The F-35 Discussion Topic (No Holds Barred II)

"Troubled Logistics System Critical to F-35’s Future"
April 2015
By Valerie Insinna

Source:
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2015/April/pages/TroubledLogisticsSystemCriticaltoF35sFuture.aspx

It has been widely reported that the Marine Corps is racing to ready the F-35 for initial operational capability this summer. Less well known — but just as crucial — is the work being done to prepare the joint strike fighter’s fleet management system, which will support everything from mission planning, ordering spare parts and maintenance.

Like the plane itself, the Autonomic Logistics Information System, or ALIS, has had its share of problems, including delays and limitations to its functionality. The office of the director of operational test and evaluation characterized the system as inefficient and difficult to use in its 2014 report.

“Overall, ALIS is behind schedule, has several capabilities delayed or deferred to later builds, and has been fielded with deficiencies,” the report stated. Although some issues have been fixed as new versions of the hardware and software are released, others have lingered and new problems have popped up. In some cases, the system “requires the use of workarounds for deficiencies awaiting correction.”

F-35 manufacturer Lockheed Martin is developing and fielding ALIS in increments, in a similar fashion to the aircraft’s software. All three U.S. services planning to purchase the F-35 — the Marine Corps, Air Force and Navy — will use the system to maintain their jets and manage its logistics enterprise. It will reach its full level of capability in 2017.

Lockheed and the F-35 joint program office plan to finish testing of a new iteration of the system, ALIS 2.0.1, in time for the July IOC date. The testing and release schedule leaves no margin for delays, the DOT&E report said.

“We have had multiple conversations with our JPO counterparts as well as our service counterparts, and they are fully onboard,” said Mark Perreault, Lockheed’s ALIS development director. “We’re all working a coordinated effort to ensure that we meet the needs of the Marine Corps in July.”

However, he added that “there’s very little buffer” in the schedule.

Air Force Lt. Gen. Christopher C. Bogdan, the government’s F-35 program executive officer, said in an emailed statement that he is concerned that ALIS 2.0.1 and 2.0.2 are slightly behind schedule.

“Lockheed Martin has made improvements in ALIS software development, testing and fielding, so we are working hard to make up some of the original delays,” he said.

There were no surprises in the DOT&E report, Bogdan said. “All of the issues mentioned were well known to us and our industry partners.” Nonetheless, the program achieved significant progress in 2014, he added.

ALIS is tied not only to logistics and maintenance, but also to operations. Pilots can plan and debrief missions using the system. Maintainers employ it to examine the health of the F-35, diagnose problems and guide them through repairs. It also supports spare parts management and customer service queries.

ALIS has experienced more problems in development and testing than is usual in part because it is so complex, said Mandy Smithberger, director of the Straus Military Reform Project at the Project On Government Oversight. Flaws or weaknesses in the ALIS system may increase the risk of fielding F-35s this summer, she added.

“ALIS is the core to making sure that the F-35 functions,” she said. “It’s so dependent on this technology, and so having all of these workarounds really limits operational capability.”

Lockheed’s program manager for the Marine Corps’ F-35B, Art Tomassetti, stressed the importance of the system in a January interview with National Defense. In order to take advantage of new mission planning and diagnostic features, the service needs at least the 2.0 version of ALIS — which is slightly older than 2.0.1 and is still being deployed to the operational fleet, he said.

Fielding ALIS 2.0.1 before testing is complete could result in the need for workarounds to support operations, the DOT&E report said.

One of Smithberger’s chief concerns is that Lockheed is building new layers of fixes into ALIS without doing enough iterative testing to ensure they don’t cause problems elsewhere, she said.

It’s good to correct problems in the system, “but if doing all these fixes means that you need to go back and do testing, the schedule needs to allow for doing that … and not continuing to defer capabilities,” she said.

That mode of development would also ratchet up cost and the number of retrofits needed to mend deficiencies in the system.

“I think the scariest thing is just imagining as a pilot that you’re looking at this system and you can’t trust what you read,” she said. “You have to be concerned about it.”

The DOT&E report likewise suggested that the program ensure software upgrades are tested on operationally representative hardware and that testing is completed before fielding operational units.

ALIS 2.0.1 is undergoing internal testing at Lockheed’s facility in Orlando, Perreault said in February. It is slated to be delivered to the government in April for flight tests and logistics test and evaluation.

The biggest difference between it and older versions of ALIS is new hardware, which breaks up the huge system into smaller, 200-pound modules that troops can more easily transport while deployed, Perreault said.

“They have wheels that come with them, and soldiers can then carry them from one location to the other without the use of mechanical devices,” he said. “Before they had to be … put onto a pallet or something like that.”

In the coming months, Lockheed will host a group of Marine Corps users and test whether two maintainers can break down the system, carry it to a different location and rebuild it within seven hours, he said. “We’ve proven already in our internal testing that can be done within that seven-hour timeframe.”

ALIS 2.0.1 also adds a software function called the “deployable spares pack,” which allows users to specify which parts will be taken on a deployment, he said. That will make it easier for the military to manage its inventory.

The current version of the system, ALIS 2.0, was delivered in September for flight testing at Edwards Air Force Base, California, and Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland. By March, ALIS 2.0 will be fielded at all of the operational bases, Perreault said.

Preliminary results from the logistics test and evaluation of ALIS 2.0 yielded five critical deficiencies and 53 serious deficiencies, the DOT&E report said. One of the critical problems results in F-35 aircraft incorrectly being listed as “not mission capable” in the squadron health management function.

Right now, ALIS is configured so that the overview health management screen classifies aircraft as “not mission capable” if there is any mission that particular F-35 cannot perform, Perreault said. However, “if you dig a little deeper,” screens displaying more specific information about the plane will show what is wrong. For instance, an aircraft may appear to be unfit for operations, but a different screen will reveal that it is only not suited to nighttime missions because of problems with the night vision system.

