The F-35 No Holds Barred topic

[GTX]

Remember that LM’s EVMS is primarily for LM’s use. If they believe they have sufficient information to manage the F-35 development/production then that should be sufficient. There are all manner of reports/tools/measures used by both LM and JPO to monitor the F-35 program and EVM is just one part of that. DO NOT confuse product quality or even program management quality with perceived quality of the EVM inputs/outputs

Remember that EVMS's non-compliance with DoD guidelines was the reason progress payments to LM have been and are being docked.

LM may have thought EVMS-as-it-was was good enough, DoD thought different. DoD funds the program, DoD calls the shots.

Which still does not alter the fact that the EVM system is primarily for LM's use... : .

 

[GTX]

The point of the quality control process is to know that the parts meet the required standards,

Well, actually to try to ensure that, but close enough. I am not disagreeing (nor did I above).

it is all well and good saying that the process is adding expense

What I have said is something felt by many in the industry. In fact in some cases companies have pulled back from things such as Nadcap since it is adding expense that is not recovered in any measurable improvement in yield/quality or orders/earnings (the ultimately important measure for any business). Don't get me wrong here: we are not saying that all quality control needs to be done away with. Smart businesses welcome quality control regimes since it is beneficial to the bottom line. What I am saying is that at some point you reach a point of diminishing returns - especially when you start adding system on top of system (ISO9000 + AS9100 + Nadcap + EASA + Customer Supplier Audits + + +). Each one of these elements adds expense. At some point you stop seeing any additional return.

that the criticism is of the process and not the parts themselves

The original issue was that the EVMS was postulated as being an indicator of poor quality. That is incorrect! To try to deduce anything regarding "part quality" from an EVM report or EVMS is like trying to use a picture of Earth from orbit to deduce the political discussions in Washington.

but it becomes impossible to know whether the parts are actually up to standard until they do/do not successfully reach the end of their design lives.

Actually it is reasonably possible through things such as testing and various well recognised Engineering/Statistical processes. B)

And ultimately the QC process is designed to enforce cost control by ensuring that money isn't wasted moving sub-standard parts through the system.

That still does not alter what I said regarding diminishing returns. There is a reason why companies have balked at proceeding with some of the quality regimes being proposed and why others have even removed some. At the end of the day though, it becomes yet another case of Risk Management and ensuring that a business case s sound.

 

[Arjen]

The original issue was that the EVMS was postulated as being an indicator of poor quality.

Which I still think it is.

That is incorrect! To try to deduce anything regarding "part quality" from an EVM report or EVMS is like trying to use a picture of Earth from orbit to deduce the political discussions in Washington.

I've been doing some close reading, and if that is how you interpret my original message, you've misunderstood me.
As I pointed out in a later message, a project's quality is as much about the project's product as the way that product is made.

The fact that Pratt & Whitney's F135 program has just been decertified by DCMA for non-compliance with DoD guidelines on EVMS, resulting in a 5% reduction in DoD payments to P&W, is an indicator of how much importance DoD attaches to the information provided by EVMS.

If the process is lacking in quality, this is fairly likely to affect its product.

 

[GTX]

The original issue was that the EVMS was postulated as being an indicator of poor quality.

Which I still think it is.

Well, please continue to show your complete ignorance of the subject! It amuses many of us to no end.

The fact that Pratt & Whitney's F135 program has just been decertified by DCMA for non-compliance with DoD guidelines on EVMS, resulting in a 5% reduction in DoD payments to P&W, is an indicator of how much importance DoD attaches to the information provided by EVMS.

If the process is lacking in quality, this is fairly likely to affect its product.

And yet again, you are making too great a leap in your conclusions all for the sake of posting negative posts on the F-35 I would postulate.


I will point out that having an issue with EVMS does not necessarily mean that there are any underlying technical issues. Are there contractual mechanisms for the DoD to penalise both LM and P&W? Yes. Does this necessarily mean that the program is having real (as opposed to admin/paperwork) technical or quality issues? Certainly not! It would also not be the first time I have seen a DoD complain about an EVMS and penalise or threaten to penalise a company over it. EVM can be very complex and is certainly open to flaws...on both sides!


