What if Iran never had a revolution?

[GTX]

The Shah showed a lot of interest in the British helicopter carrying escort cruiser - aka Invincible class

"In the mid-1970s, the Shah of Iran expressed interest in acquiring three Invincible-class ships and a fleet of twenty-five Sea Harriers to provide fleet defence. When the Iranian Navycould not commit to providing sufficient personnel for manning the vessels, the ship order was cancelled in 1976."

(1979, Aviation & Marine International magazine)

Regards
Pioneer

What may have resulted:

 

[lordroel]

The Shah showed a lot of interest in the British helicopter carrying escort cruiser - aka Invincible class

"In the mid-1970s, the Shah of Iran expressed interest in acquiring three Invincible-class ships and a fleet of twenty-five Sea Harriers to provide fleet defence. When the Iranian Navycould not commit to providing sufficient personnel for manning the vessels, the ship order was cancelled in 1976."

(1979, Aviation & Marine International magazine)

Regards
Pioneer

What may have resulted:

Off the 3 posted, i like the 1990 version.

 

[GTX]

Another take on it:

 

[Yellow Palace]

One potentially very significant effect of the Pahlavi regime continuing would be the impact on the Iraqi nuclear weapons program.

Without the Iran-Iraq war, Operation SCORCH SWORD wouldn't take place in 1980; this might or might not have delayed the Osiraq reactor becoming operational. Or rather, Israeli intervention - the Israeli government apparently having been planning an air raid on the reactor since 1979.

In OTL, Operation OPERA had significant Iranian support, including aerial reconnaissance, a preparatory air raid on the H-3 air base, and arrangements for Israeli aircraft to divert to Tabriz Air Base in an emergency. The extent to which Iran would support such an operation in the alternate timeline is open to question: on the one hand, it's very unlikely that Iraq would be at war with Iran; on the other hand, Israel would likely have better relations with the Shah's government than with the Islamic Republic

If the strike does not go ahead, it is possible that Iraq's nuclear weapons program is accelerated. Even if you accept the argument that Osiraq itself had no military role, the knowledge and experience gained would have benefited Iraqi nuclear scientists, and Iraq may have felt that it didn't need to conceal the program as comprehensively.

Alternatively, the absence of the attack might mean that Saddam Hussein does not feel the need to develop the ability to deter Israel. In that scenario, and especially without an Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqi conventional and WMD build-up of the 1980s is greatly reduced, although likely not entirely: the Iranian buildup would demand some kind of response. In either case, if the attack doesn't happen, the international backlash against Israel never happens, and UNSC Resolution 487 is never passed.

If Operation OPERA does go ahead, on the other hand, it's likely to use A-4s instead of F-16s - the aircraft used historically were originally ordered by Iran and diverted to Israel after the revolution. Without a revolution, Israel wouldn't have got F-16s as quickly. This is likely to impact on the capability of the strike force, though I'm not sure exactly how. The result might be greater likelihood of losses, or reduced likelihood of destroying the target. Without the war against Iran, Iraqi defences would likely be less alert, but also wouldn't be as focussed towards the east; this could go either way. But, Iraq would also likely feel more willing to retaliate against Israel in this scenario.

In any of these cases, the subsequent impact on regional politics is potentially immense. And, with no Iran-Iraq war, it's probable that there's no subsequent Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In turn, that means no massive American troop presence in Saudi Arabia to deter Iraq, and less anti-American sentiment in al-Qaeda and the wider Islamic world. Which, in turn, means that the entire post-1991 geopolitical environment is different.

There would of course be impacts on equipment sales and on the defence industrial base in various countries, but they're far less interesting than the geopolitical and grand strategic changes. And I haven't even touched on the possible impact of Iran developing an economy comparable with many European countries, which was possible if reforms had been better implemented. There's plenty of blame to go around there, of course.

 

[GTX]

If Operation OPERA does go ahead, on the other hand, it's likely to use A-4s instead of F-16s - the aircraft used historically were originally ordered by Iran and diverted to Israel after the revolution. Without a revolution, Israel wouldn't have got F-16s as quickly. This is likely to impact on the capability of the strike force, though I'm not sure exactly how.

