The F-35 No Holds Barred topic

[chuck4]

A friend of mine at a very dull Naval Air Station, had some F-22s stop by and he asked to take pictures "Yes-- except the back" was the answer.

That's due to the RADAR blockers they have in the back of the engine.

There are radar blockers able to survive in an afterburner and not hamper engine performance?

 

[SpudmanWP]

Maybe the burner spray bars are part of the blockers?

 

[sferrin]

A friend of mine at a very dull Naval Air Station, had some F-22s stop by and he asked to take pictures "Yes-- except the back" was the answer.

That's due to the RADAR blockers they have in the back of the engine.

There are radar blockers able to survive in an afterburner and not hamper engine performance?

Yes. Both the F-22 and F-35 have them. The spray bar functionality is integral to the blockers.

 

[Johnbr]

http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/03/06/f-35-design-problems-make-night-flying-impossible-increase-risk-of-being-shot-down-u-s-pilots-warn/
From the Nationalpost.

 

[sferrin]

“These restrictions are in place because testing has not been completed to certify the aircraft for night and instrument flight,” the report adds. “The aircraft is also currently prohibited from flying close formation, aerobatics, and stalls.”

 

[Mach42]

You can't fix the visibility though. Thats just how the airplane is designed.

 

[chuck4]

You can if the visibility is synthetically created through cameras distributed around the plane and projectors in the helmet visor.

 

[Mach42]

You can if the visibility is synthetically created through cameras distributed around the plane and projectors in the helmet visor.

There will always be some latency that will feel unnatural and probably make anyone puke.

 

[chuck4]

You can if the visibility is synthetically created through cameras distributed around the plane and projectors in the helmet visor.

There will always be some latency that will feel unnatural and probably make anyone puke.

"always" has never been a robust dogma where the persistence of computation and display technology gap is concerned. Here the barrier to synthetic vision is one of accuracy of head position detection, processing speed and refresh rate, with quantifiable thresholds to define a workable solution. Both USAF and LM believes achieving the workable solution is sufficiently assured to justify include it in f-35's base configuration.

 

[Arjen]

From DOT&E's February report:

The out-of-cockpit visibility in the F-35 is less than other Air Force fighter aircraft.

All four student pilots commented on the out-of-cockpit visibility of the F-35, an issue which not only adversely affects training, but safety and survivability as well. One rated the degree to which the visibility deficiencies impeded or degraded training effectiveness as “Moderate;” the other three rated it as “High” or “Very High.” The majority of responses cited poor visibility; the ejection seat headrest and the canopy bow were identified as causal factors. “High glare shield” and the HMD cable were also cited as sources of the problem. Of these, only the HMD cable has the potential to be readily redesigned.
In three cases, student pilots explicitly cited visibility-related impacts that could be directly applicable to the Block 1A syllabus (a largely benign visual search environment); several other implicitly did so. One student pilot commented, “Difficult to see [other aircraft in the visual traffic] pattern due to canopy bow.” Another stated, “Staying visual with wingman during tactical formation maneuvering a little tougher than legacy due to reduced rearward visibility from cockpit.”

Three student pilot comments predicted severe impacts of the visibility shortfalls in combat or in training of a more tactical nature. One said, “A pilot will find it nearly impossible to check [their six o’clock position] under g.” Another commented, “The head rest is too large and will impede aft visibility and survivability during surface and air engagements,” and, “Aft visibility will get the pilot gunned every time,” referring to close-range visual combat.

Aft visibility could turn out to be a significant problem for all F-35 pilots in the future, especially in more tactical phases of combat training than were conducted in the OUE, such as basic fighter maneuvering (BFM) and air combat maneuvering (ACM), and possibly in tactical formation as well. It remains to be seen whether or not, in these more advanced aspects of training, the visibility issues will rise to the level of safety issues, or if, instead, the visibility limitations are something that pilots adapt to over time and with more experience. Unlike legacy aircraft such as the F-15, F-16, and F/A-18, enhanced cockpit visibility was not designed into the F-35. There is no simple relief to limitations of the F-35 cockpit visibility. In all likelihood, it is partially a result of designing a common pilot escape system for all three variants to the requirements of the short-take-off and vertical landing environment.

