Army Scout after LHX...RAH...ARH

It is correct to say that "Helios serve a supporting function to Cdrs and overall missions, not function onto themselves." I have not seen anything from Army Aviation Center in the last few years that state anything other than this. I seriously doubt anyone is looking to go down the route of the Comanche. "Deep Attack" is old school I am told.
As I stated I think that the reason the AH-64 is getting put into the scout role is purly financial. It does have better, and more, sensors, weapon options, survivability, time on station and communications. Certainly if the Army had the option they would still be trying to field a better scout aircraft. I did ask a friend about the space for soldiers on the aircraft and got told that Aviation's "customer" has not asked for that capability. No one is buying extra capability, at least this year.
 
Understand the customer not asking for a capable scout in the current budget environment but BNs and even BDEs depending on "lower density assets' ie Lakotas when 58s are gone will be significant.. Better have UASs that do everything.
 
jsport said:
According to the Boeing pitch vid once posted on SecProj forum E has some RF sensing above and beyond the Ds..Additionally, they mention EO/IR improvements. better FCR, more power & less weight is faster w/ longer range tgt aqu..thus scout.

As stated repeatedly w/o any meaningful retort, Commanders need troop carrying..an understanding of the future full spectrum of mission requirements renders this unquestionable. Helios serve a supporting function to Cdrs and overall missions, not function onto themselves. Although Commanche is/was a start the craft itself was built for the Fulda Gap.


My understanding is that -64Es in service now have the same sensors as the D. Under the first part of the M-DSA (Modernized Day Sensor Assembly) program, assuming funding remains, a new laser rangefinder/designator is to be introduced achieving full capability in 2016. It will go on the Es first, but may also be retrofitted to Ds that are still some time away from upgrading to Es. Then beginning in 2016 it is hoped to start installing the rest of M-DSA which includes improved laser pointing and spot trackers, highdef color TV and a new inertial measuring unit. These may also show up on Ds, I presume, and would be retained on those converted to Es. The improved Longbow, I believe, is just for the E.
 
I would imagine that the Army will try to upgrade as many D's as they can afford, to hedge their bet that a future attack helicopter can be developed (FVL).
 
yasotay said:
I would imagine that the Army will try to upgrade as many D's as they can afford, to hedge their bet that a future attack helicopter can be developed (FVL).
Just would hope the powers would remember the troop capacity of Mil-28 should be the considered state of the art w/ respect to that capability.
 
What operational value is there in carrying a couple of troops in a scout helicopter? I'm not convinced that there is any.
 
TomS said:
What operational value is there in carrying a couple of troops in a scout helicopter? I'm not convinced that there is any.

this forum so often loses it's 'infotainment' appeal when it is punctuated by the endless requests of the uninformed to repeat one's arguments.
 
TomS said:
What operational value is there in carrying a couple of troops in a scout helicopter? I'm not convinced that there is any.

I don't believe that the United States Army has a dedicated reconnaissance and attack helicopter in its future like the Sikorsky/Boeing RAH-66 Comanche. Sikorsky is using the term light tactical helicopter to describe the S-97 Raider, not scout helicopter or attack helicopter. I've read that US Special Operation Command has expressed interest in the concept as a replacement for the MH-6 Little Bird. I also presume that the S-97 Raider could be used for the same missions that are currently performed by the Eurocopter UH-72 Lakota--homeland security, administrative, logistic, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and support of the army test and training centers missions. There is also speculation that Sikorsky will develop a light civil helicopter from the S-97 Raider.

I presume that FVL/JMR-Light described as an intended replacement for the OH-58 Kiowa Warrior will be a next generation light utility helicopter adapted for the armed scout role. So I believe it is safe to say that if we discuss any new scout helicopter for the United States Army, it will be an adaption of a light utility helicopter platform.
 
jsport said:
Just would hope the powers would remember the troop capacity of Mil-28 should be the considered state of the art w/ respect to that capability.

jsport said:
TomS said:
What operational value is there in carrying a couple of troops in a scout helicopter? I'm not convinced that there is any.

this forum so often loses it's 'infotainment' appeal when it is punctuated by the endless requests of the uninformed to repeat one's arguments.

