The problem is that an engine retrofit is probably out of the budget of most of the air forces involved. Interim fits have a tendency to become permanent and I'd expect in this case that any initial Avon fit would be the permanent fit.
The only air force I can see actually going with the RB.106 Super Tiger would be the Italians; 1966 at the outside means an RB.106 Super Tiger slots in well into the space the F-104S fit into OTL, and that model included an uprated J79 engine with almost 2000 lbs more wet thrust than the -11A version initially equipping the F-104G.
No much earlier, if funded from '57 in a turn around from bigger version RB.122. Then Lightning and Draken are clear target markets, but a German potential order could clinch the shift. RR would jump on the Germans and be yelling in the ears of ministers. Especially as funds are mostly shifting to Bristol after '57.
ISD likely '62 to '64. Possible fallout is Spey (scaled down Medway), RR may just continue pushing Medway if they can swing BOAC back.
Irony is RB.106 reheat chamber work is very likely what formed basis of Spey 202 reheat Chambre
'62-'64 as the ISD seems doable. As long as her AB doesn't get larger than 41 inches around there is no need to do any sheet metal work like on the F-4K.. the J-65 that the F-11 came with originally was 41 inches around at the AB, the J-79 was 38.3 from the SAC sheet on the B, 39.6 on the S.
IF..IF.. the RB.106 performs as projected with 15,000 pounds static dry thrust that puts our projected bird cracking Mach 2 at military power and cruising at over Mach one really easily! We might not need the AB.
But even if we go with the most boring alteration... sticking to only historically available power plants we don't have a bad aircraft here.
As I understand it, the F-104 relied on blown flaps for low altitude/low speed handling reasons. This blown flap/slat system would put extra demand on the engine, would it not? Was the blown flap/slat system prone to failure? It is interesting that those operators as mentioned, that operated the aircraft in its intended role, had few problems which would suggest that the super Tiger might not have experienced the loss rate the F-104 did. There was a senior commander (Erich Hartmann) in the Lufwaffe who resigned/retired early over the issue so problems were expected from someone who after all was an extremely experienced pilot who should have been listened to
BLC ducting and valving does add a potential failure mode, and certainly concerns like airflow distortion, dependent on intake design and ducting, are specific to the airframe. On the other hand, when the BLC system is operational, then the engine bleed will tend to reduce the chances of compressor stall (this is why jet engines frequently use bleed valves to prevent compressor stalls). GE in the design of the J79, chose a single-spool design, which required the engine to have quite a lot of variable geometry in the compressor. Variable guide vanes tend to be more susceptible to FOD than fixed geometry. That variable geometry adds quite a few failure modes.
Reading Tony Buttler's ASP: Vol 4 last night, found mention that Grumman were looking at a unreheated TF-30 powered F-11 for the VA(lit) competition before they settled on the G-128-12 single-seat A-6.
Given this was circa mid-1962, so far too late to influence the choices made for the F-104 but shows that the F-11 was not out of further growth potential.
As I understand it, the F-104 relied on blown flaps for low altitude/low speed handling reasons. This blown flap/slat system would put extra demand on the engine, would it not? Was the blown flap/slat system prone to failure? It is interesting that those operators as mentioned, that operated the aircraft in its intended role, had few problems which would suggest that the super Tiger might not have experienced the loss rate the F-104 did. There was a senior commander (Erich Hartmann) in the Lufwaffe who resigned/retired early over the issue so problems were expected from someone who after all was an extremely experienced pilot who should have been listened to
BLC ducting and valving does add a potential failure mode, and certainly concerns like airflow distortion, dependent on intake design and ducting, are specific to the airframe. On the other hand, when the BLC system is operational, then the engine bleed will tend to reduce the chances of compressor stall (this is why jet engines frequently use bleed valves to prevent compressor stalls). GE in the design of the J79, chose a single-spool design, which required the engine to have quite a lot of variable geometry in the compressor. Variable guide vanes tend to be more susceptible to FOD than fixed geometry. That variable geometry adds quite a few failure modes.
Something has been gnawing at the back of my brain for a few days now: The nagging suspicion that the SuperTiger was deliberately and with malice aforethought murdered and I am not sure where to explore best.
IF the USN does not let Grumman out of their promise to decline the German contract, I have no clue what the Germans are going to do if Starfighter is also not an option. Perhaps a mix of an F-8 variant and Buccaneer?