Or F-15s (first acquired in 1977) and F-4s.

 

[Yellow Palace]

If Operation OPERA does go ahead, on the other hand, it's likely to use A-4s instead of F-16s - the aircraft used historically were originally ordered by Iran and diverted to Israel after the revolution. Without a revolution, Israel wouldn't have got F-16s as quickly. This is likely to impact on the capability of the strike force, though I'm not sure exactly how.

Or F-15s (first acquired in 1977) and F-4s.

They'd been training for the operation using A-4s with F-15 escort before they got F-16s.

 

[Fluff]

 

[TsrJoe]

IIAF. F.16A Falcon model posted by 'taildragger' in thread 'Unbuilt F-16 based projects' https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/unbuilt-f-16-based-projects.3417/post-600734

 

[njiiaf]

IIAF chief of staff Gen. Rabii(RIP) inspecting the F-16 prototype, 1978

View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=xdw5QgofMAI

From a GD brochure, 1977




Some more Iranian officers checking out an early F-16A



Bonus pic

 

[lancer21]

Regarding Iran and F-15, is there clearer info as to they were indeed bought, how many and when were the first examples supposed to arrive? From various bits and pieces i've over the years the numbers quoted were either 53 or 90, and earlier in this topic F-15C was specified as the variant Iran was to buy.

And same for F-18, when where the first examples supposed to arrive?

My own favourite iranian scenario is for the revolution to be postponed a little bit so that Iran received their initial lots at least of F-16s and F-15, AIM-7Fs and AIM-9Ls and when the new leadership comes, have F-14s, F-15s, and F-16s sold/given to USSR and China for hefty payments, military and economic assistance and whatnot.

Or alternatively at least have a split buy of F-15s and F-14s, maybe the iranians realize they were duped by that F-14 display stunt or whatever. so by 1979 they received say 50 F-14 and 30 F-15.

As i understand in OTL Iran DID NOT give any F-14s to USSR, though the soviets tried very hard to court Iran to come to their side, and were prepared to ditch Saddam, hence the embargo on weapons sales to Iran until 1982 when Iran started invading iraqi territory after taking back it's own land occupied by the iraqis from 1980. Khomeini was just too fanatic for his own and Iran's good.

 

[njiiaf]

Regarding Iran and F-15, is there clearer info as to they were indeed bought, how many and when were the first examples supposed to arrive? From various bits and pieces i've over the years the numbers quoted were either 53 or 90, and earlier in this topic F-15C was specified as the variant Iran was to buy.

And same for F-18, when where the first examples supposed to arrive?

My own favourite iranian scenario is for the revolution to be postponed a little bit so that Iran received their initial lots at least of F-16s and F-15, AIM-7Fs and AIM-9Ls and when the new leadership comes, have F-14s, F-15s, and F-16s sold/given to USSR and China for hefty payments, military and economic assistance and whatnot.

Or alternatively at least have a split buy of F-15s and F-14s, maybe the iranians realize they were duped by that F-14 display stunt or whatever. so by 1979 they received say 50 F-14 and 30 F-15.

As i understand in OTL Iran DID NOT give any F-14s to USSR, though the soviets tried very hard to court Iran to come to their side, and were prepared to ditch Saddam, hence the embargo on weapons sales to Iran until 1982 when Iran started invading iraqi territory after taking back it's own land occupied by the iraqis from 1980. Khomeini was just too fanatic for his own and Iran's good.

Iran never bought any F-15s. The F-15 competed with the tomcat to become Iran's new air defense fighter and lost. There was still some talk afterwards of a small buy of F-15s to complement the tomcats and possibly to replace the Phantoms in some roles but this never progressed passed the talking stage. Similar situation for the F-18.
FYI, the decision to purchase the F-14 was made well before the infamous air show fly-off between the F-14 and F-15. The F-14's AWG-9 and Phoenix combo was simply better suited to defending Iran's vast, mountainous airspace which had spotty radar coverage. Developmental issues with the F-15 at the time also were a factor. https://theaviationgeekclub.com/former-iiaf-tomcat-pilots-tell-the-true-story-of-why-iran-picked-the-f-14-over-the-f-15/#:~:text=Iran's inability to prevent overflights,acquired the Grumman F-14.

