Trillion Dollar Trainwreck: How the F-35 Hollowed out the US Air Force by Bill Sweetman

[H_K]

I’ll be interested to see if the book goes into the root causes of some of the software related issues that have plagued the program.

Concurrent development. Too many lines of code and releases, never giving time for the software to settle down. Too much complexity & over engineering (e.g. ALIS). Etc.

Would be an interesting debate whether these software related issues (and the considerable expense) could have been avoided. F-15EX, Super Hornet, Rafale etc seem to indicate the answer is “Yes”.

 

[Ray]

I have enjoyed Bill Gunston's books. He flew de Haviland Vampires before retiring. Does that count?

 

[aim9xray]

I’ll be interested to see if the book goes into the root causes of some of the software related issues that have plagued the program.

Me too.

Concurrent development. Too many lines of code and releases, never giving time for the software to settle down.

Faulty software doesn't settle down. Left alone, it is immutable. It requires observation, tracking, perseverance, intervention, roping and wrestling to the ground by highly experienced coneheads. Oh, and budget and schedule. And tools. BTDT.

Too much complexity & over engineering (e.g. ALIS). Etc.

Miscomprehension and complete misunderstanding of the existing military environment and maintenance practices resulting in $hit requirements, as well as the hubris that the Computer Science weenies understood the environment (and how to fix airplanes) better than the wrench turners.

 

[Arjen]

[1] $hit requirements, as well as the

[2] hubris that the Computer Science weenies understood the environment (and how to fix airplanes) better than the wrench turners.

[2] inevitably leads to [1]. The hubris lies within the organisation that's responsible for a disconnect between end-users and the Computer Science weenies.
Start with "Weenie, meet end-user. Talk. Listen. Or else."

 

[aim9xray]

[2] inevitably leads to [1]. The hubris lies within the organisation that's responsible for a disconnect between end-users and the Computer Science weenies.
Start with "Weenie, meet end-user. Talk. Listen. Or else."

Nice idea. However, in the real world, that should not happen exactly like that for very good reasons. I was lucky enough to be embedded in a customer WSSA as part of the IPT, at the customer DT&E site. And we had the benefit of some EXTREMELY smart Systems Engineering and SME folk as we were developing our Weapon System Segment PPS from the component specs such as 1553 and 1760 as well as the existing PPS for the new weapon. And, we had aircrew involvement. Even so, we had to build up from a code maintenance/improvement cadre to an expanded development group. Let me tell you that adding codemonkeys to a project will not speed it up. Add to that new hardware integration and late deliveries/shortages of PPH hardware and associated test equipment for the labs, and software tool chain, you have a special kind of hell. (Google "software deathmarch".)

Here's a war story that hit really quite close to home:

"Several years ago I was working with a software engineering team to develop targeting sensor software for a pretty major military aircraft program. The team was also responsible for maintaining an aircraft simulator that was used heavily by engineers on the program to do systems integration testing. The software was installed on a number of test station server racks.

A huge hardware and software update was being done to all the test stations and I was given the task to update the aircraft simulator to be compatible with the new test station server racks. The update involved updating the communications layer of the simulator to send and receive asynchronous data from the targeting sensor using a new fibre channel board.

Shortly after the update was done, I received numerous reports from engineers about intermittent Blue Screens of Death that they would encounter while using the simulator.

It took me months to trace and isolate the cause of the intermittent BSODs to a missed interrupt service routine within the fibre channel driver that we received from the vendor. What made this very difficult was that the nature of the failures made it impossible to capture log data that can be shared with the vendor. We had to ship one of our servers to the vendor along with a simple program that reproduced the issue in order to prove that the failures were not due to user error."
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Now to meat and potatoes on F-35... Real Life, Dateline 2022.

"L3Harris [LHX] has completed the safety of flight certification for the company’s Integrated Core Processor (ICP) for the Lockheed Martin [LMT] F-35 fighter, L3Harris CEO Chris Kubasik said on July 29.

"ICP, which is to be 25 times more powerful than the F-35’s current processor, is central to the F-35 program’s Technology Refresh 3 (TR3). The latter is the computer backbone for Block 4, which is to have 88 unique features and to integrate 16 new weapons on the F-35. A big challenge, however, for TR3 has been ICP, and the Government Accountability Office has been concerned by the possibility of further delays in processor deliveries and by the poor software quality for Block 4.