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

Dry but interesting Canadian requirements

http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/stamgp-lamsmp/questevalfin-finquesteval-eng.html

 

[GTX]

“Aft visibility will get the pilot gunned every time,” referring to close-range visual combat.

I find comments like this amusing. How often do people really think that an F-35 (or any other modern fighter for that matter) will get into close-range visual combat? Seriously? The days of WWI/WWII dogfighting are long gone.

 

[chuck4]

“Aft visibility will get the pilot gunned every time,” referring to close-range visual combat.

I find comments like this amusing. How often do people really think that an F-35 (or any other modern fighter for that matter) will get into close-range visual combat? Seriously? The days of WWI/WWII dogfighting are long gone.

One might argue stealth on stealth will bring it right back again.

 

[RyanC]

If cockpit visibility isn't apparently a concern anymore, why design the cockpit for visibility at the expense of other requirements (speed or stealth)?

 

[sferrin]

If cockpit visibility isn't apparently a concern anymore, why design the cockpit for visibility at the expense of other requirements (speed or stealth)?

You still have to land the thing, fly formation, etc. And I've yet to hear how the difference in visibility between say, an F-35 and Gripen, is going to matter with AIM-9X / LOAL/ HMSC/ EOTS.

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

“Aft visibility will get the pilot gunned every time,” referring to close-range visual combat.

I find comments like this amusing. How often do people really think that an F-35 (or any other modern fighter for that matter) will get into close-range visual combat? Seriously? The days of WWI/WWII dogfighting are long gone.

One might argue stealth on stealth will bring it right back again.

Assuming its all equal of course.

“Aft visibility will get the pilot gunned every time,” referring to close-range visual combat.

I find comments like this amusing. How often do people really think that an F-35 (or any other modern fighter for that matter) will get into close-range visual combat? Seriously? The days of WWI/WWII dogfighting are long gone.

I find it amusing that when a pilot says something positive about the JSF he is rigorously cross examined, called a liar, a paid spokesman, or LM marketing prop and when another pilot says something negative and its taken as the gospel from on high. Where are the numerous articles rejecting this guys claim? where are the myriad of "anonymous" pilots who say its not an issue at all, doesn't matter, or the words are being twisted?

 

[Abraham Gubler]

“Aft visibility will get the pilot gunned every time,” referring to close-range visual combat.

I find comments like this amusing. How often do people really think that an F-35 (or any other modern fighter for that matter) will get into close-range visual combat? Seriously? The days of WWI/WWII dogfighting are long gone.

And they seem to be forgetting the F-35 has EODAS which will provide the pilot speherical visual SA.

 

[GTX]

Yet again we have an example of people ‘cherry picking’ select parts of a report and then trying to blow them out of all proportion. If one reads the latest DOT&E Report on the F-35A Joint Strike Fighter’s Readiness for Training Operational Utility Evaluation in its entirety you will gain a better perspective on these supposed issues.

The following statements (also from the report, though interestingly not included in much of the ‘cherry picking’ shown to date) are enlightening:

• “In mid-2010, the Joint Strike Fighter Program Executive Officer (JSF PEO) requested an assessment of the readiness to begin F-35A pilot training…” – (Exec Summary and also repeated elsewhere) What? The Program asked DOT&E to do this assessment/report? Aren’t they and everyone else involved with the JSF focussed only on covering things up??? If anything, the program should be praised for getting independent assessors involved to help ensure the system is developed efficiently.
• “The training syllabus used in this evaluation, the Block 1A syllabus, is an early phase … of what will eventually become the complete training syllabus … This partial syllabus is the first 6-8 weeks of a full syllabus that will take approximately 40 weeks to complete…” – (Pg 2) we are only looking at a small fraction of the overall training. Therefore to try to make any conclusive assessments regarding this are fraught with danger. This would be akin to having a single test drive in a car and then making a damning claim that the car will never be suitable for driving by anyone.
• “The 33 FW trained four student pilots…”– (Pg 8) that’s right, this assessment was based upon only 4 pilots + their instructors. Hardly a sample size that presents a basis for definitive conclusions. In fact this is emphasised by the next point;
• “The pilot surveys developed and administered by the JOTT provided limited data. The construction of the surveys and the limited sample sizes precluded any meaningful quantitative analyses of the responses...” – (Pg 10) emphasising the fact that using this report to make definitive conclusions is fraught with danger.
• Regarding the “out-of-cockpit visibility” issue, we get this one Pg 17/18: “It remains to be seen whether or not, in these more advanced aspects of training, the visibility issues will rise to the level of safety issues, or if, instead, the visibility limitations are something that pilots adapt to over time and with more experience.” – therefore, not to downplay the observations/comments by the pilots in question (covered in the same section), but one needs to keep in mind that this is an assessment by a small number of pilots, based upon a small part of the training without consideration for the operational arrangements that may yet be developed. It is also based upon a comparison with earlier platforms such as the F-15, F-16, and F/A-18. I am sure that when pilots first started to operate fighters with enclosed cockpits there were similar concerns about lack of out-of-cockpit visibility along with concerns about ability to escape in an emergency. Did such concerns prevent the aircraft from being used successfully in combat though? No. Did they outweigh the advantages enclosed cockpits gave? No. Perhaps people need to keep this in mind before damning the F-35…especially if you keep in mind that the aircraft has a new advantage that previous aircraft do not, i.e. the EODAS!

Overall, despite the DOT&E Report concluding that “Given its many significant limitations, the results of the OUE should not be used to make decisions regarding the readiness of the JSF system to support training in an F-35A initial qualification course. The limitations, workarounds, and restrictions in place in an air system this
early in development limit the utility of training. Also, little can be learned from evaluating training in a system this immature.” The final line in this para (on Pg 43 BTW) is most telling: “However, this evaluation revealed some areas where the program needs to focus attention and make improvements”

Surely this is a good thing? Get real pilots flying early and get evaluations, albeit limited, happening as well so as to develop a better system faster!

 

[GTX]

I would also add this for your consideration...and likely rejection :

Joint Program Office DOT&E OUE Response
(Source: F-35 Joint Program Office; issued March 6, 2013)

The U.S. Air Force conducted the Operational Utility Evaluation for its F-35As and determined its training systems were ready-for-training. F-35 operational and maintenance procedures will continue to mature as the training tempo accelerates.

The DOT&E report is based upon the Joint Strike Fighter Operational Test Team report which found no effectiveness, suitability or safety response that would prohibit continuation of transitioning experienced pilots in the F-35A Block 1A.1 transition and instructor pilot syllabus.

There are no issues identified in the DOT&E report that the Air Force and the F-35 Joint Program Office didn't already know about, and are working to resolve.

There is a deliberate process in place to validate the training system's effectiveness through advancing training blocks as they are made available to the warfighter.

-ends-

 

[RyanC]

And they seem to be forgetting the F-35 has EODAS which will provide the pilot speherical visual SA.

Speaking of that, have they fixed the problems with EODAS?

 

[kcran567]

“Aft visibility will get the pilot gunned every time,” referring to close-range visual combat.

I find comments like this amusing. How often do people really think that an F-35 (or any other modern fighter for that matter) will get into close-range visual combat? Seriously? The days of WWI/WWII dogfighting are long gone.

And they seem to be forgetting the F-35 has EODAS which will provide the pilot speherical visual SA.

I agree with you on this. But this is still a scenario worth training for to know the aircraft's abilities in this area against dissimilar aircraft esp against the stealthier aircraft like the Pakfa and J-20 and yes even the flanker. Why even have have training exercises like red flag and all the others if this is no longer relevant? Not likely to happen, but never say never.

 

[Michel Van]

What to hell is going wrong at Lockheed Martin ?!

the prototype X-35 first fly way back in 2000
we are now 2013 and still no full-scale production !
and the produce aircraft have serious problem and Test-pilots consider the F-35 as not a aircraft.

this end gonna as one of most expensive failure in Aerospace History...

 

[SpudmanWP]

Read Chicken Little much?

The F-22, Rafale, and Typhoon all had (or are still having) similar development timelines, even with the F-35’s delays.