That promise is something that I missed when I first read the book.. I was scanning for numbers and different stuff so I am giving myself a tiny break for missing it.. is the basis for my suspicion on the murder of the ST. Parts of the timeline are somewhat unclear as to when the various nations that were on the verge of signing or had signed part of the deal and then backed out; but I wonder if it had been any nation would that same hint at looking to fat have come? You have to be fairly high up the food chain to talk directly to Mr. Grumman one would think, let alone put some pressure on him. This is going to be bugging me....
Something has been gnawing at the back of my brain for a few days now: The nagging suspicion that the SuperTiger was deliberately and with malice aforethought murdered and I am not sure where to explore best.
IF the USN does not let Grumman out of their promise to decline the German contract, I have no clue what the Germans are going to do if Starfighter is also not an option. Perhaps a mix of an F-8 variant and Buccaneer?
That promise is something that I missed when I first read the book.. I was scanning for numbers and different stuff so I am giving myself a tiny break for missing it.. is the basis for my suspicion on the murder of the ST. Parts of the timeline are somewhat unclear as to when the various nations that were on the verge of signing or had signed part of the deal and then backed out; but I wonder if it had been any nation would that same hint at looking to fat have come? You have to be fairly high up the food chain to talk directly to Mr. Grumman one would think, let alone put some pressure on him. This is going to be bugging me....
Personally, I think the Navy made the decision that the Crusader had more growth potential than the Tiger did and elected to kill the Super Tiger in the cradle. Is really hard to argue that they made the wrong call. The Crusader served with the fleet as a fighter through to 1976, in the photo recon role until 1991 (active duty to 1987), and in foreign service all the way up to 2000. Not bad for an early 1950s design.
IF the USN does not let Grumman out of their promise to decline the German contract, I have no clue what the Germans are going to do if Starfighter is also not an option. Perhaps a mix of an F-8 variant and Buccaneer?
The Buccaneer is the obvious choice for the Marineflieger; they really wanted it, and it's a good fit for the job.
The Crusader was not offered to the Germans; the other two options offered were the F-100J (all-weather variant with Crusader-style nose and intake) and the N-156 (which became the F-5), neither of which are particularly appealing. Both are sub-mach 2 and exist only on paper, considerations which were what put the Super Tiger and F-104G ahead to begin with.
Something has been gnawing at the back of my brain for a few days now: The nagging suspicion that the SuperTiger was deliberately and with malice aforethought murdered and I am not sure where to explore best.
IF the USN does not let Grumman out of their promise to decline the German contract, I have no clue what the Germans are going to do if Starfighter is also not an option. Perhaps a mix of an F-8 variant and Buccaneer?
That promise is something that I missed when I first read the book.. I was scanning for numbers and different stuff so I am giving myself a tiny break for missing it.. is the basis for my suspicion on the murder of the ST. Parts of the timeline are somewhat unclear as to when the various nations that were on the verge of signing or had signed part of the deal and then backed out; but I wonder if it had been any nation would that same hint at looking to fat have come? You have to be fairly high up the food chain to talk directly to Mr. Grumman one would think, let alone put some pressure on him. This is going to be bugging me....
Personally, I think the Navy made the decision that the Crusader had more growth potential than the Tiger did and elected to kill the Super Tiger in the cradle. Is really hard to argue that they made the wrong call. The Crusader served with the fleet as a fighter through to 1976, in the photo recon role until 1991 (active duty to 1987), and in foreign service all the way up to 2000. Not bad for an early 1950s design.
One of the few advantage the Super Tiger had over the Crusader was a fatter nose for larger radars (the Crouze bullet wasn't practical), and hitting Mach 2 rather than Mach 1.7.
Except the Phantom had the same advantages... and many others.
What I came to understand is that
- the Super Tiger was allowed to happen because "naval interceptor / J79 / to Mach 2" was to be tested for the Phantom.
- the Skylancer was allowed to happen on behalf of "let's see if that daring Sparrow II can be make to work, otherwise: Sparrow III on larger fighters - Demon interim, then either Crusader III or Phantom - is the way to go".
There was no room left between "basic Crusader I / II" and "Phantom".
In fact the interim Sparrow III F3H Demons filled the small gap there.
What it is still very unclear is the following.
It seems that circa 1956-57 the USN considered all four options above, had hard time to pick a winner, and then went with the lower risk approach - two seats with SARH.
With perfect hindsight, do we know what was the most realstic option ?