"Kubasik said on a July 29 earnings call that “the first [ICP] flight systems were delivered to Lockheed Martin last month.” “So great news, relative to TR-3 and meeting that delivery a little late*, but nonetheless, this is progressing,” he said. “So our Lot 15 hardware starts getting delivered later this year, and the goal, the whole focus here is to support Lockheed to enable their 2023 aircraft delivery. So feeling much better about the progress the team has made. I know they worked a lot of long nights and weekends to get here.”

Emphasis Added.

*Translation from Managementspeak: "Gee, LockMart, we're really sorry we screwed you over on schedule by delivering late, hope you can work harder to get back on your schedule. Too bad that you couldn't have used that time by learning the new coding & simulation support enviroment - oh wait, you needed the hardware for that. Well, everything should work just tikity-boo. (Boy, am I glad we finally got this steamer out our door.) Oh, and please sign the DD250 here, so we can get paid."


to be continued.

 

[Arjen]

@aim9xray Perhaps I should clarify. My trade is programming, the demand for new systems rarely originates with the end-users. In many cases, new technology drives the demand for new systems, because it offers new possibilities, financial, functional, operational or maintenance-wise. A responsible group of Computer Science weenies will wish to gather information from as much of the fields of expertise that matter.

Some of that information, some of it crucial, resides in, among others, end-users. Us weenies ignore them at our peril. Whoever cuts us off from that source of information needs a bloody good reason for that cutoff.

My professional experience: that reason will sometimes be withheld - at times out of arrogance, at times out of embarrassment.

<edit> Some of us weenies communicate better with machinery than with people. The Computer Science weenies I've met are a remarkably diverse bunch. Some of us are adept at interpreting between our communicationally-challenged siblings and the people we work for. Customers. Users. Maintenance.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

How many IT Project Managers does it take to change a lightbulb?

None, you just descope illumination from the project initial release.

 

[joewee]

The bigger question, while off topic, is wether the Harrier needed replacing and wether the Marines really need organic fixed wing air for their mission.

And with that, was the F-35 worth it for that mission.

But this thread is about the book, which only one of us has read. Everyone has opinions about the subject of the book, those are best expressed elsewhere

Yep. Do we really need (and can we afford) the Navy's army to have its own air force? Guadalcanal was a long time ago ...

 

[Purpletrouble]

Well, that's a point.

To that point, why then should we listen to you as as you slag a book that you have not researched, written, edited, fact-checked and produced, let alone published or even read?

Dont then! Isn’t that simple enough?

It’s a self published book clearly slating a project the author has had a hive of bees in his bonnet about for decades. An author with a track record of zero experience in any actual military or project. An author with zero responsibility for ever deciding or delivering anything.

As I said, the book is an ego trip of self indulgence.

The contrast to Tom Burbage’s book is marked in the insight it can offer. Clearly he’ll defend to some extent but he was actually there in the room, making the decisions and seeing the numbers.

F-35 has flaws certainly, everything does but the gibberish that people like Sweetman throw at it is uninformed and not reality. Avionics are complex, every program struggles, sustainment contracts are just that - a contract, they are not fixed to F35 alone.

The US Govt’s main frustration with F35 in my expeirence (aside from usual cost/time) was the internationalism of it and the impact on the level of control it was used (ie lots of arguments and politics affecting the strategic level eg Turkey) that resulted. Hence NGAD not repeating that.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

Tom Burbage's book is awful. Reads like his PA wrote it. Not sure I trust your judgement;

 

[Purpletrouble]

Tom Burbage's book is awful. Reads like his PA wrote it. Not sure I trust your judgement;

Ah well, not surprising perhaps. his emails and all-hands etc. werent very good either. I didnt have a lot of hope given experience but a pity, a missed opportunity given the insight he should have.

I don’t think anyone really rated him as delivering the project, but he was incredibly well connected to keep it going and did. I see the exact same thing on another project now - a Head utterly unsble to lead or direct the actual project, but superb at moving it through all the Govt cogs. Burbage iirc later got his role redefined to the latter aspects which seemed like someone realised and acted.

 

[sferrin]

Is concurrency a terrible idea? Why yes it is. Was commonality proven to reduce costs? No it was not. Does Lockheed have a hellish Apple like draconian end user agreement that has the Air Force by the balls when it comes to sustainment? Yes, they do.

I'm sure the book will point out many more problems than this. The important questions are is the Air Force very cognizant of what the F35 program did to them? I think the answer is yes based upon comments they've made about NGAD and not making the same mistakes they did on F35.

