Alternative RAF, 1936-41?

[alertken]

Hi Desertfox

Westland can make 1000 Spitfires, each with 2 cannons, for the same investment of 1000 Merlins and 2000 cannons.

Question is, how good could Merlin Whirldwinds be in the anti-bomber role. That massed cannon firepower would have made short work of any German bomber, and the Whirlwinds would likely be fast enough to avoid the escorts, unlike the Me110s.

Considering how well the Hurricanes did despite their low speed, I'd think even the Kestrel Whirlwind if used in numbers during the Battle of Britain would have made quite an impact.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[alertken]

Peregrine.

The decisionmaker was Air Member for Devt & Prodn AM Sir Wilfrid Freeman, to whom in the Air Ministry Directors reported, of Air R&D, of Aircraft, Engine, Component Prodn. All since 11/35 had been putting together the conversion of non-Aero engineering to Aero. Never forget that Aero design parents, like Westland, Supermarine, were business minnows and that high volume engineering prodn experience was in Auro et al. In WW1 most a/c had been made by such folk and we were organising doing it over again.

Freeman had thought to use his stupendous investment in Castle Bromwich Aircraft Factory for Whirlwind. He changed his mind for Spitfire II. Many factors, inc BSA up and running on .303 Browning.

I suggest we thank his shade.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

In Dec 1918 Coastal Area/10 Group RAF (I’m not clear about its exact designation then) had about 700 aircraft plus airships across more than 70 bases. It was, AIUI, reduced to a single shore based flying boat squadron by 1923.

My source is: National Archives file AIR41.45 - R.A.F. Narrative, The RAF in Maritime War, The Atlantic and Home Waters, The Prelude, April 1918 to September 1939 by the Air Historical Branch of the Air Ministry.

According to Appendix IV - R.A.F. Strength Summary - 1918 to 1939 - The Number of Effective R.A.F. Squadrons and Flights...

In November 1918 the R.A.F. had a total of 193 squadrons and 15 flights of which:

58 squadrons and 7 flights had maritime aircraft.​

43 squadrons and 7 flights were at home.​

15 squadrons were overseas.​

​

The above included 6 squadrons with ship borne aircraft and they were all based at home.​

​

135 squadrons and 8 flights of fighters, bombers and army co-operation aircraft.​

18 squadrons were at home.​

117 squadrons and 8 flights were overseas.​

If the 15 flights were the equivalent to 7½ squadrons the Grand Total of 193 squadrons and 15 flights was the equivalent of 200½ squadrons. This included the equivalent of 61½ maritime squadrons which was 30.67% of the Grand Total.

In April 1923 the R.A.F. had a total of 34 squadrons and 1 flight of which:

6 squadrons and 1 flight had maritime aircraft.​

5 squadrons were at home.​

1 squadron and 1 flight were overseas.​

​

The above included 4 squadrons and 1 flight of ship borne aircraft. The 4 squadrons were at home and the flight was overseas. Therefore there were only 2 squadrons of shore based maritime aircraft.​

​

28 squadrons of fighters, bombers and army co-operation aircraft.​

6 squadrons at home.​

22 squadrons overseas.​

If the single flight was the equivalent of half a squadron then the Grand Total of 34 squadrons and 1 flight was the equivalent of 34½ squadrons. This included the equivalent of 6½ maritime squadrons which were 18.84% of the Grand Total.

• The Grand Total of 34½ squadrons at April 1923 was 17.21% of the Grand Total of 200½ at November 1918.
• The 6½ maritime squadrons at April 1923 were 10.57% of the 61½ maritime squadrons at November 1918.
• The 28 fighter, bomber and army co-operation squadrons at April 1923 were 20.14% of the equivalent of 139 fighter, bomber and army co-operation squadrons at November 1918.

So yes the Maritime R.A.F. had suffered disproportionately.

• The shore based element of the Maritime R.A.F. suffered worst of all because it had been reduced from the equivalent of 55½ squadrons in November 1918 to 2 squadrons in April 1923.
  • They were 27.68% of the Grand Total in November 1918 and 5.80% of the Grand Total in April 1923.
  • The 2 squadrons that existed in April 1923 were only 3.60% of the 55½ squadrons that existed in November 1918.
• On the other hand the ship based element of the Maritime R.A.F. had only been reduced from 6 squadrons to the equivalent of 4½ squadrons.
  • They were 2.99% of the Grand Total in November 1918 and 13.04% of the Grand Total at April 1923.
  • The 4½ squadrons that existed in April 1923 were 75.00% of the 6 squadrons that existed in November 1918.

If the Maritime R.A.F. had been reduced in proportion to the rest of the Service there would have been the equivalent of 13 squadrons (instead of 6½) out of a Grand Total of 41 squadrons (instead of 34½) and most of the 6½ extra maritime squadrons would have been shore based.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The strength of British air personnel in August 1914 was 276 officers and 1,797 men which produced a total of 2,073 all ranks.

• 146 officers and 1,097 other ranks belonged to the Army
• 130 officers and 700 other ranks belonged to the Navy.

That's 1,243 all ranks for the Army and 830 all ranks for the Navy which works out as 60% Army and 40% Navy.

In November 1918 the total was 291,175 (which consisted of 27,333 officers, 16,681 cadets and N.C.O.s under instruction and 247,161 N.C.O.s & men) which was 140½ times more than the total in August 1914.

Source: Appendix XXXV Strength of British Air Personnel August 1914 and November 1918 on Page 160 of The War in the Air (Being the Story of the part played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force) Appendices by H.A. Jones.

The numbers on the strength of the active force (exclusive of officers and men serving in India) was:

• 31,176 all ranks in the Air Estimates 1922-23 - which was 10.71% of the total in November 1918.
• 33,000 all ranks in the Air Estimates 1923-24 - which was 11.33% of the total in November 1918.

Source: The Flight Archive

Where did all those officers go? The RAF didn’t want them. The RN didn’t want them. (Or at least most of them). So it must have been back to civilian life for the vast majority.

That paragraph applied to the ex-Naval officers in the RAF at the end of World War One. The following paragraph could have been written about the ex-Army officers.

Where did all those officers go? The RAF didn’t want them. The Army didn’t want them. (Or at least most of them). So it must have been back to civilian life for the vast majority.

So very few ex-RNAS left to rise up through the RAF ranks inter-war.

And very few ex-RFC were left to rise up the RAF ranks inter-war as well.

Quote from Post 194 by me which I wrote in reply to part of Post 167 by @EwenS...

...the RNAS and RFC were of roughly comparable size on 1 April 1918 on formation of the RAF...

The RFC was nearly 3 times larger than the RNAS.

The RFC had 144,078 officers and men in March 1918, whereas the RNAS had 55,066 officers and men at 15th March 1918.

Therefore, in terms of personnel 72% of the RAF at 1st April 1918 was ex-RFC and 28% was ex-RNAS.

