future campaigns.

The Admiralty clearly thought protection of the latter a better use of Eastern Fleet resources than adding an R class or two to a Malta convoy where they would add little to its air defence, which was the main threat, while requiring defended themselves by the rest of the escort. As it was the convoy turned back, not because of the Italian Fleet led by the 2 modern fast battleships, for which the Rs would have been no match anyway, but because they were running low on AA ammunition.

Also remember that June 1942 was something of a nadir for the RN capital ship fleet:-

Renown, Nelson, Rodney and DoY with the Home Fleet plus USS Washington (on loan April-Jul 1942 along with other ships to free up RN ships for the IO and Med) responsibilities included escorting convoys to Russia & WS convoys south to Freetown.
Malaya with Force H at Gibraltar - covering convoy operations from western end of Med.
The 3 R class and Warspite with the Eastern Fleet covering WS convoys in the IO and being "a fleet in being".

Ramilles, QE, Valiant, KGV all under repair (first 3 due to enemy action, KGV due to collision damage from slicing the destroyer Punjabi in half in fog)
Anson running trials
Howe still to complete.

The RN couldn't afford to lose any more capital ships at that particular point of the war through unnecessary risk.

 

[zoeafr]

A small one-plane hangar could be installed between the Q and Y turret - on the place of rear conning tower (which wasn't of much use and supposed to be removed during reconstruction into training ship anyway).

It could be possible; but it would limit the Q turret straight back aiming at low angle; that hangar would have to be at least 50 feet wide, 40 feet long and 15 feet high; and then, if you had and octuple AA there, it would have to be moved elsewhere. If you added a small maintenance shop to that, you'd get a bigger restriction....But all is possible with different scenarios, hoping a straight rear salvo blast wave wouldn't damage the structures....

 

[zoeafr]

It could be possible; but it would limit the Q turret straight back aiming at low angle; that hangar would have to be at least 50 feet wide, 40 feet long and 15 feet high; and then, if you had and octuple AA there, it would have to be moved elsewhere. If you added a small maintenance shop to that, you'd get a bigger restriction....But all is possible with different scenarios, hoping a straight rear salvo blast wave wouldn't damage the structures....

A hangar would have been an easier proposition if the Q barbette was at the other end of the quarter deck; more width, without the triangle design, and no guns facing the building; It is probably the reason that the Kongos didn't have hangars even if they had two aircraft and a catapult.

 

[zoeafr]

So you think that the Centurion, converted to a target ship in 1926 and stripped of all of her original armament, was a more useful ship in WW2 than all of the R class.

Let's see what Centurion's WW2 service life consisted of. Continued her target ship role and then used as a repair ship tied up alongside at Devonport Dockyard, while thought (another Churchillian mapcap scheme) was given to using her as a blockship at Tripoli. Converted to a dummy warship (to resemble the KGV class Anson which didn't complete her work up until Sept 1942) at some point in that period, being given a handful of pom-pom and Oerlikons for self defence. Sent to the IO and then loaned to the Med Fleet for Operation Vigorous in June 1942. Her entire role in this period was one of deception nothing more. Something thatv the RN wouldn't have bothered too much about losing. After that nothing, until she turns up in June 1944 as one of the ships to be sunk in the Goosberry breakwater off Omaha Beach.

Meanwhile the R class had quite an active war all the way through to mid/late 1943. Much of it in the boring stuff like convoy protection, rather than fleet actions that attract headlines. But no less important.

As for the R class being "huddled" off Kenya, go back and read my post #164. I explained therein why all the large ships of the Eastern Fleet ended up effectively tied up at Kilindini. But that was NOT in June 1942 during Operation Vigorous. That WAS between Oct & Dec 1942 and was due to their escorting destroyers having to be sent elsewhere to combat U-boats.

In June 1942, the Admiralty were still worried about another Japanese foray into the IO. Between May & July two Japanese AMCs were operating in the IO covering the area from South of Madagascar to South of Ceylon. IIRC the Japanese were planning a second foray into the Bay of Bengal like that of April 1942, until attention was diverted to the Solomons and Guadalcanal on 7 Aug 1942. So there were real threats to consider. At the same time the WS convoys were moving large numbers of troops to the Middle & Far East in readiness for future campaigns.