“There are processes in place, and [users] are fully aware of what the different screens are providing to them, so it’s not like it’s confusing them on a daily basis,” he said. The issue does not prevent users from signing off on repairs or preparing for flights.

Lockheed is in discussions with the services to determine a better way to display that information, but “to be honest with you, they haven’t actually come to an agreement,” he said.

That illustrates one of the biggest challenges of building ALIS. “We’re dealing with [an] … environment where we’ve got different services and different platforms, but we wanted to build one solution to keep it affordable,” he said. The Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force often have different ways of doing logistics and maintenance, and the system must be able to accommodate them.

Perreault hesitated to use the word “deficiency” to describe any of the issues with ALIS, but added that the system is still evolving and maturing. Some of the workarounds necessary to operate current versions of the system will no longer be needed in later iterations, he said.

For example, because of security concerns, sometimes maintainers must put data on a CD and walk it over to another user instead of transferring it from computer to computer. Eventually, maintainers will be able to send information directly, he said.

Some of those changes are already taking place. Bogdan noted that data from ALIS’ Exceedance Management System was processed manually using CDs prior to the release of 2.0.

By and large, the pilots, maintainers and suppliers that operate ALIS are pleased with the improvements made in the 2.0 version, including faster response times, Perreault said.

Lockheed receives feedback directly from users during flight testing. It also holds “operator-user events” where the company brings in logistics and maintenance personnel to familiarize themselves with new versions of ALIS hardware and software, he said. “It allows them to ask those questions up front so that when we get to the bases, they’ll be familiar enough with it to understand any of the changes.”

Not all of ALIS’ capabilities were criticized in the DOT&E report. The system’s 2.0 release included a new piece of hardware called the portable maintenance device reader meant to cut down the time it takes to transfer data from an aircraft into ALIS. “The fielded PMD readers have functioned as intended,” the report stated. Download time decreased from about an hour to less than five minutes.

The Air Force plans to field ALIS 2.0.2 in time for its own initial operational capability in July 2016. The service will use the same “deployable” hardware as the Marine Corps. The software, however, will contain a new feature called sub-squadron reporting, which allows the service to operate jets separately from their squadron while still allowing status reports and other data to be sent to the mother squadron.
 
To compare the complexity of F-35 software to the F-16 and other fourth-generation fighter aircraft:

The F-35, which is made by Lockheed Martin Corp., requires more than 8 million lines of code, compared with about 2 million for the F-16 and less than 1 million for other fourth-generation fighter aircraft, according to Steve O’Bryan, vice president of F-35 program integration and business development at the Bethesda, Md.-based defense contractor.

Source:
http://defensetech.org/2013/12/26/experts-to-study-f-35-software-delays/
 
"lines of code" is an idiotic metric, particularly in public procurement and most so in military procurement.

One way of programmers to bloat code is to add whole libraries for functions instead of implementing only the actually required function. There are many incentives to bloat the code, particularly if the managers have promised a certain quantity of "lines of code" for a specific date.
 
lastdingo said:
"lines of code" is an idiotic metric, particularly in public procurement and most so in military procurement.

One way of programmers to bloat code is to add whole libraries for functions instead of implementing only the actually required function. There are many incentives to bloat the code, particularly if the managers have promised a certain quantity of "lines of code" for a specific date.
Do you have evidence this is happening with the F-35 program?
 
Just to get back to the F-16's range for a minute, something fascinating, which was contrary to most of the design specs I've seen for most aircraft, was how Harry Hillaker's team designed the F-16's fuel loading profile. Now, everyone knows the F-16 was one of the very first fighters designed to pull 9gs sustained, but the fact that they designed it to do so with full internal fuel was new to me. In one of the interviews, Harry said they figured the external tanks would get it to the fight and that it would have to perform to it's full structural capability with full internal fuel. Then you add in that it had one of the highest fuel fractions for an advanced fighter and that tells me that for a fighter this plane was built like a tank. I think that speaks a lot to it's longevity. It's still the most brilliant modern fighter design, from an engineers perspective, to me.


OK, now you can go back to your regularly scheduled arguing between the F-35 haters and idolaters.
 
lastdingo said:
"lines of code" is an idiotic metric, particularly in public procurement and most so in military procurement.

One way of programmers to bloat code is to add whole libraries for functions instead of implementing only the actually required function. There are many incentives to bloat the code, particularly if the managers have promised a certain quantity of "lines of code" for a specific date.

Lines of Code (LOC), along with Kilo Lines of Code (KLOC) and Source Lines of Code (SLOC), is a traditional software metric used to measure the size of a computer program. We would hope that the programmers at Lockheed Martin aren't creating bloatware.
 
http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/million-lines-of-code/


According to this a high end car has double the lines of code of an F-35 including ground systems.
 
lastdingo said:
"lines of code" is an idiotic metric, particularly in public procurement and most so in military procurement.

One way of programmers to bloat code is to add whole libraries for functions instead of implementing only the actually required function. There are many incentives to bloat the code, particularly if the managers have promised a certain quantity of "lines of code" for a specific date.

What would be a better one? Right then. . .
 
PaulMM (Overscan) said:
http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/million-lines-of-code/


According to this a high end car has double the lines of code of an F-35 including ground systems.