Honestly, I don't understand the latter statement and maybe I'm not the only one. IIRC the MiL 28 actually has a two men crew and no
additional capability to carry troops. Maybe it was meant ironically, but please remember, that ironical remarks often get lost in a written
communication. Using smilies can help in such cases, comments that may be regarded as offensive by someone certainly cannot.
 
This discussion also begs the question, if the United States Army converts an existing attack helicopter for the armed scout role, will it want a scout conversion of a light utility helicopter in the future? Should the Army have been willing to spend more than $15 million a piece for a replacement of the Bell OH-58 Kiowa Warrior and gone with an off-the-shelf attack helicopter for the armed aerial scout? Should they have evaluated the Eurocopter Tiger ARH, Boeing AH-64 Apache, Bell AH-1Z Viper, and the Agusta A129 Mangusta as part of the AAS program? Less units, but a more capable helicopter?
 
"Army Debates Divestment of Kiowa Warrior; Replacement Program in Doubt"
by Valerie Insinna 1/14/14

Source:
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=1374

Big changes could be on the way for the Army’s aviation brigades, including the divestment of several aircraft such as the OH-58 Kiowa Warrior, said the service’s top aviator.

Army officials are discussing an aviation strategy that would use AH-64 Apaches, teamed with Shadow and Gray Eagle unmanned aerial systems, to conduct the scouting missions currently flown by the Kiowa, said Maj. Gen. Kevin Mangum, commanding general of the Aviation Center of Excellence and Fort Rucker.

"You can imagine the love notes I've gotten over that, [but] scouting is a mission, not a platform,” he said at a Jan. 14 speech.

Under this plan, the service would also divest the TH-67 training aircraft and use UH-72 Lakota light utility helicopters. An estimated 898 OH-58 A/C, OH-58 D and TH-67 aircraft would be mothballed.

In order to have enough aircraft to fill requirements, the Army would move all reserve Apache aircraft into the active force, he said at an Association of the United States Army conference. In return, reserve components would gain 159 UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters for lift and medical evacuation.

Officials acknowledged that aspects of the strategy are likely to be unpalatable to certain parts of the Army aviation community, but such measures were necessary to protect aircraft modernization programs, they said.

“We ought to be shot if we … cut up one modernized platform,” said Maj. Gen. Tim Crosby, the outgoing program executive officer for aviation. “There are going to be folks that are going to criticize [us] for what we recommended. I got it. … We worry about that soldier having something they need, that they can sustain, maintain and rely on in combat, and that’s the process we looked at.”

At this point, the service is not considering any changes to the Apache program, such as the purchase of additional aircraft or the acceleration of E-model aircraft procurement, Mangum said.

Apaches cost more and burn more gas than Kiowa Warriors, Mangum said, but "we don't have the money today to do anything differently. It's going to cost us more money in the long run if we keep the old stuff at this point, because we're going to be throwing money at platforms that really will not be economical to keep in the force."

For the past couple years, the Army has been searching high and low for a solution on how best to accomplish airborne reconnaissance missions.

Bell Helicopter, which manufactures the OH-58, touted continued upgrades and life extensions as the most cost-effective way to fulfill the scout helicopter requirement.

Another option was to buy a brand new aircraft through the armed aerial scout program. Boeing, AgustaWestland, Bell and EADS North America, which has been rebranded as Airbus, flew aircraft during a 2012 demonstration to the Army. Sikorsky’s S-97 Raider has also been floated as a possible Kiowa replacement, but it is not scheduled to fly until this year.

Army leaders in 2012 believed procuring new aircraft was the best choice, Mangum said.

“What a difference a year makes,” Mangum said. After sequestration and continued fiscal constraints in 2013, officials realized that both options were too expensive.