The biggest obstacle to the F-35 keeping the original schedule has been the economy, not LM's production capability. If the DoD had wanted to and the economy had allowed for it, they could have met the original development & production (post SDD) schedule. Instead, the downturn in the economy forced the Congress & the DoD to keep to the yearly SDD costs low which forced the SDD & production to slide to the right. The downturn in the economy also forced them to scale back the concurrency plans which also slowed down production.

Btw, what do you consider “full scale production” as they are producing more per year than either the F-22, Rafale, or Typhoon.

 

[chuck4]

In this case full scale production should be defined by the production rate capable of achieving something like the force level envisioned in the original justification for the project. If anything much less is deemed "full scale production" than that is a defacto admission that the project overall has fellen severely short of its initial justification.

Due to the 3000+ unit force level envisioned in the justification, JSF's full scale production had better be many times fuller in scale than that of F-22, Typhoon or Rafale.

 

[SpudmanWP]

That sounds about right.

 

[Arjen]

Prior to 2013, I don't recall any cutbacks in JSF funding. Meeting the original SDD schedule would have involved exactly how much additional investment?

 

[SpudmanWP]

They limited funding in four ways:

1. The cut the annual F-35A build rate from 120 to 80 years before the problems began.

2. They cut an SDD airframe out of the program that had to be later added back in

3. When they discovered that they needed more resources in the SDD program, they decided to extend the SDD timeline rather than increase the available resources to meed the then-current timeline. Besides affecting US jets, theis has caused many negative ripples among our International Partners.

4. Once the F-35 was back on track, they have continued to butcher the LRIP buy rate which not only affected the US jets, but also caused many problem with the Partner buys.

Look at all the problems associated with delaying the SDD timeline like:
1. Increased cost to SLEP airframes.
2. Partner nations reducing buys due to higher LRIP pricing.
3. Partner nations possibly leaving program over LRIP pricing and schedule.
4. Lowering the chance to win FMS sales due to LRIP pricing and schedule.
5. Sub-contractors leaving the program or going bankrupt due to delayed/reduced orders that don't meet the business plan that they bid for.

Given all of that, I feel that spending more money per year to keep the SDD program on track would have been a wiser choice than the current plan of capping the yearly cost.

 

[GTX]

What to hell is going wrong at Lockheed Martin ?!

the prototype X-35 first fly way back in 2000
we are now 2013 and still no full-scale production !
and the produce aircraft have serious problem and Test-pilots consider the F-35 as not a aircraft.

this end gonna as one of most expensive failure in Aerospace History...

Time to revisit something I wrote back at Reply #1437 (updated ever so slightly):

Has the F-35 taken longer to enter full service then originally desired? Well, once again possibly yes. Is this entirely the fault of the companies developing it? Once again I would have to say no. Just look at the history of the program, especially these last few years. The majority of the delays to production numbers (which after all, ultimately drive when squadrons and the like can stand up) have been driven by the customers, especially in terms of sliding production schedule. If you don’t buy enough aircraft, then you can’t enter service fast enough. Trust me, all of the companies involved would very much like to see larger production orders sooner – it does no-one’s balance sheet good to have orders only growing slowly.

There have certainly been no major delays caused by aircraft technical issues (despite what some in the popular press would have you believe!). For instance, there have been no crashes - something that if you look at historic programs (including the F-22) should have occurred by now from just a statistical point of view. That in itself should stand testament to the success with which this program has been run to date.

Sure, some of you will point to some of the various reports that have been released highlighting various technical concerns, however, how many of you have actually even fully read those reports or investigated what the issues are? For one, they were identified when they should have been identified (in development and testing) and in virtually every case, there was already a technical solution at hand. Hardly a cause for concern or for significant delays.

And let’s just take a closer look at just one of those supposed technical problems – the tail hook issue. From what I understand, one of the problems was that the design team tried to re-use the hook design from the Super Hornet with minimal change but have discovered during testing that it requires more specialised designing. If anything, these people should be praised for trying to reduce costs and not "reinvent the wheel". Unfortunately, during testing (which is why you test!!!) they found that sometimes one has to...

