Surface Ships Need More Offensive Punch, Outlook

[lastdingo]

Some more related links (mostly old blog posts)

global shipbuilding, 2004
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.de/2008/03/shocking-shipbuilding-industry.html

global shipbuilding, 2013
https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.de/2014/05/global-shipbuilding-industries.html

state of affairs with Western air-launched anti-ship missiles (short answer: neglected in Europe)
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.de/2017/04/anti-ship-strike-from-air-and-european.html

potential use of C-17 for anti-ship saturation missile attacks
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.de/2017/03/the-y-20-and-transport-bombers-in.html

 

[marauder2048]

And more specifically about the topic; USN warships need more ASW punch (especially a much better detection of silent subs with LFASS on all DDG) and the USN should learn to not lag behind missile technology so badly (something like SM-6 was feasible by the early 90's, same with ESSM Blk II, there's no modern SSM in USN service and the too few ASW missiles are embarrassing).
There was too much emphasis on bombing Third World shitholes with naval air and cruise missiles for too long.
The BMD craze didn't help either.

The presence of bi-static LF receivers on US and threat submarines means that placing LFASS in
emitting form on a warship is a really bad idea unless you want your warship to be a torpedo/ASCM soak.

As a receiver in a multi-static configuration, sure.

Neither SM-6 nor ESSM Blk II were feasible in the early 90's since the
composite track/clutter mitigation/datalink technology that enable the active seeker to
be useful at terminal handover were not yet developed or refined.

What was done in the 90's was IR seekers on SM and improvements to RAM.

The anti-surface versions of SM-6 and TLAM are reasonably modern but
LRASM will be a big improvement.

I tend to agree with you on ASW missiles though there's still
the signature issue which isn't there from torpedoes with glide kits
launched from MPAs or dropped from ASW helicopters.

The BMD craze has been paced by the threat which has only gotten
worse in the intervening decades.

 

[lastdingo]

The presence of bi-static LF receivers on US and threat submarines means that placing LFASS in
emitting form on a warship is a really bad idea unless you want your warship to be a torpedo/ASCM soak.

As a receiver in a multi-static configuration, sure.

Neither SM-6 nor ESSM Blk II were feasible in the early 90's since the
composite track/clutter mitigation/datalink technology that enable the active seeker to
be useful at terminal handover were not yet developed or refined.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sonar_2087
https://www.thalesgroup.com/sites/default/files/medias/documents/MP%203206%20SONAR%202087.pdf

The USN may feel free to deploy some active LFAS tow ship, but I suppose we all know it would gold-plate it into a destroyer before it's willing to add two such ships into a CVBG. They equipped almost no dedicated LFAS ships ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance_Towed_Array_Sensor_System ) so far.

An Arleigh Burke DDG has extremely poor odds against a conventional AIP submarine because it won't detect it passively and its active sonar is short-ranged against that threat (and of course giving the DDG's location away just like a LFAS would).

Helicopter sonobuoys can't be used to screen ahead of a CVBG at 20+ nm width when said CVBG cruises with 15+ kts for a week. That's 30 sq nm per hour, 720 per day, about 5,000 per week. This would require ten thousands of expensive active sonobuoys for a single CVBG and week, for the old expectation of 2,500 m range doesn't apply to relatively small conventional subs with anechoic tiles and you need two, better three sonobuoys in range to get a fix (and none of them should be in front of the sub, for the echo is weak in that direction).

The USN with ~11 CVNs and maybe 4-5 CVBGs in wartime could not possibly rely on sonobuoys for first sub detection in a multi-week conflict. The math is merciless in this regard.

---------

AIM-120 was ready by the early 1990's, so to have an active radar seeker naval SAMs in service was feasible by the early 90's.
The USN did not hesitate to replace Sparrow with AMRAAM for whatever clutter issues. AIM-120A arrived in the very early 90's (some copies were even carried in Desert Storm '91), and the B version in 1994. They both had data downlink already.

The Aster missile family was in service in 2001.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aster_(missile_family)
Its testing against air targets began in around '93-'95 and against seaskimmers in 1997, with some direct hits.

SM-6 arrived 12 years after Aster. The USN was and is badly lagging in regard to deployment of active radar SAMs.
It was too much in love with its 'AEGIS + SM-2' approach and too occupied with the BMD craze.
Keep in mind that the combination of E-2D, SM-6 and ESSM Blk II put a huge question mark behind those huge SPY-x radars and thus the Arleigh Burke DDG concept in itself. Active radar SAMs are "disruptive" to the USN.