A new armed aerial scout helicopter could cost upwards of $16 billion, Mangum said. A cockpit and sensor upgrade program and service life extension for the Kiowa would cost $3 billion and $7 billion respectively.

"Not a good value proposition. Really it was going to be putting new shoes on an old horse for $10 billion. Oh, by the way, we don't have that $10 billion,” he said.

The Army will be able to meet 80 percent of its armed aerial scout requirements using existing Apaches and UAS, Mangum said. The current Kiowa fleet can only accomplish 20 percent of armed aerial scout missions, while an upgraded OH-58 would be able to accomplish 50 percent, he said.

The Kiowa Warrior’s cockpit and sensor upgrade program is already under way, but if Army leaders sign off on the strategy, all work on the initiative would come to a halt, Mangum said.

A requirement for an armed aerial scout helicopter would stay on the books, he said. Whether that gets filled will depend on what aircraft is available when the Army has money to purchase new aircraft. Increased speed, range and payload, as well as the ability to fly 6,000 high at 95-degree temperatures, would continue to be AAS requirements.

Crosby said he didn’t know whether the Army would revisit the armed aerial scout competition at a later date. Even if it doesn't reopen the competition, the service will eventually procure a new scout helicopter as part of the future vertical lift program, a family of rotorcraft that will replace current systems.

In order to fill UH-72 requirements at Fort Rucker, aircraft from the active and reserve components — including about half of the National Guard’s fleet — will be moved.

Mangum said the UH-72 would be a good fit for pilots training to fly the Apache, Black Hawk and Chinook helicopters that will be a staple of the fleet for the next decade.

"The fact that it's a glass cockpit, a digital cockpit, a dual engine aircraft will help our youngsters transition more readily to those modernized platforms, the AH-64E, the UH-60M and the CH-47F,” he said.
 
Triton said:
"Army Debates Divestment of Kiowa Warrior; Replacement Program in Doubt"
by Valerie Insinna 1/14/14

Source:
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=1374

The Army will be able to meet 80 percent of its armed aerial scout requirements using existing Apaches and UAS, Mangum said. The current Kiowa fleet can only accomplish 20 percent of armed aerial scout missions, while an upgraded OH-58 would be able to accomplish 50 percent, he said.
would then speculate that the twenty percent not covered by Apache & UAS speaks to the need carry at least two passengers.
 
jsport said:
Triton said:
"Army Debates Divestment of Kiowa Warrior; Replacement Program in Doubt"
by Valerie Insinna 1/14/14

Source:
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=1374

The Army will be able to meet 80 percent of its armed aerial scout requirements using existing Apaches and UAS, Mangum said. The current Kiowa fleet can only accomplish 20 percent of armed aerial scout missions, while an upgraded OH-58 would be able to accomplish 50 percent, he said.
would then speculate that the twenty percent not covered by Apache & UAS speaks to the need carry at least two passengers.

I don't think the oh-58D can carry passengers, only the OH-58 A/C models can. And how often do you hear of Kiowas carrying passengers anyway, seems to be a capability not used much, if at all
 
hopefully others such as yasotay will speak to this..as mentioned before .. the Mil-28 has troop carrying. the rescue of other pilots was a big issue in the Kosovo campaign..causing too large of formations just to rescue a potential downed set of pilots.

in-extremis has had even Apaches carrying individuals outside the craft..

Storing missiles inside the craft, delivering sniper/scouts makes basic, practical military/tactical sense regardless of spectrum of conflict. As resources force a combining of scout and attack roles survivability may drive out internal stowage for missiles or troops but distributed or dispersed ops speaks opposite that notion.

what ever the final mix, hopefully the corporate memory serves the way it should...
 