I should have added that:

• The 144,078 officers and men in the RFC included 18,286 officers, and...
• The 55,066 officers and men in the RNAS included 5,378 officers.

That's a total of 23,664 officers of which 22.73% were RNAS.

In Post 161 @xv107 wrote:

These are most of the senior RAF officers between 1919 and 1939 - Group commanders, Area Commanders, staff College, Air Council, etc holding rank of Air Cdre or higher on 3 Sept 39

There were 55 names in the list. 42 were ex-Army and 13 were ex-Navy & Marines. That's 76.36% ex-Army and 23.64% ex-Navy & Marines.

So about a quarter of the RAF's officers in April 1918 were ex-RNAS and about a quarter RAF's "top brass" at 3rd September 1939 were ex-RNAS.

 

[riggerrob]

Peregrine.

The decisionmaker was Air Member for Devt & Prodn AM Sir Wilfrid Freeman, to whom in the Air Ministry Directors reported, of Air R&D, of Aircraft, Engine, Component Prodn. All since 11/35 had been putting together the conversion of non-Aero engineering to Aero. Never forget that Aero design parents, like Westland, Supermarine, were business minnows and that high volume engineering prodn experience was in Auro et al. In WW1 most a/c had been made by such folk and we were organising doing it over again.

Freeman had thought to use his stupendous investment in Castle Bromwich Aircraft Factory for Whirlwind. He changed his mind for Spitfire II. Many factors, inc BSA up and running on .303 Browning.

I suggest we thank his shade.

What if Birmingham Small Arms also got patterns to build Browning .50 caliber heavy machine guns?

 

[riggerrob]

Actually I would've kept the Whirlwind, swapping the RR Peregrines for the RR Merlin engines. It was a good ground attack aircraft and fighter with four 20mm cannon that suffered from a dud engine.

What kind of numbers we're talking for the Merlin Whirly? 200, 500, 1000, more?

I believe that the only reason that .303 was chosen was because of the extensive supply of .303 ammo left over from WW1. IMHO the ,303 round was inadequate. In actual fact .50 calibre would have been far better and so it was proven later in the war. Six .50 cal guns would've been more than adequate.

British will probaby want to have the LMG of any type in their caliber?
I'm not against the .50, just that a good 20mm is better. The .50s of 1936 were not as good as the ones from 1942/43/44.

Secondly, the Air Ministry strengthens its acquisition structures and is more specific in its requirement standards. So it tells the manufactures what it wants, what it expects in return and if the product isn't up to the required standard the company doesn't get paid, and it mightn't get any future work. This means that the RAF and Air Ministry have to be up with the play about what is happening in the aviation world everywhere, and not sitting upon their laurels under the misconception that British aviation technology was the most advanced - it wasn't.

That was the case historically - in the wast % of cases the companies delivered exactly what was asked from. It was Air Ministry's good decision to go with Hurricane, Spitfire or Wellington, as much as it was AM's fault to specify and buy Gladiator and Defiant (thus also dooming the Roc), or to buy so many Battles, or to specify both Botha (that was indeed botched by Blackburn) and Beaufort.

In the real world Fighter Command as short of Hurricanes and Spitfires and it got to the point where AM Dowdling had to request that the PM stop promising the French more RAF fighters. However the biggest problem during the BoB was trained pilots and that could be mitigated by increasing the size of the University Sqns, RAFR and RAFVR from 1935. Also the Empire Air Training Scheme could've been established say in 1936 / 37 with it easily ramped up a lot quicker when war broke out in 1939. This would've have begun the RAF an ample supply of trained aircrew by the time the BoB started.

Yes, having more trained pilots is a boon.
Having Air Ministry ordering more Hurricanes instead of Gladiator, no Defiants (for more Spitfires), 500-700 Battles instead of 2100 = thousands more of useful fighters.

For the RAAF, RCAF, RNZAF and SAAF, I would be strongly suggesting that UK govt strongly suggest to the four Dominion governments that they acquire Curtiss P-40 Warhawks, Douglas A-20 Havocs, North American B-25 Mitchells, and Consolidated PBY-5 Catalinas from the US in the short - medium term to build up their air forces. They could later acquire the North American P-51 Mustang and Consolidated B-24 Liberator when they becomes available. Later the Canadians and Australians could and would licence build British aircraft. This keeps all UK production for the RAF without having to worry about Dominion requirements. Also RAF requirements have to take priority over any thoughts of exports.

Dominons were already focusing on US-made aircraft, despite the London 1st objecting that while promissing a lot, and later barely offering help to kick-start the domestic aero industry. RAF's job was not taking care of dominion's aircraft anyway.

Dominions were "priority last" in the RAF's planning.
Canadian "shadow factories" complained about incomplete drawings and tooling. Truth be told, British factories were also struggling to tool-up for the war effort. In one amusing case, RAF engineering officers rejected the first batch of Canadian-built Lancaster bombers ... upon further investigation, they had been built precisely to an old set of drawings.

RCAF technicians complained about the lack of bolts for Avro Ansons, Fairey Battles, shipped over at the start of the war. It seems that RAF technicians were not in the habit of re-using bolts, so simply discarded them when dismantling Ansons for shipping. They just "assumed" that British-pattern hardware was readily available in the colonies.
One wonders if those RAF technicians were even told that the airplanes were destined for the colonies.

In a similar gaff, Harvards re-assembled in South Africa eventually developed cracks (post 2000) because they lacked a few wing attach bolts. The task of re-assembling Harvards was left to black technicians, who may or may not have been taught the finer points of airplane assembly. There is also the nagging question of whether those Harvards were shipped with enough bolts to complete assembly???????

 

[PMN1]

is there any chance of the Napier Dagger being reliable?

 

[tomo pauk]

is there any chance of the Napier Dagger being reliable?

Improve cooling? Eg. like D-H did with their Gipsy V12?
Not installing it on slow aircraft in the 1st place, so the air stream goes faster?
Redesign it for water cooling?

 

[lancer21]

Seeing this, i'll add just a small comment. Imo the air cooled inline was a dead end. Same as the whole sleeve valve thing, more trouble that's it worth. Merlin, Griffon, as well as major US, german, japanese etc engines did prefectly fine without. The time and efforts invested and spent to make the sleeve valve work would have better used to get more power earlier.

Also, there was a lot of duplication/redundant engines, Tiger vs Bristol radials, Sabre vs Vulture, Peregrine and other related engines, that useless Dagger, this just off the top of my head, i'm sure there are more.

 

[HoHun]

Hi Lancer,

Seeing this, i'll add just a small comment. Imo the air cooled inline was a dead end. Same as the whole sleeve valve thing, more trouble that's it worth. Merlin, Griffon, as well as major US, german, japanese etc engines did prefectly fine without.