One wonders where they got their information. I still remember, back in the 80s, there was concern that SDI was completely undoable because "it could require 20 million lines of code". (Obviously 20 million lines of Assembly code is a bit more difficult than 20 million lines of Android bloatware.)
 
bobbymike said:
Triton said:
We should probably also add the cost of writing and debugging 24 million lines of software code, including 9.5 million on board the plane, to the cost of the F-35.
Software is so incredibly complex. Every time I read about F-35 or other modern weapon systems software requirements it always reminds me of early debates on SDI when opponents estimated the system (entire SDI system that is) would require maybe 5 million lines of code and that would be impossible to write let alone get to work.

Consider how often your Android aps update and they're nothing compared to what they're doing here. And you can't have a BSOD on the aircraft so they really, really, REALLY, test the crap out of the software. Consumer software rolls out with "known shippables" all the time. "We'll fix that in the first patch."
 
Sundog said:
Just to get back to the F-16's range for a minute, something fascinating, which was contrary to most of the design specs I've seen for most aircraft, was how Harry Hillaker's team designed the F-16's fuel loading profile. Now, everyone knows the F-16 was one of the very first fighters designed to pull 9gs sustained, but the fact that they designed it to do so with full internal fuel was new to me. In one of the interviews, Harry said they figured the external tanks would get it to the fight and that it would have to perform to it's full structural capability with full internal fuel. Then you add in that it had one of the highest fuel fractions for an advanced fighter and that tells me that for a fighter this plane was built like a tank. I think that speaks a lot to it's longevity. It's still the most brilliant modern fighter design, from an engineers perspective, to me.


OK, now you can go back to your regularly scheduled arguing between the F-35 haters and idolaters.

One of the designers posts over on F-16.net. The original spec was for 7.33Gs with full internal fuel. They did an internal study to see what it would take to get them 9. It added something like 25 lbs of material, mostly in the wing root areas. The USAF said, "HELL yeah". (He just posted that a week or two ago. Will see if I can find the post.)

"It is also surprising how little weight is sometimes needed to raise the g limit of an airplane. The original requirement for the F-16A/B was 7.33g with full internal fuel, with 9g capability with less fuel and at off-design conditions . After the preliminary structural design was completed, GD did a study to determine what weight increase it would take to provide 9g for all air to air loadings without tanks at all flight conditions. The surprising answer was 22 lb, all in the wing root/center fuselage area. USAF readily agreed it was well worth 22 lb, so 9g everywhere became the new requirement."
 
Triton said:
PaulMM (Overscan) said:
http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/million-lines-of-code/


According to this a high end car has double the lines of code of an F-35 including ground systems.

Perhaps growing from 15 million lines of code to 24 million lines of code for the entire F-35 program (onboard and offboard) isn't that big of a deal considering desktop computer operating systems and applications. ;)

45 Mb the last time Facebook wanted to update it's android app. Doom I & II together weren't that big. I fully expect to see icons weighing in at 10 Mb.
 
sferrin said:
Consider how often your Android aps update and they're nothing compared to what they're doing here. And you can't have a BSOD on the aircraft so they really, really, REALLY, test the crap out of the software. Consumer software rolls out with "known shippables" all the time. "We'll fix that in the first patch."

You're right. So we really shouldn't compare the F-35 software development project to a desktop operating system or application. I imagine that much of the software on-board the F-35 is considered to be mission or safety critical.
 
sferrin said:
One of the designers posts over on F-16.net. The original spec was for 7.33Gs with full internal fuel. They did an internal study to see what it would take to get them 9. It added something like 25 lbs of material, mostly in the wing root areas. The USAF said, "HELL yeah". (He just posted that a week or two ago. Will see if I can find the post.)

"It is also surprising how little weight is sometimes needed to raise the g limit of an airplane. The original requirement for the F-16A/B was 7.33g with full internal fuel, with 9g capability with less fuel and at off-design conditions . After the preliminary structural design was completed, GD did a study to determine what weight increase it would take to provide 9g for all air to air loadings without tanks at all flight conditions. The surprising answer was 22 lb, all in the wing root/center fuselage area. USAF readily agreed it was well worth 22 lb, so 9g everywhere became the new requirement."


Thanks. That makes sense since that's where all the bending moment gets transferred. It probably was also less of a drawback, compared to older designs, because of the blended body as it moved the wing/fuselage interface outboard.


My main point, though, was that they did it with full internal fuel. Most of your basic air combat calculations, classically, are done considering the aircraft performs combat maneuvering with only 50% internal fuel.


I'll have to check out the forums over there to see if the author of that post has more info regarding the development and the design of the F-16. I really enjoy those types of posts.
 
Thoughts?

"Revealed: How China and Russia Could Destroy America's F-35 in Battle "
Malcolm Davis
July 26, 2015

Source:
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/revealed-how-china-russia-could-destroy-americas-f-35-battle-13429

After the leaking of a report about the recent failure of an F-35 to win in a dogfight against an F-16D, debate has intensified about the future nature of air to air combat. In a recent Strategist post, Andrew Davies identifies the importance of combining long-range air-to-air engagement using ‘Beyond-Visual Range Air to Air Missiles’ (BVRAAMs), with the advantage bestowed by stealth technology to reduce detectability of the aircraft, as well as exploiting superior sensors, information processing and electronic warfare capability.

Davies also notes that it is yet to be demonstrated how effective these capabilities will be in a future operational environment, stating “…there are reasons to wonder how effective the F-35’s bag of tricks will be into the future, especially as counter-stealth systems evolve, and I’d like to see it carry more and longer-ranged weapons…” Clearly the F-35 was designed to undertake a particular approach to air-to-air combat in mind (long-range attacks) rather than close-in dogfighting. This highlights a key question that is now generating significant debate: “Are our current assumptions about future air combat—that BVR engagement will dominate and ‘dogfights’ have had their day
“—correct?