- single seater with Sparrow II, active homing
- single seater with Sparrow III, semi-active homing
- two-seater with Sparrow III, semi-active homing
(I have experience of UK procurement system, none of US...but, assuming broad consistency:
selling armaments is different and AW-capable a/c are different again. Export Approvals come down from the Main Man).
The first whiff of a customer Prospect comes from the in-country Embassy of the prospective Supplier: so, Defence and/or Commercial Attache. Their career is enhanced by being initiator of a Big Deal. US/Bonn Attaches will have fed back FRG appetite to have more local content in successors to F-84s/F-86s. Separate lines of interest are Marketing teams of...Grumman, Lockheed, Northrop, Vought, who instantly lobby DoD to favour ME!
So: Grumman has several active DoD prospects - inc Mohawk: more than their competitors. But it is not Grumman's mahogany row that tells USN: "don't worry my boy, we will decline FRG and attend only to you". Its DoD (so SecDef, so the Main Man) who (might) say that.
But he would not. DoD would try to measure the effect on DoD-business of Grumman's support to a Euro-licence: some R&D, lots of Production Control. Chevrolet invented that long ago, UK to this day does not understand it. Chop up the job into bite-sized pieces to be handled by semi-skilled labour, located somewhere on Amtrak's network.
Just as (we now know) Lockheed was able to serve F-104G licence-prog while handling black progs., so DoD would have Aided Grumman, say by managing a dispersed, out-sourced structure-supply scheme for DoD Intruders et al. See Kaiser for C-119s, recently see Boeing turning turf in S.Carolina, employing non-Engineering hires, to assemble (remember Grumman, like most manufacturers, was actually an assembler) 787s - now sole-source. If the MainMan saw National Interest in an FRG ST he would have caused such a solution. Grumman's bosses would have been told, with greenbacks, what was required. I doubt ST was killed for any nefarious motive. I go with #168,SSgtC.
It's strange that every cancelled aircraft is tainted with the whiff of conspiracy. So much so that its cliché.
As with recent posts of the CF-105's performance on this forum, it's clear that just because something looks 'cool' and is meant to be the finest object conceived by the best brains in the industry doesn't actually mean that it was capable of meeting the hype or capable of meeting its requirements or showing superlative advantages over the competition.
I don't see it as a conspiracy. Grumman was keeping in with its biggest buyer, the USN, who wanted every aircraft they could get out of the factories. The USN was hardly short of choices given the size it was, the Skylancer and Crusader III would likewise prove surplus to their requirements. And in truth Grumman had very few export successes for its naval fighters (Argentina brought two new F9F-8T trainers Cougars but its Panthers had been ex-USN stock) to get its management that excited about a big export drive to Germany.
It's clear that if there was any shenanigans then it was the German's themselves that talked themselves into the F-104, Lockheed were out for number one, they weren't necessarily interested in crippling the Super Tiger per se but in getting ahead of the entire playing field.
The view from the US side on Grumman Vs Lockheed certainly adds to some perspective to the stories of poor old Aubrey Jones waiting up on Christmas Eve, not for Santa but for Bonn to ring through an order for the Saro P.177. Sandys had it right, it was better to pack it up lock, stock and barrel and not wait around for Bonn (or Tokyo) to call, Lockheed had already stuffed their Christmas stockings with dollars way before the Christmas season. Export dreams for the Saro were just that.
Something has been gnawing at the back of my brain for a few days now: The nagging suspicion that the SuperTiger was deliberately and with malice aforethought murdered and I am not sure where to explore best.
IF the USN does not let Grumman out of their promise to decline the German contract, I have no clue what the Germans are going to do if Starfighter is also not an option. Perhaps a mix of an F-8 variant and Buccaneer?
That promise is something that I missed when I first read the book.. I was scanning for numbers and different stuff so I am giving myself a tiny break for missing it.. is the basis for my suspicion on the murder of the ST. Parts of the timeline are somewhat unclear as to when the various nations that were on the verge of signing or had signed part of the deal and then backed out; but I wonder if it had been any nation would that same hint at looking to fat have come? You have to be fairly high up the food chain to talk directly to Mr. Grumman one would think, let alone put some pressure on him. This is going to be bugging me....
Personally, I think the Navy made the decision that the Crusader had more growth potential than the Tiger did and elected to kill the Super Tiger in the cradle. Is really hard to argue that they made the wrong call. The Crusader served with the fleet as a fighter through to 1976, in the photo recon role until 1991 (active duty to 1987), and in foreign service all the way up to 2000. Not bad for an early 1950s design.