Another aspect here that shouldn’t be overlooked, and one that links directly to schedule, has been the extraordinary time taken these last few years to agree each LRIP contract. LRIP4 took almost a year to negotiate and agree a contract. LRIP 5 some 14mths! LRIP 6 still hasn’t been agreed (though to his credit Lt Gen Bogdan is working his team hard to have LRIP6,7 & 8 all finalised this calendar year). Delays such as this flow directly into the production delays – no-one will produce a single aircraft without an agreed order or price for it.

BTW, looking beyond the USA aircraft, many of the apparent delays to partner nation aircraft have been because the partner nations have consistently/collectively not wanted to get ahead of the USA when it comes to introducing these aircraft into service. As a result, whenever the USA slides purchase orders (and thus operational service) the partner nations tend to also automatically slide their service entries and thus aircraft buys. The end result is that the apparent schedule delays are not necessarily the result of the aircraft developers but rather the customers yet again...

Also when looking at development timeframes one needs to keep in mind that the F-35 is not alone in taking a long time. Just look at the development timeframes for some of its contemporaries (using a simple first flight to service entry measure – note however that this is an admittedly crude measure that excludes pre-first flight development which in most cases is considerable. BTW, if you don't like this measure, please suggest another - I will think the basic overall message is the same though.):

• Typhoon: 9 years, 4 months, 8 days
• F-22: 8 years, 3 months, 8 days
• Rafale: 14 years, 5 months
• JAS-39 Gripen: 8 years, 10 months, 23 days

Now given that the F-35 carried out its first flight on 15 December 2006 and it is, as of today, only some 6 years, 2 months, 22 days down the track, I hardly think criticising on schedule is fair! But maybe that’s just me…

Finally, another aspect not to be over looked in all this is the overall effect of the Global Financial Crisis (and related). This cannot be ignored, and IMHO has added a lot of additional scrutiny to the program. If nothing else, because countries’ budgets are hurting and because democratic governments’ policies are often driven by short term populist considerations, programs such as the F-35 are easy targets. What does this mean? Well, to use Australia as an example (something I am very familiar with), the government is facing a very high likelihood of being voted out at the next election (for a variety of reasons). One way they hope to avoid this situation is to be able to paint themselves as good economic managers at the next election. Part of their strategy to do this is to be able to have their budget back in surplus at the next election. And a part of their way of doing this has been to delay the purchase of many of the first RAAF F-35s by a couple of years. This saves them from paying for these aircraft in the short term and thus they are able to exclude this outlay from their budget. However, this delay has nothing what-so-ever to do with the performance of the F-35 itself or even of the ability of the aircraft to be produced to schedule.

 

[GTX]

the prototype X-35 first fly way back in 2000
we are now 2013 and still no full-scale production !

Taking another look at this, if you want to do a somewhat similar comparison, let's look at the Eurofighter Typhoon:

• 8 Aug 1986 - EAP demonstrator makes first flight. This is somewhat akin to your X-35 in development.
• 24 October 2000 - X-35 makes first flight
• 13 Feb 2003 - First Eurofighter Typhoon Series Production Aircraft, GT001 flies from Manching (note, this doesn't really mean that the Typhoon was in mass production numbers equal to the F-35. Already now Lockheed is producing some 30 odd F-35s per year, though technically is still in LRIP...)

Now to do a comparison on durations (I am using today's date for the F-35 so that there is no argument over what constitutes full-scale production):

• Typhoon: 16 years, 6 months, 5 days
• F-35: 12 years, 4 months, 13 days

Now is the F-35 so odd? ???

Taking a slightly different view. Where will the F-35's planned production be at the 16 yr mark? Well according to the latest plans, in 2016 we will be in LRIP10 The number of aircraft scheduled to be produced in this LRIP is 124. That will mean that there will have been some 431 F-35s produced/in production since LRIP1. Interestingly that will be more then the number of Typhoons produced to date (some 340+). It will also be close to the total number of Typhoons actually planned to be ordered. All this and the F-35 is still in supposed Low Rate Production.

BTW, the numbers planned for subsequest years of F-35 production get higher...

 

[GTX]

From the F-35 News Thread:

Canadians and Norwegians may find this of interest.