The underlying basis for current assumptions about the ascendance of long-range air-to-air combat and the demise of the dogfight is that U.S. and allied forces will always have a clear and sustainable ‘knowledge edge’ over any adversary in a manner that bestows superior situational awareness to permit unrestricted use of BVRAAMs. In this regard, the true success of the F-35 in tactical air-to-air warfare may in fact depend on an ability to preserve a knowledge edge at the strategic level in the face of determined efforts by future adversaries to decisively win an information battle at the outset of any future conflict.

In considering future adversaries, Chinese information warfare doctrine makes clear the requirement to attack U.S. C4ISR systems, including satellites, from the outset or even prior to, any military conflict. This information warfare campaign will be fought in space, cyberspace and across the electromagnetic spectrum. The PLA sees the information battle-space as an integrated environment comprising both cyberspace and electronic warfare, and base their approach to these domains around the concept of Integrated Networked Electronic Warfare (INEW).

General Dai Qingmin, PLA, states that a key goal of the PLA’s approach to INEW is to disrupt the normal operation of enemy battlefield information systems, while protecting one’s own, with the objective of seizing information superiority. Therefore, winning in the air against the PLAAF may be determined as much by which side wins these information warfare campaigns, as through success in tactical beyond-visual range air to air engagements. Imagine no data links between the F-35s and the AWACS; AESA radars on an E-7A Wedgetail spoofed; ASAT attacks that bring down strategic communications or computer-network attacks that strike logistics or which jam GPS signals, and the first shots fired are not missiles but satellites silenced by computer hackers or ground-based jamming. Furthermore there will be an incentive to strike quickly and decisively, with an information ‘battle of the first salvo’ effect emerging. Without the flexibility bestowed by these systems, the F-35 pilot must rely on on-board sensor systems such as its AESA Radar and Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS) to detect, track and engage targets which increase the detectability of the aircraft and potentially bring the F-35 into the envelope of an opponent’s within visual range systems.

Does the F-35s dependence on maintaining information superiority make it ineffective? If the F-35 is relegated to a long-range BVR-AAM role, and if future air power doctrine is formulated with this approach in mind, then the effectiveness of the platform—and of Western air power—is at risk if key C4ISR systems can be attacked. In this regards, any assumption that modern air forces don’t dogfight is a dangerous one to make. Such an assumption lacks credibility as no air force would cede control of the air simply because it cannot operate with all desired advantages. Air forces have to be prepared to dogfight—even with the F-35 as their fighter. Finally, future adversaries will not be as courteous as to fight the U.S. and its allies on their own terms and in a manner that reinforces their advantage. The enemy always gets a vote.

In the future, what wins in the air is firstly winning the information battle across space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum to gain superior situational awareness and deny it to an opponent at the strategic, operational, and tactical level. An inability to counter an adversary’s information warfare systems will significantly reduce the ability of tactical combat aircraft like the F-35 to gain sufficient situational awareness to employ BVRAAMs effectively, and thus fight in our preferred approach to air operations.

It seems unlikely our future adversaries will fight in a manner most conducive to their own defeat, and it’s a safe bet that Chinese and Russian analysts understand all the weaknesses of the F-35 and how to wage air warfare in a manner to best exploit those weaknesses. Expect the F-35 to be forced to dogfight when it is employed in real warfare against an intelligent, well-equipped and determined enemy.
 
Triton said:
Thoughts?

"Revealed: How China and Russia Could Destroy America's F-35 in Battle "
Malcolm Davis
July 26, 2015

Source:
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/revealed-how-china-russia-could-destroy-americas-f-35-battle-13429

After the leaking of a report about the recent failure of an F-35 to win in a dogfight against an F-16D, debate has intensified about the future nature of air to air combat. In a recent Strategist post, Andrew Davies identifies the importance of combining long-range air-to-air engagement using ‘Beyond-Visual Range Air to Air Missiles’ (BVRAAMs), with the advantage bestowed by stealth technology to reduce detectability of the aircraft, as well as exploiting superior sensors, information processing and electronic warfare capability.

Davies also notes that it is yet to be demonstrated how effective these capabilities will be in a future operational environment, stating “…there are reasons to wonder how effective the F-35’s bag of tricks will be into the future, especially as counter-stealth systems evolve, and I’d like to see it carry more and longer-ranged weapons…” Clearly the F-35 was designed to undertake a particular approach to air-to-air combat in mind (long-range attacks) rather than close-in dogfighting. This highlights a key question that is now generating significant debate: “Are our current assumptions about future air combat—that BVR engagement will dominate and ‘dogfights’ have had their day
“—correct?

The underlying basis for current assumptions about the ascendance of long-range air-to-air combat and the demise of the dogfight is that U.S. and allied forces will always have a clear and sustainable ‘knowledge edge’ over any adversary in a manner that bestows superior situational awareness to permit unrestricted use of BVRAAMs. In this regard, the true success of the F-35 in tactical air-to-air warfare may in fact depend on an ability to preserve a knowledge edge at the strategic level in the face of determined efforts by future adversaries to decisively win an information battle at the outset of any future conflict.

In considering future adversaries, Chinese information warfare doctrine makes clear the requirement to attack U.S. C4ISR systems, including satellites, from the outset or even prior to, any military conflict. This information warfare campaign will be fought in space, cyberspace and across the electromagnetic spectrum. The PLA sees the information battle-space as an integrated environment comprising both cyberspace and electronic warfare, and base their approach to these domains around the concept of Integrated Networked Electronic Warfare (INEW).