I understand what you are saying, but hear me out here: How does that affect a foreign sale, how would that make Grumman "to fat", "fat" enough to threaten any and all existing USN contracts?
The German deal called for Grumman manufacturing perhaps 50 initial units the rest of the order being built in Germany. The Canadian and Japanese orders are nearly identical. So it would be logical to presume that any one of them could trigger that warning off.
All of the developmental growth to the ST would in theory benefit greatly existing Tigers that were currently serving in the Fleet no?
THAT becomes a possible problem. This would tend to make the F-8 look like the wrong choice... and as we have discussed in other threads we know that the F-8 was not only a good aircraft but was purchased as much for it keeping Vought alive as a company.
Note I will be adding to this post a little later.
EDIT: The additions.
I will draw attention to the solid black portions of the drawing, in particular the wingtips. The 98L was what was to become the F-12. Adding to any of the possible production orders just the wingtips, which could be done to any existing F-11 in inventory increases the wing area to 313 sq. feet and lowers the wing loading to 83 and change at 26,000 pounds, at the max TO for the standard Tiger of 23,000 you are looking at 73... so she can launch off anything that can handle an A-4 including the H-8 CVS Essex.
The second drawing is of the AN-1, on that I want to draw attention to the F-11 folded up in the tube... they actually altered 6-7 just off the assembly line aircraft that way.. a large enough number that it is strongly likely that they test flew one to make sure it still would.
That also becomes a problem a couple plays ahead: She folds up to 10 feet across. F-8 is 23 folded, so 2 Tigers could fold up in the space taken up by a single F-8... And in the case of the Royal Navy it could directly replace both in terms of span and weight 2-1 SeaVixen.
But the wingtip thing is enough to be a threat to the Crusader and give smaller carriers a viable all weather mach 2, sparrow carrying air defense fighter in either single or 2 seater form... and that makes justifying bigger carriers more of a PITA to congress.
So yeah politics does suck.. I know I have worked in the field... and SuperTiger was murdered, murdered I tell you!!! LOL
Something has been gnawing at the back of my brain for a few days now: The nagging suspicion that the SuperTiger was deliberately and with malice aforethought murdered and I am not sure where to explore best.
IF the USN does not let Grumman out of their promise to decline the German contract, I have no clue what the Germans are going to do if Starfighter is also not an option. Perhaps a mix of an F-8 variant and Buccaneer?
That promise is something that I missed when I first read the book.. I was scanning for numbers and different stuff so I am giving myself a tiny break for missing it.. is the basis for my suspicion on the murder of the ST. Parts of the timeline are somewhat unclear as to when the various nations that were on the verge of signing or had signed part of the deal and then backed out; but I wonder if it had been any nation would that same hint at looking to fat have come? You have to be fairly high up the food chain to talk directly to Mr. Grumman one would think, let alone put some pressure on him. This is going to be bugging me....
Personally, I think the Navy made the decision that the Crusader had more growth potential than the Tiger did and elected to kill the Super Tiger in the cradle. Is really hard to argue that they made the wrong call. The Crusader served with the fleet as a fighter through to 1976, in the photo recon role until 1991 (active duty to 1987), and in foreign service all the way up to 2000. Not bad for an early 1950s design.
I understand what you are saying, but hear me out here: How does that affect a foreign sale, how would that make Grumman "to fat", "fat" enough to threaten any and all existing USN contracts?
The German deal called for Grumman manufacturing perhaps 50 initial units the rest of the order being built in Germany. The Canadian and Japanese orders are nearly identical. So it would be logical to presume that any one of them could trigger that warning off.
All of the developmental growth to the ST would in theory benefit greatly existing Tigers that were currently serving in the Fleet no?
THAT becomes a possible problem. This would tend to make the F-8 look like the wrong choice... and as we have discussed in other threads we know that the F-8 was not only a good aircraft but was purchased as much for it keeping Vought alive as a company.
Note I will be adding to this post a little later.
Grumman was acutely aware that they were not the most popular company in Washington, that both McDonnell and Lockheed were preferred by law makers. If Grumman won the Super Tiger contract, it was highly unlikely that either the E-2 or A-6 would have been allowed to win their competitions and those planes would have been awarded to one of the other competitors. Because to Congress, "Grumman doesn't need that work, they just won this huge contract from Germany. But __________ in my district doesn't have that day contract. Let's award them the win even though the Grumman plane is better."