Had the revolution not occurred, I can see a realistic scenario in which the Air Force completes its buys of 140 F-14s and 300 F-16s and purchases a small number of F-15Es to replace the phantoms in the bomb truck role. But buying hundreds and hundreds of -14s, 15s, 16s, 18s, etc. like some commentators suggest would have been virtually impossible. The Air Force did not have the personnel or the infrastructure to operate and sustain this many advanced aircraft of different types. Ditto for the post-revolution Air Force which lost 90%+ of its senior personnel and 50(!)% of its total personnel.

 

[Yellow Palace]

Had the revolution not occurred, I can see a realistic scenario in which the Air Force completes its buys of 140 F-14s and 300 F-16s and purchases a small number of F-15Es to replace the phantoms in the bomb truck role.

What the Iranian air force seems to have planned, in reality, is:

• 80, perhaps more, F-14s - I've been searching for contemporary evidence for the additional aircraft
• 460 F-16s, of which 300 would be new capability and 160 would be F-5 replacements
• 250 of something to replace the Phantoms

That 'something' might have been F-15s, F-16s, or F-18s, and I suspect that by the mid-1980s it would have been looking increasingly improbable that they'd actually be ordered.

Or alternatively at least have a split buy of F-15s and F-14s, maybe the iranians realize they were duped by that F-14 display stunt or whatever. so by 1979 they received say 50 F-14 and 30 F-15.

Something like this was initially considered: 53 F-15s for four squadrons and 30 F-14s for three squadrons. It was decided that going all F-14 was a better plan.

 

[njiiaf]

What the Iranian air force seems to have planned, in reality, is:

• 80, perhaps more, F-14s - I've been searching for contemporary evidence for the additional aircraft
• 460 F-16s, of which 300 would be new capability and 160 would be F-5 replacements
• 250 of something to replace the Phantoms

That 'something' might have been F-15s, F-16s, or F-18s, and I suspect that by the mid-1980s it would have been looking increasingly improbable that they'd actually be ordered.

In hindsight, if I already had 160 F-14s and 300-400 F-16s I wouldn't find it necessary to purchase 250 of an additional aircraft to replace my Phantoms. The F-16 is a very capable airframe that can punch well above its weight. But it seems like the IIAF hadn't quite realized this at that point in time, given what the F-16 was initially designed as. An additional order of F-16s, specifically the -C model perhaps equipped with sparrows in the mid-80s, would have been an excellent replacement for the Phantom fleet.

If however, they were that determined to absolutely exceed the Phantoms capabilities in all aspects then an order of F-15s isn't a bad idea. 250 is exceeding the limits of what the Air Force would have been able to operate even with its personnel and structure intact, but around a 100 would have been manageable. This is all assuming of course that the Iranian economy does well in the 80s, money is not an issue.

 

[Yellow Palace]

In hindsight, if I already had 160 F-14s and 300-400 F-16s I wouldn't find it necessary to purchase 250 of an additional aircraft to replace my Phantoms. The F-16 is a very capable airframe that can punch well above its weight. But it seems like the IIAF hadn't quite realized this at that point in time, given what the F-16 was initially designed as. An additional order of F-16s, specifically the -C model perhaps equipped with sparrows in the mid-80s, would have been an excellent replacement for the Phantom fleet.

Yeah, my guess is that they'd probably wind up with the F-14s, 300 F-16A/B, and 160 F-16C/D. At some point in the mid-1990s, they might look at the F-15E, partly as an F-14 replacement and partly as a long-range strike aircraft similar to the contemporary Saudi purchase.

An Iranian F-14 upgrade comparable to the F-14D is fun to think about, but I doubt it's at all realistic.

 

[Hood]

Plus there might be the Mirage 4000 to tempt them as a Phantom replacement.

Of course they may well have gone down the Phantom modernisation route like some other air forces did to keep them operational into the 1990s.

 

[Yellow Palace]

I think that Mirages (or Tornadoes, for that matter) would be a hard sell to Iran, at least as long as Mohammed Reza Shah sits on the throne; he was strongly in favour of an all-American air force.