The other question is what ongoing damage did the F35 program do to our acquisitions or defense posture. Those are the kind of questions I hope the book answers.

People go on about concurrency like its unique to the F-35. It's been used since the at least the 60s to very good effect. Saw a government video on the development and fielding of the Minuteman ICBM and they emphasized how concurrency was vital to hitting the tight schedule they had.

 

[sferrin]

The bigger question, while off topic, is wether the Harrier needed replacing and wether the Marines really need organic fixed wing air for their mission.

The Harrier isn't a B-52 that will last forever so it certainly needed replacing. As for organic fixed wing the USMC has had it since WW2 so the answer is an obvious "yes". It's not like USMC Harriers have been hangar queens their entire career.

 

[LowObservable]

Dont then! Isn’t that simple enough?

It’s a self published book clearly slating a project the author has had a hive of bees in his bonnet about for decades. An author with a track record of zero experience in any actual military or project. An author with zero responsibility for ever deciding or delivering anything.

As I said, the book is an ego trip of self indulgence.

The contrast to Tom Burbage’s book is marked in the insight it can offer. Clearly he’ll defend to some extent but he was actually there in the room, making the decisions and seeing the numbers.

F-35 has flaws certainly, everything does but the gibberish that people like Sweetman throw at it is uninformed and not reality. Avionics are complex, every program struggles, sustainment contracts are just that - a contract, they are not fixed to F35 alone.

The US Govt’s main frustration with F35 in my expeirence (aside from usual cost/time) was the internationalism of it and the impact on the level of control it was used (ie lots of arguments and politics affecting the strategic level eg Turkey) that resulted. Hence NGAD not repeating that.

You earned this fair and square, sunshine.

 

[Purpletrouble]

You earned this fair and square, sunshine.

View attachment 728401

Great contribution. Did you come up with it yourself, or just copy what someone else did?

Which ironically sums up this topic.

I suggest you get out and enjoy the sunshine whilst it lasts.

 

[LowObservable]

People go on about concurrency like its unique to the F-35. It's been used since the at least the 60s to very good effect. Saw a government video on the development and fielding of the Minuteman ICBM and they emphasized how concurrency was vital to hitting the tight schedule they had.

Designing a program plan (which, pace PurpleFace, I've done for realz) is a lot about managing concurrency. Concurrency is like water. You need some of it but too much of it will drown you. Essentially, you're going to commit resources to production at an increasing rate, and you want to make sure that as the rate of investment increases, your development has advanced and the risk is reduced. I submit that when you're building 1000 aircraft under "low rate initial production" something has gone wrong.

 

[Purpletrouble]

Designing a program plan (which, pace PurpleFace, I've done for realz) is a lot about managing concurrency. Concurrency is like water. You need some of it but too much of it will drown you.

Really useful stuff. Define “some of / too much”…

Essentially, you're going to commit resources to production at an increasing rate, and you want to make sure that as the rate of investment increases, your development has advanced and the risk is reduced. I submit that when you're building 1000 aircraft under "low rate initial production" something has gone wrong.

The overlapping of development and production was a wider cultural/political imposition that has been applied to numerous projects of the era and since. Its flaws, like it’s benefits, are immaterial to F-35 as they would be the same with any alternative project(s) and similarly if the approach to this and other programs had been different. F-35 is a symptom in that case of a wider procurement malaise (if the considered view is the costs outweigh the benefits), not a cause.

 

[Arjen]

I can see this being... divisive

Don't care. I will have a copy.

 

[edwest4]

Dont then! Isn’t that simple enough?

It’s a self published book clearly slating a project the author has had a hive of bees in his bonnet about for decades. An author with a track record of zero experience in any actual military or project. An author with zero responsibility for ever deciding or delivering anything.

As I said, the book is an ego trip of self indulgence.

The contrast to Tom Burbage’s book is marked in the insight it can offer. Clearly he’ll defend to some extent but he was actually there in the room, making the decisions and seeing the numbers.

F-35 has flaws certainly, everything does but the gibberish that people like Sweetman throw at it is uninformed and not reality. Avionics are complex, every program struggles, sustainment contracts are just that - a contract, they are not fixed to F35 alone.

The US Govt’s main frustration with F35 in my expeirence (aside from usual cost/time) was the internationalism of it and the impact on the level of control it was used (ie lots of arguments and politics affecting the strategic level eg Turkey) that resulted. Hence NGAD not repeating that.