Something has been gnawing at the back of my brain for a few days now: The nagging suspicion that the SuperTiger was deliberately and with malice aforethought murdered and I am not sure where to explore best.
IF the USN does not let Grumman out of their promise to decline the German contract, I have no clue what the Germans are going to do if Starfighter is also not an option. Perhaps a mix of an F-8 variant and Buccaneer?
That promise is something that I missed when I first read the book.. I was scanning for numbers and different stuff so I am giving myself a tiny break for missing it.. is the basis for my suspicion on the murder of the ST. Parts of the timeline are somewhat unclear as to when the various nations that were on the verge of signing or had signed part of the deal and then backed out; but I wonder if it had been any nation would that same hint at looking to fat have come? You have to be fairly high up the food chain to talk directly to Mr. Grumman one would think, let alone put some pressure on him. This is going to be bugging me....
Personally, I think the Navy made the decision that the Crusader had more growth potential than the Tiger did and elected to kill the Super Tiger in the cradle. Is really hard to argue that they made the wrong call. The Crusader served with the fleet as a fighter through to 1976, in the photo recon role until 1991 (active duty to 1987), and in foreign service all the way up to 2000. Not bad for an early 1950s design.
I understand what you are saying, but hear me out here: How does that affect a foreign sale, how would that make Grumman "to fat", "fat" enough to threaten any and all existing USN contracts?
The German deal called for Grumman manufacturing perhaps 50 initial units the rest of the order being built in Germany. The Canadian and Japanese orders are nearly identical. So it would be logical to presume that any one of them could trigger that warning off.
All of the developmental growth to the ST would in theory benefit greatly existing Tigers that were currently serving in the Fleet no?
THAT becomes a possible problem. This would tend to make the F-8 look like the wrong choice... and as we have discussed in other threads we know that the F-8 was not only a good aircraft but was purchased as much for it keeping Vought alive as a company.
Note I will be adding to this post a little later.
Grumman was acutely aware that they were not the most popular company in Washington, that both McDonnell and Lockheed were preferred by law makers. If Grumman won the Super Tiger contract, it was highly unlikely that either the E-2 or A-6 would have been allowed to win their competitions and those planes would have been awarded to one of the other competitors. Because to Congress, "Grumman doesn't need that work, they just won this huge contract from Germany. But __________ in my district doesn't have that day contract. Let's award them the win even though the Grumman plane is better."
I think the Grumman not being a popular company thing is more a Cheney era thing... Dick Cheney was positively allergic to Grumman. But back in the late 50's? I don't think they had the same problem.
You were the one who posted the brochures!
I think it was RLBH who pointed out how the performance was very similar to that attained by the Convair F-106 and you mentioned all the missile/fire-control selection issues.
Sure it looked good but it was a flawed design, not saying it wouldn't have worked but it wouldn't have been a wonder fighter.
What had Grumman done to deserve that? Most of the their programmes seem to have been very successful. Was it because they never penetrated the USAF hierarchy (the USMC/US Army OV-1 might have ruffled feathers)?
Well when you have things like the Lockheed bribery scandal and in particular to the SuperTiger labeling an aircraft that was almost 300 pounds lighter than the Tiger in current carrier service "to heavy for carrier service"... it tends to enhance that LOL!
I think the Grumman not being a popular company thing is more a Cheney era thing... Dick Cheney was positively allergic to Grumman. But back in the late 50's? I don't think they had the same problem.
What had Grumman done to deserve that? Most of the their programmes seem to have been very successful. Was it because they never penetrated the USAF hierarchy (the USMC/US Army OV-1 might have ruffled feathers)?
Grumman had gotten kind of arrogant AIUI. Something they never really learned not to be. I also think some of it had to do with the fact that Lockheed and McDonnell knew how to play the political game and were just better at it.
I think the Grumman not being a popular company thing is more a Cheney era thing... Dick Cheney was positively allergic to Grumman. But back in the late 50's? I don't think they had the same problem.
What had Grumman done to deserve that? Most of the their programmes seem to have been very successful. Was it because they never penetrated the USAF hierarchy (the USMC/US Army OV-1 might have ruffled feathers)?
Grumman had gotten kind of arrogant AIUI. Something they never really learned not to be. I also think some of it had to do with the fact that Lockheed and McDonnell knew how to play the political game and were just better at it.