General Dai Qingmin, PLA, states that a key goal of the PLA’s approach to INEW is to disrupt the normal operation of enemy battlefield information systems, while protecting one’s own, with the objective of seizing information superiority. Therefore, winning in the air against the PLAAF may be determined as much by which side wins these information warfare campaigns, as through success in tactical beyond-visual range air to air engagements. Imagine no data links between the F-35s and the AWACS; AESA radars on an E-7A Wedgetail spoofed; ASAT attacks that bring down strategic communications or computer-network attacks that strike logistics or which jam GPS signals, and the first shots fired are not missiles but satellites silenced by computer hackers or ground-based jamming. Furthermore there will be an incentive to strike quickly and decisively, with an information ‘battle of the first salvo’ effect emerging. Without the flexibility bestowed by these systems, the F-35 pilot must rely on on-board sensor systems such as its AESA Radar and Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS) to detect, track and engage targets which increase the detectability of the aircraft and potentially bring the F-35 into the envelope of an opponent’s within visual range systems.

Does the F-35s dependence on maintaining information superiority make it ineffective? If the F-35 is relegated to a long-range BVR-AAM role, and if future air power doctrine is formulated with this approach in mind, then the effectiveness of the platform—and of Western air power—is at risk if key C4ISR systems can be attacked. In this regards, any assumption that modern air forces don’t dogfight is a dangerous one to make. Such an assumption lacks credibility as no air force would cede control of the air simply because it cannot operate with all desired advantages. Air forces have to be prepared to dogfight—even with the F-35 as their fighter. Finally, future adversaries will not be as courteous as to fight the U.S. and its allies on their own terms and in a manner that reinforces their advantage. The enemy always gets a vote.

In the future, what wins in the air is firstly winning the information battle across space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum to gain superior situational awareness and deny it to an opponent at the strategic, operational, and tactical level. An inability to counter an adversary’s information warfare systems will significantly reduce the ability of tactical combat aircraft like the F-35 to gain sufficient situational awareness to employ BVRAAMs effectively, and thus fight in our preferred approach to air operations.

It seems unlikely our future adversaries will fight in a manner most conducive to their own defeat, and it’s a safe bet that Chinese and Russian analysts understand all the weaknesses of the F-35 and how to wage air warfare in a manner to best exploit those weaknesses. Expect the F-35 to be forced to dogfight when it is employed in real warfare against an intelligent, well-equipped and determined enemy.
Why do these articles always read like the US has this ONE strategy and all our adversaries have to do is counter it somehow and they win the war.

The US is the only nation on earth that has 50 yrs fighting massive integrated multi-service air operations from Vietnam to Gulf War I II, Kosovo, Syria, etc.

If a sports analyst published an article saying Tom Brady likes to pass so we'll just put 11 defensive backs on the field and that will stop him would be mocked mercilessly.

The US is not invincible but these articles are so simplistic as to be laughable.
 
I didn't see a link to this article earlier in the topic.


"F-35 versus F-16: who wins? Who cares?"
7 Jul 2015|Andrew Davies

Source:
http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/f-35-versus-f-16-who-wins-who-cares

Last week there was a real flurry in the press and the blogosphere about the performance of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Or, more accurately, about the lack of manoeuvre performance in a trial against an F-16—a design that dates back to the 1970s. War is Boring has been running hard on the issue, with writer David Axe—a frequent critic of the F-35—leading the charge. The story was picked up by the mainstream press, including an ‘exclusive’ in The Australian today.

The story is based on a leaked test pilot’s report (PDF) of an air-to-air exercise in January this year. (Note: the report is marked Export Controlled Information FOUO. For Strategist readers inside government, this is one to access at home.) The crux of the story is that the F-35 was beaten because it couldn’t outturn the F-16, and suffered from ‘energy disadvantage for every engagement’. To those who have been strident F-35 critics for years, such as Aviation Week’s Bill Sweetman, this was the news they’d been expecting.

When I first saw the story, I was a bit surprised—but only a bit. Based on figures I’ve seen, my expectation would’ve been that the F-35 and F-16 would be roughly comparable in close-in dogfighting performance, with one or the other having a marginal advantage depending on exactly how the fight was set up, and the configuration of the aircraft—particularly how much stuff was slung under the F-16. And that’s consistent with other, far less reported on, comparative assessments between the two.

That might seem strange at first. Why, after all, would the latest and most sophisticated combat aircraft around not be able to completely outclass a competitor that pre-dated it by decades? (To be precise, the Block 40 F-16 in the trial is a late 80s design.) The answer, in part, is that it isn’t the fight the F-35 was designed for. An F-35 pilot who finds him- or herself in a tight turning contest within visual range has got something terribly wrong. In fact, in today’s world of helmet mounted off-boresight targeting, any pilot who finds themselves in such a fight is probably going to be walking home. And as for air-to-air gunfighting, as practiced in the January trial, oh please—the 1960s called and wants its top guns back.

Instead, the F-35 is designed to be lethal at well beyond visual range through a combination of stealth, sensors, superior information processing and electronic warfare capability. There are reasons to wonder how effective the F-35’s bag of tricks will be into the future, especially as counter-stealth systems evolve, and I’d like to see it carry more and longer-ranged weapons, but the trial back in January tells us precisely nothing about the effectiveness of the F-35 in the regime it was designed for.

And if that was all that could be criticised about the recent fuss, it wouldn’t be so bad. But it seems that there was a strong element of confirmation bias at work as well. If you already thought the F-35 was a dog (not entirely a bad thing to be in a dogfight, but I digress), then this report confirmed it. But a careful reading suggests that the flight controls of the F-35 involved were software limited to a point where it was effectively handicapped out of the fight. That’s why the recommendations made at the end of the report read like this:

Increasing pitch rate would provide the pilot more options
Consider increasing alpha onset
Consider increasing pilot yaw rate control authority

And that’s why an Aviation Week piece a couple of months ago (subscribers) about the same trial—which was picked up by Lockheed Martin’s PR team as a positive story—noted that the aircraft ‘can be cleared for greater agility as a growth option’. Simply put, we don’t yet know what the relative manoeuvrability of the F-35 to the F-16 is, only what that particular software load allowed. (And even when we do know, the significance will be limited for the reasons mentioned earlier.) I notice that there are now some ‘second generation articles’ that have picked up on the same observation. (You can get an F-16 pilot’s perspective here.)