The Admiralty clearly thought protection of the latter a better use of Eastern Fleet resources than adding an R class or two to a Malta convoy where they would add little to its air defence, which was the main threat, while requiring defended themselves by the rest of the escort. As it was the convoy turned back, not because of the Italian Fleet led by the 2 modern fast battleships, for which the Rs would have been no match anyway, but because they were running low on AA ammunition.

Also remember that June 1942 was something of a nadir for the RN capital ship fleet:-

Renown, Nelson, Rodney and DoY with the Home Fleet plus USS Washington (on loan April-Jul 1942 along with other ships to free up RN ships for the IO and Med) responsibilities included escorting convoys to Russia & WS convoys south to Freetown.
Malaya with Force H at Gibraltar - covering convoy operations from western end of Med.
The 3 R class and Warspite with the Eastern Fleet covering WS convoys in the IO and being "a fleet in being".

Ramilles, QE, Valiant, KGV all under repair (first 3 due to enemy action, KGV due to collision damage from slicing the destroyer Punjabi in half in fog)
Anson running trials
Howe still to complete.

The RN couldn't afford to lose any more capital ships at that particular point of the war through unnecessary risk.

So then, wouldn't having that extra ship been useful instead of having an Iron Duke sitting in port? That's the argument here in the end. Nothing done to the Iron Duke could have been usefull aside a full re-construction, which in itself would have been too costly for any types use usability. The same cannot be said about the Tiger...

 

[Dilandu]

So then, wouldn't having that extra ship been useful instead of having an Iron Duke sitting in port? That's the argument here in the end. Nothing done to the Iron Duke could have been usefull aside a full re-construction, which in itself would have been too costly for any types use usability. The same cannot be said about the Tiger...

True. The situation on Far East was especially bad, with Royal Navy having only one moderatedly fast capital ship - the Warspite - to support carriers.

 

[zoeafr]

True. The situation on Far East was especially bad, with Royal Navy having only one moderatedly fast capital ship - the Warspite - to support carriers.

Yes.... So, with that in mind, and if you look at the sketches and resume, what kind of outfit would you want on the ship?

 

[BlackBat242]

As the Japanese did with the Hiei, they kept her as a training ship, but kept her in good state, so that when the time came, all that was needed was to bring her back to fighting capability. even if they would not have done a full re-construction, the idea was a good one. So, when that moment came, they had an extra ship... No one will make me believe that the U.S. didn't do the same with the USS Arkansas, and most probably a couple of other ships, just in case......They knew what Japan was up to, and took measures to be prepared....

Well, if you won't be convinced by reality, I can't help you learn.

The USN had exactly the number of capital ships in 1940 as were allowed them under the 1930/36 LNT - Arkansas was one of the capital ships the US was allowed to keep, so she was never taken out of full service - plus Wyoming (sister to Arkansas) disarmed, dearmored, and with half her boilers hacked up as specified in the treaties serving as training ship... and Utah disarmed as target ship.

ALL of the capital ships that were not allowed to be kept had long before been scrapped.

Utah, of course was sunk at Pearl Harbor - but even so there had never been any plans to return her to combat service.

Wyoming likewise was deemed far too valuable as a gunnery training ship - there were never plans to re-arm & re-armor her, and she even lost all of her remaining 12" turrets!

As for Wyoming... here are two photos of her passing through the Panama Canal in 1919. Note how her armor belt is clearly evident on the outside of her hull:





Here she is in 1927 after modernization with bulges, relocated 5" gun battery, new boilers & turbines, etc. Note how far out from the rest of her hull side the armor belt extends:


Note all the 12" gun turrets.
Now here she is in June 1942. Note that half of her 12" turrets are gone, and looking along her hull side you can see her belt has been removed:







And then in April 1944 (first photo) and April 1945 (the last 3) - note all 12" turrets are gone, and all that are left are 5" and smaller guns for training purposes:

 

[zoeafr]

Well, if you won't be convinced by reality, I can't help you learn.