That would tend to support my hypothesis.. they were being trolled. Any of the foreign orders would have triggered the warn off, and Grumman's suspicion that they were being toyed with might have a basis in reality not just gut feeling. Will post another tidbit along with this.
They were going to market the origami ST. So, let us say that CNO doesn't warn off Grumman and lets the sales go through (This is a potential suspect as he would have eyes on all possible programs but could be someone else); this kind of system would have some appeal to the Germans since as I recall they may have done something similar with the F-104.. I have a vague memory of a video of a Starfighter being "yeeted" like this, but am fuzzy on it... Edit: Though a folding wing is not shown in the illustration this just demands nay screams for one and to be put on a train or a covered trailer
This would give the USMC a platform to compare to the F-8 and start screaming for as Vietnam starts heating up... all of the improvements made to the ST including the origami folding could be done to any long nose F-11, including the ones that were mostly in storage in the mid '60s allowing you to double up a Marine squadron of F-8s in the same hangar space with an aircraft that is a much better CAS platform and a near equal gunfighter... Marines love raining "hate and discontent" on the heads of people shooting at fellow Marines and they are super good at being REALLY annoying in yelling for things that help them do that... see the amount of money poured into the F-8 to add A2G to it because of the Corps. I would bet the conversion costs of the program would be less than the development costs of the F-8 subtype that I can't remember the designator of.
You were the one who posted the brochures!
I think it was RLBH who pointed out how the performance was very similar to that attained by the Convair F-106 and you mentioned all the missile/fire-control selection issues.
Sure it looked good but it was a flawed design, not saying it wouldn't have worked but it wouldn't have been a wonder fighter.
Ah, I see what you mean now. Yeah, I love the Arrow but not to the point of losing my lucidity over it, I mean, Randall Withcomb really annoyed me back in 2002-2006 when I red some of his stuff on the Internet and nearly fell for it... then I decided to make my own research.
Took a very long time to get out of the annoying myth blown out of proportion (in that regard, I think Palmiro Campagna is doing an honest job, but it nonethless needs to be balanced by other stuff)
- but finding those NRC documents was pretty exciting, NOT become they made the Arrow a SUPER-DUPER aircraft; rather, to ground it in truth and real-world, rock-solid numbers.
Now I have a clue of what this aircraft could do, and what it could not. Related to a F-106, its best aguments were: 2-seats, 2-engines. F-101B however was already there...
Do people think that if the Germans, and other European countries, had been offered an aircraft that was broadly comparable to the F-4 which first flew in say 1956 and was on track to be introduced in late 1959 or 1960 they might have been interested, or would it be too much aircraft? A more expensive purchase price can be dealt with via low/no-interest loans or similar but higher running costs could be a problem.
Do people think that if the Germans, and other European countries, had been offered an aircraft that was broadly comparable to the F-4 which first flew in say 1956 and was on track to be introduced in late 1959 or 1960 they might have been interested, or would it be too much aircraft? A more expensive purchase price can be dealt with via low/no-interest loans or similar but higher running costs could be a problem.
I posted earlier in the thread about the navy making Grumman promise to NOT take the German order... came across this in earlier in the same book screen-shot-2020-04-30-at-4-26-22-pm-png.631876
The part where Admiral Schoecher WANTS them to win the German order to show that the navy can build a great fighter...
Anyone else find that combo a bit "sketchy"
Posting here to keep the two bits of data together.
Well that was why I mentioned low/no interest loans, much like financing a car it allows you spread the payments out over say five or ten years taking some of the sting out of the price. You can't however do that with running costs hence the question of whether it would be a deal killer or not.
Well that was why I mentioned low/no interest loans, much like financing a car it allows you spread the payments out over say five or ten years taking some of the sting out of the price. You can't however do that with running costs hence the question of whether it would be a deal killer or not.
A land-based Crusader with a J79 would indeed no longer need a VI wing - as the engine is not only shorter, but the nozzle won't hit a flight deck at low speed and high AoA anymore.
Problem: these two modifications would cost Germany an arm and a leg. "Better is the ennemy of good" sometimes.
Maybe the V.I wing mechanism could be locked in place or removed altogether without further modifications ?
Nothing wrong with revisiting the amazing topics/post on this forum, I often learn more on the second read....
Please let us know what you assertain as a result mate.