Oh please. Give it a rest, will you? Are you here just to rag on Bill Sweetman or are you going to be a good expert and actually read the book? Fair means fair.

 

[edwest4]

An aside if I may, I am sick and tired of anonymous experts posting on various sites about expertise they may or may not have. If you know the answer, then publish it. In a book.

 

[Purpletrouble]

An aside if I may, I am sick and tired of anonymous experts posting on various sites about expertise they may or may not have. If you know the answer, then publish it. In a book.

It must be hard not to have expertise, but I wouldn’t know.

I suppose one could just bitch on about something for decades, despite no actual expertise in doing any of it, and then write a book about that bitching to try and fleece a few gullibles of their cash. I guess it works for some.

 

[edwest4]

It must be hard not to have expertise, but I wouldn’t know.

I suppose one could just bitch on about something for decades, despite no actual expertise in doing any of it, and then write a book about that bitching to try and fleece a few gullibles of their cash. I guess it works for some.

I have been in book publishing for decades. I know how to do proper research.

 

[Purpletrouble]

I have been in book publishing for decades. I know how to do proper research.

I love unintended irony.

 

[CJGibson]

 

[edwest4]

View attachment 728417

Is this how barroom brawls usually go?

 

[CJGibson]

Is this how barroom brawls usually go?

Only over the rules of pool.

Chris

 

[edwest4]

Only over pool rules.

Chris

Thank you.

 

[TinWing]

The reality is that the F-35 was forged by the congressional budget process as much as any operational requirement. It needed to be uncancellable, with work share in enough congressional districts to garner votes. In hindsight, 3 separate programs might have been cheaper. STOVL was doable, even with the X-32 propulsion concept, if internal carriage had been minimized or eliminated. The Harrier II was never a first-day-of-war strike platform and that wasn’t even a Marine Corp mission. The F-35B is nice to have and the shaft driven front fan has been amazingly unproblematic. Supersonic STOVL has been a success. The packaging limitations and high weight have take a toll on other variants. Take away internal carriage and relax the stealth requirement and even the X-32’s propulsion concept would have worked just fine, probably with an uprated F110 instead of the mammoth F135. Maybe a less ambitious ASTOVL combined with CALF would have had total per-unit program costs 1/3 of the F-35A/B that we actually got. The Navy’s need for a type with the range of the A-6 and the flight performance exceeding the F-14 along with an acceptable approach speed was always going to be expensive. As it is, the F-35C doesn’t have the flight performance or range to get the job done. F/A-XX is truly vital for the future of American Carrier aviation. As it is, we’ve managed to live through a decades long carrier aviation capability gap because of the lack of serious “near peer” adversary.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

Don't care. I will have a copy.

Me too

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

Chris and I would both dispute the frankly ludicrous idea that only people with aviation industry experience can write worthwhile books on aircraft. Its like saying only combatants in WW2 can write a history of WW2.

Ah well, not surprising perhaps. his emails and all-hands etc. werent very good either. I didnt have a lot of hope given experience but a pity, a missed opportunity given the insight he should have.

I don’t think anyone really rated him as delivering the project, but he was incredibly well connected to keep it going and did. I see the exact same thing on another project now - a Head utterly unsble to lead or direct the actual project, but superb at moving it through all the Govt cogs. Burbage iirc later got his role redefined to the latter aspects which seemed like someone realised and acted.

According to the book he's an ex Navy pilot who spent many years at Lockheed "through several demanding assignments, including managing the Washington operations for the Lockheed Aeronautical Companies, leading their Navy aircraft programs and then the F-22 Raptor program".

So yes, typical executive management material, deeply embedded in Washington.

In my aero engineering course, we used to rag on the quality of teachers by quoting George Bernard Shaw's "He who can does; he who cannot, teaches."

In my first IT job in a higher education college, seeing the managers there, I extended the saying to

"Those who can, do. Those who can't, teach. Those who can't teach, manage."

 

[Purpletrouble]

Chris and I would both dispute the frankly ludicrous idea that only people with aviation industry experience can write worthwhile books on aircraft. Its like saying only combatants in WW2 can write a history of WW2.

Which is fine as I’m not claiming that and have explictly said so. Misrepresenting me is a rather underhand tactic.

My issue is someone who, without any relevant quals or experience in any kind of military capability or program, has spent years loudly deriding a program on and now publishes a book on the very same.