The USN had exactly the number of capital ships in 1940 as were allowed them under the 1930/36 LNT - Arkansas was one of the capital ships the US was allowed to keep, so she was never taken out of full service - plus Wyoming (sister to Arkansas) disarmed, dearmored, and with half her boilers hacked up as specified in the treaties serving as training ship... and Utah disarmed as target ship.

ALL of the capital ships that were not allowed to be kept had long before been scrapped.

Utah, of course was sunk at Pearl Harbor - but even so there had never been any plans to return her to combat service.

Wyoming likewise was deemed far too valuable as a gunnery training ship - there were never plans to re-arm & re-armor her, and she even lost all of her remaining 12" turrets!

As for Wyoming... here are two photos of her passing through the Panama Canal in 1919. Note how her armor belt is clearly evident on the outside of her hull:

View attachment 755657

View attachment 755658

Here she is in 1927 after modernization with bulges, relocated 5" gun battery, new boilers & turbines, etc. Note how far out from the rest of her hull side the armor belt extends:
View attachment 755665

Note all the 12" gun turrets.
Now here she is in June 1942. Note that half of her 12" turrets are gone, and looking along her hull side you can see her belt has been removed:

View attachment 755659

View attachment 755660

View attachment 755661

And then in April 1944 (first photo) and April 1945 (the last 3) - note all 12" turrets are gone, and all that are left are 5" and smaller guns for training purposes:

View attachment 755666

View attachment 755662

View attachment 755663

View attachment 755664

I guess you might not have understood me; I never said that the U.S. kept more ships than they signed for; I said that, as the japanese navy did, they kept that vessel in good condition, even if it was converted to a training ship in accordance with the treaty, but they had every intention of bringing it back into service if anything or event was to happen; and like the Japanese navy which did the same, the day which they didn't sign, their Hiei battlecruiser( training ship up until then) was re-activated and modified, the U.S. were already prepared to do the same with the Arkansas, and they did.....The British navy didn't because the Iron Duke was not worth bringing back into active service since no amount of funds would have made it a worthwhile ship, which the Tiger would have.......The U.S. did reactivate some of their older and previously de-activated ships, because they had more funds available ...... In fact, 5 were re-activated, 4 after Pearl Arbour....Did you see the British navy re-activate fully their Centurion, or their Iron Duke? No, no money, no candy........But they had just under 1000000 pounds for extra work in their year's budget, not enough for a full reconstruction, but some amount of work on re-activating was possible; but they choose not to put that toward re-activated ship.

 

[zoeafr]

I guess you might not have understood me; I never said that the U.S. kept more ships than they signed for; I said that, as the japanese navy did, they kept that vessel in good condition, even if it was converted to a training ship in accordance with the treaty, but they had every intention of bringing it back into service if anything or event was to happen; and like the Japanese navy which did the same, the day which they didn't sign, their Hiei battlecruiser( training ship up until then) was re-activated and modified, the U.S. were already prepared to do the same with the Arkansas, and they did.....The British navy didn't because the Iron Duke was not worth bringing back into active service since no amount of funds would have made it a worthwhile ship, which the Tiger would have.......The U.S. did reactivate some of their older and previously de-activated ships, because they had more funds available ...... In fact, 5 were re-activated, 4 after Pearl Arbour....Did you see the British navy re-activate fully their Centurion, or their Iron Duke? No, no money, no candy........But they had just under 1000000 pounds for extra work in their year's budget, not enough for a full reconstruction, but some amount of work on re-activating was possible; but they choose not to put that toward re-activated ship.

As for ''learning'' condescension will never make for constructive discussions........