What is somewhat ironic with 100% hindsight is that Vought triumphed with the Crusader yet never put a J79 in that bird. By contrast Douglas and Grumman with the Skylancer and Super Tiger had plans to do so (the former) or very much did it; yet these aircraft ended orphans and went nowhere.
Another irony is related to vietnam. When the MiGs started making Phantom lives a misery, the USN was more than happy to have the Crusader guns and agility and smaller carrier abilities; to the point of remanufacturing hundreds of them;
- while USAF not so lucky not only struggled with the Phantoms
but also threw everything but the kitchen sink at air combat:
- F-111A and F-105 were for strike
- F-102 and F-104 were tried but found to be ill-suited
- F-101A /C /R were for reconnaissance, strike
- F-101B and F-106 were too few and for ADC in CONUS
It is pretty unnerving to think USAF couldn't find a decent fighter in its immense inventory to efficient tackle those freakkin' MIG-21 in A2A combat. In the end Phantoms did the job, TBH.
What else ?
Can't help thinking of Crusader III, Skylancer and Super Tiger fighting their way in Vietnam - some in place of Crusaders, some in place of Phantom.
The USAF's primary problem in Vietnam was poor training. After I think 1968 both the Navy and Air Force implemented changes to improve their performance in air combat. The Navy focused on improving training and maintaining their missiles better, the Air Force focused on improving their hardware (this included the addition of the Vulcan on the F-4E). The Navy's kill ratio improved dramatically while the Air Force's changed little. Operation Bolo further proves the point that it was poor tactics due to a lack of training that hindered the AF. Bolo demonstrated that even the older F-4C was a very viable air superiority platform when flown properly, 7 MiG-21s shot down to 0 losses on part of the Phantoms. Unless the Air Force dramatically improved training a la Navy Fighter Weapons School, throwing a new fighter into the mix that just turns better would not have significantly improved overall performance of the Air Force.
Considering the fact that the F-104's high wing loading gave it a smooth ride at low altitude, and that it was a relatively simple aircraft, like the G.91, I've questioned whether it would have actually made a good supersonic alternative to the Gina, suppose the F-104G was repurposed into a dedicated low level strike aircraft intended to carry two sidewinders on the wingtips for self protection and one Instant Sunrise Device, rather than having a secondary interceptor role, and Germany looked for another type better suited to air defense (maybe the F-8?). With better training for poor weather, I think it would have been a much more successful strike aircraft, then again, the temperamental J79-GE-11 might have still caused the aircraft significant problems in German service.
A land-based Crusader with a J79 would indeed no longer need a VI wing - as the engine is not only shorter, but the nozzle won't hit a flight deck at low speed and high AoA anymore.
Problem: these two modifications would cost Germany an arm and a leg. "Better is the ennemy of good" sometimes.
Maybe the V.I wing mechanism could be locked in place or removed altogether without further modifications ?
Vanilla Crusader IIs would probably be a better idea.
The Marineflieger at least would like the Crusader for obvious reasons. Maybe it could be adapted to lob anti-ship missiles (Kormoran ?)
I vote for the Crusader as the winner here. Super Tiger would be better but has no backing from its mother country, and that's pretty bad.
Didn't the requirement specify the ability to operate from short runways? If so the VI wing (as much as I personally don't care for it) would probably have given the F-8 a strong selling point.
How about the A-4 Skyhawk? Subsonic, sure. But it was a very useful attack platform, with nearly 3,000 built. The Luftwaffe could have had hundreds of the things! And putting bombs on any supersonic type makes it subsonic anyway!
I have a better idea to turn this thread on its head, the F-104 as a G.91 alternative. Hear me out, the highly loaded wing and lack of any real interceptor capability means it theoretically could have been developed into a dedicated low level strike aircraft. Like the G.91 it was also specifically designed to be mechanically simple and easy to maintain. Imagine if these qualities had been recognized early on and the Starfighter selected as winner of NBMR-1 despite not being entered in the competition, and the G.91 cancelled altogether. The F-104 becomes a dedicated Instant Sunrise Device-hauler and Germany selects the Super Tiger in 1958 as their next frontline tactical aircraft due to its greater usable load, Sparrow capability, and benign handling characteristics.
I think the Grumman not being a popular company thing is more a Cheney era thing... Dick Cheney was positively allergic to Grumman. But back in the late 50's? I don't think they had the same problem.
