Trillion Dollar Trainwreck: How the F-35 Hollowed out the US Air Force by Bill Sweetman

I get the impression is that the overall principle is that limiting what changes you need to make is critical. If someone wants it to be VTOL, then cut them loose and let them go it alone on that. Generally, design creep is death, and design for three services will guarantee it, so start where you want to go.

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Bill Sweetman shares 10 ways GCAP can avoid the hell of the F-35 project with little or no effort

You hear a lot of “the Global Combat Air Programme’s going to cost just as much and take as long as the F-35 has, so why bother?” Based on the work I did for TRILLION DOLLAR TRAINWRECK (now availab…
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One way of looking at the whole picture:

The JSF program was designed to remake the U.S. military aircraft industry (and defense, of which it was the largest part) in a form that was sustainable in the post Cold War era, as it was seen in the 1990s. Hence the following elements of the strategy:
- One common aircraft, to reduce cost and force mergers, for the USAF, USN, USMC and export - "quad-common"
- Stealth to differentiate it from current generation aircraft
- Low cost to blow away all export competitors

What happened, however:
- Stealth plus quad-common was impossible within timeframe and cost (R&D, procurement, sustainment)
- Single design meant that there was no Plan B
- Mergers, forming megaprimes, and "competimate" relationships among defense companies, nuked what was little competition there was.
 
One way of looking at the whole picture:

The JSF program was designed to remake the U.S. military aircraft industry (and defense, of which it was the largest part) in a form that was sustainable in the post Cold War era, as it was seen in the 1990s. Hence the following elements of the strategy:
- One common aircraft, to reduce cost and force mergers, for the USAF, USN, USMC and export - "quad-common"
- Stealth to differentiate it from current generation aircraft
- Low cost to blow away all export competitors

What happened, however:
- Stealth plus quad-common was impossible within timeframe and cost (R&D, procurement, sustainment)
- Single design meant that there was no Plan B
- Mergers, forming megaprimes, and "competimate" relationships among defense companies, nuked what was little competition there was.

So, monopoly control and higher profits were the answers? Forced mergers? Investors, not people who actually know something, take over. For more profits. Unsustainable? Does that mean technology or just more profits? I suspect the latter.

Once the cow gets milked to death, leave the carcass by the side of the road.

Perhaps a bit more scholarly reply goes like this: Closed door meetings at the Department of Defense to decide what to do now that a major enemy has left the field. Although this is slightly less worse than a nuclear war, a defense industry that was put in place in the late 1940s has to be dismantled in some kind of orderly fashion. The sharks/investors begin to swarm and contact their contacts in defense. The defense industry is set upon and those who are trying to formulate reasonable plans are run over by a massive stampede of investors who >demand< to be heard. This is the takeover opportunity of a lifetime. Those on the technology side are greatly hindered by a mostly organized group of investors who insert themselves into the decision-making process.

I suggest looking into a think tank formed in 1997, Project for the New American Century (PNAC). Someone had to look out for and plan America's future. The final plan would insure American global dominance for the next 100 years.
 
- One common aircraft, to reduce cost and force mergers, for the USAF, USN, USMC and export - "quad-common"
- Stealth to differentiate it from current generation aircraft
- Low cost to blow away all export competitors
The programme did largely succeed with all three of those points. But there are also multiple downsides as you note.

At the same time then it's difficult to see any clearly better alternative course of action across all metrics.
 
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