 

[BlackBat242]

I guess you might not have understood me; I never said that the U.S. kept more ships than they signed for; I said that, as the japanese navy did, they kept that vessel in good condition, even if it was converted to a training ship in accordance with the treaty, but they had every intention of bringing it back into service if anything or event was to happen; and like the Japanese navy which did the same, the day which they didn't sign, their Hiei battlecruiser( training ship up until then) was re-activated and modified, the U.S. were already prepared to do the same with the Arkansas, and they did.....The British navy didn't because the Iron Duke was not worth bringing back into active service since no amount of funds would have made it a worthwhile ship, which the Tiger would have.......The U.S. did reactivate some of their older and previously de-activated ships, because they had more funds available ...... In fact, 5 were re-activated, 4 after Pearl Arbour....Did you see the British navy re-activate fully their Centurion, or their Iron Duke? No, no money, no candy........But they had just under 1000000 pounds for extra work in their year's budget, not enough for a full reconstruction, but some amount of work on re-activating was possible; but they choose not to put that toward re-activated ship.

1. Arkansas was never deactivated - she had been in continuous service up to and then well after the start of WW2 - just like the treaties allowed. She was never designated a training ship, or anything other than a front-line battleship.

2. There was never any "plan to reactivate Wyoming as a warship" - except in your imagination!

3. Would you mind listing what battleships you think the USN deactivated then reactivated?
You can't, because THERE WERE NONE!
Every battleship other than Wyoming and Utah that had to be taken out of service due to the treaties were then, as the treaties specified, scrapped. The ones the US kept were kept in service except for short shipyard periods where they were openly being updated.

Destroyers, yes - but they had been deactivated to save operating money, not due to any treaty provisions - the US had been fully allowed to have kept all of them in active service, but Congress balked at the expenditure in the 1920s & 1930s.

No cruisers were reactivated.

 

[EwenS]

The point that seems to have been missed by some is that "training ships" come in a variety of guises. For example:-

1. Ships designated as such under the Treaties that required to have their armaments reduced, armour removed, machinery part removed / mutilated to comply with said Treaties. In the 1930s Wyoming, Iron Duke and Hiei fall into that is category.

2. Ships from the ACTIVE fleets that undertook training cruises for reservists and personnel, particularly officers, under training, that were not required under the Treaties to be modified as in 1. above. HMS Tiger filled such a role between 1924 and 1929, the RN Third Battle Squadron (the Iron Dukes) was reduced to this status in the late 1920s, before becoming a victim of the 1930 London Treaty, and Arkansas filled a similar role for the USN in the 1930s. Post WW2 the RN used first its battleships then carriers in this type of role.

3. Training ships that rarely, if ever, went to sea, but were useful for teaching personnel their trades. For example the monitor Marshall Soult inter war, or a couple of the old R class battleships from 1944 for training stokers.

Hiei represents an interesting case. The IJN actually started her demilitarisation BEFORE the 1930 London Conference. (It was carried out starting in Oct-Nov 1929. The Conference ran from 21 Jan to 22 April 1930 and the Treaty put her status beyond doubt).

While her reconstruction to battlecruiser took place between April 1937 and Jan 1940, some work on her main armament shell rooms had been carried out as early as Jan 1934-Mar 1935. It was Dec 1934 before Japan formally announced it would be leaving the Treaty system on the expiry of the 1922 & 1930 Treaties on 31 Dec 1936.

Her reconstruction remained unknown to western intelligence agencies until after she re-entered service.

 

[zoeafr]

1. Arkansas was never deactivated - she had been in continuous service up to and then well after the start of WW2 - just like the treaties allowed. She was never designated a training ship, or anything other than a front-line battleship.

2. There was never any "plan to reactivate Wyoming as a warship" - except in your imagination!

3. Would you mind listing what battleships you think the USN deactivated then reactivated?
You can't, because THERE WERE NONE!
Every battleship other than Wyoming and Utah that had to be taken out of service due to the treaties were then, as the treaties specified, scrapped. The ones the US kept were kept in service except for short shipyard periods where they were openly being updated.

Destroyers, yes - but they had been deactivated to save operating money, not due to any treaty provisions - the US had been fully allowed to have kept all of them in active service, but Congress balked at the expenditure in the 1920s & 1930s.

No cruisers were reactivated.