John21 said:
jsport said:
Triton said:
"Army Debates Divestment of Kiowa Warrior; Replacement Program in Doubt"
by Valerie Insinna 1/14/14

Source:
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=1374

The Army will be able to meet 80 percent of its armed aerial scout requirements using existing Apaches and UAS, Mangum said. The current Kiowa fleet can only accomplish 20 percent of armed aerial scout missions, while an upgraded OH-58 would be able to accomplish 50 percent, he said.
would then speculate that the twenty percent not covered by Apache & UAS speaks to the need carry at least two passengers.

I don't think the oh-58D can carry passengers, only the OH-58 A/C models can. And how often do you hear of Kiowas carrying passengers anyway, seems to be a capability not used much, if at all

You are right it can't the back seats are loaded with blackboxes

http://www.mycity-military.com/imgs2/143473_68650415_OH-58D%20KIOWA%20WARRIOR-US%20ARMY.jpg

jsport said:
hopefully others such as yasotay will speak to this..as mentioned before .. the Mil-28 has troop carrying. the rescue of other pilots was a big issue in the Kosovo campaign..causing too large of formations just to rescue a potential downed set of pilots.

can you give some more background on this?
 
Kosovo was a significant AD threat to Apaches and there was operational reluctance reported in AW&ST to Apaches flying against Serb positions w/o rescue copters etc. ended up Wes Clark called off the use of Apaches..and one crashed in Albania as well..
 
As pointed out OH-58D cannot carry anyone. It could barely pick up its weapon load and fuel. In Afghanistan it had to trade fuel for ammo in some places. This did not bother the aeroscouts as they really don't like playing taxi to staff poges. This is what they had to do in the old OH-58A/C that did have room for two in the back. Most of the mission that could not be done was probably due to high gross weight and old airframes. Uprated engine and complete rebuild of the airframe with the OH-58F would have restored some of the lost mission capability.

My speculation toward the twenty percent has to do with the up close and personnel scouting that small scout helicopters do. Finding tracks in snow and mud,smelling camp fires where there shouldn't be any, staring down a dude with a misshapen cloak in a crowd. None of these are done well with an Apache and a UAV has the visual acuity of a near blind man. Neither of them smell or hear so well either. Most folks are not familiar with how up close aeroscouting was. It is one reason why they have been so well loved by the ground forces. They usually go home dirty.

Some of this will indeed be overcome by technology, but some of the art of scouting that was truly a marvel to see will now become lore like the horse cavalrymen of old.
 
jsport said:
Kosovo was a significant AD threat to Apaches and there was operational reluctance reported in AW&ST to Apaches flying against Serb positions w/o rescue copters etc. ended up Wes Clark called off the use of Apaches..and one crashed in Albania as well..

I was just confused as you pointed out capability that not even oh-58Ds have and then tried to apply it to a scenario where aircraft didn't deploy. and the mi-28 has troop carrying ability?
 
Rlewis said:
jsport said:
Kosovo was a significant AD threat to Apaches and there was operational reluctance reported in AW&ST to Apaches flying against Serb positions w/o rescue copters etc. ended up Wes Clark called off the use of Apaches..and one crashed in Albania as well..

I was just confused as you pointed out capability that not even oh-58Ds have and then tried to apply it to a scenario where aircraft didn't deploy. and the mi-28 has troop carrying ability?
Maybe Yasotay can add some insight but the AW&ST article explained that Apaches were not deployed by Wes Clark because too many copters would be necessary to support only two Apaches deploying against Serb armor.. One of the requirements listed was a craft to immediately retrieve downed pilots.. One Apache crashed in Albania training for a mission which never launched..

Since the Mi-24, the Russians apparently have been aware of the need to carry spare missiles and carry troops in their attack helicopters. Once a dedicated Hellfire firing Blackhawk was proposed as spare missiles could be carried in the troop compartment.
 
yasotay said:
As pointed out OH-58D cannot carry anyone. It could barely pick up its weapon load and fuel. In Afghanistan it had to trade fuel for ammo in some places. This did not bother the aeroscouts as they really don't like playing taxi to staff poges. This is what they had to do in the old OH-58A/C that did have room for two in the back. Most of the mission that could not be done was probably due to high gross weight and old airframes. Uprated engine and complete rebuild of the airframe with the OH-58F would have restored some of the lost mission capability.