If you have never operated within an EVM system/arena (which is obvious by your lack of understanding of what it even is), don't continue to make a fool of yourself by coming up with such ridiculous comments all for the sake of trying to paint the F-35 in a negative way.

 

[GTX]

From F-35 News thread:

From Jane's: F-35 project seeks to overcome EW obsolescence

Anika Torruella, Washington DC - IHS Jane's International Defence Review

07 October 2013

The United States has embarked on a technology refresh development track for the electronic warfare (EW) module of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter to overcome obsolescence issues before the system has even made it into service.

This has seen the US Naval Air Systems Command place a USD149 million contract to Lockheed Martin, as a modification to a previous advanced acquisition deal and covers the "redesign and qualification of replacement F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter Electronic Warfare system components due to current diminishing manufacturing sources".

Principal components of the fifth-generation multi-mission F-35's integrated avionics suite are the Northrop Grumman AN/APG-81 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, Northrop Grumman's AN/AAQ-37 Distributed Aperture System (DAS), the Lockheed Martin AAQ-40 Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS), a VSI (joint venture between Elbit Systems and Rockwell Collins) Helmet-Mounted Display System (HMDS), and BAE Systems' digital AN/ASQ-239 (Barracuda) system derived from the F-22 Raptor's AN/ALR-94 EW suite.

Note emphasis on real issue as opposed to alarmist headline!

This is not a case of the EW system being obsolete against its spec or the threats it will face but rather simply a case of parts becoming harder to source. The same issue hit the F-22 (to a far greater extent) and is a characteristic of other similar programs as well.

 

[SpudmanWP]

This particular issue has been budgetted for in every year as part of the Nonrecurring fighter costs. It is neither new nor unplanned for.

 

[GTX]

This particular issue has been budgetted for in every year as part of the Nonrecurring fighter costs. It is neither new nor unplanned for.

Exactly! But let's not let the truth or facts get in the way of an alarmist headline... : . So much better when we can imply that the F-35 is yet again on the brink of failure. ;D

 

[GTX]

Korea aviation plan ‘a mess’

Fighter procurements are ponderous, complicated and subject to political interference.

Whatever you think of the outcome of South Korea’s F-X III fighter selection - now leaning toward the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter - you cannot deny that it is a mess. The government first created a new agency to manage its defense procurements, set clear selection criteria for 60 new fighters and told the Defense Acquisition Program Administration to git’er done. DAPA picked the F-15SE, a decision that the government speedily set aside.

In accordance with a common definition of insanity, the luckless agency must now go through the same process in hopes of a different outcome. DAPA has caught one break: Eurofighter will be back for round two, so DAPA will not be tied across a sole-source barrel after throwing out binding offers presented in 2013.

Fighter procurements are ponderous, complicated and subject to political interference. The last-named attribute is a feature, not a bug: The price tag gets the Treasury involved, other military services have to vote, and the relationship between the supplier and its own national government will last longer than most marriages.

That said, Korea’s decision stands out because the government had tried to do better. After Dassault noisily bailed out of F-X1 in 2002, alleging that the fix had been in for a U.S. win from the outset, Korea tried to clean up its act by forming DAPA.

Whether or not it was based on a study of Sweden’s FMV, the Korean agency emerged with similar key features: civilian, not subordinate to the services, responsible to the whole of government, and including in its brief, domestic research and development. This would all have been fine had the government not responded to DAPA’s first controversial decision by folding like a cheap suit.

Overt pressure on the government came from 15 former air staff chiefs, who signed an emotional screed that not too subtly evoked a possible threat from F-35-armed Japan. There are a few problems with this sort of appeal.