The Arkansas served as a training ship, and is not considered as an active fleet ship....And was re-activated..
The Wyoming was refit for Anti- aircraft training.....In 44, so replaced the Arkansas as a trainer....
So, you have 2 New York class, 2 Nevadas', 2 Pennsylvanias', 3 New Mexicos', 2 Tennessees', 3 Colorados', 2 North Carolinas, the two last ones being supposed to replace some of the older ones, like the King Georges Vs';
The argument here is that, the U.S. had the possibility of one more ship, which had not yet been disposed of, and one more ship which they did put back in the active fleet (Arkansas)......So, in that context, the British navy had the Iron Duke as a trainer, and the Centurion as a de-activated multiple chores trial ship. It is the vision of the british navy which kept them from being able to re-activate two more ships when the time came, and the funds obviously.
Had they kept the Tiger instead of the Iron Duke, there were more re-activion possibilities should the need arise, which it did need.... As for the Utah, it was in the same status as the HMS Centurion was......
So, in the whole count, the U.S. had more potential reserve battleships to fall back on if the need would have been dire.....

 

[zoeafr]

The point that seems to have been missed by some is that "training ships" come in a variety of guises. For example:-

1. Ships designated as such under the Treaties that required to have their armaments reduced, armour removed, machinery part removed / mutilated to comply with said Treaties. In the 1930s Wyoming, Iron Duke and Hiei fall into that is category.

2. Ships from the ACTIVE fleets that undertook training cruises for reservists and personnel, particularly officers, under training, that were not required under the Treaties to be modified as in 1. above. HMS Tiger filled such a role between 1924 and 1929, the RN Third Battle Squadron (the Iron Dukes) was reduced to this status in the late 1920s, before becoming a victim of the 1930 London Treaty, and Arkansas filled a similar role for the USN in the 1930s. Post WW2 the RN used first its battleships then carriers in this type of role.

3. Training ships that rarely, if ever, went to sea, but were useful for teaching personnel their trades. For example the monitor Marshall Soult inter war, or a couple of the old R class battleships from 1944 for training stokers.

Hiei represents an interesting case. The IJN actually started her demilitarisation BEFORE the 1930 London Conference. (It was carried out starting in Oct-Nov 1929. The Conference ran from 21 Jan to 22 April 1930 and the Treaty put her status beyond doubt).

While her reconstruction to battlecruiser took place between April 1937 and Jan 1940, some work on her main armament shell rooms had been carried out as early as Jan 1934-Mar 1935. It was Dec 1934 before Japan formally announced it would be leaving the Treaty system on the expiry of the 1922 & 1930 Treaties on 31 Dec 1936.

Her reconstruction remained unknown to western intelligence agencies until after she re-entered service.

Yes I understand; but the point I was trying to convey is that more of the U.S. navy ships were in a better maintenance state than the British counterpart, which left them more options when came decision time. As for the japanese interpretation of the treaty, they did skate around word interpretation, and from the treaty's texts, there are certain ''loopholes'' in different interpretations which could have been used. Of course that would not have been without controversies, but it could have been one more way for negotiations......That was the initial Japanese argument used in 1935, before they officially left in 1936, as they had intended from the end of 1934....

 

[Owens Z]

Wyominglikewise was deemed far too valuable as a gunnery training ship - there were never plans to re-arm & re-armor her, and she even lost all of her remaining 12" turrets!

2. There was never any "plan to reactivate Wyoming as a warship" - except in your imagination!

Unfortunately I don't have Norman Friedman's US Battleships: An Illustrated Design History at hand, but Dr Friedman wrote on p114 of Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1906-1921 that battleship "Wyoming was converted into a gunnery [training ship], her side armor removed, under the London Naval Treaty... Although reconversion to full battleship configuration was briefly considered early in World War Two, it was never carried out". A similar brief note, also by Dr Friedman, is on p199 of Conway's Battleships Rev Ed. The current Wikipedia article for this ship states "Early in the war, the Navy briefly considered converting Wyoming back to her battleship configuration, but decided against the plan", and the Conway's 1906-1921 book is cited at the end of that sentence.