What happens after he dies is anybody's guess. If he dies on OTL's schedule - not a given - Reza Pahlavi would be very young (19 years and 9 months). There was concern from pro-monarchist groups that he would make a poor Shah, and that his younger brother Ali Reza should be installed in his place with a regency council.

 

[GTX]

Speaking of Tornadoes:

 

[GTX]

Of course a twist to this scenario is the Revolution taking place slightly later and thus things like below resulting:

 

[njiiaf]

I have never been a gambling man, but I would place a significant sum of money on the revolution being averted during the Reagan presidency. It was a uniquely Carter screwup exacerbated by Mohammad Reza Shah’s natural timidity during times of crisis. It would have been a footnote in history like the ‘63 crisis that also caused by Khomeini.

So with that in mind, can someone please make an IIAF F-35 livery?

 

[njiiaf]

Ok, I just heard from Colonel Ali-Reza Namaki in an interview that Iran was planning to purchase 40 F-15s and an additional 80 F-14s for the yet-to-be established Strategic Air Command.
Edit: Correction it was the Strategic Air Defense Command

 

[zjz]

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8gAhODPWU2g

 

[Siberia]

It's understandable the forum it's on how the thread has concentrated on military hardware, but with how things are currently going in the Middle East for me one of the most interesting knock-on effects would be the lack of Iranian support for groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.

Continued cooperation with Israel. I can see Lavi going forward with Iranian cooperation.

Depends. There were several oil for arms development deals but Israel was apparently cheating Iran by supplying lower technology weapons than they were producing for themselves. If Iran gets proof of this, or is just sufficiently convinced, then any cooperation comes to a screeching halt.

You have to remember, the Shah was tech mad and had ordered some potent kit and wanted more, that's quite hard to wean off given the threats Iran faced from almost all her neighbours.

The Soviet Union is a potential threat but what others are there? Afghanistan and Pakistan are military pygmies, the Gulf states hadn't yet gone on the military buying spree they later would. That leaves Iraq. Some of what the Shah bought was sensible, a large part of it however reads like some of the more excitable members of this forum being given free rein.

 

[griml0ck122]

Iran probably keeps buying guns like there is no tomorrow, but unless the monarchy reforms to make things better, they will eventually face problems. If they do perform some reforms, you may end up with more of a supersize UAE or Turkey.

 

[Yellow Palace]

It's understandable the forum it's on how the thread has concentrated on military hardware, but with how things are currently going in the Middle East for me one of the most interesting knock-on effects would be the lack of Iranian support for groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.

Oh, it gets very interesting regionally. Iran under the Shah was pretty interventionist, viewed itself as the dominant regional power, and had designs on being a world power.

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were both seen as potential rivals - part of the military expansion of the 1970s and planned into the 1980s was for a significant force in the southeast of Iran, well placed to control the Persian Gulf and to deter/threaten Pakistan. The possibility of a coup in Saudi Arabia had exercised the Shah since the late 1960s; developing the ability to stage a counter-coup was part of what the Iranian Air Force's airlift force was intended for.

One of the scary possibilities is that with Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia all vaguely threatening to each other and feeling around the edges of nuclear weapons, you may get fairly rapid proliferation in that area.

Iran probably keeps buying guns like there is no tomorrow, but unless the monarchy reforms to make things better, they will eventually face problems. If they do perform some reforms, you may end up with more of a supersize UAE or Turkey.

IMO Turkey is a pretty good point of comparison for a non-revolutionary Iran.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Seriously - whatever your opinion of Carter, the Mullahs really were absolute arseholes there (they were, and still are, assholes - make no mistake. But that day, they really went beyond that).

The only good thing I can say about Carter-as-president is that as a nuclear trained submarine officer, he knew exactly what to do about Three Mile Island: Stay out of the way and let the techs work.

this got me thinking.. what if Iran chose the F-15 instead of the F-14?
how would it change things?
such as
- F-15 in combat against Iraq and interception against Soviet MiG-25s?
- impact on the price of the F-15 and F-14 (in that video he claims that the Iran order significantly brought down the price of the F-14). thus I assume an F-15 order would make the F-15 cheaper and F-14 more expensive
- how would it affect exports of F-15 and F-14?