In an interesting incidental commentary, most of those contrarian articles say something along the lines of ‘there are plenty of reasons to be critical of the F-35 program, but this isn’t one of them’. And that captures the problem about much of the public reporting on the F-35. The program has been running almost a decade and a half, with significant schedule slippages, engineering problems, software issues and cost overruns in its early years. The net effect has been to cost the Australian taxpayer many billions of dollars to establish an interim air combat capability. But much of the discussion has been about the wrong thing—yesterday’s concept of air warfare.
 
If Davies is right, pull the internal gun off the F-35A and save weight, drag and cost. The pod is adequate for A2G, and if you're using the gun in A2G it doesn't matter.

The point he misses is that the agility fixes don't address the deficit in energy maneuverability.
 
What I don't understand is why everybody thinks "dogfight" when it comes to air combat manoeuvrability, not "dodge missile".
The latter is likely more relevant nowadays, and the F-35's fancy technologies as published don't change the need to be able to deal with already incoming missiles (other than to use the ejection seat).
 
LowObservable said:
If Davies is right, pull the internal gun off the F-35A and save weight, drag and cost. The pod is adequate for A2G, and if you're using the gun in A2G it doesn't matter.

The point he misses is that the agility fixes don't address the deficit in energy maneuverability.

The gun is obviously the USAF's attempt to meet it's CAS commitment by having each of it's F-35's armed with at least the ability to perform a couple of strafes.

As for agility fixes; they do have an impact on energy maneuverability when your software is forcing you to spend excessive time getting in and out of high-alpha. Obviously the fixes won't have a large impact on that EM, but they are intrinsically linked.
 
LowObservable said:
If Davies is right, pull the internal gun off the F-35A and save weight, drag and cost.

"Fitted for but not with" right? ;)
 
Dragon029 said:
LowObservable said:
If Davies is right, pull the internal gun off the F-35A and save weight, drag and cost. The pod is adequate for A2G, and if you're using the gun in A2G it doesn't matter.

The point he misses is that the agility fixes don't address the deficit in energy maneuverability.

The gun is obviously the USAF's attempt to meet it's CAS commitment by having each of it's F-35's armed with at least the ability to perform a couple of strafes.

Which is all any other modern fighter is going to be doing.
 
Down the toilet? There isn't really any more point to this thread, other than making it the (5th?) F-35 debate thread.
 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1WFP2hMBo8I#t=126

In this video from Oshkosh 2015 during the landing sequences does it look like there is some nozzle deflection?
 
"F-35 Fighter Engines: How The Pentagon Will Make Sure Pratt & Whitney Performs"
by Loren Thompson
7/23/2015

Source:
http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2015/07/23/f-35-fighter-engines-how-the-pentagon-will-make-sure-pratt-whitney-performs/

The Marine Corps is only days (maybe hours) away from declaring its version of the F-35 fighter operational, signaling that the most important challenges the tri-service program faced have been overcome. Program officials are gradually shifting their attention from monitoring developmental progress to managing a serial production process (over 145 planes have been delivered). In terms of saving money, the most important question they must answer as the program matures is how to get companies that have been awarded a production monopoly for the next quarter-century to perform up to their full potential. In the case of engine-maker Pratt & Whitney, the government seems to have hit upon a smart solution.

Pratt’s contract to build high-performance engines for 2,447 F-35s used by three U.S. military services and hundreds more bought by allies is huge. The most recent official estimates indicate the contract will be worth $67 billion in then-year dollars, and that doesn’t count the multi-decade stream of revenues the United Technologies unit will realize providing spare parts and servicing to the engines after they enter operation. Combined with work on other military aircraft such as the Air Force’s new tanker and rapidly growing commercial demand for Pratt’s PurePower line of geared turbofan engines, the F-35 program nearly guarantees the engine company will generate double-digit margins through mid-century.

Unless it screws up by becoming lazy. Some industry observers say that’s precisely what happened a generation ago, when Pratt & Whitney (which contributes to my think tank) was awarded a similar monopoly to produce engines for the Air Force’s F-15 and F-16 fighters. Air Force managers weren’t happy with the price and performance they were getting, so they funded arch-rival General Electric to develop a competing powerplant in what came to be known as the Great Engine War. Once it had two engines to select between, the Air Force felt it got a better deal – even though the GE engine never quite matched the Pratt offering in some respects.

The problem with funding a second engine, though, is that the government has to pay for everything — dual engineering teams, dual supply chains, dual maintenance procedures, etc. Commercial airlines have no need for engines that can break the sound barrier while their planes pull multiple G’s in aerial maneuvers. That is a purely military franchise. When government analysts did the math on developing competing engines for the F-35, they just couldn’t come up with a convincing business case for spending all that extra money to develop two engines. So they had to find a cheaper way of assuring the incumbent engine producer didn’t become fat and happy at the government’s expense.

To date, Pratt has been performing well. The cost of each F135 engine has been cut in half since early production lots, and after 6,000 flights (including 800 vertical landings by the Marine variant), the engines are exhibiting a 96% readiness rate. That level of readiness wasn’t expected until 2019. The engine used on the Air Force version exceeds specified requirements by 47%, the Marine version by 19%. The engines have been run through full life-cycle tests — equivalent to 1,200 F-35 missions — without requiring any turbine maintenance. Climatic tests indicate they can operate reliably in pretty much any type of weather, even when they ingest rain or ice. So at this point, the Pentagon has little reason to complain.