I was not there, but I understood that it wasn't expense or shipyard capacity that dissuaded the US Navy from reconstructing Wyoming after Pearl Harbor to again match her sister (and since Arkansas did useful duty through 1945 as mentioned above, an identical Wyoming would have too)—rather it was because Wyoming was so valuable in her existing role of live-fire training for antiaircraft gunners and testing new fire-control equipment. A role that became still more valued after the kamikaze onslaught began in late 1944. So like you say, BlackBat, Wyoming was good where she was. Had USS Utah been ignored by the Pearl Harbor attackers like they had been ordered, that ex-battleship probably would have spent the war in a similar role. So the mistaken torpedoing and sinking of Utah was not of zero profit to Japan.

The UK's Royal Navy could have used good AA live-fire training as much as anyone, but so desperate was their situation in 1941-42 that disarmed old HMS Centurion was instead kept in the thick of things as an AA escort and decoy fake battleship, until she was so worn (and damaged from a German bomb hit) that she was no longer fit for sea.

 

[Dilandu]

2. There was never any "plan to reactivate Wyoming as a warship" - except in your imagination!

I'm not sure. If I recall correctly, the reconstruction of Wyoming back to battleship was actually considered - very briefly - immediately after Pearl Harbor. At this moment USN was still shocked by the massive loss of capital ships, and explored essentially any idea, including buying battleship from Chile to somehow bolster the battleline.

 

[Dilandu]

Had USS Utah been ignored by the Pearl Harbor attackers like they had been ordered, that ex-battleship probably would have spent the war in a similar role. So the mistaken torpedoing and sinking of Utah was not of zero profit to Japan.

Just a thought about Utah. She was a radio-control target ship, with remote controls installed. If she survived the Pearl Harbor - what about using her as "kamikaze trap" by 1945? She could got deck strenghtened with additional armor, a fake deck and superstructure installed to camouflage her as aircraft carrier, and could be deployed forward under remote control to lure Japanese kamikaze strikes on herself (with no one aboard)

 

[Owens Z]

At this moment USN was still shocked by the massive loss of capital ships, and explored essentially any idea, including buying battleship from Chile to somehow bolster the battleline.

But see post # 25 above regarding the USA's alleged plan to purchase Chilean battleship Almirante Latorre (ex-HMS Canada).

 

[Dilandu]

But see post # 25 above regarding the USA's alleged plan to purchase Chilean battleship Almirante Latorre (ex-HMS Canada).

Oh. So it's a myth? Didn't knew that!

 

[zoeafr]

Just a thought about Utah. She was a radio-control target ship, with remote controls installed. If she survived the Pearl Harbor - what about using her as "kamikaze trap" by 1945? She could got deck strenghtened with additional armor, a fake deck and superstructure installed to camouflage her as aircraft carrier, and could be deployed forward under remote control to lure Japanese kamikaze strikes on herself (with no one aboard)

All of these discussions point to my comment about the U.S. navy having a better maintained fleet of ships and that gave them options when the time came for needs. Even if the Wyoming was a training ship, she was in a condition that could have allowed her back into active duty after doing the reactivation work; same goes for the Utah......We are talking about the 1930 decisions which took place. The British navy didn't have those options because of choices made before the treaty. Sure, the situation changed drastically after Pearl Harbor, and they had to work hard to save as many ships as possible, but put the British navy in that position, and they would have been ''out of action''.......

 

[Owens Z]

Without spotting planes it would be not very efficient by early 1940s standards, I'm afraid.

While I'm not sure what the RN method was, the USN towed a mat behind the ship that the crane would then pick up once the seaplane had powered itself onto the mat.
This worked pretty well in allowing plane recovery even in moderate seas and without slowing the ship.

Looks like the only really available spot to stick catapults and crane is on the fantail, all the way aft like on the later US designs.

Strongly disagree, a battlecruiser's planes are there to enable effective long range gunnery (and to find the enemy in the first place). There is a reason the USN made room for planes on everything from light cruisers on up!

If there's space for one small crane on one side that will be out of the way of the guns there's space for two such cranes, one on each side.
And having 1-2 aircraft for scouting and shell spotting would be well worth it for a battlecruiser. I would have sent any/all battlecruisers the RN kept to the Pacific and/or Indian Oceans, where their higher speeds would reduce transit times.