I don't believe that the F-15 is capable of intercepting Foxbats, while the Tomcat (rather, AWG-9/Phoenix) is much more capable.

But also the Iranian nuclear weapon effort. Rather than Pakistan, it would would be a Persian Bomb as the counter to Soviet and Indian nuclear weapons.
This alone could trigger all sorts of crisii and negotiations.

No, Pakistan would still need to have their Bomb to be superior to India.

It's understandable the forum it's on how the thread has concentrated on military hardware, but with how things are currently going in the Middle East for me one of the most interesting knock-on effects would be the lack of Iranian support for groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.

That would be a very nice improvement in the general quality of life of the planet.

One of the scary possibilities is that with Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia all vaguely threatening to each other and feeling around the edges of nuclear weapons, you may get fairly rapid proliferation in that area.

No may about that. I fully expect Iran, India, Pakistan, Iraq, and Saudi to have nukes in this scenario.

 

[Lascaris]

Iran probably keeps buying guns like there is no tomorrow, but unless the monarchy reforms to make things better, they will eventually face problems. If they do perform some reforms, you may end up with more of a supersize UAE or Turkey.

Does it? The shah still dies on schedule give or take a year or two given his cancer. Oil prices plummet in the 1980s. Reza is 20 year old in 1980, given his age he is not likely to have the influence 9f his father in government even if he wants to. Against whom the shah's plans of a 1,000 fighter air force, a navy with multiple aircraft carriers and the likes make actual sense? Iran likely scales back significantly on military procurement in the 1980s... Unless of course Shaddam decides that the likely instability during and right after the succession is his opportunity to invade. Then things get... interesting.

 

[zen]

The fall of the Shah was followed by Afghanistan and thus is the environment in which Washington gave the green light to Saudi funding the Pakistan nuclear weapons program.

As US military planners faced the potential horror of trying to stop a Soviet push to the Gulf. WWIII seemed to be very close indeed.

With the Shah still upon the Peacock Throne, Iran is no weak point in the US global order, Afghanistan is unlikely to fall as the Shah would surge forces across the boarder with Western support. The Soviet backed coup would fail.

Pakistan would remain a basket case and the US would not sanction their nuclear weapons program.

But the Iranian one would continue uninterrupted.

Saddam was a lifeline with the fall of the Shah. He's unnecessary to US goals if the Shah remains.

 

[Yellow Palace]

A lot of this scenario depends on how and why the revolution is averted. It looks very different if it comes about from a stronger security crackdown in 1977-1978 than if it's better investment of oil revenues in 1973, a better managed White Revolution in 1963, or a totally different tack taken during and after the Iranian oil crisis and associated coup of 1951-1953.

FWIW, my view is:

• The 1951-1953 change gives a fundamentally different global situation.
• The White Revolution change is probably the most promising for turning Iran into a liberal Westernised state, by modernising the economy and reducing the influence of Islamic clerics in civil society.
• The 1973 oil investment change is as late as you can go and significantly change the trajectory for Iran; it can be stabler and richer if money is put into the economy instead of arms, and that's likely to be enough to avoid revolution.
• A stronger crackdown in 1977 at best buys the regime time for Mohammed Reza to occupy the throne as he dies, and may allow for a peaceful transition away from absolute power if his son is smart about it.

No may about that. I fully expect Iran, India, Pakistan, Iraq, and Saudi to have nukes in this scenario.

India and Pakistan are givens. The question is whether the three Gulf powers nuclearise - if they do, it's almost certainly all three, and I suspect that Israel openly becomes a nuclear state too. Of the three, I suspect Iraq goes first, seeing nuclear weapons as a way to contain Iran, prompting Iran to realise a 'virtual' capability and Saudi Arabia to call in Pakistan's side of their deal.

Reza is 20 year old in 1980, given his age he is not likely to have the influence 9f his father in government even if he wants to.

The question is, if Reza II Shah has less influence, who has more influence?

If it's senior figures from Mohammed Reza's government, there's likely to be little change. If it's a reaction against his father's government, it's likely to be Islamist (in which case a less extreme version of OTL) although a left-leaning group may become dominant. The US can probably work with an Islamist group, but will completely lose its mind over a leftist group.