My speculation toward the twenty percent has to do with the up close and personnel scouting that small scout helicopters do. Finding tracks in snow and mud,smelling camp fires where there shouldn't be any, staring down a dude with a misshapen cloak in a crowd. None of these are done well with an Apache and a UAV has the visual acuity of a near blind man. Neither of them smell or hear so well either. Most folks are not familiar with how up close aeroscouting was. It is one reason why they have been so well loved by the ground forces. They usually go home dirty.

Some of this will indeed be overcome by technology, but some of the art of scouting that was truly a marvel to see will now become lore like the horse cavalrymen of old.

Yasotay, can you speak to the below capability at all? As was assuming this was still the case..

"MultiPurpose Light Helicopter (MPLH) : Further modification of Kiowa Warrior; features include squatting landing gear, quick-folding rotor blades, horizontal stabiliser and tilting fin to allow helicopter to be transported in cargo aircraft and flown to cover 10 minutes after unloading from C-130. Later additions include cargo hook for up to 907kg (2,000 lb) slung load and fittings for external carriage of six outward-facing troop seats or two stretchers. All Kiowa Warriors have MPLH capability."
 
A age old question in aircraft design; how much extra space to put into an aircraft. Space adds volume and thus likely weight. For attack helicopters in the west the objective was to look at them as being purpose built tank killers with no extra volume for anything else. Very similar to the philosophy of building fighters, before they became fighter/bombers. Eastern designers(Russia really) looked at them as more of an Airborne Infantry Fighting Vehicle with a focus on combined arms operations. This debate can rage on unabated for years, and will likely do so. Interestingly the purpose built attack helicopter philosophical school seems to have taken accendency even in the east. Witness both Ka-52 and Mi-28. While Mi-28 does have some space available at the rear of the aircraft, from what I have seen of it, it does not look like a purpose built space for humans. More of a vestigial leftover from the design. Sure you can put a couple people in there and I would be one of them if my choice was that or capture. However adding ~400 pounds of people that far aft is going to make the aircraft center of gravity challenging if you have to do any maneuvering.

Having said that, the debate continues now in the west. If you look at the designs for the U.S.Army JMR/FVL at least two of them are showing multipurpose designs at this point. I for one will be surprised if the Army stays with this concept in the final effort. It will be to far out of the comfort zone for those who make the decisions.

As to Kosovo, as with many things about the whole Balkan debacle, much of it revolves around politics. Many of the pundits in DC both pro and con for intervention threw any question they could into the fray. Then there was internal division in the DoD with the USAF wanting to finally achieve the aviationist vision of winning a war through air power alone. Add limited access, aircrews with little or no training in mountains (the reason for the crash: settling with power), confused rules of engagement and command and control with the U.S. Army throwing artillery and a Corps headquarters in to the effort... It was a disaster ready to be made. Ironically three times helicopters flew into the supposed death trap of an integrated air defense to conduct CSAR. Those were not armored purpose built attack airframes.
 
Thank you for your insights sir..Would just throw again (other threads) that the entire family of FVL should focus on the armed transport as the main mission (if ya don't bring it ya ain't gonna have it) (gotta work for the troops and reduce immediate threats immediately). Unfortunately in a world where ya can't even afford to allow one to get shot down, defensive DEW (including a deep enough magazine) should also be major design concern.
 
yasotay said:
A age old question in aircraft design; how much extra space to put into an aircraft. Space adds volume and thus likely weight. For attack helicopters in the west the objective was to look at them as being purpose built tank killers with no extra volume for anything else. Very similar to the philosophy of building fighters, before they became fighter/bombers. Eastern designers(Russia really) looked at them as more of an Airborne Infantry Fighting Vehicle with a focus on combined arms operations. This debate can rage on unabated for years, and will likely do so. Interestingly the purpose built attack helicopter philosophical school seems to have taken accendency even in the east. Witness both Ka-52 and Mi-28. While Mi-28 does have some space available at the rear of the aircraft, from what I have seen of it, it does not look like a purpose built space for humans. More of a vestigial leftover from the design. Sure you can put a couple people in there and I would be one of them if my choice was that or capture. However adding ~400 pounds of people that far aft is going to make the aircraft center of gravity challenging if you have to do any maneuvering.