Former generals have no more access to classified F-35 or threat data than the rest of us (or at least they should not). The Japanese threat might play to the man in the Seoul karaoke bar, but one does not need tinfoil headgear to suspect that. In the event of such a conflict, both sides’ F-35s would succumb to software maladies and stop working rather quickly. And while the generals may all be motivated by pure patriotism, we know that if paying retired officers to influence decisions were illegal, the U.S. defense industry would have to move its business development activities to federal correctional facilities.

There may not have been any U.S. government pressure involved. And Barney might be a real dinosaur. Korea’s 60 near-term orders (the aircraft are needed to replace aging F-4s) are important for the F-35. As recent briefings have shown, the program needs 300 non-U.S. orders in the next 4-5 years to prime the production line and support an orderly ramp-up.

Failure to secure those orders may not kill the program, but they will make it harder to gain the sunlit uplands of building 150-plus per year and un-F-22-like costs. The Netherlands cutting its buy to 37 from 85, and the U.K. punting two-thirds of its nominally planned offtake into the long grass of the later 2020s, are not promising signs that the program’s founding partners are good for those early orders.

It would be understandable if Korea underestimated the importance of an F-35 order to Washington and assumed that an F-15 buy would be of equal validity. When F-X III was in its formative years in 2009, the Pentagon’s high sheriffs believed the F-35 program was blasting ahead toward initial operational capability this year. The Asian market was a sideshow, another dish to be gobbled up in due course.

Korea is in no position to ignore U.S. government warnings about the two nations’ strategic relationship. The next year or so will see how and whether Korea manages to reach a decision that meets the needs of its armed forces, its Treasury and its major ally, while restoring international confidence in the integrity of its procurement process.

Korea’s about-face is a tactical win for the F-35. However, the aircraft has yet to win an open, rules-based competition where all sides were expected to bid a fixed price. Most of its committed buyers, including the U.S. services, signed on when the aircraft was promised to be much earlier and cheaper than it is today. And given the repeated claims of advocates that the price of the F-35A is headed down into F-16 country, the fact that it was beaten on price by not only the massive twin-engine F-15 Eagle but also the Eurofighter Typhoon - from the people who make Aston Martins, Porsches and Lamborghinis - has to raise some eyebrows.

We’ll see what happens in the next open, rules-based, fixed-price, professionally executed competition. What? I’m not saying definitively that Barney can’t be some subspecies of theropoda.

*The author is senior international defense editor of Aviation Week.


by Bill Sweetman

You want to try to explain this comment Bill?

 

[Triton]

Interesting interview of Italian Air Force Chief Lt. Gen. Pasquale Preziosa concerning the F-35 and its use in coalition air power.

Source:
http://breakingdefense.com/2013/11/italian-air-force-chief-speaks-on-f-35-lt-gen-preziosa/

 

[sferrin]

Korea aviation plan ‘a mess’

Fighter procurements are ponderous, complicated and subject to political interference.

Whatever you think of the outcome of South Korea’s F-X III fighter selection - now leaning toward the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter - you cannot deny that it is a mess. The government first created a new agency to manage its defense procurements, set clear selection criteria for 60 new fighters and told the Defense Acquisition Program Administration to git’er done. DAPA picked the F-15SE, a decision that the government speedily set aside.

In accordance with a common definition of insanity, the luckless agency must now go through the same process in hopes of a different outcome. DAPA has caught one break: Eurofighter will be back for round two, so DAPA will not be tied across a sole-source barrel after throwing out binding offers presented in 2013.

Fighter procurements are ponderous, complicated and subject to political interference. The last-named attribute is a feature, not a bug: The price tag gets the Treasury involved, other military services have to vote, and the relationship between the supplier and its own national government will last longer than most marriages.

That said, Korea’s decision stands out because the government had tried to do better. After Dassault noisily bailed out of F-X1 in 2002, alleging that the fix had been in for a U.S. win from the outset, Korea tried to clean up its act by forming DAPA.

Whether or not it was based on a study of Sweden’s FMV, the Korean agency emerged with similar key features: civilian, not subordinate to the services, responsible to the whole of government, and including in its brief, domestic research and development. This would all have been fine had the government not responded to DAPA’s first controversial decision by folding like a cheap suit.