I would argue that the Argus As 411 V12 was in fact a reliable, useful and quite successful engine, but as it didn't have anywhere near the power of the "major" engines, we're probably not even in disagreement there The As 412 as its H24 descendant might have been the better counterpart to the Dagger, and as the H24 Argus didn't even make it into series production, this maybe actually confirms your point.

Another way of looking at it perhaps would be that there was a maximum sensible number of moving parts per HP of power outoput, with the Dagger and the As 412 being on the "too many" side of the criterion ;-)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[PMN1]

Is there any space for the Culverin or other diesel engine?

 

[PMN1]

Hi Lancer,

Seeing this, i'll add just a small comment. Imo the air cooled inline was a dead end. Same as the whole sleeve valve thing, more trouble that's it worth. Merlin, Griffon, as well as major US, german, japanese etc engines did prefectly fine without.

I would argue that the Argus As 411 V12 was in fact a reliable, useful and quite successful engine, but as it didn't have anywhere near the power of the "major" engines, we're probably not even in disagreement there The As 412 as its H24 descendant might have been the better counterpart to the Dagger, and as the H24 Argus didn't even make it into series production, this maybe actually confirms your point.

Another way of looking at it perhaps would be that there was a maximum sensible number of moving parts per HP of power outoput, with the Dagger and the As 412 being on the "too many" side of the criterion ;-)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

The Exe is said to have been reliable in service, not that there were many examples to go by of course.

 

[JWilly]

What if Birmingham Small Arms also got patterns to build Browning .50 caliber heavy machine guns?

As an alternative to negotiating that with Colt in USA, with the potential complications of USA neutrality, it might have been possible to negotiate with Fabrique Nationale in Herstal, Belgium...as they had a primary (sub-licensable) license from Browning for all of his military weapon designs, and might have been convinced to establish a British-located shared-responsibility factory, contributing the IP, licenses, engineers, and the initial tooling while the British side contributed the land-bricks-and-mortar, the production workforce, the supply chain and the setup capital.

Certainly it would have been a boon to the Allied war effort if FN's expertise hadn't been dissipated and/or lost to the Germans in 1940, because a second factory complex had been available (in Britain, or alternately in southern France) to which the Belgian engineers could evacuate.

Britain might also have considered whether, instead of following the American lead with 12.7mm guns, they might be better off going with the FN Herstal 13.2mm variant, with the same external dimensions and ammo feed arrangements but with HEI/HEI-T shells available instead of only ball and AP/AP-T.

 

[Pepe Rezende]

Sooo...
- No Gladiators, 500 Gloster Hurricanes instead
- Their Merlins provided by screwing half of the Defiants (532)
- the other half of Defiants (532) can live their OTL lives, with or without a turret
- Over 2100 Battles (easier to divide that number than 2200) 700 are produced as bomber but up to 1400 could be turned into land-based Fulmars

So the RAF would end (fighters) with
- 532 less Defiants (not a great loss)
- no Gladiators (yet only 247 Squadron and 239 Squadron fought in the BoB)
- 500 more Hurricanes
- 1400 Fulmars

Hence 1400 more fighters ?
(the lost Defiants somewhat cancel - in raw number only, obviously - the Hurricanes)

EDIT - Honey, I have de-turreted the Defiant (from Wikipedia). Looks much, much better like this. Except it has no armement left, damn it. Should have pasted the machine guns into the wings !

There was a de-turreted Defiant proposal with 12 .303 Browning machine guns at the wings. In my opinion, Boulton-Paul could install a long range fuel tank in place of turret to get an early escort fighter, Without the turret, the Defiant was a good plane, faster than the Hurricane, a little slower than the Spitfire, and very manoeuvrable.

 

[Pepe Rezende]

Sooo...
- No Gladiators, 500 Gloster Hurricanes instead
- Their Merlins provided by screwing half of the Defiants (532)
- the other half of Defiants (532) can live their OTL lives, with or without a turret
- Over 2100 Battles (easier to divide that number than 2200) 700 are produced as bomber but up to 1400 could be turned into land-based Fulmars

So the RAF would end (fighters) with
- 532 less Defiants (not a great loss)
- no Gladiators (yet only 247 Squadron and 239 Squadron fought in the BoB)
- 500 more Hurricanes
- 1400 Fulmars

Hence 1400 more fighters ?
(the lost Defiants somewhat cancel - in raw number only, obviously - the Hurricanes)

EDIT - Honey, I have de-turreted the Defiant (from Wikipedia). Looks much, much better like this. Except it has no armement left, damn it. Should have pasted the machine guns into the wings !

About the Gladiators, they were comanded before the war as a stop gap fighter. They did a good job at the Med Theatre. Gloster had a good monoplane fighter proposal the F5/34, almost a British Zero (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gloster_F.5/34). About Whirlwind, with Taurus engines it would be a fantastic fighter. Gloster also had a twin engine fighter proposal that could be a fantastic night fighter (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gloster_F.9/37).

 

[Pepe Rezende]

About British bomber fleet, after Mosquito appearance, I would kept only one heavy bomber: the Lancaster, because of its large bomb bay and bomb load. The Mosquito would substituted all other heavies to did precision attacks instead of night carpet bombardments against civil population.

 

[alertken]

Mossie, 2 or 3-man crew, vice Heavies - much cheaper to build and operate. No brainer, so why did we wait into 1942 before ordering many multi-role balsa bombers? It was disparaged as Freeman's Folly when 50 were ordered 1/40, and then only for PR.

AM Freeman was Father of the Heavy, went on 11/40 as VCAS to implement Heavy deployment. So he very well knew both their potential and problems...which included developing skills in teams of 7 youngsters who could not drive on the road (very few Brits could in 1939). He had problems enough in training for night flying (as he realised he must after early, savage Mediums losses): to train for low level would delay/reduce output of (navs+) pilots - already causing single-pilot crewing of Heavies. The Unarmed (low-level) Speed Bomber was counter-intuitive.

Those blessed with hindsight, suggesting more balsa sooner would have delivered precision damage sooner, overlook the depth and strength of Germany's Defences of 1943, early 1944: daylight low level (Mk.I eyeball could not do nocturnal low level) would have been a stirring Mission until, OTL, Defences were eroded by the weight of the Combined Bomber Offensive, 1943 into 1944, before diversion to support Overlord. Those spectacular precision Missions would have suffered more in 1943 than in early 1945.

Freeman found a way to cascade Mossies without reducing output of Heavies: carpenters + many Merlins.

 

[zen]

Sooo...
- No Gladiators, 500 Gloster Hurricanes instead
- Their Merlins provided by screwing half of the Defiants (532)
- the other half of Defiants (532) can live their OTL lives, with or without a turret
- Over 2100 Battles (easier to divide that number than 2200) 700 are produced as bomber but up to 1400 could be turned into land-based Fulmars

So the RAF would end (fighters) with
- 532 less Defiants (not a great loss)
- no Gladiators (yet only 247 Squadron and 239 Squadron fought in the BoB)
- 500 more Hurricanes
- 1400 Fulmars

Hence 1400 more fighters ?
(the lost Defiants somewhat cancel - in raw number only, obviously - the Hurricanes)

EDIT - Honey, I have de-turreted the Defiant (from Wikipedia). Looks much, much better like this. Except it has no armement left, damn it. Should have pasted the machine guns into the wings !

