I think there is a very important part of the success/failure dynamic that gets lost: there is a distinction between the F-35 program succeeding or failing and the F-35 succeeding or failing as a design and that this is much more than semantic.
The F-35 program was funded to do a very specific mission: produce an affordable strike fighter to fill the fighter gap. It has failed on both counts regardless of how good (or bad) the F-35 turns out to be. This means the F-35 program is an unmitigated failure not as a matter of opinion but as a matter of fact. If the F-35 program had put up PowerPoints that said "we will be years late and billions over budget but we will produce a fantastic bleeding edge plane" the program would have been cancelled in its first year.
Given this, I think that "haters" sometimes let our anger at the mismanagement, stupidity, and outright lies that built the F-35 program to color our opinions of the plane per se: we hate the program so much that we actually want the design to fail. But this is a problem because it obscures the key debates that need to happen just as much as the pro-F35 people's "remain calm, nothing to see here, move along, move along" crap.
We are where we are and, even if the haters' big wish of program cancellation were granted, we don't have money and we don't have time for clean sheet development and, in any case, as AC and I talked about in another thread, the same people and forces that FUBAR'd the F-35 will create and run any replacement program so even that fantasy would never work out.
The question now is what to do with the F-35 we have, not the F-35 we wanted. I think a lot of comes down to very important issues that are not being debated:
-- should the US abandon the "High-low mix" force concept and instead go all "High Mix" as the USAF and the USMC want to with the F-35?
-- Is their a sufficient need for "low mix" affordable strike aircraft to justify a new development? If not are the alternatives (legacy airframes, foreign procurement, and a fighter derivative of the LIFT trainer)cost-effective?
-- Given that all of the assumptions underlying the F-35's planned production run are false, what should the production run be as a high mix adjunct to the F-22?
All of these questions key off having a realistic grasp of the scenarios expected and the F-35's performance in those scenarios vs. the same amount of dollars worth of the alternatives (not the same number of alternative planes, the same number of dollars worth of the alternatives).