Having said that, the debate continues now in the west. If you look at the designs for the U.S.Army JMR/FVL at least two of them are showing multipurpose designs at this point. I for one will be surprised if the Army stays with this concept in the final effort. It will be to far out of the comfort zone for those who make the decisions.

As to Kosovo, as with many things about the whole Balkan debacle, much of it revolves around politics. Many of the pundits in DC both pro and con for intervention threw any question they could into the fray. Then there was internal division in the DoD with the USAF wanting to finally achieve the aviationist vision of winning a war through air power alone. Add limited access, aircrews with little or no training in mountains (the reason for the crash: settling with power), confused rules of engagement and command and control with the U.S. Army throwing artillery and a Corps headquarters in to the effort... It was a disaster ready to be made. Ironically three times helicopters flew into the supposed death trap of an integrated air defense to conduct CSAR. Those were not armored purpose built attack airframes.

so it was more to do with politics and the bane of force protection, and much less to do with the types of aircraft?
 
so it was more to do with politics and the bane of force protection, and much less to do with the types of aircraft?

That would be my take on it, yes. Remember that the notion of deep attack had yet to be executed in reality up to that point. Therefore nobody had any practical experience to go on. In a politically charged environment that was the US and NATO efforts, big jumps into the unknown were not well received.
 
yasotay said:
so it was more to do with politics and the bane of force protection, and much less to do with the types of aircraft?

That would be my take on it, yes. Remember that the notion of deep attack had yet to be executed in reality up to that point. Therefore nobody had any practical experience to go on. In a politically charged environment that was the US and NATO efforts, big jumps into the unknown were not well received.
Speaking only on vague memory of the AW&ST article and not at all to the politics. The proposal was for only two Apaches which then needed two escorts for safe fast CSAR and then an ESM bird for the whole gaggle and suddenly it just didn't make operational sense.. A scout/attack which can rescue its downed comrades if the other scout/attack is downed would have avoided this mess.
 
The mission called for Apaches to operate as part of the joint force. Neither the Army, nor the Air Force was really good at sharing at the time and the Army railed at the idea of their attack helicopters under control of the Joint Air Forces, probably fearing a roles and mission fight as well as being left out of the mission. The fact that Army Aviation fixed wing (electronic) reconnaissance aircraft had always been part of the overall mission, seemed not to count. In fairness the Air Forces planners and staffs had not ever planned or trained in earnest with attack helicopters. So an ad hoc method was developed when General Clark insisted (with a lot of pressure I'm sure) on Apaches being added to the force mix. What had been a plan for an Apache battalion became an Apache Task Force with Blackhawks for command and control and internal CSAR. Then the Army decided it needed MLRS to provide suppression of air defense fires directly to the Apaches. With all of this you now need a logistics organization for all of these. You also need a staff to coordinate the operations and airspace with Apaches and artillery flying around in that Allied airspace, so you need a Corps, tactical headquarters. These are my supposition as a bystander back in the USA.
It spiraled out of control. Not the U.S. Army's best day.