What about the USAF out of Alaska? RAF? etc, etc. Just because they are in the Arctic does not mean only Norway or Canada faces cold issues. However, just as equally aren't they used to it and plan for this sort of thing?

DOT&E report: F-35 270 Volt Battery Charger Control has a problem with temperatures below 590 Fahrenheit/ 150 Celsius.

Overnight temperatures below 59 degrees Fahrenheit, the design minimum temperature for the 270 Volt Battery Charger Control Unit (BCCU), resulted in four ground aborts and the loss of two student sorties, an unacceptable condition for combat aircraft. To mitigate this problem, maintenance crews put jets in heated hangars overnight. Moving jets in and out of a hangar to keep them warm involves five personnel for three to four hours per shift. The parking of flyable jets in a hangar also interfered with maintenance because these flyable jets occupied space that would otherwise be used for jets requiring repair. In this case, the availability of an unused weapons hangar permitted maintainers to conduct low-observable and other maintenance activities despite the non-availability of the primary hangar.

My bolding. Let's put this in context. Also from the DOT&E Report (Pg 30 to be specific): "Fifty out of sixty scheduled sorties launched as planned. Ten sorties could not be completed as scheduled: eight due to ground aborts of the aircraft and two due to weather."

8 out of 60 due to ground aborts - just over 10% for a developmental platform! Moreover, the cold was supposedly responsible for 4 out of 60 - just over 6%. And overall, only 2 student sorties were lost - just over 3%! All with a developmental platform which is under a number of USAF mandated restrictions that cause people to play by more cautious rules.

I hardly think the cold is going to prevent future combat operations with the F-35. Do you? Honestly.

Also susceptible to low temperature: curing stealth coatings.

The cure times for low-observable maintenance increased as temperatures cooled and caused pilots to fly some sorties using spare aircraft. As noted earlier, one aircraft was not flyable because seals around a wingtip light were still curing, but it was available for a taxi event.

Yet again, something that I think you will find will not really limit the platform in service. Some simple procedural/GSE etc fixes can address this one.

 

[GTX]

Also from the F-35 News Thread:

Via Navy Matters.
Somebody has put a figure on how much concurrency in F-35 development and production is costing the US Navy.
From: FY 2013 Department of the Navy (DON) President’s Budget Summary http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/FMB/13pres/FY_2013_PB_Overview.pdf

FY2013 Budget Highlights
[...]
• 765 new aircraft over the FYDP (down from 842)
o JSF reduced by 69 airframes over the FYDP to pay for concurrency and reduce need for future modifications.
[...]

69 aircraft, to be precise, over the five year period 2013-2017 inclusive.

First up, the measure/cost that the Navy Matters commentary tries to put on Concurrency is very simplistic"

Multiply 69 airframes times the cost of single plane (say $100M – could be more depending on what source you want to believe) and you come up with the concurrency cost.

Sorry, but it doesn't work that way in reality. As previously explained: whilst acknowledging the risk involved with concurrency, one must also take some of the reporting with a good dose of salt. It should also be understood that such a risk is inherent in all programs where development is occurring concurrent to production. In the case of the F-35 though, the reporting of this risk and the cost supposedly involved has been blown out of proportion. Why do I say this? Well for one, the way these items have often been costed does not reflect the way things happen in the real world. In much of the reporting the costs used for this are based upon each issue being corrected individually as a stand-alone event. In the real world though, you try to resolve as many issues as possible at the same time and often where possible at scheduled maintenance downtime. Think of it as though you were taking your car in to be serviced and at the same time wanted them to fix some minor squeaks and rotate and align the tyres. Where possible you try to get all of these things done at once. You certainly don’t have the car serviced on one day, schedule another session for the tyres on another day and lastly schedule each squeak/repair to be done on a separate day(s) yet again. However, with the concurrency costs reported to date for the F-35, that is just what people are seemingly expecting to happen!

I think you will also find that part of the reduction in aircraft numbers due to concurrency is part of a bid to try to push of some aircraft so that they don't face the risk (i.e. you will find the latter part of the statement - "reduce need for future modifications" - carries more weight here). In other words, concurrency basically involves earlier aircraft needing to be modded to later aircraft standards. Well, if you push of the aircraft to later years, they are less likely to need any modding. Is this really a direct cost though?