BTW, hard kill is but one method against quasiballistic anti-ship missiles, and it incurs huge costs and requires to give away some key ships' position with powerful emissions by search radars.

 

[marauder2048]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sonar_2087
https://www.thalesgroup.com/sites/default/files/medias/documents/MP%203206%20SONAR%202087.pdf

Still monostatic installations which due to the inherent range resolution limitations of LF requires a helicopter or MPA
to go perform a finer grained sweep.

Frankly, I'm only sanguine about non-acoustic techniques against modern subs.

Still there are 5 US LFASS platforms and (through cost sharing) 3 Japanese LFAS platforms available which is adequate
but not ideal.

But again, threat subs equipped with bi-static LF receivers are likely to have near FCQ
tracks of LF emitters long before the sub is detected. So you better attach the emitters to platforms
you can afford to lose or that are sufficiently low-value that a sub skipper is not willing to
risk exposing his position by attacking.

AIM-120 was ready by the early 1990's, so to have an active radar seeker naval SAMs in service was feasible by the early 90's.
The USN did not hesitate to replace Sparrow with AMRAAM for whatever clutter issues. AIM-120A arrived in the very early 90's (some copies were even carried in Desert Storm '91), and the B version in 1994. They both had data downlink already.

AIM-120 A/B were uplink only and totally unsuited to maritime clutter and multipath environments.
AMRAAM didn't get credible counter-cruise missile updates until C6 and, ideally, the firing platform
still needs a beam aspect on the target.

At best, it would been useful solely in last ditch defense for which RAM is inherently better
suited.

The Aster missile family was in service in 2001.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aster_(missile_family)
Its testing against air targets began in around '93-'95 and against seaskimmers in 1997, with some direct hits.

And much shorter range (in the form that was tested during that period) than ESSM or SM.
As pointed out above, things are easier for active RF missiles if the handover is quick since error
accumulation in target track is, to a first order approximation, a function of time and therefore range.

It was too much in love with its 'AEGIS + SM-2' approach and too occupied with the BMD craze.

Which of course explains the IR seeker and trajectory shaping additions to SM-2 which are
not AEGIS dependent and strictly focused on airbreathing sea skimmers.

Keep in mind that the combination of E-2D, SM-6 and ESSM Blk II put a huge question mark behind those huge SPY-x radars and
thus the Arleigh Burke DDG concept in itself.

They don't. How do you think the ship tracks and communicates with these long range,
active missiles in flight, at range and against jamming?

SM-6 is also a completely different beast than Aster; compare the range and aperture size
not to mention the varied mission set.

Aside from OTH (or the near OTH) case, the main utility of active RF SAMs is in reducing dependence
on illuminators in the terminal phase during large raids.

Of course, ICWI waveforms from shipborne AESAs can do this as well but not every SM/ESSM
launching platform has these so there's a need for an active seeker.

BTW, hard kill is but one method against quasiballistic anti-ship missiles, and it incurs huge costs and requires to give away some key ships' position with powerful emissions by search radars.

Very few of the proposed soft-kill mechanisms hold up under scrutiny (e.g. DIRCM against IIR)
and still put the defender at the mercy of Red's war reserve modes. They are a fine adjunct
to hard-kill in that they help preserve hard-kill inventory.

In many cases, the ship's own radars aren't being employed for anything but the terminal phase
or interceptor uplink/downlink.

 

[lastdingo]

Repeat; the USN had its first active radar homing SAM in service 12 years after the Europeans. That's a severe lag because

Aside from OTH (or the near OTH) case, the main utility of active RF SAMs is in reducing dependence
on illuminators in the terminal phase during large raids.

IS HUGE.

Plain old Super Etendard + Exocet attacks as of 1982 were extremely difficult to deal with using only what Arleigh Burkes and Ticos had prior to SM-6 because of the low altitude horizon issue. The Super Etendards would rarely be shot down by the ships' defences. This changed radically with active radar homing SAMs if there is AEW available. It's similar with San Carlos-style scenarios and self-defence in port.
Without active radar homing SAMs the USN had to rely on fighters.