There was a de-turreted Defiant proposal with 12 .303 Browning machine guns at the wings. In my opinion, Boulton-Paul could install a long range fuel tank in place of turret to get an early escort fighter, Without the turret, the Defiant was a good plane, faster than the Hurricane, a little slower than the Spitfire, and very manoeuvrable.

Let's add that if one needed a two seater, the Defiant could retain that even without the turret.

 

[Pepe Rezende]

My RAF in 1939:

Fighters: Hurricanes and Spitfires for Home Theatre. Taurus engined Glosters F.5/34 as an alternative to not rely only on Merlins;
Escort Fighters: Defiants (without turret and more fuel);
Night Fighter: Taurus engined F.5/37;
Fighter Bombers: Taurus engined Whirlwinds;
Bomber: Wellingtons.

 

[tomo pauk]

My RAF in 1939:

Fighters: Hurricane, Spitfire
Escort fighter: Spitfire
Night fighter: Merlin-powered F.9/37
Fast bomber: early Mosquito
Heavy bomber: A-W Ensign lookalike, powered by Pegasus engines

Produced by:
Hurricane: Hawker, Gloster
Spitfire: Supermarine, Vickers, Boulton-Paul, Westland
Merlinized F.9/37: Austin, Blackburn
Mosquito: De Havilland
Heavy bomber: A-W, Handley-Page, Fairey

 

[lancer21]

Hi Lancer,

Seeing this, i'll add just a small comment. Imo the air cooled inline was a dead end. Same as the whole sleeve valve thing, more trouble that's it worth. Merlin, Griffon, as well as major US, german, japanese etc engines did prefectly fine without.

I would argue that the Argus As 411 V12 was in fact a reliable, useful and quite successful engine, but as it didn't have anywhere near the power of the "major" engines, we're probably not even in disagreement there The As 412 as its H24 descendant might have been the better counterpart to the Dagger, and as the H24 Argus didn't even make it into series production, this maybe actually confirms your point.

Another way of looking at it perhaps would be that there was a maximum sensible number of moving parts per HP of power outoput, with the Dagger and the As 412 being on the "too many" side of the criterion ;-)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

Hi HoHun,

It does seem that much beyond the size and power of the As-410 there wasn't any other successful air cooled inline that i know of, so about 600 HP and under 20 litre displacement looks like the upper limit. Must have to do with cooling/heat dissipation etc., the bigger the engine the harder to cool the rear cylinders (not that i'm an engine expert like others here, but it makes sense).

They're fine for trainers and generally low powered applications, but that's about it. Anything larger/more powerful, for example taking the italian IF Delta which was 26 litres and 750HP or so was a reliability nightmare, as i understand the thing kept overheating and catching fire. The IF Zeta 24 cylinder was hopeless in every respect.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

So far this thread has mainly been build aircraft X instead of aircraft Y and the rest has been about engines & gun armament. I want to widen the discussion to electronics, i.e. radar and night navigation aids.

The notes that I made from the copy of the British official history of the Design & Development of Weapons contains this paragraph,

Priority was given to the Chain Home type warning radar over other types like Airborne Interception. This was mainly because of lack of money which with more foresight could have been provided. However, in the 66 months from the first demonstration to the start of the Battle of Britain progress had been remarkable.

They had the extra money and we have the foresight.

• I think priority should be given to Airborne Interception & Ground Controlled Interception radars for the RAF and Gun Laying & Searchlight Control radars for the British Army.
• The goal should be for the AI Mk IV, GCI network, GL Mk II & SLC to enter service a year earlier than they did in the "Real World" which means they'd be in large-scale service at the beginning of the Blitz.
• However, as RAF Fighter Command and the British Army's Anti-Aircraft Command didn't become effective at night until the last 6 weeks of the Blitz (i.e. from the beginning of April 1941 to the end of May 1941) in the "Real World" brining those improvements forward by 6 months would make a considerable difference.
• As we have hindsight second priority for these systems should be given to Malta. That is so that on 10.06.40 there's a GCI station to complement the CH radar station & fighter sector station and the AA guns & searchlights on the Island have GL Mk II & SLC radars to make them more effective at night.

In the "Real World" the Luftwaffe had "Knickebein" in service at the start of the War. It also had the pathfinder unit LN.100 formed on 26.08.38 (but its lineage stretched back to 01.10.35). It would be renamed KGr.100 on 18.11.39 and expanded into KG100 on 15.12.41. The next navigation aid "X-Gerät" was being tested by the end of 1939 and was in service early enough to be used in the raid on Coventry and then came "Y-Gerät".

The RAF was far behind the Luftwaffe in this technology. According to the British official history on the Strategic Bombing Offensive against Germany.

• Development of "G" also known as "Gee" didn't begin until 1941. The first trials were in July 1941, the first operational use was on 12.08.41 and in August 1942 80% of Bomber Command's operational force had it, but it was also when the Luftwaffe started to jam it. The whole operational force had it in January 1941 and in March 1943 "Gee Mk II" with anti-jamming devices was fitted to 60% of the force.
• Development of "H" began in July 1942, service trials began in June 1943, the first operational use was on 03.11.43 and it was used in conjunction with "Gee" as "G-H".
• Development of "Oboe" began in 1940 with the intention of having it operational by July 1942, but it wasn't available until December 1942. To get "Oboe Mk I" into service deployment of the centimetric & jamming-resistant "Oboes Mk II & III" and "Repeater Oboe" had to be delayed. "Oboe Mk II" became operational in October 1943 and "Oboe Mk III" became operational in April 1944.
• Approval wasn't given to adapting the centimetric Air to Surface Vessel (ASV) radar to BN (later H2S) radar until September 1941 and the first operational use was in January 1943.

However, the same source also said.

• "Gee" was first proposed in 1938 which was three years before development began in the "Real World". Does that mean that had development begun immediately that IOC would have been in August 1938 (in time for the Munich Crisis) and that 80% of Bomber Command's operational force would have had it August 1939 and 100% by January 1940? One of "Gee's" limitations was its short range. However, it wouldn't be as bad in this "version of history" as "Gee" transmitters could be installed in France in September 1939 which would allow Bomber Command to bomb with greater accuracy further into Germany.
• "H" was first proposed in June 1940 which was two years before development began in the "Real World". Does that mean that in this "version of history" service trials could be advanced to June 1941 and the first operational use to 03.11.41?
• If there was a delay between the first proposal for "Oboe" and the start of its development, by source doesn't say so.
• The requirement for a H2S-type radar was stated as early as 1938. This followed the AI trials of 1936-37 with a Heyford bomber. The trials for AI purposes were unsatisfactory but it did show the difference between the countryside and built up areas. However, development of Blind Navigation (BN) radar was not proceeded with due to the priority given to air defence and as already stated the go ahead to adapt the centimetric ASV wasn't given until September 1941. If it was given in September 1938 in this "version of history" would the first operational use have been in January 1940? However, if it did the H2S Mk I radar of this "version of history" would have to use a metric rather than the 10 cm centimetric wavelength because the development of centimetric radar wasn't far enough advanced in the late 1930s to allow that.