 

[quellish]

Yet again, something that I think you will find will not really limit the platform in service. Some simple procedural/GSE etc fixes can address this one.

F-22, B-2, F-117, AGM-129, F-16 all experienced the same issues. Don't know about the F-18E, and that may be especially relevant to the F-35 program.

 

[Arjen]

Given all of that, I feel that spending more money per year to keep the SDD program on track would have been a wiser choice than the current plan of capping the yearly cost.

The Pentagon, after balancing all its needs, decided on some percentage of its finite budget to be spent on JSF.
What other projects would have been affected if overal funding would have been redistributed?
What would extra funding have meant for cost-per-unit?
Some problems simply take time to solve, no matter how much funding you throw at them.

I repeat, how many billions of extra funding would have been needed to comply with the original schedule?

What would development have been like if no STOVL-requirements had been included? It did not happen.
What would development have been like if concurrency had kicked in later? It did not happen.
What would development have been like if less trust had been placed in testing-is-validation? It did not happen.

All interesting what-if exercises, but what it ultimately boils down to: it did not happen, and we are saddled with the-project-as-it-is

 

[Arjen]

Multiply 69 airframes times the cost of single plane (say $100M – could be more depending on what source you want to believe) and you come up with the concurrency cost.

Sorry, but it doesn't work that way in reality.

I agree. Which is why I did not mention this line of reasoning. What the item in the DON-budget does provide, however, is an order of magnitude of the financial consequences of concurrency. It also shows aircraft, if delivered eventually, will be late because of concurrency.

 

[bobbymike]

From the News Thread:
Via www.jsfnieuws.nl:

Senator Leahy says F-35 is not what our troops need

Quote<blockquote>
This is a portion of a letter a friend just received from Senator Leahy:

"...I have heard from a number of Vermonters who have specifically questioned the value of the F-35. The F-35 program has been poorly managed and is a textbook example of how not to buy military equipment. The causes of the F-35 program's present difficulties are too numerous to detail in my response to your letter; however, I believe the F-35 program is approaching a point where the military services and a majority of Congress will recognize that the jet is just too costly to proceed with purchases at today's planned levels. That recognition may lead to a decision to diversify of our future fighter jet fleet, with the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps opting to modernize their current fleet of fighter jets and substantially reduce the total number of F-35s that they plan to buy. I do not believe, because of the huge sums taxpayers have already invested and because the F-35 is our only next-generation aircraft presently in development, that a majority of Congress or military leaders will support terminating the program entirely.

I have pushed and continue to push for a better approach to buying military equipment. I don't think "one size fits all," monolithic, ultra-expensive equipment is what our troops need, but enacting a change to the F-35 program at this stage will require the support of a majority of members of Congress. Please know that I am working to find savings in this program and elsewhere in the Pentagon budget to reinvest that money in other critical areas..."

</blockquote>Released right around the time of the budget hmmm..!

 

[2IDSGT]

"Vermonters." Aren't they the ones who wanted to cry about the noise before they even heard it?

 

[Arjen]

If Leahy has his way, the Vermonters will have ringside seats to judge for themselves.

[Leahy spokesman David] Carle said, “Senator Leahy’s preference is for Vermont’s Air Guard to be a part of the Air Force’s future, with basing in Vermont, for the many strategic reasons that led the Air Force to consider Vermont basing in the first place.”

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

If Leahy has his way, the Vermonters will have ringside seats to judge for themselves.

[Leahy spokesman David] Carle said, “Senator Leahy’s preference is for Vermont’s Air Guard to be a part of the Air Force’s future, with basing in Vermont, for the many strategic reasons that led the Air Force to consider Vermont basing in the first place.”

Looks like some wonderfully stupid local political football, thank god we could include it here :

 

[2IDSGT]

OMG! ;D Y'all gotta read this laughingstock. Reads like an 8 year-old's current events school report (among other things). One problem airplane after another
http://www.lancastereaglegazette.com/article/20130317/OPINION04/303170003/1023/rss03?gcheck=1&nclick_check=1

 

[GTX]

OMG!!! That is a laugh. ;D