On the MPLH effort. Obviously the Army was looking for a means to make the OH-58 a more rapidly deployable helicopter like the special operations OH-6. In fact it may have been an effort to replace the OH-6 so the SOAR did not have to buy a non-standard aircraft. Big Army did not have a need for planks as they had no missions for that. Stretchers on the side were redundant as they already had MEDEVAC aircraft. They did actually make some of the OH-58 with the collapsing skids but their was two fundamental challenges in that you still had to take the mast mounted sight off and there was significant concern about the crash safety of the collapsible skids. While you could fly the aircraft with without the MMS you carried around a lot of weight for what was already an overweight scout. I do not think the cargo hook made it to the aircraft because the it really could not carry a meaningful load and was not worth the expense. Also recall that the OH-58 was to be replaced by the RAH-66 so the extra funding for an aircraft that was to go out of inventory was philosophically "money tossed". All that came of the program was the folding blades and the stabilizers as that did let you pack more OH-58 into cargo aircraft or ships.
There are others who might have better insights into this story because I was busy actually flying at the time and my suppositions are from discussions over coffee and beer, both of which are notoriously full of rumor.
 
..could have guessed, the age old JFACC and ATO problem neither of which are likely, even now, Joint.. Likewise, this issues emphasizes the 'carry one's own firepower as it won't be coming from anywhere else' paradigm mentioned. Clearly another thread, but again this problem also speaks to the need for breaking the fixed wing prohibition and bringing the A-10 into the Army. JSF will not be Joint when it comes to the Army nor will there be enough to Strike for the Army likely there will only be enough to fight. ..won't get into an opinion on the last attribute.

On MPLH, would express that likely supported Cdrs as well as Aviators would always prefer multipurpose capability which is one reason MH-6 and MH-60s are in effect multipurpose birds..understanding the cost vs capability problem remains.
 
Ok, AW&ST says the ability of a scout helio to hover at '6k' in 95f' was part of the 20% which the UAV-Apache team can not accomplish..
Not sure if that requirement still makes sense w/ current technology though.. that is if the UAS being used weren't Model A designs..
 
jsport said:
Ok, AW&ST says the ability of a scout helio to hover at '6k' in 95f' was part of the 20% which the UAV-Apache team can not accomplish..
Not sure if that requirement still makes sense w/ current technology though.. that is if the UAS being used weren't Model A designs..
While an Army Grey Eagle, may have no issue staying at those altitudes, the smaller UAS are very restricted in their flight envelopes up there. The other issue with fixed wing is of course they don't stay in one place (at least not while flying). There may be some rotorcraft UAS that can operate at a hover or low and slow at those altitudes but none of them are in the fleet. Of course the OH-58D was also very restricted at higher altitudes, this being one of the reasons the Army was looking for a more powerful replacement. AH-64 can go to the altitude, but do to its weight it is a wallowing pig at those altitudes. Many a beer story about how close to the edge Apaches were at those altitudes and having to be very careful with the controls.
 
yasotay said:
jsport said:
Ok, AW&ST says the ability of a scout helio to hover at '6k' in 95f' was part of the 20% which the UAV-Apache team can not accomplish..
Not sure if that requirement still makes sense w/ current technology though.. that is if the UAS being used weren't Model A designs..
While an Army Grey Eagle, may have no issue staying at those altitudes, the smaller UAS are very restricted in their flight envelopes up there. The other issue with fixed wing is of course they don't stay in one place (at least not while flying). There may be some rotorcraft UAS that can operate at a hover or low and slow at those altitudes but none of them are in the fleet. Of course the OH-58D was also very restricted at higher altitudes, this being one of the reasons the Army was looking for a more powerful replacement. AH-64 can go to the altitude, but do to its weight it is a wallowing pig at those altitudes. Many a beer story about how close to the edge Apaches were at those altitudes and having to be very careful with the controls.
Small turret technology can allow virtual dwell. Would again emphasize that current tube and wing (model A ) designs which are also not well designed from almost all perspectives are the reason in service small UAS can't do the job. Grey Eagles and even Shadows are low density assets and are clay pigeons in a real battlefield. Small rotor craft scout UAS can't carry enough energy for any useful dwell. The whole beating the air into submission versus actually flying..and w/ speed and maneuver. This is not to mention the loud acoustic signature even for the smallest of rotor designs.. Great video of Turkish police taking down a quad rotor w. one shot at the summer Istanbul protests.
 