 

[alertken]

NOM: yours is a truly tantalising Whiff....thanks for bringing it forward.
This what actually happened after Air Ministry's Telecommunicatons Research Establishment extracted R&D funds to move its experiments into UK radio industry...which broadly was after Austrian Anschluss, so 4/38, when we also imposed Compulsion, converting Auto et al to Munitions, so drastically reducing our ability to earn $ by export of manufactures.

A.M./TRE introduced (A.E.I)Metro-Vickers Electrical Co. (transmitter) and A.C.Cossor (receiver) to produce Chain Home air defence radar (in 1940) “the only firms who knew the radar secret” Postan/Weapons,P383. MV then took Gun Laying radar GL.Mk.I (transmitter), to which MAP added Ferranti Ltd (receiver) and (E.M.I.) the Gramophone Co.Ltd; then for G.L.Mk.II, (A.E.I/)B.T.H.Ltd.

As more EW kit emerged other radio firms were added: Dynatron Radio Ltd: (Gee nav.eqpt.);
E.K.Cole Ltd: Airborne Intercept radar AI.Mk.IV;
Ferranti: (IFF) Identification Friend or Foe Mk.II;
H2S Mk II nav/ASV Mk.III detection Systems: EMI Ltd. (electrical unit; Prime), M-V (elec' scanner; BTH radar), Nash&Thompson (hydraulic scanner);
Murphy Radio, Pye Radio, Standard Tel&Cable Co (US ITT).
RAE gyro gunsight was assigned,1940: Mk.I: Elliott Bros.(London)Ltd/Lewisham - instrument makers; Mk.II: (Hall Tel. Accessories Ltd/ Glasgow, then) Ferranti/('43 Edinburgh), and Reyrolle/Newcastle.

Most of this innovation was taken by A.M Chief Scientific Advisor Prof Sir H.Tizard to US, 9/40: today, his Mission is known for cavity magnetron, gas turbines, and such progress as we had then made on matters atomic. But it was far more, creating the Systems Houses that now Rule, OK!
Most of these UK firms in 1946 turned straight back to high-volume consumer/general industrial products - at Ministers' instruction, as a scarce source of export $. Most of the US firms that absorbed, improved and produced this UK-origin kit were funded into (GW), done in parallel with their return to civil products.

So: your Whiff is...UK Radio compulsion in 1936-ish. I do not know whether the techno-innovations that did produce kit in 1940/41 could have been sufficiently mature to do so earlier (exemplar: reaction thrust: RAE/Griffith there earlier than Ohain/Whittle...without the metallurgy base). You well make the point that Germany did well, then. But may I divert the Whiff into...UK, like US, putting (GW) Prime roles into Radio firms, not airframers - who nearly always put this disdained work into B Teams.

​

 

[PMN1]

Hi Lancer,

Seeing this, i'll add just a small comment. Imo the air cooled inline was a dead end. Same as the whole sleeve valve thing, more trouble that's it worth. Merlin, Griffon, as well as major US, german, japanese etc engines did prefectly fine without.

I would argue that the Argus As 411 V12 was in fact a reliable, useful and quite successful engine, but as it didn't have anywhere near the power of the "major" engines, we're probably not even in disagreement there The As 412 as its H24 descendant might have been the better counterpart to the Dagger, and as the H24 Argus didn't even make it into series production, this maybe actually confirms your point.

Another way of looking at it perhaps would be that there was a maximum sensible number of moving parts per HP of power outoput, with the Dagger and the As 412 being on the "too many" side of the criterion ;-)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

The Exe is said to have been reliable in service, not that there were many examples to go by of course.

There is also the Pennine at over 2,500 hp, though again only one built and I am not sure how long it was run having never been fitted to any aircraft.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Rolls Royce picks up the RAE negative-g immune carburettor:

https://twitter.com/x/status/1650227982739427332

View: https://twitter.com/CalumDouglas1/status/1650227982739427332

The 4 x 20m Hispano armed Supermarine Type 312 is selected for F.37/35 and ultimately goes into production with all the modifications proposed for the IRL Spitfire Mk.III (retractable tailwheel, modified undercarriage, new windshield, armour changes etc.) including the Merlin XX with the RAE carburettor.

 

[PMN1]

• "Gee" was first proposed in 1938 which was three years before development began in the "Real World". Does that mean that had development begun immediately that IOC would have been in August 1938 (in time for the Munich Crisis) and that 80% of Bomber Command's operational force would have had it August 1939 and 100% by January 1940? One of "Gee's" limitations was its short range. However, it wouldn't be as bad in this "version of history" as "Gee" transmitters could be installed in France in September 1939 which would allow Bomber Command to bomb with greater accuracy further into Germany.

Not so sure about that bit, I have heard that the French wee not too happy about the idea of Battles being stationed in eastern France which is where they would need to be to be useful against Germany.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

• "Gee" was first proposed in 1938 which was three years before development began in the "Real World". Does that mean that had development begun immediately that IOC would have been in August 1938 (in time for the Munich Crisis) and that 80% of Bomber Command's operational force would have had it August 1939 and 100% by January 1940? One of "Gee's" limitations was its short range. However, it wouldn't be as bad in this "version of history" as "Gee" transmitters could be installed in France in September 1939 which would allow Bomber Command to bomb with greater accuracy further into Germany.

Not so sure about that bit, I have heard that the French were not too happy about the idea of Battles being stationed in eastern France which is where they would need to be to be useful against Germany.

I am sure about that. The RAF won't have the Fairey Battle as we know it and the purpose of setting up Gee transmitting stations in France is to help the UK-based aircraft bomb with greater accuracy further into Germany.

Edit 30.04.23: That's why I deliberately wrote Bomber Command instead of the Advanced Air Striking Force.

As far as I know No. 1.

What made the French unhappy about having Battles stationed in Eastern France was that there wasn't enough space for the airfields. My vague memory from reading the relevant parts of "The War in the Air" there was a similar problem finding space in Eastern France to accommodate the Independent Force.

As far as I know No. 2.

According to what I've read the "AASF Concept" had been around for years, i.e. from at least circa 1933 when the main potential European enemy changed from France to Germany. The single-engine biplane Light Bombers that were most of ADGB's strength didn't have the range to bomb Germany from bases in the UK so it would be necessary to move them to France.