The cost of catapult and plane installation would be very little comparing to the overall scale of refit.

The extra fuss and expense to add floatplane capability to HMS Tiger during her counterfactual reconstruction is unwelcome, but my main worries are taking up space on the weather deck better used for light AA cannon (and keeping their firing arcs clear) for a war that proved you couldn't ever have enough, and the fire hazard in battle from the aviation gasoline and any ordnance stored in that new hangar.

Spotting floatplanes were indeed routinely carried and flown in the Pacific War; I remember as a kid I built a model of a Vought OS2U Kingfisher. But the US Navy's catapults and cranes aft (which the Royal Navy believed too exposed for rough North Sea and North Atlantic conditions—they preferred amidships) were designed into those cruisers and battleships from the ground up, not shoehorned in as an afterthought later.

Aircraft are great: but for aiding Tiger, keep them aboard the accompanying Royal Navy cruisers and carriers.

 

[Owens Z]

All of these discussions point to my comment about the U.S. navy having a better maintained fleet of ships and that gave them options when the time came for needs. Even if the Wyoming was a training ship, she was in a condition that could have allowed her back into active duty after doing the reactivation work; same goes for the Utah......We are talking about the 1930 decisions which took place. The British navy didn't have those options because of choices made before the treaty. Sure, the situation changed drastically after Pearl Harbor, and they had to work hard to save as many ships as possible, but put the British navy in that position, and they would have been ''out of action''.......

As far as I can tell from naval history, Zoeafr, that does seem to be the general case in the Second World War: USN warships, whatever their age, were kept well maintained, with even terrible battle damage repaired to like-new condition, sometimes again and again, while RN warships became increasingly dingy and battered. For example tough old HMS Warspite, which never did steer quite right after enduring fifteen 283mm and 305mm shell hits at Jutland, was famously "repaired" in Scotland after the 16 September 1943 Fritz-X guided bomb hit by having concrete poured to cover the hole blasted in her bottom, with her damaged boiler room and third turret left permanently abandoned. This general wartime difference was not due to RN preference or to any lack of fight. Comparing both countries after they entered the war (the UK two years earlier) and were fully mobilized, the USA had much greater manufacturing capacity than the UK, including in shipyards. And the UK's smaller population, with slightly more casualties than the USA suffered, was already unable in 1944-45 to provide enough young men to hard-fighting British Army divisions; therefore ship's crews had to be curbed. The British wrung everything out of their fleet (and then some) to ensure victory: a necessary, and honorable, decision.

But to keep this thread tight, let's stay focused here on battlecruiser HMS Tiger, please.

 

[Owens Z]

So you think that the Centurion, converted to a target ship in 1926 and stripped of all of her original armament, was a more useful ship in WW2 than all of the R class.

Don't sell plucky ex-battleship HMS Centurion short: her guns fired in anger during 1942 (and were credited with at least one Stuka). The guns of the four R-class battleships did not. That the Admiralty deemed the best use of the R-class, which had no sonar or antisubmarine weapons, was to be escorting convoys along the backwater African coast, while there was desperate fighting elsewhere around the globe, speaks for itself. Unlike any American battleship, of which five were older, all the R-class were put out of service well before VE Day (Revenge and Resolution in 1943, Ramillies in Jan 1945 after bombardment duties off Normandy and Provence) except for the ship lent to the Soviet Navy, and it turned out that one didn't do anything either. I don't question those wartime decisions. I question the decision made in the early 1930's, which you endorse: that the R-class battleships (and Iron Duke) would be more valuable to their country than battlecruiser HMS Tiger. Sadly, this proved not to be the case. Hence the interest in this thread about Tiger's counterfactual career after 1932. This interest is not new: see for example author Antony Preston's words quoted in post # 20 above.

The R-class did have postwar value: turret machinery from two ships were repurposed to build the famed Lovell Radio Telescope at Jodrell Bank, which remains active.

 

[Dilandu]

counterfactual reconstruction

Althistorical is a better term)