All you really need for a nuclear submarine is a moderately sized floating drydock. No need for multi-billion dollar funding and a decade of planning. There are plenty of available floating drydocks with more than adequate capacity. https://horizonship.com/ship-category/barges-for-sale/floating-dry-docks-for-sale/

A moderately sized 'nuclear certified' drydock....

And at that point the costs go through the roof. In all seriousness by the time you've done that you may as well have constructed a big, fixed drydock and have it as a facility for decades to come. The RN made the mistake of thinking similar in the 80's and built the Syncolift at Faslane....which is now one of the reasons the RN's sub fleet is in dire straits. It cost way more than expected and they could have built a new drydock easily with the cost it eventually ran out to. If they'd just built a proper dry dock they wouldn't have the issues they have. Unfortunately they're about to attempt to repeat the mistake as they're looking for a floating drydock for Faslane....a decision they will either stop in time or live to regret...
 
A moderately sized 'nuclear certified' drydock....

And at that point the costs go through the roof. In all seriousness by the time you've done that you may as well have constructed a big, fixed drydock and have it as a facility for decades to come. The RN made the mistake of thinking similar in the 80's and built the Syncolift at Faslane....which is now one of the reasons the RN's sub fleet is in dire straits. It cost way more than expected and they could have built a new drydock easily with the cost it eventually ran out to. If they'd just built a proper dry dock they wouldn't have the issues they have. Unfortunately they're about to attempt to repeat the mistake as they're looking for a floating drydock for Faslane....a decision they will either stop in time or live to regret...
Admittedly, the shape of the pier at Bangor made installing a drydock rather trivial. It's triangular-shaped, point out on the water. The drydock is on the base side of the triangle, and the whole pier sits a couple hundred feet off the shoreline.


Sorry, not sure how to get that as an image.
 
Stingray torpedoes to equip US and Australian P8 aircraft is a surprising development, we weren't even sure they would be equipping British P8 aircraft with them!
I get the feeling this was a case where it cost basically nothing to apply across the whole fleet and it is a useful emergency capability for USN and RAN aircraft to use British warstocks just in case.
 
I get the feeling this was a case where it cost basically nothing to apply across the whole fleet and it is a useful emergency capability for USN and RAN aircraft to use British warstocks just in case.
Crud, it's probably cheaper to apply across the entire fleet than it is to just do for the 9(!) UK aircraft.
 
Follow up story:

 

US Congressional Report suggests opportunity to take the money Australia is going to spend inside Australia and have it spent on US products like bombers and leased submarines instead, Leading opponent of AUKUS in the Australian Senate doesn't welcome the report, instead says its sounds more like a 'strategic surrender than a partnership'. Australian Strategic Policy Institute thinktank, which receives grants from the US State Department, says 'hold on, perhaps theres something here?'.
 
It does not seem like the authors of the report asked the Australians?
Aukus’ original sin is that - because of the need for total secrecy - it was really a half-baked idea discussed only at the most senior levels among a few politicians and a handful of their favorite admirals whispering in their ear.

A lot of the usual due diligence, feasibility assessments etc were skipped, which is where a lot of important stakeholders might have brought up big questions around the industrial supply chain, manning constraints, and Australia’s ability to run 3.5 different submarine types in parallel.

In the US this means that the Navy itself was mostly kept in the dark, with the White House and National Security Council driving the show. In Australia this means that the goalposts where moved arbitrarily, throwing aside all concerns about affordability, schedule risk, and industrial workshare.

I think what we’re seeing now is some of those stakeholders who were ignored and are perhaps threatened by aspects of Aukus are starting up their own lobbying campaigns, including some within the US submarine community who will be directly impacted by any shortfall in hull numbers, and who are starting to whisper that there won’t be enough Virginia subs to go around, and US operators’ needs should take priority irrespective of any political arrangements that were made without involving them.

And in Australia there is a growing awareness that the cost, schedule and domestic industrial aspects that were ignored could come back and bite hard, and that perhaps the deal could start drifting in a direction that is too favorable to the US & UK, while Australia will have lost its negotiating leverage and could just end up bankrolling foreign yards with little operational capability to show for in exchange.

All in all a very sensitive situation and likely to get worse as the US industrial base continues to miss commitments and pressure builds up on both sides.
 
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So, people probably need to understand what the Congressional Research Service is/does. The purpose of CRS reports is to outline possible issues for Congress to consider and alternatives they might take. In the case of naval matters, CRS is basically one person, Ron O'Rourke. So this is Ron very loosely speculating about alternative Australian strategies for Congress to consider. It's not an expression of US policy.

PS: The bulk of the report seems to be focused on the US sub-building industry's capacity (or lack thereof) to actually implement AUKUS Pillar 1.

The actual report is here: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=RL32418
 
So this is Ron very loosely speculating about alternative Australian strategies for Congress to consider. It's not an expression of US policy.
I’ve been reading Ron O’Rourkes reports for years so I’m aware. The question still stands why he would bring up such a speculative scenario? I dont know his process to be sure, but I doubt that the scenarios he puts forward are his brainchild, they are more likely to reflect what people are whispering in Washington or briefing off the record.
 
Depending on when Oz wants to buy their Virginia-class, it'd be relatively simple to have them buy the long-lead items to keep the shipyards making two boats per year when Congress makes the USN only buy one boat a year.
 
Depending on when Oz wants to buy their Virginia-class, it'd be relatively simple to have them buy the long-lead items to keep the shipyards making two boats per year when Congress makes the USN only buy one boat a year.
Wrong, it’s not Congress. The USN can’t order 2 boats a year because industry is only able to deliver 1.3/year and the backlog just keeps growing, so the USN has actually had to beg Congress not to make it order more subs.

This problem won’t go away until industry hires and trains enough workers to handle both SSBN production and 2-2.33 SSNs/year. Jury’s still out IMHO on whether industry can deliver on their promises.
 
Wrong, it’s not Congress. The USN can’t order 2 boats a year because industry is only able to deliver 1.3/year and the backlog just keeps growing, so the USN has actually had to beg Congress not to make it order more subs.

This problem won’t go away until industry hires and trains enough workers to handle both SSBN production and 2-2.33 SSNs/year. Jury’s still out IMHO on whether industry can deliver on their promises.
~6-12 months to get them cleared, though if there's nothing obvious popping up they can be given interim access before then.

The easiest way to get shipyard workers is to hire sailors that already have a clearance and run them through a welder's apprenticeship.
 
 
Weird article from an unnamed writer (paid article? All the other articles list their author), basically says that only SSBN's can be deterrents and if Australia wants a deterrent it should have got SSBN's. However concludes by saying they are the most lethal solution Australia could have gotten, a formidable submarine and 5-8 of them will very much irritate somebody.
 
The admiral who runs America’s submarine building program has confirmed construction is behind schedule and nowhere near the rate required to supply Australia’s Aukus nuclear submarines on schedule.

R Adm Jon Rucker told the Naval Submarine League’s annual symposium in Arlington, Virginia, last week that the US had “an exceptionally fragile” military shipbuilding base and could not meet construction rates for its own vessels this year.
 

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