However, a secondary reason might have been that it "made life harder" for the German defenders, because the attackers would be coming from more directions. I've not read that anywhere. It's speculation by me.

In this "version of history" the Real-Fairey Battle won't exist. It will be the Twin-Merlin-Battle which was proposed in the "Real World" and the ALT-Fairey Battle will have the range to attack targets in Germany from bases in the UK.

Or it won't be ordered into production in the first place because Expansion Scheme C will be for an all-heavy Home Defence Bomber Force. Therefore, more Whitley's will be ordered instead of the Blenheim and Battle. It has to be more Whitleys (which will be built by the firms that built the Battle & Blenheim in the "Real World") because it was the only one of the three Heavy Bombers in development at the time that (in common with the Battle & Blenheim) entered service in 1937 (the Hampden & Wellington didn't enter service until towards the end of 1938).

Therefore, no Fairey Battle and many fewer Bristol Blenheims because the latter will only be needed to re-equip the Light Bomber squadrons in the Overseas Commands.

In either case, no Advanced Air Striking Force, because all the aircraft in Bomber Command could reach Germany from bases in the UK. That is, unless they wanted to have some in France to "make life harder" for the German defenders and even then it would not be necessary to base them in Eastern France because they'd have the range to use airfields further back and still be able to reach targets deeper into German territory than the Real-Battle.

NB. France wasn't really thought of as the main potential enemy in Europe between 1918 and circa 1933.

Instead France had the largest Air Force that was within range of the UK and British policy was to have "Air Parity" with the Country that possessed the largest Air Force within range of the UK.

From what I've read in the Air History Branch narrative on the evolution of Bomber Command, the 52-Squadron Scheme of 1923 was Stage 1 of a multi-stage plan to create a Home Defence Force of Fighters & Bombers that was as large as the one that France actually possessed at the time.

However, as we both know, the completion date for Stage 1 was postponed several times. When Hitler & the Nazis came to power the planned date of completion was 31.03.38 exactly 10 years later than the original planned date of completion, which was 31.03.28.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

NB. France wasn't really thought of as the main potential enemy in Europe between 1918 and circa 1933.

Instead France had the largest Air Force that was within range of the UK and British policy was to have "Air Parity" with the Country that possessed the largest Air Force within range of the UK.

From what I've read in the Air History Branch narrative on the evolution of Bomber Command, the 52-Squadron Scheme of 1923 was Stage 1 of a multi-stage plan to create a Home Defence Force of Fighters & Bombers that was as large as the one that France actually possessed at the time.

However, as we both know, the completion date for Stage 1 was postponed several times. When Hitler & the Nazis came to power the planned date of completion was 31.03.38 exactly 10 years later than the original planned date of completion, which was 31.03.28.

I've got the notes dated 20.04.01 from the National Archives copy of AIR41/39 "The Evolution of Bomber Command 1917-39" in front of me.

The 52 Squadron Scheme was the first of four Phases.

• Phase 1 - 52 squadrons with 608 aircraft by 31.03.39 - 39 Regular (464 aircraft), 7 Special Reserve (74 aircraft) and 6 Auxiliary (70 aircraft).
• Phase 2 - to 86 squadrons with 866 aircraft - no completion date - 24 new squadrons - 18 Regular (230 aircraft), 3 Special Reserve (30 aircraft) and 3 Auxiliary Air Force (32 aircraft).
• Phase 3 - to 1,400 aircraft - no other details.
• Phase 4 - to 1,692 aircraft - no other details.

AIR41/39 "The Evolution of Bomber Command 1917-39" can now be downloaded from the Air History Branch website along with many of the other Air History Branch narratives.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Make the ALT-Specification B.1/35 the same as the Real-Specification P.13/36.

• The Real-Specification B.1/35 issued on 08.05.35 was for an aircraft powered by two engines in the Merlin class and single prototypes of three designs were ordered in September and October 1935.
  • The Armstrong-Whitworth A.W. 39 which was cancelled before the aircraft could fly. I don't know when it was cancelled but I suspect that the aircraft was made obsolete by Specification P.13/36 and therefore cancelled sometime after 08.09.36.
  • The Handley Page H.P. 55 which was cancelled. I don't know when other than it was sometime after Specification P.13/36 was issued.
  • The Vickers Type 284 Warwick.
    • The original prototype was redesigned to take two RR Griffon engines and flew in that form on 13.08.39.
    • A second prototype was ordered on 02.07.37 and flew with 2 Bristol Centaurus engines on 05.04.40.
    • 1,815 Warwicks were ordered from the Vickers factories at Blackpool, Chester and Weybridge.
    • However, the Warwick never served with the RAF as a Bomber.
    • This was due to the problems with the Griffon and the Centaurus not being ready for service for several years.
      • All the aircraft ordered from Blackpool and Chester were cancelled so they had to continue building Wellingtons.
      • Many of the 843 aircraft built at Weybridge had a pair of P&W Double Wasp engines instead of Bristol Centaurus engines.
    • It eventually entered service as an Air/Sea Rescue aircraft in August 1943, as a Transport aircraft in August 1944 and as a General Reconnaissance aircraft in November 1944
• The Real-Specification P.13/36 issued on 08.09.36 was for an aircraft powered by two engines in the Griffon class and two prototypes of two designs were ordered.
  • The Avro Type 679 Manchester.
    • These aircraft flew on 25.07.39 and 26.05.40 respectively.
    • The first Manchester squadron began forming in November 1940 and made its first operational sorties in February 1941.
    • The Manchester was redesigned around four RR Merlin engines as the Type 683 Lancaster and made its first flight in this form on 09.01.41.
    • The first Lancasters were delivered to No. 44 Squadron in September 1941 and the squadron was completely equipped with the aircraft in December 1941.
    • The Lancaster made its first operational sorties in April 1942.
  • The Handley Page H.P. 56 which was an enlarged H.P. 55.
    • The aircraft became the H.P. 57 Halifax on 03.09.37 when the aircraft was redesigned to take four Merlin engines.
    • The prototypes flew in this form on 25.10.39 and 17.08.40 respectively.
    • The first Halifax squadron began to form in November 1940 and made its first operational sorties in March 1941.

The former was specification was issued exactly 16 months before the latter. I think that if we make ALT-Specification B.1/35 one for an aircraft with nearly the same characteristics as the Real-Specification P.13/36 the Halifax, Lancaster and an ALT-Warwick can be put into service in the Summer of 1939. (It's nearly the same because instead of being for an aircraft with two Griffon class engines it would be for one with four Merlin class engines.)