What had Grumman done to deserve that? Most of the their programmes seem to have been very successful. Was it because they never penetrated the USAF hierarchy (the USMC/US Army OV-1 might have ruffled feathers)?
Grumman had gotten kind of arrogant AIUI. Something they never really learned not to be. I also think some of it had to do with the fact that Lockheed and McDonnell knew how to play the political game and were just better at it.
That would tend to support my hypothesis.. they were being trolled. Any of the foreign orders would have triggered the warn off, and Grumman's suspicion that they were being toyed with might have a basis in reality not just gut feeling. Will post another tidbit along with this.
They were going to market the origami ST. So, let us say that CNO doesn't warn off Grumman and lets the sales go through (This is a potential suspect as he would have eyes on all possible programs but could be someone else); this kind of system would have some appeal to the Germans since as I recall they may have done something similar with the F-104.. I have a vague memory of a video of a Starfighter being "yeeted" like this, but am fuzzy on it... Edit: Though a folding wing is not shown in the illustration this just demands nay screams for one and to be put on a train or a covered trailer
This would give the USMC a platform to compare to the F-8 and start screaming for as Vietnam starts heating up... all of the improvements made to the ST including the origami folding could be done to any long nose F-11, including the ones that were mostly in storage in the mid '60s allowing you to double up a Marine squadron of F-8s in the same hangar space with an aircraft that is a much better CAS platform and a near equal gunfighter... Marines love raining "hate and discontent" on the heads of people shooting at fellow Marines and they are super good at being REALLY annoying in yelling for things that help them do that... see the amount of money poured into the F-8 to add A2G to it because of the Corps. I would bet the conversion costs of the program would be less than the development costs of the F-8 subtype that I can't remember the designator of.
Im surprised there was only minimal mention of the F-107. It has the issue that it was never adopted by the USAF, but neither was the Super Tiger, and it fits the Luftwaffe requirements to a T.
All true and well put. Germany had every incentive to choose the F-104 and did. But what if, in a bizarre twist (and this being an 'alternative history' thread), Germany did not go for the F-104? Who had the next best proposition - Grumman?
The version offered to Germany was actually an F11F-1F. Instead of the Wright J65 in the original Tiger, this version was powered by a Pratt & Whitney J79 and was capable of reaching Mach 2.04 in level flight. And possibly faster in the production version (the prototypes were just stock F11F-1s with a fuselage plug and wing root fillets).
Forget the Super Tiger or the Crusader, the real answer to this problem, as the Germans realised a decade later, was the F4 Phantom. It first flew in 1958 and entered service in 1961.
Compared with the tortuous options above, especially the daft SR177, getting the F4 around in the late 50s rather than the early 60s seems a much easier alt Luftwaffe.
Canada is the other F4 should have been.
This would not have killed the Starfighter though the Belgians, Danes, Dutch and Norwegians might have gone with Drakens (Denmark bought some) or Mirages (Belgium later bought Mirage Vs).
They might even have bought Lightnings if the UK had got its act together.
The only problem is, the Phantom is something like 2-2.5 times as expensive as the F-104/F11F. So while F-4 was the, by far, better plane for Germany, it was also a plane that they simply couldn't buy enough of given it's cost.
Germany was already by the early 1960s on the way to being the West's biggest economy after the US.
German Industry building F4s with McD would not have needed MRCA Tornado. Swing Wing F4s instead.
The G91 bulked out the Light Attack Wings. A joint UK/German replacement based on Harrier or BAC ctol designs might have replaced them.
Honestly, I'd argue the F-104 actually should have replaced the G.91 before it entered production. The F-104 was a lightweight, relatively easy to maintain (from what I've heard/read), fighter with exceptional high speed, low altitude performance. The high wing loading offered a smooth ride through the dense, turbulent air at low altitude. The G model pioneered the use of an Inertial Navigation System, the Litton LN-3 was the system used in the Starfighter. I'd argue the F-104G should have been developed into a dedicated ground attack platform with an avionics suite tailored (more so than it already was) to low altitude navigation in poor visibility and air to ground weapons delivery. Considering nuclear strike was at the forefront of NATO tacair requirements at the time, especially for West Germany, and considering the F-104 airframe was well suited to the "one pass-haul ass" mission profile of a nuclear strike aircraft, I'd argue that the Starfighter should have been declared winner of NBMR-1 by default, developed into a dedicated nuke-hauler and Germany should have looked at either Mirage IIICs or F-8s to fill its fighter/interceptor requirements.
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