The studies that resulted in CVA-01 started in late 1958 and were derived from work undertaken by the then Director Naval Air Warfare over the summer/autumn of that year. From the very outset the carrier was coupled, indeed intimately linked with, a next generation of aircraft beyond the Sea Vixen/Buccaneer combination, OR.346 being the resultant naval requirement. Even this work was probably informed by studies dating to 1956/57.
True, how long is a piece of strong? You could argue it goes all the way back to the 1952 Medium studies.
Just dug out a couple of tables from Friedman on sizes and costs:
1960 Alternatives
42,000 tons, 31 aircraft, 770x165ft flight deck, 2 cats, Sea Cat, £44M
48,000 tons, 41 aircraft, 820x165ft flight deck, 2 cats, 3 Tartar, £54M
48,000 tons, 43 aircraft, 820x200ft flight deck, 2 cats, 3 Tartar, £54M
50,000 tons, 44 aircraft, 860x165ft flight deck, 2 cats, 3-4 Tartar, £55M
55,000 tons, 34 aircraft, 870x200ft flight deck, 3 cats, 4 Tartar, £59M
68,000 tons, 59 aircraft (+4 ASW heli), 1004x190ft flight deck, 3 cats, 4 Tartar, £67M
1962 Alternatives
50,000 tons, 36 aircraft inc. heli (36 interim Vix & Bucc), 890x177ft, 2 cats (200 & 250ft), 1 Sea Dart & 1 Ikara, £50-60M
52,000 tons, 39 aircraft inc. heli (36 interim Vix & Bucc), 900x177ft, 2 cats (200 & 225ft), 1 Sea Dart & 1 Ikara, £50-60M
53,000 tons, 40 aircraft inc. heli (36 interim Vix & Bucc), 920x180ft, 2 cats (250ft), 1 Sea Dart & 1 Ikara, £50-60M
55,000 tons, 40 aircraft inc. heli (36 interim Vix & Bucc), 940x180ft, 2 cats (250ft), 1 Sea Dart & 1 Ikara, £58-63M
58,000 tons, 46 aircraft inc. heli (48 interim Vix & Bucc), 970x190ft, 2 cats (250ft), 1 Sea Dart & 1 Ikara, £60-65M
The carrier studies showed anything less than 50,000 tons was useless, 58,000 tons was too expensive so the "golidlocks zone" was 53-55,000 tons. But even then by 1966 such a fleet was unaffordable.
Around 1958 the Admiralty knew the chances of getting the Treasury to fund a carrier larger than 45-50,000 tons were slim. Friedman connects this with the interest in high performance AAMs - to enable a smaller fighter to carry a bigger punch. Their thoughts were a Buccaneer sized fighter of 60,000lb MTOW and reasonably low take-off speed (150-160kt).
By 1960 that became 50,000lb (35,000lb landing), 90kt take-off and landing, 4hr loiter 150nm away and intercept 150-600nm with M2.5 dash with 2-6,000lb of weapons. Friedman notes this was highly optimistic, A-5 was 55,000lb but only had a radius of 685nm with a 1,885lb bomb and stalled at 134.5kt, F-111B was 77,600lb with a radius of 475nm with 3,000lb (6x AIM-54).
And by now the Admiralty knew it would probably only have funds for one aircraft so it had to be dual-role. Friedman again notes (my italics):
"Thus the Navy could not afford to plan for a spectrum of aircraft, some large and some small, unless it brought in the United States (to capitalize on much longer production runs) and accepted American design requirements. Although that actually occurred in the case of the F-4 Phantom, it seems unlikely that British planners very willingly accepted such a fate."
So it would seem that post-Sandys cut of the P.177 finished any hopes of a small fighter. The RN would have to choose - develop a home-grown VG heavy. And doctrine had moved on from the point-defence P.177, assuming the all-jet version wasn't a pipe dream it certainly wasn't a Scimitar replacement and even a 2hr loiter is half of the 4hrs wanted.
So where does the Super Tiger fit in? Well as a direct purchase it offers a fast interceptor, has AN/APQ-50 radar but only four Sidewinders. APQ-50 was used on early F4H-1Fs but was not a mass produced set and is a late-50s set.
Since APQ-50 was used on early F4H-1Fs I assume that means Sparrow could be integrated onto F11-1F?
So an off-the-shelf purchase means a lot of dollars on the airframe, J79s plus parts and APQ-50 parts - Sidewinders had been funded for Scimitar so there were usable stocks existing. But there is no mass production to reduce purchase costs, restarting the line would incur additional charges.
Start talking about fitting Avons and AIRPASS and Red Top and you're ramping up R&D costs plus flight trials etc.
Assuming Admiralty interest in Super Tiger in 1960-61, that predates P.1154 by a small margin. Sea Vixen FAW.2 is in development but still 2 years from first flight (1962, IOC 1964). Sea Vixen FAW.2 has 2-crew, more loiter time and Red Top has supersonic head-on engagement capability. Although Sparrow on Super Tiger might counter this advantage slightly.
It makes AW.406 interesting, arguably would P.1154 offer enough advantages over a stock Super Tiger or even an anglicised one? A full licence-built, British powered and armed version probably wouldn't be ready until 1964 (same time as Vixen FAW.2) but would overlap P.1154.
I could see AW.406 being recast as a heavy VG - an early AFVG but without the French maybe. A VG AW.406 versus TSR.2 for R&D cash.... not sure what would come out of that, only BAC could really do VG and they have hands tied up with TSR.2 and Concorde. HSA only really knows VSTOL - does that mean only VSTOL is on the table as a realistic option or does HSA prey Maurice Brennan can cook up something swing-wing that's suitably impressive? Gnat Mk.4 was sexy an indication perhaps but HSA needs to think big, I think they wouldn't be able to resist putting thrust vectoring onto it either way.
A lot of questions - it certainly doesn't help carrier design, whatever the case the Admirals want something capable of handling 60-70,000lb jets not 26,000lb featherweights. They just can't afford it.
Only three nations in the world at this time had the capability to build steam-powered medium-eavy carriers, only one ever did and yet never built the one they really fitted this bracket (PA58) - I find that very instructive.
Two found them too expensive, the other found them too lame.