Overt pressure on the government came from 15 former air staff chiefs, who signed an emotional screed that not too subtly evoked a possible threat from F-35-armed Japan. There are a few problems with this sort of appeal.

Former generals have no more access to classified F-35 or threat data than the rest of us (or at least they should not). The Japanese threat might play to the man in the Seoul karaoke bar, but one does not need tinfoil headgear to suspect that. In the event of such a conflict, both sides’ F-35s would succumb to software maladies and stop working rather quickly. And while the generals may all be motivated by pure patriotism, we know that if paying retired officers to influence decisions were illegal, the U.S. defense industry would have to move its business development activities to federal correctional facilities.

There may not have been any U.S. government pressure involved. And Barney might be a real dinosaur. Korea’s 60 near-term orders (the aircraft are needed to replace aging F-4s) are important for the F-35. As recent briefings have shown, the program needs 300 non-U.S. orders in the next 4-5 years to prime the production line and support an orderly ramp-up.

Failure to secure those orders may not kill the program, but they will make it harder to gain the sunlit uplands of building 150-plus per year and un-F-22-like costs. The Netherlands cutting its buy to 37 from 85, and the U.K. punting two-thirds of its nominally planned offtake into the long grass of the later 2020s, are not promising signs that the program’s founding partners are good for those early orders.

It would be understandable if Korea underestimated the importance of an F-35 order to Washington and assumed that an F-15 buy would be of equal validity. When F-X III was in its formative years in 2009, the Pentagon’s high sheriffs believed the F-35 program was blasting ahead toward initial operational capability this year. The Asian market was a sideshow, another dish to be gobbled up in due course.

Korea is in no position to ignore U.S. government warnings about the two nations’ strategic relationship. The next year or so will see how and whether Korea manages to reach a decision that meets the needs of its armed forces, its Treasury and its major ally, while restoring international confidence in the integrity of its procurement process.

Korea’s about-face is a tactical win for the F-35. However, the aircraft has yet to win an open, rules-based competition where all sides were expected to bid a fixed price. Most of its committed buyers, including the U.S. services, signed on when the aircraft was promised to be much earlier and cheaper than it is today. And given the repeated claims of advocates that the price of the F-35A is headed down into F-16 country, the fact that it was beaten on price by not only the massive twin-engine F-15 Eagle but also the Eurofighter Typhoon - from the people who make Aston Martins, Porsches and Lamborghinis - has to raise some eyebrows.

We’ll see what happens in the next open, rules-based, fixed-price, professionally executed competition. What? I’m not saying definitively that Barney can’t be some subspecies of theropoda.

*The author is senior international defense editor of Aviation Week.


by Bill Sweetman

You want to try to explain this comment Bill?

It's Bill Sweetman. That's all the explanation you need.

"In accordance with a common definition of insanity, the luckless agency must now go through the same process in hopes of a different outcome. DAPA has caught one break: Eurofighter will be back for round two, so DAPA will not be tied across a sole-source barrel after throwing out binding offers presented in 2013."

I'm confused. Is Bill talking about Eurofighter here or South Korea? ;D

 

[sublight_]

In the event of such a conflict, both sides’ F-35s would succumb to software maladies and stop working rather quickly.

How does this seem implausible? Stuxnet has shown us that it is no longer theory, we are now deep into the age of cyber warfare. The code running the F-35 will not be open source. All of the computer hardware inside the F35 will not be open source. There will be no way for an "ally" to detect nor prevent a trojan horse in that platform.

We now not only live in an age of cyber warfare, we live in an age of DRM (digital rights management) for weapons platforms.....

 

[SpudmanWP]

In the event of such a conflict, both sides’ F-35s would succumb to software maladies and stop working rather quickly.

How does this seem implausible?

Because any computer that connects to the F-35 should not be connected to the internet.

Good luck trying to hack into the F-35 using its radio links.

 

[sublight_]

In the event of such a conflict, both sides’ F-35s would succumb to software maladies and stop working rather quickly.

How does this seem implausible?