Alternatively, if Mohammed Reza can hang on a couple more years, Reza II may be able to transition into power without too much trouble. He does seem to be more reform-minded than his father, though of course a lot of his vies today will have been coloured by the experience of revolution and exile.

As US military planners faced the potential horror of trying to stop a Soviet push to the Gulf. WWIII seemed to be very close indeed.

It should be remembered that the primary reason for Mohammed Reza's arms buildup was that he thought a Soviet push to the Gulf was likely in the 1980s, and anticipated that Western military aid wouldn't be available in sufficient speed and strength to fight it off. That's why it seemed so excessive for a Gulf state: the goal was to pose a near-peer threat to the Soviet Union.

With the Shah still upon the Peacock Throne, Iran is no weak point in the US global order, Afghanistan is unlikely to fall as the Shah would surge forces across the boarder with Western support. The Soviet backed coup would fail.

I'm not sure I'd put it quite that strongly, but I'd certainly expect the Iranian regime to use the coup and invasion as evidence to support their military buildup, and more support to the Shia and ethnically Iranian elements of the mujahideen.

Saddam was a lifeline with the fall of the Shah. He's unnecessary to US goals if the Shah remains.

What happens with Iraq is a real keystone issue here. AFAIK, there was a shift away from the USSR towards the West through the later 1970s, which I'd expect to continue. But without the Iranian revolution, the weakness that allowed for the Iran-Iraq war doesn't take place. That means a lot less economic damage to both countries. It may also mean that Saddam doesn't become quite so dictatorial.

The same can be said of Saudi Arabia, though to a lesser extent, which hugely shifts the dynamic through the 1980s and 1990s. It'll just be one of several US allies in the region, rather than a vital ally against Iran and Iraq. Also: no Iran-Iraq war means no Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, no US forces in Saudi Arabia, and no 9/11.

The Kurdish situation would be interesting - I'm guessing the 1976-1979 Iraqi-Kurdish conflict keeps going rather than dying down as the emphasis of Kurdish insurgents moves to post-revolutionary Iran. While it would weaken Iraq, I doubt it's in Iran's interests to support the insurgency due to the risk of spillover into their own territory.

 

[alertken]

YP#108, thoughtful, introduces a Nirvana prospect, which I agree.

How lucky we are to have on this forum the only fellow that knows why the1979 insurrection succeeded where others had failed. The Revolutionary Narrative rests on Elites' corruption, overthrown by the Faithful. But...no.

The Pahlavi regime was corrupt by the standards of our Western words (if not always deeds), but they were also trying to prepare for a post-oil world to employ 39Mn. people (since doubled). On a Defence base, the intent was to be the Workshop for the Middle East by building the skills base to maintain the best kit. I was involved (modestly) in their Aircraft Industry, '77-78, leaving weeks before the Shah. If I tried to claim foresight, you would rightly laugh. I heard the explosion in a Tehran cinema; I heard machine gun bursts on street corners. I, and more, shrugged, and knew SAVAK (the Secret Police) would, again, sort it. So, why didn't they?

The Main Railway Station at the foot of Tehran's mountain seethed daily with new jobseekers, milling around, broke, depressed. They saw private buses taking workers from Doshan Tappeh Ministry of War components Workshop up from steamy, dusty heat home to aircon comfort. They were ex-USAF maintenance technicians experienced on F-4, F-5, C-130 matching IIAF's fleet: US citizens and SE.Asia Nationals (Taiwan, Thai, Filipino, so mostly non-Muslim), who had supported PACAF/SVAF. All were also to train Iranis for the ME Workshop Policy.

They were visibly swigging their Buds on the bus onway to their large, cool apartments with their idle women. What kind of women could USAF techies acquire in Bangkok, Manila?

Mehrabad,Tehran Airport, was where many more expat technicians worked on aircraft, engines, and where the Elite had their bizjets and 707s, guarded by Elite Forces of the Shah. Doshan Tappeh was guarded by conscripts. The mob surged up to them and said: Are you, brother, with the Infidel, or with us the Faithful and dutiful?

When it was known in Mehrabad that they had let the mob in, the Generals tried to flee. End of...

