Rhinocrates
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This seems a worthy news report and analysis from a reputable source. Given the repeated descent of other threads on Ukraine into chaos, I won't object to this thread being locked or this post moved. I hope that the thread can be exclusively devoted to delayed data-based analysis from reputable sources, not immediate reactions.
"In battle nothing is ever as good or as bad as the first reports of excited men would have it” - William Slim
www.economist.com
It's reporting on this:
Key takeaways:
Ukraine endured this initial blitz largely because it had the foresight to disperse its munitions stockpiles from main arsenals a week before the invasion, with those efforts accelerating three days before the war
Russian command chain operates very slowly and hierarchially, meaning two days before a strike can be mounted, by which time the target will have moved.
“There is no sanctuary in modern warfare,” concludes the report. “The enemy can strike throughout operational depth”—in other words, well behind the notional front lines. [HG Wells pointed this out over a century ago]
Sensors are so effective that The best way of surviving is simply to disperse and move more quickly than the enemy can spot you.
Contrary to popular wisdom, Javelin and nlaw anti-tank missiles supplied by America and Britain did not save the day, despite featuring heavily in video footage from the first week of the conflict. Nor did Turkey’s tb2 drones, which struggled to survive after day three.
The pivotal role of artillery is a sobering thought for western European armies, whose firepower has dwindled dramatically since the end of the cold war.
Drones have played a vital role, though largely for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance rather than for strike missions.
But a key lesson from Ukraine is that armies need more drones than they think. Around 90% of all drones used by the Ukrainian armed forces between February and July were destroyed, notes rusi. The average life expectancy of a fixed-wing drone was approximately six flights; that of a simpler quadcopter a paltry three. Such attrition would chew up the fleets of European armies in a matter of days.
It puts a premium on cheap and simple systems, which can be treated as near-disposable, rather than tiny fleets of large and expensive drones, with big liquid-fuelled engines, carrying advanced sensors.
The most important way of countering drones, says rusi, is to use electronic warfare (ew), a weapon whose invisibility has left it languishing in the shadows.
Mr Watling tells the story of two Russian pilots overheard complaining that their radars are scrambled. They quickly realise that their own ew pods... are each targeting the other’s radar. The pods are duly turned off, forcing the planes to fly without electronic protection in a dangerous zone.
“We don’t have many exercise areas where we can actually turn all of our ew equipment on,” he says. “We can do it in niche contexts. We have not tested doing it at scale.”
Essential search terms then: dispersal, mobility, deception, artillery (including rockets), drones (cheap, expendable, and numerous), techniques for co-ordinated EW over large, dense theatres.
"In battle nothing is ever as good or as bad as the first reports of excited men would have it” - William Slim
What is the war in Ukraine teaching Western armies?
It shows the importance of dispersal, firepower and stockpiles
It's reporting on this:
Key takeaways:
Ukraine endured this initial blitz largely because it had the foresight to disperse its munitions stockpiles from main arsenals a week before the invasion, with those efforts accelerating three days before the war
Russian command chain operates very slowly and hierarchially, meaning two days before a strike can be mounted, by which time the target will have moved.
“There is no sanctuary in modern warfare,” concludes the report. “The enemy can strike throughout operational depth”—in other words, well behind the notional front lines. [HG Wells pointed this out over a century ago]
Sensors are so effective that The best way of surviving is simply to disperse and move more quickly than the enemy can spot you.
Contrary to popular wisdom, Javelin and nlaw anti-tank missiles supplied by America and Britain did not save the day, despite featuring heavily in video footage from the first week of the conflict. Nor did Turkey’s tb2 drones, which struggled to survive after day three.
The pivotal role of artillery is a sobering thought for western European armies, whose firepower has dwindled dramatically since the end of the cold war.
Drones have played a vital role, though largely for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance rather than for strike missions.
But a key lesson from Ukraine is that armies need more drones than they think. Around 90% of all drones used by the Ukrainian armed forces between February and July were destroyed, notes rusi. The average life expectancy of a fixed-wing drone was approximately six flights; that of a simpler quadcopter a paltry three. Such attrition would chew up the fleets of European armies in a matter of days.
It puts a premium on cheap and simple systems, which can be treated as near-disposable, rather than tiny fleets of large and expensive drones, with big liquid-fuelled engines, carrying advanced sensors.
The most important way of countering drones, says rusi, is to use electronic warfare (ew), a weapon whose invisibility has left it languishing in the shadows.
Mr Watling tells the story of two Russian pilots overheard complaining that their radars are scrambled. They quickly realise that their own ew pods... are each targeting the other’s radar. The pods are duly turned off, forcing the planes to fly without electronic protection in a dangerous zone.
“We don’t have many exercise areas where we can actually turn all of our ew equipment on,” he says. “We can do it in niche contexts. We have not tested doing it at scale.”
Essential search terms then: dispersal, mobility, deception, artillery (including rockets), drones (cheap, expendable, and numerous), techniques for co-ordinated EW over large, dense theatres.