VTOLicious said:
I think this was posted in another thread before!
U.S. Army Roadmap for UAS 2010-2035
http://www.rucker.army.mil/usaace/uas/US%20Army%20UAS%20RoadMap%202010%202035.pdf

...teaser attached ;)

BR Michael
have skimmed before.. Think 2025 is way early for Nanos to make any practical sense.. If you can store enough energy on a nano for any useful endurance you might as well have a hand thrown SUAS w/ DEW. ..Rooms searched by armed UGS not expensive swatable bugs.
 
It seems that the new joint usage of UAVs & Apaches for scouting may have hit another stumbling block....funding. :mad:
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140201/DEFREG02/302010027/Scout-Mission-Compromised-by-Funding-Cut

I can't believe they've bought 1821 of the Encrypted digital data links but don't have the cash to ******* install them....gah, it ticks me off.
 
Internal budget free fall will make the next few years chaotic for all of the services. Ironically everyone but the people who actually have to do the mission think having manned platforms control unmanned think it a wonderful idea. There won't be a lot of disappointment in the ranks of Apache crews if they don't have to do the mission.
 
until better UASs are in the works... the current are more anchor than enablers..
not convinced given all the propreitary HW/SW autopilots, links etc. that even the current scheme makes any sense anyway..
likewise never have seen that helicopter borne UAV pilots really makes sense .. heard of all sorts of problems. Single HK mission like the Ferret missile maybe others unlikely.
Until PMs don't spend all there time finding a way to be hired by the company they are supposed to assessing... There is ticked off.
 
I think once they figure out how to make it possible for aircrew to talk to unmanned aircraft (not like the theatrics of the movie Stealth) with basic commands (" go to waypoint 1") there will be less resistance to manned aircraft controlling unmanned ones.
 
yasotay said:
I think once they figure out how to make it possible for aircrew to talk to unmanned aircraft (not like the theatrics of the movie Stealth) with basic commands (" go to waypoint 1") there will be less resistance to manned aircraft controlling unmanned ones.
no qualms about pilots being in the routing mix..but becoming ISR pilots...
 
Looks like we missed this news back in March.

"Armed Aerial Scout still valid requirement, Army says"
March 19, 2015
by C. Todd Lopez

Source:
http://www.army.mil/article/144918/Armed_Aerial_Scout_still_valid_requirement__Army_says/

WASHINGTON (March 19, 2015) -- Despite cancelling its quest for an Armed Aerial Scout, or AAS, aircraft - a replacement for the OH-58 Kiowa - an Army leader told Congress there is still a valid need for that type of aircraft.

During a March 19 hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, subcommittee on tactical air and land forces, Maj. Gen. Michael D. Lundy, commander of the U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence, said the Army still considers AAS a valid requirement.

"We still have a valid requirement for Armed Aerial Scout. That has not changed," he said. "We made a fiscal decision, based on the original 40-percent cuts that came into the aviation modernization portfolio."

Right now the Army plans to divest itself of the OH-58 Kiowa aircraft, which had performed the armed reconnaissance helicopter mission. The Army deemed it too expensive to maintain the aircraft or upgrade it for the AAS mission through a Service Life Extension Program. Also too expensive was a replacement aircraft.

The Army now plans to use AH-64 Apache aircraft teamed with unmanned aerial systems to fill the role. But Lundy said that isn't the end of the Army's quest for a new AAS aircraft.

"Really where we are taking that now is, as we go into Future Vertical Lift [FVL]- what is going to be the armored reconnaissance capability that we have in FVL? We are doing a number of analyses of alternatives associated with the armored reconnaissance variant. We've got the requirement already clearly identified for a conventional aircraft right now. We are looking again at FVL as being that next iteration of the armed scout," Lundy told lawmakers. "If something materializes between now and then we are going to remain agile enough we can look at it. It is a valid requirement. But we are certainly going to be dependent on the fiscal constraints that we have."
 

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