So, if an Officer had kept discipline at D-Tappeh, SAVAK then to do what came naturally, the Shah then spreading the oil money more widely...Zen#107, YP #108 are so, plus, plus. None of Afghan, Iraq, Terror. Nirvana.

 

[Yellow Palace]

Are you, brother, with the Infidel, or with us the Faithful and dutiful?

Herein lies the problem. A harder line in 1978 might postpone the time when the question gets asked. But it will be in the minds of many people. If you get that late without addressing the problems, I think you're past the point when oppression and reform will be sufficient to prevent change. There was just too much discontent among those who felt that the Shah's policies were counter to their interests.

If the lid is kept on for long enough, the death of the Shah might act as a pressure valve, allowing for more comprehensive reform. Or it might be a power vacuum for some faction to exploit.

 

[okakac]

Iranian generals were ready to crush the troubles. Carter didn't let them. If political leanings of one predisposes one to blame Carter, one should also understand Iran and the Islamist Resistance of Afghanistan is a package deal, especially in hindsight used to write history to cover up other failings elsewhere... To actually hidden proud boasting of the other side in the US politics.

Why did Carter sacrifice Iran? Iran is not to fight Russians. Iran is to hold the line while there is trouble in the chain from the Balkans to the Pakistan. Some growing too big for their boots, in the view of Americans. Let there be trouble, one might envision Carter in the White House. I count up to 920 modern jets in a proposed future Iran. Ours was a more modest 750 or so. Only 240 of them F-16s.

 

[zen]

Iran falls because of Iranian Elite failure. Humiliated by external interventions, Counter Elites arise and the most organised seizes the moment, when the Regime collapses.
Weakness invites pressure and random events provide opportunity.

US Democrats have soft spot for Leftist Revolutionaries, and Said got into bed with "just a bunch of priests Bro" only to belatedly discover the Mullahs have been playing politics in Iran since the place fell to Islam many centuries ago.

After all the Shah giving power to Industrialists, managers who ....shudder....actually engage with real things. Not 'our sort' of managers at all!
Weak Shah looks to try to become strong and strong is independent....independent of Washington.
Not allowed!
So much support for the usual crowd of intellectuals, and university types who never dirty their hands with making actual stuff or fixing anything.
Who in turn hold their noses to lure Bazari businessmen into bed....for the moment.
Come the day the disorganised rabble think they're getting holy man only concerned with esoteric issues of worship.
A theatrical leader for show while Leftists start the purges and executions. Mostly each other.

But Kominei ignores them, swiftly embeds himself in the center of the 'rival castle' of the network of Islamic institutions and seized power. To much relief. Bazari's want order to keep profits.
Everyone cheers for the organised minority, firm government is back on the table.....and Leftists up against the wall...briefly.

But Weakness internal invites external pressure and Leftist appeal to fellow Comrades is nightmare scenario as Gulf ports mean Soviet cut off of oil to allies. Who's economic collapse is manna from heaven to Comrades.

 

[Scott Kenny]

India and Pakistan are givens. The question is whether the three Gulf powers nuclearise - if they do, it's almost certainly all three, and I suspect that Israel openly becomes a nuclear state too. Of the three, I suspect Iraq goes first, seeing nuclear weapons as a way to contain Iran, prompting Iran to realise a 'virtual' capability and Saudi Arabia to call in Pakistan's side of their deal.

I thought that the Saudis paid for a chunk of Pakistan's bombs in exchange for a few of their own?

 

[Yellow Palace]

I thought that the Saudis paid for a chunk of Pakistan's bombs in exchange for a few of their own?

A lot of people think that; I don't think it's been confirmed, but that's the 'Pakistan's side of the deal' I mentioned.

Another consideration, I think, is the impact on global oil markets. The 1979 oil crisis would be avoided, likely slowing the rise of non-OPEC oil production and improvements in car fuel economy. The economic impacts in the United States - as well as the absence of the hostage crisis - will probably also affect the 1980 US presidential election. I'm not sure it would be enough to get a Carter win, but it would at least make it less of a Reagan landslide.

 

[Kiltonge]

Or alternatively at least have a split buy of F-15s and F-14s, maybe the iranians realize they were duped by that F-14 display stunt or whatever. so by 1979 they received say 50 F-14 and 30 F-15.