Because any computer that connects to the F-35 should not be connected to the internet.

Good luck trying to hack into the F-35 using its radio links.

You wont need an internet connection. You wont need to plug a computer into it. You wont need an authorized data link. It is one big sensor platform, across a gigantic swath of electro optical wavelengths. Filled with a lot of DSP's.
You just need one little tiny command somewhere in the belly of the beast to send it into Forrest Gump mode....

 

[SpudmanWP]

In the event of such a conflict, both sides’ F-35s would succumb to software maladies and stop working rather quickly.

How does this seem implausible?

Because any computer that connects to the F-35 should not be connected to the internet.

Good luck trying to hack into the F-35 using its radio links.

You wont need an internet connection. You wont need to plug a computer into it. You wont need an authorized data link. It is one big sensor platform, across a gigantic swath of electro optical wavelengths. Filled with a lot of DSP's.
You just need one little tiny command somewhere in the belly of the beast to send it into Forrest Gump mode....

Not going to happen for one simple reason, hackers have nothing to test their methods on.

With PCs, they can test gazillions of different attack methods and log into the PC to see how the attack fared. With the F-35 they would quite literally be firing blind. Not only that, but assuming that you could somehow insert a piece of code into the F-35, you would still need a method to execute it.

Hacking an airborne F-35, or any modern fighter is best left to the movies.

 

[sublight_]

Not going to happen for one simple reason, hackers have nothing to test their methods on.

With PCs, they can test gazillions of different attack methods and log into the PC to see how the attack fared. With the F-35 they would quite literally be firing blind. Not only that, but assuming that you could somehow insert a piece of code into the F-35, you would still need a method to execute it.

Hacking an airborne F-35, or any modern fighter is best left to the movies.

I'm sorry my friend, I think you missed the gist of all this. The back door isn't for hackers. It is for the DoD to assert the ultimate rights of the platform.

 

[sferrin]

I'm sorry my friend, I think you missed the gist of all this. The back door isn't for hackers. It is for the DoD to assert the ultimate rights of the platform.

That's some weapons-grade paranoia right there. The notion that the DoD would intentionally make the F-35 hackable is beyond fantasy.

 

[sublight_]

I'm sorry my friend, I think you missed the gist of all this. The back door isn't for hackers. It is for the DoD to assert the ultimate rights of the platform.

That's some weapons-grade paranoia right there. The notion that the DoD would intentionally make the F-35 hackable is beyond fantasy.

It is not "hackable". It is called "platform rights management". The concept is not theory, it is fact.

 

[SpudmanWP]

I'm sorry my friend, I think you missed the gist of all this. The back door isn't for hackers. It is for the DoD to assert the ultimate rights of the platform.

That's some weapons-grade paranoia right there. The notion that the DoD would intentionally make the F-35 hackable is beyond fantasy.

It is not "hackable". It is called "platform rights management". The concept is not theory, it is fact.

Source or it didn't happen

 

[sferrin]

It is not "hackable". It is called "platform rights management". The concept is not theory, it is fact.

I would love to see your "facts". Pony up.

 

[sublight_]

As a primer, lets start here so you understand exactly what a hardware backdoor is.....

 

[SpudmanWP]

I know what a backdoor is. However, it is useless if the piece of hardware cannot be communicated with.

In the case of the F-35, you would need "backdoors" in several F-35 systems that would have to be coordinated in their design.

Good luck with that.

Besides, BS's comment was not about some DoD backdoor, but about some fanciful notion that the systems would crash on their own.

 

[sublight_]

Besides, BS's comment was not about some DoD backdoor, but about some fanciful notion that the systems would crash on their own.

Incorrect. He is implying that if those two did not play nice with their toys, then the DoD would shut them down.

 

[bobbymike]

Besides, BS's comment was not about some DoD backdoor, but about some fanciful notion that the systems would crash on their own.

Incorrect. He is implying that if those two did not play nice with their toys, then the DoD would shut them down.

Which is another fantasy. Say goodbye to ever selling a weapon system to anyone, ever.