That is not an author researching a topic and presenting an objective history, of which my shelves are full, indeed 2 of Chris’ products arrived this afternoon presenting me a storage problem!

It is a self indulgent whinge fest and seems no different from the growing trend of those that havent done, taught or managed to tell us how it should be. Sorry, but I’ll look at those that have done some of that before I sign up to their agenda/pronoucements.

According to the book he's an ex Navy pilot who spent many years at Lockheed "through several demanding assignments, including managing the Washington operations for the Lockheed Aeronautical Companies, leading their Navy aircraft programs and then the F-22 Raptor program".

So yes, typical executive management material, deeply embedded in Washington.

Without them programs don’t survive. I dont like them tbh, but its observable fact.

In my aero engineering course, we used to rag on the quality of teachers by quoting George Bernard Shaw's "He who can does; he who cannot, teaches."

On my Aero MEng, few of the “teachers” were any good at teaching. They were extremely good at research however. On my (much later) post grad qual, I had excellent teachers, all of whom had done absolutely incredible things, although all were abysmal managers.

In my first IT job in a higher education college, seeing the managers there, I extended the saying to

"Those who can, do. Those who can't, teach. Those who can't teach, manage."

Are you being intentionally ironic regarding the importance of “those that do” vs anyone else? Because that doesnt quite fit your first para…

 

[LowObservable]

The reality is that the F-35 was forged by the congressional budget process as much as any operational requirement. It needed to be uncancellable, with work share in enough congressional districts to garner votes. In hindsight, 3 separate programs might have been cheaper. STOVL was doable, even with the X-32 propulsion concept, if internal carriage had been minimized or eliminated. The Harrier II was never a first-day-of-war strike platform and that wasn’t even a Marine Corp mission. The F-35B is nice to have and the shaft driven front fan has been amazingly unproblematic. Supersonic STOVL has been a success. The packaging limitations and high weight have take a toll on other variants. Take away internal carriage and relax the stealth requirement and even the X-32’s propulsion concept would have worked just fine, probably with an uprated F110 instead of the mammoth F135. Maybe a less ambitious ASTOVL combined with CALF would have had total per-unit program costs 1/3 of the F-35A/B that we actually got. The Navy’s need for a type with the range of the A-6 and the flight performance exceeding the F-14 along with an acceptable approach speed was always going to be expensive. As it is, the F-35C doesn’t have the flight performance or range to get the job done. F/A-XX is truly vital for the future of American Carrier aviation. As it is, we’ve managed to live through a decades long carrier aviation capability gap because of the lack of serious “near peer” adversary.

About right. The added costs (such as they were) of building separate aircraft would have been offset by the fact that separate requirements would have been less demanding. But as the book explains, there were other reasons for doing JSF the way it was done.

I'm just reading a recently unearthed 1997 Congressional Budget Office paper on TacAir. It seems quite perceptive and I may add comments later.

 

[Purpletrouble]

The reality is that the F-35 was forged by the congressional budget process as much as any operational requirement. It needed to be uncancellable, with work share in enough congressional districts to garner votes. In hindsight, 3 separate programs might have been cheaper. STOVL was doable, even with the X-32 propulsion concept, if internal carriage had been minimized or eliminated. The Harrier II was never a first-day-of-war strike platform and that wasn’t even a Marine Corp mission. The F-35B is nice to have and the shaft driven front fan has been amazingly unproblematic. Supersonic STOVL has been a success. The packaging limitations and high weight have take a toll on other variants. Take away internal carriage and relax the stealth requirement and even the X-32’s propulsion concept would have worked just fine, probably with an uprated F110 instead of the mammoth F135. Maybe a less ambitious ASTOVL combined with CALF would have had total per-unit program costs 1/3 of the F-35A/B that we actually got. The Navy’s need for a type with the range of the A-6 and the flight performance exceeding the F-14 along with an acceptable approach speed was always going to be expensive. As it is, the F-35C doesn’t have the flight performance or range to get the job done. F/A-XX is truly vital for the future of American Carrier aviation. As it is, we’ve managed to live through a decades long carrier aviation capability gap because of the lack of serious “near peer” adversary.

That doesnt add up. X32 was never a viable aircraft and as you say the SDLF has been superb. The idea this could result in something cheaper is absurd. It just gets cancelled as inadeqaute.