The USN is addressing the deficit and I have high expectations for ESSM Blk II, but the existence of the deficit shows that it's far from perfect in making use of technology advances. A lag of 12 years behind an ally is embarrassing for a service with such an obscene budget. There are almost certainly systemic problems, and those should be addressed - not only their symptoms of the past.

 

[marauder2048]

Repeat; the USN had its first active radar homing SAM in service 12 years after the Europeans. That's a severe lag because

Repeat: The USN had an IR seeker equipped version of SM-2 in the
fleet inventory in the 90's. AFAIK, there is still no European equivalent.

SM-2 Blk IIIB is not dependent on illuminators and was designed
(in conjunction with some maneuverability enhancements) specifically
to defeat the sea skimming threat.

It had an unprecedentedly successful IOT&E and FOT&E.
Modern versions are still in production and still being sold.

I can only conclude that you are repeatedly ignoring it because it doesn't fit your premise.

ICWI handles saturation attacks very well and versions of ESSM and SM have
supported that waveform since the 90's.*

So the only thing left is the OTH or near-OTH case for which remote illuminators
are absolutely required. Active seekers do fulfill that role but you still need the
datalinks to put the missile in the OTH or near-OTH box in the first place.

* The USN absolutely deserves criticism for not having more shipborne AESAs
by this point and for not embracing sea-based Hit-to-kill; it's likely
some threat ASCMs are armored beyond what blast frag can consistently
overcome.

 

[lastdingo]

Excuse me, ESSM supported some waveform in the 90's? It came into service only after 2000.


So far I've seen claims that the IR seeker on the SM-2 Blk III is for ECCM (sensor fusion with semi-active terminal guidance), and but once that it's good enough for stand-alone seeker mode and thus for OTH engagements. Even that one was exclusively about sea skimmer threat, not about overland threats. The seeker is rather small (smaller than RAM's or Sidewinder's) and I doubt that it has a large footprint, so in case of a NLOS engagement the midcourse guidance would need to be very accurate and the terminal phase very short.

Or in other words; I largely ignored that IR seeker, thinking of it as an equivalent to some clever ECCM algorithms. It's nothing like Aster's or SM-6's active radar seeker.

 

[sferrin]

it's likely
some threat ASCMs are armored beyond what blast frag can consistently
overcome.

IIRC the P-1000 Vulkan has a titanium armored warhead/front end.

 

[marauder2048]

Excuse me, ESSM supported some waveform in the 90's? It came into service only after 2000.


So far I've seen claims that the IR seeker on the SM-2 Blk III is for ECCM (sensor fusion with semi-active terminal guidance), and but once that it's good enough for stand-alone seeker mode and thus for OTH engagements. Even that one was exclusively about sea skimmer threat, not about overland threats. The seeker is rather small (smaller than RAM's or Sidewinder's) and I doubt that it has a large footprint, so in case of a NLOS engagement the midcourse guidance would need to be very accurate and the terminal phase very short.

Or in other words; I largely ignored that IR seeker, thinking of it as an equivalent to some clever ECCM algorithms. It's nothing like Aster's or SM-6's active radar seeker.

The ICWI waveform was developed in the 90's for SM and later applied to ESSM.
The transceiver was ready long before the radars that emitted the waveform were ready.

I didn't claim any particular OTH capability for SM-2 Block IIIB though it likely has some.
My point was that its development along with most of the composite track and datalink tech in the 90's
was focused on the air breathing threat not the BMD craze.

The main envisioned use of all of the above (as is now the vision for ESSM Blk II)
was to launch on remote and intercept sea skimmers near the horizon.
It's AEGIS and illuminator independent.

 

[bobbymike]

https://news.usni.org/2017/06/01/navsea-extending-surface-ship-service-life-could-speed-up-355-ship-buildup-by-10-15-years

 

[bobbymike]

http://breakingdefense.com/2017/06/navy-must-boost-carrier-air-wings-range-size-lethality/

 

[bobbymike]

https://news.usni.org/2017/06/20/houses-2018-defense-bill-increase-ddg-ssn-production-rates-buy-carriers-every-3-years

The House Armed Services Committee’s defense bill for 2018 would allow the Navy to buy 15 Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers and 13 Virginia-class attack submarines over the next five years instead of the 10 each the Navy wanted, would urge the Navy to buy aircraft carriers every three years, and would force the destroyer shipbuilders to make quicker progress upgrading to the Flight III ship design that boasts a more impressive radar, HASC aides told reporters today.