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

Its Sweetman throwing out a theory that is not at all backed up with any actual evidence or fact.

Lets call the magic DoD controlled off-switch he is talking about "Aurora" ;D


If it was some internet nutter I wouldn't bat an eye, but its just Bill Sweetman deciding to suicide the last of his credibility and become... well an internet nutter. Theres nothing wrong with that, I just kind of think that when I read an article by a "respected aviation journalist" that it should be professional and based on facts. and not "well you don't have to be a tinfoil hat type to think..." insert tinfoil hat theory. For some reason this theory doesn't apply to the F-15SE nor the Eurofighter.

Moreover, if there was some crazy shooting war between Japan and South Korea thousands of systems would be in play and fewer than 100 of them would be F-35s. So if that's our magical "ace in the hole" should they go to war with each other its a drop in the bucket compared to all the firepower they would bring against each other.

So its just bill throwing out garbage to make the F-35 look bad. Also in other "news" the sun will be rising in the east, and setting in the west. Lets take a look at exactly what bill said:

Overt pressure on the government came from 15 former air staff chiefs, who signed an emotional screed that not too subtly evoked a possible threat from F-35-armed Japan. There are a few problems with this sort of appeal.

So one of the reasons they are for the F-35 is that Japan is also getting the F-35. Makes sense. But then:

Former generals have no more access to classified F-35 or threat data than the rest of us (or at least they should not)

Admits to not knowing himself.

The Japanese threat might play to the man in the Seoul karaoke bar, but one does not need tinfoil headgear to suspect that. In the event of such a conflict, both sides’ F-35s would succumb to software maladies and stop working rather quickly.

So the South Koreans should not opt for the F-35 because he implies there could be a kill switch in them. So the only reason they shouldn't buy the aircraft they feel is best to defend their country is because Sweetman suspects (based on no evidence whatsoever, and having admitted he doesn't have access to the info,) that there would be a terminal software issue in the event of hostilities.

Seriously think about this. The entire thing has that special blend of paranoia, nationalism, and ignorance that belong in the Key Publishing Forum, not Aviation Week. This is Slowman's level of unsubstantiated drivel.

 

[Antonio]

Please, remember the forum rules:

Personal attack not allowed

 

[sferrin]

As a primer, lets start here so you understand exactly what a hardware backdoor is.....

Sorry, I'm not seeing a document describing the F-35's backdoor. Perhaps you meant to post a different link?

 

[LowObservable]

I have stayed off this thread because it's usually a waste of time dealing with trolls.

However, I need to point out that (1) nobody said anything about a "kill switch", (2) such a thing is not necessary, for reasons that are in the public domain, and (3) the JSF system architecture was defined before the APT emerged, in an era where there was a very different understanding of what cybersecurity involved.


Over and out!

 

[sferrin]

I have stayed off this thread because it's usually a waste of time dealing with trolls.

However, I need to point out that (1) nobody said anything about a "kill switch", (2) such a thing is not necessary, for reasons that are in the public domain, and (3) the JSF system architecture was defined before the APT emerged, in an era where there was a very different understanding of what cybersecurity involved.


Over and out!

Translation: "Uh, I got nothin'."

 

[SpudmanWP]

If disabling the F-35s in a Japan/South Korean dust-up would cause a major problem (due to them not being available in combat) that would lead to the cessation of hostilities, doesn't that lend more credence to the F-35's capabilities?

 

[Arjen]

If disabling the F-35s in a Japan/South Korean dust-up would cause a major problem (due to them not being available in combat) that would lead to the cessation of hostilities, doesn't that lend more credence to the F-35's capabilities?

Edward Snowden's next revelation: US leaks F-35's specs to dupe Chinese into building aircraft that won't let them wage war
<edit> inserted smiley after severe reprimand from RSPCD

 

[GTX]

Edward Snowden's next revelation: US leaks F-35's specs to dupe Chinese into building aircraft that won't let them wage war.

