USMC Doctrine Changes

Well, the enemy of marines probably also know that using artillery and sinking marine transports or destroying them on landing is the decisive course of action, while a tank with similar logistics and monetary cost is far less effective as it lacks firepower and range. So what enemy of marines would choose the less effective weapon to oppose marines? Marines is unlikely to run into tanks in their offensives. Even if marines do meet tanks, air and naval firepower can destroy them at no risk, while landing involve total superiority of both. Leakers can be defeated by missiles before doing too much damage, not like tanks fire fast like MRLS that erase grids.

Now, direct fire may be handy in shooting up targets other than tanks, however responsive precise indirect fire and smaller guns can do the bulk of the job. The only target set I think large direct fire gun is really that helpful is in urban warfare where buildings impede indirect fire while resisting smaller guns. If one is assaulting a city, just ask the army.

As for armor and protection in offensives, the capability for massed suicidal charges by unmanned systems changes the historical morale and value constraint on rate of offense of poorly protected forces. Even before that kind of thing gets realized, offensives is possible based mostly on firepower, just slower. If we are talking about the kinds of rocks marines are talking about taking, speed is not important as the land area is tiny. In is not like they are trying to knock out Russia in a single season or something.
 
_Del_ said:
Because anti-shipping missiles only work once the balloon goes up, while minelaying is both a deterrent to actual conflict which is the most favourable chance of defeating an invasion, and in the event they decide to proceed anyway, it shepherds all the commercial and military traffic into nice crowded areas even farther away from Taiwan's beaches to which you can lob your anti-shipping missiles.
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"-We hit them here, here, here!
-And if they hit us?
-Us? For what??? "

Offensive mining in peacetime is an act of war. Stupid one at that, since it'll seriously makes US look like a provocateur, and it takes literally no effort to make US into a cartoon villain after that.

In a way, it'll be even worse to US system of security than loss of Taiwan. In one case, you're on your own. In another - your ally willfully descends region into war, at a cost of everyone else.
_Del_ said:
Skipjack and Flounder are the only meaningful way to defend Taiwan.
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Preemptive small-scale aerial mining as a way to contain strategic invasion?
(which is expected to deal with orders-of-magnitude more massive, elaborate and diverse Taiwanese minefields anyways?)

That's anything but a way.
Dilandu said:
And just imagine the possibilities of the offensive mining of Chinese naval bases and sub pens)
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Perilous, for given probability of return. There are much better targets for remote aerial bombing.
 
Ainen said:
Offensive mining in peacetime is an act of war. Stupid one at that, since it'll seriously makes US look like a provocateur, and it takes literally no effort to make US into a cartoon villain after that.
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Pretty sure this was all in the context of mining the Taiwan Strait with controlled mines which is totally permissible under all
of the relevant treaties and international agreements.
 
It shouldn't be that challenging to hit a target in the Taiwan straight during a conflict. You could just fire an AGM-158C in the general direction from a couple hundred miles away. Mining doesn't seem to bring a lot to the table unless it is specifically directed at landing craft, which is something Taiwan should invest in, not the US.
 
Josh_TN said:
It shouldn't be that challenging to hit a target in the Taiwan straight during a conflict. You could just fire an AGM-158C in the general direction from a couple hundred miles away. Mining doesn't seem to bring a lot to the table unless it is specifically directed at landing craft, which is something Taiwan should invest in, not the US.
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The first casualties of the minefields would be any decoy ships the PRC would employ.

For IIR seekers, you want ship-sky contrast which is much harder to suppress (it's been argued that it's impossible)
relative to ship-sea contrast. With blockers out of the way, target presentation is much more favorable.
 
marauder2048 said:
Josh_TN said:
It shouldn't be that challenging to hit a target in the Taiwan straight during a conflict. You could just fire an AGM-158C in the general direction from a couple hundred miles away. Mining doesn't seem to bring a lot to the table unless it is specifically directed at landing craft, which is something Taiwan should invest in, not the US.
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The first casualties of the minefields would be any decoy ships the PRC would employ.

For IIR seekers, you want ship-sky contrast which is much harder to suppress (it's been argued that it's impossible)
relative to ship-sea contrast. With blockers out of the way, target presentation is much more favorable.
Click to expand...
The PLAN would send the People's Fishing Boat Floatilla across the straight as a buffer.
 
In_A_Dream said:
marauder2048 said:
Josh_TN said:
It shouldn't be that challenging to hit a target in the Taiwan straight during a conflict. You could just fire an AGM-158C in the general direction from a couple hundred miles away. Mining doesn't seem to bring a lot to the table unless it is specifically directed at landing craft, which is something Taiwan should invest in, not the US.
Click to expand...
The first casualties of the minefields would be any decoy ships the PRC would employ.