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.scout.com/military/warrior/story/1675096-army-howitzer-fires-navy-rail-gun-round

 

[bring_it_on]

IIRC the original SCO project involved integrating it with a radar, possibly the HAMMR. Hope they are planning on sticking to it.

 

[sferrin]

http://www.scout.com/military/warrior/story/1675096-army-howitzer-fires-navy-rail-gun-round

A shame they don't have a competitive howitzer to fire it from:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4bjcHqqema0

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.scout.com/military/warrior/story/1675096-army-howitzer-fires-navy-rail-gun-round

A shame they don't have a competitive howitzer to fire it from:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4bjcHqqema0

Wow just wow 15 to 3 rounds now multiply that buy five or ten platforms. My biggest beef with Bush41 was his complete elimination of all nuclear modernization but the damage to modernization overall that has arguably persisted to this day has put us in such a hole don't know if we'll ever catch up.

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.realcleardefense.com/2017/07/04/joint_leonardo-bae_munition_could_triple_us_navy_gun_range_294581.html

 

[sferrin]

http://www.realcleardefense.com/2017/07/04/joint_leonardo-bae_munition_could_triple_us_navy_gun_range_294581.html

And I "could be the next winner in the Publisher's Clearing House Sweepstakes". I'll believe it when I see it deployed.

 

[sferrin]

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/exclusive-cno-announces-the-return-vertical-launch-system-21425

"The U.S. Navy is looking to restore its ability to reload its ships’ vertical launch systems at sea, which could be a dramatic logistical game changer in the planning and execution of high-intensity contingencies against peer competitors.

This encouraging revelation comes from an exclusive one-on-one conversation with Chief of Naval Operations John Richardson following his remarks at the U.S. Naval War College’s 2017 Current Strategy Forum last month."

Except: 1. it reduces the round loadout by 3 cells worth per bank of modules.
2. the reason they got rid of it in the first place was it was dubious at best. Reloading a heavy round like a Tomahawk (or SM-3 Block II I'd imagine) in anything but glass-smooth seas was apparently quite the adventure.

 

[TomS]

There are solutions to the reloading problem that don't depend on the strike-down crane. I haven't read the 2009 paper about robotic reloading systems, but given that it's by Marvin O. Miller, it's probably related at a concept of his that was first trialed at Port Hueneme in the 1980s. That kept the missile canister under positive control throughout the loading cycle, unlike the strike-down crane. (There was a very detailed article about it in UNREP Journal at the time. No way to find that again now, though.) The only real downside was the length of time alongside required -- you could be UNREPing for a solid day if you had really depleted the magazines on a cruiser, for example. That's kind of hell on the bridge watch, even if the weapon handling itsself is automated.

I think the suggestion of forward but not underway replenishment may make more sense. If you can add cranes and the other gear to a replenishment ship to allow a combatant to raft alongside in an anchorage and quickly reload VLS there, it might make more sense than trying to find an UNREP solution. They've been doing this sort of thing on a much smaller scale for subs for a while, reloading their TLAMs in port in a forward area and sending them back out to shoot some more.

 

[TomS]

Aha! I found an excerpt from the UNREP Journal article here:

http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2013/10/vertical-launching-systems-and-type-26.html

The concept for replenishing 15 VLS per hour in Sea State 5, shown in Figures 9, 10, 11 and 12 centers around a transportable VLS rearming device that is stowed and maintained on the Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ship. When the combatant ship comes alongside for at-sea rearming or load adjustment, the rearming device is transported from the CLF ship by the new Heavy Unrep rig to the combatant ship sliding padeye along with a team to operate the rearming device. A swing arm at the base of the sliding padeye is used to position the rearming device onto three low profile rails permanently mounted atop the VLS launcher. A hydraulic power unit on the combatant ship powers the swing arm and also the rearming device after it is on the rails.

The CLF ship will next transfer a loaded VLS canister to the sliding padeye. The canister will be lowered to the swing arm by the sliding padeye and then be released from the transfer rig. The canister will be swung around and be picked off from the swing arm by the rearming device two clamp rings. The canister will be moved by the rearming device to a position over an empty cell. The cell hatch will open and the rearming device will erect the canister to the vertical. The canister will be lowered by a wire rope hoist into the cell. The rig will be disconnected from the end of the canister, the cell hatch will close and the canister will be connected below decks to the VLS circuits. When the VLS rearming or VLS load adjustment is completed, the rearming device and team will be returned to the CLF ship.