Therefore I think:

• The Avro Lancaster could have been put into service 16 months before the Avro Manchester.
  • The first Lancaster squadron would form from May 1939 instead of November 1940 (Manchester) and September 1941 (Real-Lancaster).
    • And
  • It would be operational by October 1939 instead of February 1941 (Manchester) and April 1942 (Real-Lancaster).
• The Handley Page Halifax could have been put into service 16 months earlier.
  • The first Halifax squadron would form from July 1939 instead of November 1940.
    • And.
  • It would be operational by November 1939 instead of March 1941
• An ALT-Vickers Warwick powered by four Merlin engines would replace the Wellington on the production lines in late 1938 or early 1939 and enter into service in the Spring or Summer of 1939.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

. . . that Bristol makes a Beaufort around the proper engines.

They did . . . the Twin Wasp powered Mark II . . .
There's a passage in R.C. Nesbit's book 'Woe to the Unwary', where the Beaufort in which he's flying as a navigator suffers an engine failure over water. Filled with dread over the forthcoming, inevitable ditching, with relief he suddenly remembers that his aircraft is a Mk.II, and thus able to maintain height on one engine . . .

cheers,
Robin.

Not the same R.C. Nesbit that was played by Gregor Fisher methinks.

cheers,
NOMISYRRUC

 

[robunos]

. . . that Bristol makes a Beaufort around the proper engines.

They did . . . the Twin Wasp powered Mark II . . .
There's a passage in R.C. Nesbit's book 'Woe to the Unwary', where the Beaufort in which he's flying as a navigator suffers an engine failure over water. Filled with dread over the forthcoming, inevitable ditching, with relief he suddenly remembers that his aircraft is a Mk.II, and thus able to maintain height on one engine . . .

cheers,
Robin.

Not the same R.C. Nesbit that was played by Gregor Fisher methinks.

cheers,
NOMISYRRUC

Err, No . . .

cheers,
Robin.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

. . . that Bristol makes a Beaufort around the proper engines.

They did . . . the Twin Wasp powered Mark II . . .
There's a passage in R.C. Nesbit's book 'Woe to the Unwary', where the Beaufort in which he's flying as a navigator suffers an engine failure over water. Filled with dread over the forthcoming, inevitable ditching, with relief he suddenly remembers that his aircraft is a Mk.II, and thus able to maintain height on one engine . . .

cheers,
Robin.

The Beaufighter which was a development of the Beaufort (and according to one of the Australian official histories could be built on the same production line) had more powerful Hercules and Merlin engines. Does anyone know if Hercules and Merlin powered versions of the Beaufort were proposed?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Please note that I've already suggested that Bristol makes a Beaufort around the proper engines.

And while we're at it I suggest that Blackburn makes the Botha around the proper engines too.

The standard aircraft was the B.26 Botha Mk I powered by two 880hp Perseus X or two 930hp Perseus XA engines.

However, Page 428 of the Putnams on Blackburn aircraft says there was a proposal for a B.27 Botha Mk II powered by two 1,400hp Hercules III engines but gives no further details. Would 50% extra horsepower solve some of the Botha's problems?

 

[Hood]

The Beaufighter which was a development of the Beaufort (and according to one of the Australian official histories could be built on the same production line) had more powerful Hercules and Merlin engines. Does anyone know if Hercules and Merlin powered versions of the Beaufort were proposed?

I suspect not once they found they could easily sling a torpedo under a Beaufighter. But there were efforts to make a bomber out of the Beaufighter with Beaufort bits thrown in.

In January 1939 Bristol had proposed a 'Beaubomber' - a Beaufighter wing with a new bomber fuselage but the Air Ministry wasn't interested given it had other similar types in the pipeline (the Bristol 155/Albemarle for one). Bristol refined its work with the Type 161 in mid-1940 in two versions; high altitude with a 4-gun dorsal turret, 4x MGs in the nose and 2x ventral MGs; army support with the bomb bay and 2x of the nose MGs replaced by 2x 20mm cannon. Bombload was only 1,000lb.
This evolved into the Type 162 Beaumont using the Beaufighter Mk.III rear fuselage and tail surfaces with a new forward and centre fuselage. The wings were modified and a new undercarriage needed. Two Hercules VII would give a speed of 315mph, alternatively Merlin 5.SMs would give 305mph. Bristol looked at ways of using more existing Beaufort and Beaufighter tooling. The plan was for 3 protoypes, the first flying in autumn 1941 and production beginning by 1943. The first prototype, the 'slim fuselage' prototype was ordered in late 1940 was but never completed.
It's worth noting that the Beaumont was ordered because Spec B.7/40 for a Blenheim replacement (300mph, 1,000lb bombs, dorsal turret with 2x 0.5in MGs) had been a flop, with no good designs coming out.

But design changes came thick and fast - a new twin-fin tailplane, requirements for dive-bombing and army support roles etc. Eventually the Air Ministry decided to hive those off onto the Brewster Bermuda (yikes!) and Vultee Vengeance. The Beaumont then looked a bit tame compared to US designs that would be available (B-25s etc.) so the specs were ramped up to 360mph, 4,000lb bombload and 1,600 miles range and that led to the Type 163 Buckingham in 1941 and which by the time it first flew in 1943 had already been relegated to the Far East and then chopped altogether as a bomber in favour of Brigands and fighter-bombers.

The Type 161 and Beaumont seemed ok designs but they were short on bombload - but well armed with MGs, had they flown in 1941 and entered service in 1942 they might have been useful but its hard to see how the Beaufighter couldn't lift the same payload (and more), faster and with more firepower and fewer aircrew demands.


There is another high-speed proposal that might - or might not - float your boat. The Blackburn B.28 private-venture, a cleaned up Botha (actually quite different in layout) with two Griffons for 400mph, 1,000lb payload, originally unarmed but a 4-gun dorsal turret could be fitted. Spec B.3/40 was raised to cover it, a prototype ordered never built. I may be sceptical, but its hard to see how Blackburn (who seemed to have the opposite of the midas touch) wouldn't cock it up.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The Beaufighter which was a development of the Beaufort (and according to one of the Australian official histories could be built on the same production line) had more powerful Hercules and Merlin engines. Does anyone know if Hercules and Merlin powered versions of the Beaufort were proposed?

I suspect not once they found they could easily sling a torpedo under a Beaufighter. But there were efforts to make a bomber out of the Beaufighter with Beaufort bits thrown in.

In January 1939 Bristol had proposed a 'Beaubomber' - a Beaufighter wing with a new bomber fuselage but the Air Ministry wasn't interested given it had other similar types in the pipeline (the Bristol 155/Albemarle for one). Bristol refined its work with the Type 161 in mid-1940 in two versions; high altitude with a 4-gun dorsal turret, 4x MGs in the nose and 2x ventral MGs; army support with the bomb bay and 2x of the nose MGs replaced by 2x 20mm cannon. Bombload was only 1,000lb.
This evolved into the Type 162 Beaumont using the Beaufighter Mk.III rear fuselage and tail surfaces with a new forward and centre fuselage. The wings were modified and a new undercarriage needed. Two Hercules VII would give a speed of 315mph, alternatively Merlin 5.SMs would give 305mph. Bristol looked at ways of using more existing Beaufort and Beaufighter tooling. The plan was for 3 protoypes, the first flying in autumn 1941 and production beginning by 1943. The first prototype, the 'slim fuselage' prototype was ordered in late 1940 was but never completed.
It's worth noting that the Beaumont was ordered because Spec B.7/40 for a Blenheim replacement (300mph, 1,000lb bombs, dorsal turret with 2x 0.5in MGs) had been a flop, with no good designs coming out.