For IIR seekers, you want ship-sky contrast which is much harder to suppress (it's been argued that it's impossible)
relative to ship-sea contrast. With blockers out of the way, target presentation is much more favorable.
Click to expand...
The PLAN would send the People's Fishing Boat Floatilla across the straight as a buffer.
Click to expand...
No question. That's why I think you need something to thin out the swarm.
 
In_A_Dream said:
marauder2048 said:
Josh_TN said:
It shouldn't be that challenging to hit a target in the Taiwan straight during a conflict. You could just fire an AGM-158C in the general direction from a couple hundred miles away. Mining doesn't seem to bring a lot to the table unless it is specifically directed at landing craft, which is something Taiwan should invest in, not the US.
Click to expand...
The first casualties of the minefields would be any decoy ships the PRC would employ.

For IIR seekers, you want ship-sky contrast which is much harder to suppress (it's been argued that it's impossible)
relative to ship-sea contrast. With blockers out of the way, target presentation is much more favorable.
Click to expand...
The PLAN would send the People's Fishing Boat Floatilla across the straight as a buffer.
Click to expand...
No doubt, but an IIR seeker should be able to filter out non essential targets. More over, is a ship of any size really less expensive than a missile?
 
Josh_TN said:
In_A_Dream said:
marauder2048 said:
Josh_TN said:
It shouldn't be that challenging to hit a target in the Taiwan straight during a conflict. You could just fire an AGM-158C in the general direction from a couple hundred miles away. Mining doesn't seem to bring a lot to the table unless it is specifically directed at landing craft, which is something Taiwan should invest in, not the US.
Click to expand...
The first casualties of the minefields would be any decoy ships the PRC would employ.

For IIR seekers, you want ship-sky contrast which is much harder to suppress (it's been argued that it's impossible)
relative to ship-sea contrast. With blockers out of the way, target presentation is much more favorable.
Click to expand...
The PLAN would send the People's Fishing Boat Floatilla across the straight as a buffer.
Click to expand...
No doubt, but an IIR seeker should be able to filter out non essential targets. More over, is a ship of any size really less expensive than a missile?
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One point of the buffer ships is to breakup the silhouette of the essential targets..
Most of the IIR seekers try to match seeker imagery to stored infrared signature templates that are
computed from ship silhouette and temperature models.

I suppose the decoy ship/ASCM trade is relative to the inventory replenishment time.
It's not like the US has a deep inventory of LRASMs
 
marauder2048 said:
Ainen said:
Offensive mining in peacetime is an act of war. Stupid one at that, since it'll seriously makes US look like a provocateur, and it takes literally no effort to make US into a cartoon villain after that.
Click to expand...
Pretty sure this was all in the context of mining the Taiwan Strait with controlled mines which is totally permissible under all
of the relevant treaties and international agreements.
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1, mining of international straits in peacetime is outright illegal. Article 38 paragraph 1, UNCLOS. (right of transit) . You can say that controlled mines do not constitute navigation hazard, but....

2, ... you get civilian ship exploding somewhere around there the very next morning. Good luck proving anyone what that mine probably wasn't yours, and they actually sunk themselves.

(+good luck proving anyone anytime soon, that your treaty obligations w/o ratification are worth a damn)

3, aerial mining is heavily dependent on surprise. Properly forewarned mining won't just put their usefulness into a question, it will also justify 3rd party presence(guess which 3rd party it will be) out there. It's going to be hard to do much with them: it's legal to preempt imminent strike under the right of self defense, but this "imminent" isn't all that stretchable.

4, and as a bonus: employing ER mines isn't all that different from employment of bombs. Now that (salvo in the air) is a perfectly legal "imminent threat" under UN charter, but imminent threat going a very wrong direction.

Conclusion : there are ways to tell a peer state that you won't just watch. Aerial mining appears to be a really bad and ineffective way of doing this. Actual Taiwanese mining plans, for example, are much more reasonable.
 
Ainen said:
You can say that controlled mines do not constitute navigation hazard, but....
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That's the basic legal argument and the official position of the United States (amongst others).
The modern versions can be enabled or disabled remotely and civilian traffic is provided with the appropriate notification.

Ainen said:
aerial mining is heavily dependent on surprise.
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The incredibly successful B-29 mining of Japan's inner zones notwithstanding apparently.
They didn't achieve surprise but they were able to conceal they layout of the minefields and use a
sufficient variety to prevent easy sweeping; ER mining does this the former by design.

Yes, the preemptive mining of an international strait does permit third parties to sweep them.
Given that mines can almost always be relaid faster than they can be swept...