 

[bobbymike]

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/10/12/inflection_point_for_american_seapower_112469.html

 

[bobbymike]

https://news.usni.org/2017/10/19/open-architecture-systems-design-is-key-to-navy-evolution

 

[bobbymike]

https://scout.com/military/warrior/Article/Navy-to-Fire-Rail-Gun-Hypervelocity-Projectile-From-5-inch-Guns-103103278

 

[bobbymike]

https://breakingdefense.com/2017/10/trumps-355-ship-fleet-will-take-til-2050s/?utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=57769574&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--xx7x795BgNkTZPpazoCQk_rpBUAAliiy-jK60zGzvKnmhGEI4hbxUzLUJcUnhJ0cEkC3gV7M73XoAgTkkHa8VIVJxHw&_hsmi=57769574

 

[bobbymike]

https://scout.com/military/warrior/Article/Navy-SM-6-Intercept-Proves-It-Could-Counter-North-Korea-Attack-110262741

 

[bobbymike]

https://breakingdefense.com/2017/11/marines-seek-anti-ship-himars-high-cost-hard-mission/

 

[bobbymike]

https://www.c4isrnet.com/intel-geoint/2017/11/21/tomahawks-get-faster-processors-better-flight-paths/

 

[bobbymike]

https://www.military.com/defensetech/2017/12/01/marine-corps-firing-rockets-ship-just-starting-point.html

 

[bobbymike]

https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2017/12/14/trump-just-made-355-ships-national-policy/

 

[bobbymike]

https://news.usni.org/2018/01/02/navys-fy-2019-budget-request-will-include-new-shipbuilding-life-extensions-help-grow-fleet

 

[Moose]

DDG Service Life Extension has been moving forward since 2008, I'm at a loss as to why anyone would be trying to portray it as a new initiative. I'm also a bit confused and skeptical about the scheduling he's proposing, though that's maybe a bit in the weeds for the topic.

The shipyard recap request is nice, will be nicer if it actually happens.

 

[bobbymike]

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-01/increase-strike-group-lethality

 

[bobbymike]

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/01/08/building_a_bigger_navy_means_buying_ships_in_bulk_112867.html

 

[fredymac]

VLS cells mounted above the deck plus a high power microwave EMP system for self defense.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YWZ6xZHsQMo

 

[TomS]

Cocoon is back, 20 years later.

 

[sferrin]

Looks like a good way to take up a lot of deck space.

 

[bobbymike]

https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/surface-navy-association/2018/01/09/surface-warfare-director-cruiser-replacement-wont-be-a-cruiser/

https://breakingdefense.com/2018/01/frigate-design-awards-by-april-950m-max-vls-mandatory/

 

[TomS]

Looks like a good way to take up a lot of deck space.

Works if you have the deck area but not the hull depth for a vertical launcher.

It's funny that the video says it was done "several years ago" because Cocoon as a design dates to the mid to late 1990s. As the video says, it was originally proposed for carriers (angled to keep VLS booster cans away from the flight deck) where they already had the area on the sponsons where the Mk 29s trainable launchers sit. I think it was alo pitched for the large-deck amphibs and maybe even LSDs, all cases where they had deck area rto play with but not a lot of enclosed volume to lose.

Now they have a requirement to retrofit LCS, which has some dedicated deck area but not the depth for Mk 41. Same basic use case; more flexible than just slapping dedicated SSM tubes on the ship (assuming you have fire control for anything else).

 

[sferrin]

Looks like a good way to take up a lot of deck space.

Works if you have the deck area but not the hull depth for a vertical launcher.

It's funny that the video says it was done "several years ago" because Cocoon as a design dates to the mid to late 1990s. As the video says, it was originally proposed for carriers (angled to keep VLS booster cans away from the flight deck) where they already had the area on the sponsons where the Mk 29s trainable launchers sit. I think it was alo pitched for the large-deck amphibs and maybe even LSDs, all cases where they had deck area rto play with but not a lot of enclosed volume to lose.

Now they have a requirement to retrofit LCS, which has some dedicated deck area but not the depth for Mk 41. Same basic use case; more flexible than just slapping dedicated SSM tubes on the ship (assuming you have fire control for anything else).

Are these things Strike length or the shorter, ESSM, Self-Defense?