The Navy hasnt spec’d an A6 or F14 flight performance and the C replaces the Hornet which it confortably out-ranges and performs whilst giving it a sustainble LO platform.

The purpose of JSF was to get 3 variants that actually arrive in service and meet that middling strike fighter ground with next gen LO ans avionic capabilities. Tick VG all the way.

If you were in love with A12 or the F14 its hard, but just build a bridge over it.

Good luck if FAXX is some uber plane - because I dont think that has a chance of surviving. If “carrier aviation depends” upon something exotic like that, that should tell you something about the validity of the carrier aviation vision…

As you say, you’ve survived a decade just with SH. So F14/A6 clearly not required and Hornets of both flavous have done extremely well, so a LO Hornet equivalent with the latest gen of avionics seems just what is needed.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

Which is fine as I’m not claiming that and have explictly said so. Misrepresenting me is a rather underhand tactic.

My issue is someone who, without any relevant quals or experience in any kind of military capability or program, has spent years loudly deriding a program on and now publishes a book on the very same.

That is not an author researching a topic and presenting an objective history, of which my shelves are full, indeed 2 of Chris’ products arrived this afternoon presenting me a storage problem!

It is a self indulgent whinge fest and seems no different from the growing trend of those that havent done, taught or managed to tell us how it should be. Sorry, but I’ll look at those that have done some of that before I sign up to their agenda/pronoucements.

Again, I think you are judging the book based on its cover. I think there's a saying about that. I'm pretty sure Bill will have sources to back up his arguments.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

Are you being intentionally ironic regarding the importance of “those that do” vs anyone else? Because that doesnt quite fit your first para…

Nope, but its a general statement about people that take the management path. Many managers at my higher education college were bad teachers, promoted to where they couldn't do too much damage. In my IT career, I've observed the best engineers rarely become managers, most managers were mediocre to average at best at the technical stuff.

 

[publiusr]

If the F-35 program is considered not too expensive---then I'd better not hear a peep about SLS

 

[Purpletrouble]

Again, I think you are judging the book based on its cover. I think there's a saying about that. I'm pretty sure Bill will have sources to back up his arguments.

The cover and the author’s pedigree. The latter being rather substantial. There is a saying about elephants in rooms and how you tell if one has been in the fridge…

Nope, but its a general statement about people that take the management path. Many managers at my higher education college were bad teachers, promoted to where they couldn't do too much damage. In my IT career, I've observed the best engineers rarely become managers, most managers were mediocre to average at best at the technical stuff.

So unintentional then!

You should try engineering in the armed forces. Literally defines itself as “engineering managment”. Explains a lot…

And lack of apology for misrepresting what I said, accepted.

 

[sferrin]

The reality is that the F-35 was forged by the congressional budget process as much as any operational requirement. It needed to be uncancellable, with work share in enough congressional districts to garner votes. In hindsight, 3 separate programs might have been cheaper. STOVL was doable, even with the X-32 propulsion concept, if internal carriage had been minimized or eliminated. The Harrier II was never a first-day-of-war strike platform and that wasn’t even a Marine Corp mission. The F-35B is nice to have and the shaft driven front fan has been amazingly unproblematic. Supersonic STOVL has been a success. The packaging limitations and high weight have take a toll on other variants. Take away internal carriage and relax the stealth requirement and even the X-32’s propulsion concept would have worked just fine, probably with an uprated F110 instead of the mammoth F135. Maybe a less ambitious ASTOVL combined with CALF would have had total per-unit program costs 1/3 of the F-35A/B that we actually got. The Navy’s need for a type with the range of the A-6 and the flight performance exceeding the F-14 along with an acceptable approach speed was always going to be expensive. As it is, the F-35C doesn’t have the flight performance or range to get the job done. F/A-XX is truly vital for the future of American Carrier aviation. As it is, we’ve managed to live through a decades long carrier aviation capability gap because of the lack of serious “near peer” adversary.

Well of course you could do it cheaper by gutting capability. But you couldn't do it cheaper while keep capability.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

F-35 is a symptom in that case of a wider procurement malaise (if the considered view is the costs outweigh the benefits), not a cause.

How do you know that isn't the argument made in the book?

 

[Purpletrouble]

How do you know that isn't the argument made in the book?

Seems highly unlikely for a title “F35 hollowed out the air force” and based on that pedigree.

Although granted “procurement malaise hollows our forces” wouldnt sell. Although arguably that is far more what is needed to be researched and written.