But it’s early. The government needs something beyond the usual contract incentives to assure Pratt & Whitney keeps performing, given how reliant the joint force will be on its engines. Not only that, but as production of initial and replacement engines continues for decades to come, program managers want the F135 to keep improving. After all, neither the threat nor aerospace technology will be standing still. A powerplant that looks like the greatest fighter engine ever in 2015 could look pretty dated in 2035. So it’s not enough for Pratt to keep popping out more copies of the baseline engine; it has to look for ways of continuously improving the fuel burn, the durability, and other features to stay at the cutting edge.

Many big companies such as Boeing and Caterpillar manage to do that in response to market forces, but the F-35 fighter isn’t likely to have serious competition in global markets for some time to come. So the idea that policymakers have hit upon to keep Pratt on its toes is what Pentagon acquisition chief Frank Kendall calls “indirect competition.” Basically, Pratt keeps its monopoly as long as military users like the price and performance they are getting. But if the engine-maker shows signs of becoming unresponsive, there’s an alternative to the F135 engine waiting in the wings that could be implemented fairly quickly. In other words, fear will supplement profits as an inducement to keep Pratt focused.

The key to making this threat real resides in two engine projects being funded by the Air Force Research Laboratory to develop adaptive-engine technology. To quote Guy Norris of Aviation Week & Space Technology, “adaptable engines use an array of variable geometry devices to dynamically alter the fan pressure ratio and overall bypass ratio — the two key factors influencing specific fuel consumption and thrust.” Traditionally, jet engines were optimized for one key performance feature. In the case of fighters, it was power and speed. In the case of commercial engines, it was fuel efficiency and range. With adaptive engine technology, though, these parameters no longer have to be traded off in a design, because they both can be enhanced.

One of the Air Force projects has developed components for a next-generation military engine incorporating adaptive technology. The other, follow-on, project would produce a prototype engine. And because the precise performance requirements for a future tactical aircraft are unclear, the prototype is being configured for use on an F-35. That’s the most capable fighter that actually exists. Pratt & Whitney is one of two companies the Air Force has selected to work on the research. The other is General Electric, which has made little secret of the fact that it thinks its prototype could be turned into a real, operational engine for the F-35 around the middle of the next decade.

So there’s the threat that the Pentagon knows will keep Pratt motivated: its nemesis GE is developing technology that might out-perform the engine Pratt is currently making for the F-35 fighter. For instance, the prototype is designed to increase fuel efficiency by 25%, which GE says could extend the F-35′s unrefueled range by nearly a third — an important consideration as U.S. air fleets increasingly operate in the vast expanses of the Western Pacific. Pratt & Whitney hasn’t been as vocal about its contribution to the research project, but Norris of Aviation Week reported in January that Pratt is planning to test a high-pressure core for a variable-geometry engine next year.

The Air Force insists that its research is not developing an alternative to Pratt’s current engine, but rather is exploring propulsion concepts for whatever follows the F-35 fighter. However, it doesn’t take much imagination to see how GE might pitch a prototype engine circa 2020 if it promises to significantly out-perform the F135 powerplant. At the very least, this will incentivize Pratt to look for ways to enhance the features of its engine. It already is under contract with the Navy to introduce refinements that would increase fuel efficiency by 5%, and some experts think 7% is feasible. Other features such as thrust and durability could be improved if the military users of the F-35 had formal requirements justifying funding for such upgrades.

The good news for Pratt & Whitney is that it doesn’t have to match the performance of an adaptive engine with its F135 to unwind the business case for installing a new engine on the fighter. All it has to do is get close enough so that the life-cycle savings from implementing a new engine can’t cover the cost of developing and producing it. For example, if the new engine were only 10% more fuel efficient than an improved F135, that probably wouldn’t generate the kind of sustainment savings needed to justify the expense of implementing it across the F-35 fleet. But Pratt & Whitney will have to run as fast as it can to stay ahead of the threat GE poses, so this is one program where the concept of indirect competition could save the government billions of dollars.
 
If one wants to see scary they should look at how many aircraft were dependent on the J57 and J79. Miraculously, life went on.
 
But as we know when we read history, the J57, J75 and J79 were the engines that survived and prospered out of a whole bunch of candidates - J40, J65, J67 and J71 were the others left by the wayside.
 
LowObservable said:
But as we know when we read history, the J57, J75 and J79 were the engines that survived and prospered out of a whole bunch of candidates - J40, J65, J67 and J71 were the others left by the wayside.

Yep. Just as the F119/135 prospers while the F120/136 was left by the wayside.
 
I just thought it was interesting that Thompson felt compelled to explain why the Pratt & Whitney F135 jet engine program, without direct competition from the General Electric/Rolls-Royce F136 jet engine program, wouldn't be a repeat of the experience of the Pratt & Whitney F100 jet engine program. According to Thompson, The Great Engine War II is not between the F135 and the F136, but will between the F135 and the adaptive engine programs.
 
"Marines File Paperwork for F-35 IOC; Sign-Off 'Soon'"
By Aaron Mehta 5:39 p.m. EDT July 27, 2015

Source:
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/strike/2015/07/27/marine-ioc-f35-soon-paperwork-dunford/30751515/

WASHINGTON — The US Marine Corps finished tests and filled out the paperwork needed to turn the F-35 joint strike fighter into an operational aircraft.

Lt. Gen. Jon Davis, deputy commandant for Marine aviation, told reporters Monday that once Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Joe Dunford signs off on the paperwork, the F-35B fleet will have achieved initial operational capability (IOC), becoming the first model of the joint strike fighter to become operational.