Things did get very shaky on the F-14 deal when it emerged that Grumman paid $6 million ( out of a planned $28 million ) to sales agents. The first individual, Houshang Lavi, made the initial introductions to appropriate Iranian consular and military contacts and the second, Albert Fuge, was said to be vital in winning the second tranche order for 50 F-14s.

That was a surprising win, as Grumman knew they were the underdogs for the second tranche. In fact:

A COPY OF THE CABLE SENT AT THAT TIME BY THE U.S. MILITARY
ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP IN TEHRAN TO THE U.S. JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF AND OTHER LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT READS:
"IT IS THE INTENTION ON THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN TO
PROVIDE FOR THE IIAF (IMPERIAL IRANIAN AIR FORCE):
"30 EACH F-14 TOMCAT, 50 EACH F-15 EAGLE...TOUFANIAN
STRESSED THAT HE (HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY) APPROVED THE CHOICE
OF WORDS IN THIS.

Iran later demanded that $28 million be deducted from the total program cost ( $2.5 billion ) as they did not approve of the use of sales agents. I believe Grumman's final concession was was to provide that value of spare parts at no cost.

Had those negotiations not followed that path, or if Grumman had pryed more into rumours that the payments were being funneled to very senior Iranian officials, then I could easily see the F-14 purchase being truncated and the F-15 coming into the picture.

 

[bobtdwarf]

A lot of people think that; I don't think it's been confirmed, but that's the 'Pakistan's side of the deal' I mentioned.

Another consideration, I think, is the impact on global oil markets. The 1979 oil crisis would be avoided, likely slowing the rise of non-OPEC oil production and improvements in car fuel economy. The economic impacts in the United States - as well as the absence of the hostage crisis - will probably also affect the 1980 US presidential election. I'm not sure it would be enough to get a Carter win, but it would at least make it less of a Reagan landslide.

It would lower inflation enough that Carter is likely to win by at least 5-6 points.... Reagan in '80 was considered about as far right as the American population could find palatable, an improvement in the economy and he doesn't stand a ghost of chance.

 

[Scott Kenny]

It would lower inflation enough that Carter is likely to win by at least 5-6 points.... Reagan in '80 was considered about as far right as the American population could find palatable, an improvement in the economy and he doesn't stand a ghost of chance.

I dunno, the Fed was saying that they were going to reduce how much money they were printing and then NOT actually doing that.

 

[Yellow Palace]

It would lower inflation enough that Carter is likely to win by at least 5-6 points.... Reagan in '80 was considered about as far right as the American population could find palatable, an improvement in the economy and he doesn't stand a ghost of chance.

I doubt you could get that dramatic a change - Carter was nearly 10% behind on the popular vote, only led by 2% in 1976, and the economic problems weren't purely because of Iran. And with different circumstances, the Republicans may have chosen someone less extreme than Reagan.

Thinking about the UK as well... I wonder what the effect might be on the Winter of Discontent, the 1979 Scottish referendum, and the 1979 general election.

 

[bobtdwarf]

to Yellow and Scott...

Carter was up by 8 in the polling in October, earlier in the campaign he was up by nearly 15 at some points. No hostage crisis and all that dragging him down he was not in bad shape.. his unadjusted GDP growth was around 10% per year (once you adjust for inflation it gets worse, IIRC about 2%), and his jobs numbers were as good or better than HW Bush and better than Trumps before covid. No Iran and you are also likely to not have Teddy primary him disrupting party support bitterly... yeah he should be fine for reelection.

 

[Scott Kenny]

to Yellow and Scott...

Carter was up by 8 in the polling in October, earlier in the campaign he was up by nearly 15 at some points. No hostage crisis and all that dragging him down he was not in bad shape.. his unadjusted GDP growth was around 10% per year (once you adjust for inflation it gets worse, IIRC about 2%), and his jobs numbers were as good or better than HW Bush and better than Trumps before covid. No Iran and you are also likely to not have Teddy primary him disrupting party support bitterly... yeah he should be fine for reelection.

The economy was still going to bite him in the butt, and the stagflation has little to do with oil prices.