Unless there's a PRC amphibious fleet in being that poses a credible invasion threat, it's going to take
time to mass and transport.
 
marauder2048 said:
That's the basic legal argument and the official position of the United States (amongst others).
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It's about mining international waters, not international straits.
Straits are under a different and far more stringent regime.(part iii of the treaty).
For a very obvious reason.

Just as importantly - undisturbed navigation through straits is actually US position.
marauder2048 said:
The incredibly successful B-29 mining of Japan's inner zones notwithstanding apparently.
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There won't be any such b-29 campaign overnight. There probably won't be anything similar until fairly late into conflict, provided it's successful for the United States.

There is simply a limit of how much US can do on a short notice in a short time, and without risking far too much.

It still hasn't reached many, but at existing force ratio, at least initial part of this conflict is up to China to lose and for US to win, not the other way around.

Recognition by allies and neutrals is hugely important here.
Their stakes are higher than American ones: capitals of this region remember 1942 very well.
marauder2048 said:
Given that mines can almost always be relaid faster than they can be swept...
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By Taiwan - yes. By US - probably no, and attempt would be so ugly optically, that it essentially sets campaign on a losing course. Even w/o possible incidents as described in the previous post.

There is no due regard in unilateral action in international waters. And continuous mining of international strait by 3rd party is not just internationally wrongful act, it's simply an aggression under article 2(4) of UN charter.
 
Ainen said:
t's about mining international waters, not international straits.
Straits are under a different and far more stringent regime.(part iii of the treaty).
For a very obvious reason.
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It's about both actually. Straits change the notification requirement; controlled mines in international waters would not require notification.
The overall US position is that channelizing neutral traffic via mining of an international strait is permitted. That could be in perpetuity
especially with controlled mines and notification.

Given that traffic can be readily and safely routed around the straits (see the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis) why neutrals and allies
would be offended or annoyed is unclear.


Ainen said:
There won't be any such b-29 campaign overnight. There probably won't be anything similar until fairly late into conflict, provided it's successful for the United States.
Click to expand...

Which was true in WW2. But not true for US defensive mine laying plans against Soviet surface groups.
Wing-kit-added-to-mine is of course something Taiwan itself could do.
Or a surface launched variant. Or something combined. It takes time to marshall and cross the straits; I can't see how the
ROC would not have strategic warning of an amphib fleet.

For the an air campaign they would not have warning which is really the flaw that threatens to undermine aerial minelayer.
 
The discussion is going a bit OT, I'm afraid. Please, back to the original topic !
 
Lets talk islands:

take, copy, kill?
------------
As for offensive mining: If the world's two biggest economies with large nuclear arsenals gets into a fight, that is **** hit the fan moment and traditional legalist thinking probably goes out the window.

Offensive mining of PLA submarine bases (some of them very hardened) may induce significant virtual attrition by slowing operations to a crawl. This is an effect that Taiwan based defensive mining or missile strikes can not do. Could be strategically significant it the conflict ends up in convoy battles.
 
Marine and Army long range strike appears overlapping, not surprising. The Army got the jump on using SM-6 in a land role as well....

I do wonder if the Army have the right mentality for island defense.

When the maneuverists and power projection people controlling the organization, would the army be really proficient in operations while dominated by opponent air. How much of the army is going to specialize in tunnel digging, decoy tending and general hiding? The Skill at this task is shown in comparison between Iraq and Serbia.

The lack of initiative and repulsive power means islands are just missile sponges for soaking up missiles (a wall) as it can not actually prevent Chinese maneuver, only raise the costs. Actual combat power beyond "demands a neutralization response" maybe useless, while survivability overrides all other warfighting concerns.
 
hmm, it just hits me that...

If you have affordable under water missile pods you don't need actual land to place your missiles. Hide the pods inside a complex minefield with lots of decoys and it'd take a lot of time and UGVs to clear, if it could be cleared at all.

If the entire complex can be deployed from the air, with time one can mass for a massive alpha strike that is far bigger than the payload of the air force, at any point that the air force can penetrate into. With longer range missiles the shooting points can be distributed while covering strategic amounts of territory. Peace time deployments and prepositioned kits surface ships/islands near strategic areas and have them deploy as tensions increase and opponent mobilizes are also possible. Finally submarines and ugv naturally fix into this concept.

Imagine, instead of having surge air force capability to push bombers 1000km out of area of operations, having to clear out much of the entire seafloor 1000km out~
 
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With the openness of the PLA being the perceived principle threat by the USMC, I think the long neglected aspect of its ground-based air defence assets needs serious addressing. I would think the re-hashing and re-introduction of the LAV-AD (GE Blazer turret) mounted on the new Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) chassis would be a sensible and cost effective system.

Why the USMC phased out its original LAV-AD has me completely stuffed.

Regards
Pioneer
 

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