But design changes came thick and fast - a new twin-fin tailplane, requirements for dive-bombing and army support roles etc. Eventually the Air Ministry decided to hive those off onto the Brewster Bermuda (yikes!) and Vultee Vengeance. The Beaumont then looked a bit tame compared to US designs that would be available (B-25s etc.) so the specs were ramped up to 360mph, 4,000lb bombload and 1,600 miles range and that led to the Type 163 Buckingham in 1941 and which by the time it first flew in 1943 had already been relegated to the Far East and then chopped altogether as a bomber in favour of Brigands and fighter-bombers.

The Type 161 and Beaumont seemed ok designs but they were short on bombload - but well armed with MGs, had they flown in 1941 and entered service in 1942 they might have been useful but its hard to see how the Beaufighter couldn't lift the same payload (and more), faster and with more firepower and fewer aircrew demands.

Did these proposals evolve into the Bristol Type 163 Buckingham, Type 164 Brigand and Type 166 Buckmaster?

There is another high-speed proposal that might - or might not - float your boat. The Blackburn B.28 private-venture, a cleaned up Botha (actually quite different in layout) with two Griffons for 400mph, 1,000lb payload, originally unarmed but a 4-gun dorsal turret could be fitted. Spec B.3/40 was raised to cover it, a prototype ordered never built. I may be sceptical, but its hard to see how Blackburn (who seemed to have the opposite of the midas touch) wouldn't cock it up.

My preferred alternatives are for Blackburn to build either the Hampden or the Wellington under licence instead of the Botha.

If I remember correctly (and on this occasion I think I do) both were tendered to the specifications that produced the Beaufort & Botha and the Hampden was used as a Torpedo-Bomber and the Wellington was used as a G.R. aircraft.

The reason why I chose the Hampden & Wellington is because they were ahead of the Beaufort & Botha in development and therefore they aught to be in service much sooner. I think as much as a year earlier than the Beaufort & Botha. Schemes F & L included 13 T.B./G.R. squadrons in Coastal Command and more-than-a-few T.B./G.R. squadrons in the Overseas Commands. The late delivery of the Beaufort and late deliver & failure of the Botha meant that most of the 13 T.B./G.R. squadrons in Coastal Command were stilly flying the Anson & Vildebeest at the outbreak of World War II and most of the squadrons in the Overseas Commands hadn't been formed.

My second choice is for Blackburn to build the G.R. version of the Blenheim under licence. The National Archives documents about Scheme F that I posted earlier in the thread show that at one time some of the G.R. squadrons at home and overseas were to have been equipped with it. Furthermore, some of the Blenheims ordered from Bristol & Rootes in 1936 were ordered as the G.R. version but completed as the Bomber version. I think that if Blenheims were ordered from Blackburn in 1936 (instead of its first Botha contracts) deliveries would begin up to 2 years before the the first Botha was delivered in the "Real World".

 

[Hood]

Did these proposals evolve into the Bristol Type 163 Buckingham, Type 164 Brigand and Type 166 Buckmaster?

Yes they did - the Buckingham was a result of upping the specs to need the Centaurus to provide enough power.

 

[tomo pauk]

And while we're at it I suggest that Blackburn makes the Botha around the proper engines too.

The standard aircraft was the B.26 Botha Mk I powered by two 880hp Perseus X or two 930hp Perseus XA engines.

However, Page 428 of the Putnams on Blackburn aircraft says there was a proposal for a B.27 Botha Mk II powered by two 1,400hp Hercules III engines but gives no further details. Would 50% extra horsepower solve some of the Botha's problems?

Me, I'd cancel the Botha all together.
One 1400 HP engine is more than enough to power a torpedo bomber, let alone a land-based torpedo bomber. If one needs two of 1400 HP engines, it means the design is bad in the 1st place.
Heck, even the Battle with Pegasus in the nose would've filled the role.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

And while we're at it I suggest that Blackburn makes the Botha around the proper engines too.

The standard aircraft was the B.26 Botha Mk I powered by two 880hp Perseus X or two 930hp Perseus XA engines.

However, Page 428 of the Putnams on Blackburn aircraft says there was a proposal for a B.27 Botha Mk II powered by two 1,400hp Hercules III engines but gives no further details. Would 50% extra horsepower solve some of the Botha's problems?

Me, I'd cancel the Botha all together.
One 1400 HP engine is more than enough to power a torpedo bomber, let alone a land-based torpedo bomber. If one needs two of 1400 HP engines, it means the design is bad in the 1st place.
Heck, even the Battle with Pegasus in the nose would've filled the role.

Except that the Botha wasn't a Torpedo-Bomber it was a General Reconnaissance aircraft. The sole squadron that was equipped with the type (No. 608) was a G.R. squadron that had formerly been equipped with Ansons.

 

[tomo pauk]

Except that the Botha wasn't a Torpedo-Bomber it was a General Reconnaissance aircraft. The sole squadron that was equipped with the type (No. 608) was a G.R. squadron that had formerly been equipped with Ansons.

It was not a torpedo bomber because it was unable to perform that role, despite being designed as such and purchased as such.
Bristol Blenheim will do just fine for GR role (it is already obsolete as a bomber by 1939), no need for 2800 HP on board to do that.

We can just imagine the rejoicing of the No.608 crewmembers when they found out that they will be now receiving the Ansons instead of Bothas.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Except that the Botha wasn't a Torpedo-Bomber it was a General Reconnaissance aircraft. The sole squadron that was equipped with the type (No. 608) was a G.R. squadron that had formerly been equipped with Ansons.

It was not a torpedo bomber because it was unable to perform that role, despite being designed as such and purchased as such.
Bristol Blenheim will do just fine for GR role (it is already obsolete as a bomber by 1939), no need for 2800 HP on board to do that.

If I had time I would do a table to prove that the 1,256 Bothas ordered were intended to replace the Anson in the 11 G.R. squadrons in Coastal Command and to equip more than a few G.R. squadrons that were to be formed in the Overseas Commands as part of Schemes F & L. The Beaufort was to equip the existing torpedo-bomber squadrons in Coastal Command & Singapore and the new squadrons to be formed at Hong Kong & Malta as part of Schemes F & L.

We can just imagine the rejoicing of the No.608 crewmembers when they found out that they will be now receiving the Ansons instead of Bothas.

Unless you're being sarcastic No. 608 squadron went from Ansons to Bothas not the other way around. Then it operated Blenheims for a few months before converting to the Hudson.