So now we're resorting to simply making things up?


can I get in on that: F-35 revealed to be replacement for Orion Spacecraft... ;D

 

[GTX]

I also find it amusing how those with an Anti-F-35 bent regularly lampoon/attack the program in one area (e.g. software development) and then flip the coin and give the team supposedly unprecedented capabilities in the same area...can't have it both ways folks!

 

[mkurt]

There is no obligation for anybody to believe in any part of what follows.

There has been a reference to "the fault in the Phantom bomb bay" being corrected by Turkish technicians. Some years back on a late night TV programme as a barely noticeable writen note that flows underneath the screen.

The response still remains the same, four letter or longer expletives. Will stay the same until the end of the world.

Respect to doubters and promoters, yet the whole world somehow knows something since 2009.

 

[sferrin]

There is no obligation for anybody to believe in any part of what follows.

There has been a reference to "the fault in the Phantom bomb bay" being corrected by Turkish technicians. Some years back on a late night TV programme as a barely noticeable writen note that flows underneath the screen.

The response still remains the same, four letter or longer expletives. Will stay the same until the end of the world.

Respect to doubters and promoters, yet the whole world somehow knows something since 2009.

The Phantom has no bomb bay.

 

[mkurt]

That's exactly why the world knows.

 

[sferrin]

That's exactly why the world knows.

That makes no sense whatsoever.

 

[Triton]

The news that South Korea intends to buy 40 F-35 fighters and an option for 20 more must be a blow to Boeing trying to market the F-15 Silent Eagle. This week at the Dubai Air Show there was considerable interest in the F-35 by the United Arab Emirates. Will Brazil splurge for the F-35 in the FX-2 competition?

Are Dassault, the Eurofighter consortium, and Saab taking note? The F-35 makes 4.5-generation fighter aircraft obsolete. The F-35 is the H.M.S. Dreadnought of armed fighters. We will probably see more governments defer their purchase decisions until the F-35 is available and pass on the Rafale, Typhoon, or Gripen. I believe that it has come to the point where Dassault, Eurofighter, or Saab have to develop stealth products or leave the manned fighter business to Lockheed Martin or Boeing. Or dare I say Russia, India, and the People's Republic of China. How can governments justify not purchasing LO fighters? Despite its flaws, real or imagined, the F-35 is the western fighter aircraft of choice.

 

[TsrJoe]

possibly ot as it is a genuine question ... has the 'export' F.35A variant been offered with the probe refuelling point of the B/C variant for those states without boom refuelling capability ? or to increase refuelling options (abiet at a weight penalty)

cheers, Joe

 

[jsport]

The news that South Korea intends to buy 40 F-35 fighters and an option for 20 more must be a blow to Boeing trying to market the F-15 Silent Eagle. This week at the Dubai Air Show there was considerable interest in the F-35 by the United Arab Emirates. Will Brazil splurge for the F-35 in the FX-2 competition?

Are Dassault, the Eurofighter consortium, and Saab taking note? The F-35 makes 4.5-generation fighter aircraft obsolete. The F-35 is the H.M.S. Dreadnought of armed fighters. We will probably see more governments defer their purchase decisions until the F-35 is available and pass on the Rafale, Typhoon, or Gripen. I believe that it has come to the point where Dassault, Eurofighter, or Saab have to develop stealth products or leave the manned fighter business to Lockheed Martin or Boeing. Or dare I say Russia, India, and the People's Republic of China. How can governments justify not purchasing LO fighters? Despite its flaws, real or imagined, the F-35 is the western fighter aircraft of choice.

As LO has conveyed in recent AW&ST articles, Russian AD developments are placing into question the costly addiction of LO . If technology developments continue to cancel each other then fights might well be reduced to the 'fir ball' where maneuverability matters.

 

[sferrin]

As LO has conveyed in recent AW&ST articles, Russian AD developments are placing into question the costly addiction of LO .

1. What have they actually, you know, demonstrated?
2. Imagine how screwed non-LO aircraft will be in such an environment.

This is nothing more than Bill, once again, trying to tear down the F-35. *YAWN*