"[Dunford has] got all the paperwork now. He's going through all that," Davis said. "I would say 'soon' but… he and I talked. He's a busy guy and he's working his way through that right now. I'll tell you we met all of the IOC criteria."

Getting Dunford's signature may take longer than it normally would, as he is currently up for nomination as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is possible the decision could slip to Dunford's nominated successor, Lt. Gen. Robert Neller, although that would be surprising.

Once IOC is declared on the jump-jet variant, the F-35B will be deployable by the Marines in the same manner as any other military aircraft. The first F-35B deployment is scheduled to take place in 2017, with the unit known as VMFA-121 moving to Iwakuni, Japan.

However, if national security objectives required it, Davis said, the planes could be deployed anywhere in the world post IOC. Which is to say, the F-35 will no longer be a paper airplane, but rather one that is part of the overall US military aviation arsenal.

It is a milestone for an F-35 program which suffered years of delays and cost overruns, having been branded as the "trillion dollar plane" and "the plane that ate the Pentagon" by critics.
 
"Marines' new F-35 software warns maintainers of needed fixes"
by James K. Sanborn, Staff writer 2:02 p.m. EDT July 26, 2015

Source:
http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/story/military/tech/2015/07/26/marines-new-f-35-software-warns-maintainers-needed-fixes/30571429/

As the Marine F-35B joint strike fighter completes final operational testing, including bomb runs and shipboard landings, a lesser publicized piece of the program critical to keeping the jet in the air received its last required upgrade before the aircraft can be certified as ready for war.

Affectionately known as ALIS, the Autonomic Logistics Information System used by Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 121 out of Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, serves as the information hub for the F-35, transmitting aircraft health and maintenance needs directly to maintainers, said Gunnery Sgt. Brian Erline, the VMFA-121 aviation logistics information management systems chief.

The high-tech software allows pilots to create a mission profile on a hard drive that they load onto their aircraft before taking flight. The hard drive tracks flight data and flags required maintenance, and lets ground crews know when parts are nearing their life span and need to be changed.

The new upgrades also allow supply and sustainment crews to get those alerts, so maintainers get the parts they need to fix the aircraft, Erline said.

ALIS is "a single management tool to support all F-35 operations," he said.

Along with software upgrades, new hardware for ALIS also got it ready for the field. It was previously rigged on standard server racks like those found in office buildings. Its rugged new cases make it more portable, allowing for it to be easily moved on and off aircraft carriers or deployed to remove bases, Erline said.

The Marine Corps is expected to continue upgrading the logistics information system over the next two years throughout the next phase of the F-35 program testing.
 
Triton said:
I just thought it was interesting that Thompson felt compelled to explain why the Pratt & Whitney F135 jet engine program, without direct competition from the General Electric/Rolls-Royce F136 jet engine program, wouldn't be a repeat of the experience of the Pratt & Whitney F100 jet engine program. According to Thompson, The Great Engine War II is not between the F135 and the F136, but will between the F135 and the adaptive engine programs.

He's right. The F136 didn't bring enough to the table.
 
This article seems to sum up the reasons for the F136 alternative engine program.

"The Great Engine War II: Choice or Monopoly for Global F-35 Fleets?"
Jul 21, 2014 19:38 UTC by Defense Industry Daily staff

Source:
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-f136-engine-more-lives-than-disco-03070/
 
"GE Jet Sets Record; Will F-35 Get New AETD Engine?"
by Colin Clark on June 18, 2015 at 8:41 AM

Source:
http://breakingdefense.com/2015/06/ge-sets-aetd-record/

PARIS AIR SHOW: Pratt & Whitney has refused to disclose the price of its F135 engines for the F-35 for quite a while, even while Lockheed Martin boasted it would bring down the price of the Joint Strike Fighter to $80 million a copy — including engine.

Now we know why. At a Monday briefing here, the head of Pratt’s F135 program, Mark Buongiorno, told reporters the company didn’t want to release the information because the Adaptive Engine Technology Development (AETD) program’s engines were being tested for dimensions that matched those of the F-35. A more fuel-efficient AETD engine could overcome one of the longstanding concerns about the F-35 in an era of ever deeper anti-access/area denial defenses, its relatively short unrefueled range of a bit more than 600 nautical miles.

Then General Electric put out a release late yesterday about testing for its Adaptive Versatile Engine Technology (ADVENT) project, which achieved the highest combined compressor and turbine temperature operation “in the history of jet engine propulsion.”

That release included this sentence: “It is now being applied to the next step – an engine that could fit an F-35-like aircraft.”

You could almost hear the pin drop. Years after former Defense Secretary Bob Gates pushed hard to kill the so-called second engine program — GE’s F136 — it looks as if GE may be poised to come back with what could be either a second engine for the F-35, a replacement for Pratt’s F135, or the next-generation power plant.

GE finished tests on a new engine, which included the highest combined compressor and turbine temperature operation “in the history of jet engine propulsion.”

Daniel McCormick, general manager of GE’s advanced combat engine programs, said there had been a Preliminary Design Review that involved the Air Force, NASA and Lockheed Martin. The new engine can adapt for either maximum thrust — to outrun an enemy anti-aircraft missile, for example — or long-range cruise — say, to penetrate deeply and stealthily into an enemy air-defense zone.

As more details emerge it will be fascinating to hear how senior Pentagon officials and Air Force leaders view this GE engine: as a technology marvel, the beginnings of the next generation in F-35 power, or as a “second engine.”
 
"You could almost hear the pin drop."

Well, there ya go folks, it's a done deal. ::) This is at least the second or third time this article has been posted. It's already been mentioned the ADVENT will not fit in the F-35 due to the 3rd stream. Engine is too fat and if they remove that the case for a swap becomes much less compelling.
 

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