Surface Ships Need More Offensive Punch, Outlook

[marauder2048]

But even the Block I doesn't cost half a million

Assuming it's possible, the per-unit cost of reworking ESSM Block I to Block II standard
could be under half a million.

 

[bring_it_on]

When?

For the navy, the ability to expand missile functionality without the need to re-design and recertify hardware is a game changer. "If I can make software-only modifications to those missiles I now have the ability to pace the threat without having to go back in and change hardware and complete a development effort," said Capt Ladner. "It's like a Windows 10 upgrade … the software is updated and now I get a new capability rolled out. What I [need to] do is to be nimble in how I make those software upgrades."

SBT Increment 1 is the first example of a software upgrade that is endowing additional capability, introducing functionality to enable the SM-6 Dual I missile to defeat short-range ballistic missile threats inside the atmosphere in their terminal phase. The SM-6 Dual I was entered in the MDA's Operational Capability Baseline in December 2015 and delivered to the fleet.

Having completed a first SM-6 Dual 1 flight test in July 2015 - intercepting and destroying a short-range ballistic missile target in its final seconds of flight - the MDA and the USN conducted a second test, designated Flight Test Standard Missile-27 (FTM-27), off the coast of Hawaii in December 2016. On this occasion the destroyer John Paul Jones , configured to Aegis Baseline 9.C1, fired a salvo of two SM-6 Dual I missiles against a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) target fired from PMRF.

Lockheed Martin's Targets and Countermeasures team designed, built and launched the MRBM target vehicle. Although it has been widely reported that the target was flying a trajectory typical of a Chinese DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missile, the MDA has made no comment as to the specific threat type being replicated by the MRBM target.

https://www.scribd.com/document/341375277/Three-Missions-One-Missile-SM-6-Changes-the-Arithmetic?secret_password=znhNNvhdnPQdjPFUwuHs

Has the PAC-3, or PAC-3 MSE been tested against an MRBM target? Besides, even that is not a half a million dollar interceptor as Clark suggests (although the PAC-3/MSE fits his criteria better than the ESSM). More like $4 Million plus change.

 

[bring_it_on]

But even the Block I doesn't cost half a million

Assuming it's possible, the per-unit cost of reworking ESSM Block I to Block II standard
could be under half a million.

Thanks! But someone has paid for those Block I stockpile . While in principle I agree with his notion that shortening the stand off range requirement gets you a larger magazine it won't get you to six figures in terms of cost, particularly when it comes to highly capable missiles that can defeat the spectrum of ASBM's out there that range from 300 or so km up to 2000+ kms. Given that you could swap out an SM2/SM6 with 2 MSE's it does appear be something worth considering in the future in terms of maximizing the ABM capability of the MSE if greater magazine depth is warranted. The Block II ESSM will probably struggle to match the ABM capability of the MSE.

Patriot fire units are slanted and the MSE launcher for the Medium Extended Air Defence System (MEADS) was canted marginally from vertical - for safety reasons - but a naval version would need to be fired vertically to fit into legacy launch cells and deck architecture, and provide all-round coverage. However, Barry McCullough, vice president of international business development for Aegis programmes said that the company proved the MSE's basic fit in a Mk.41 vertical launch system cell and its vertical launch capability in a launcher at Aberdeen Proving Ground.

Trotsky acknowledged that "there is a small amount of integration work required to get the missile into a vertical launch cell, but you can get two MSE in each launch canister". The missile's solid fuel configuration should also ease its integration into the shipboard environment.

It is also assumed (as Vago seems to have done) that the anti ship long range targeting, even using a ballistic missile is cost effective. I would love to see a cost comparison between an SM6, THAAD and DF-26. I mean a highly precise medium-intermediate range ballistic missile inventory is not going to be 'cheap' especially if you are going to use it as a swarm to overwhelm ship defenses at very long distances.

 

[sferrin]

Although it has been widely reported that the target was flying a trajectory typical of a Chinese DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missile, the MDA has made no comment as to the specific threat type being replicated by the MRBM target.[/b]

Interesting. I wonder how it was "widely reported" if the MDA made no specific announcements regarding threat types. Sounds like a bunch of assumptions by the MSM that got picked up and copied by the rest of the MSM. And unless the target they actually flew against was different than that in the video the MDA released, it was just your average Terrier-boosted, spin-stabilized ballistic target. Nothing special.

Vanillia PAC-3 was tested against MRBMs at Kwajalein well over a decade ago, and has also been tested against maneuvering RVs.

 

[bring_it_on]

And unless the target they actually flew against was different than that in the video the MDA released, it was just your average Terrier-boosted, spin-stabilized ballistic target. Nothing special.

Is there footage of the target missile for FTM-27? The one on DVIDS and MDA only shows interceptor launch. Maybe you are talking about a different test? From what we know based on open source reporting quoting Lockheed officials is that this particular target has only been used twice before and was contracted for in Q2 FY13. It's acquisition appears to be seperate from the eMRBM targets contracted for in the early 2000s.

https://www.dvidshub.net/video/500586/ftm-27-flight-test?sub_id=141437&utm_campaign=subscriptions&utm_medium=email&utm_source=141437&utm_content=asset_link

Official DOD PR read -

The Missile Defense Agency and sailors aboard USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53), an Aegis baseline 9.C1 equipped destroyer, today successfully fired a salvo of two SM-6 Dual I missiles against a complex medium-range ballistic missile target, demonstrating the Sea Based Terminal endo-atmospheric defensive capability and meeting the test's primary objective.

Vanillia PAC-3 was tested against MRBMs at Kwajalein well over a decade ago, and has also been tested against maneuvering RVs.

Thanks. Any details on the target in terms of range?

 

[sferrin]

Thanks. Any details on the target in terms of range?

They tested against a 1000km range target at Kwajalein. The target with the Pershing II warhead was a shorter ranged missile. (Storm II) If I had to guess it was to simulate Iskander. No idea if they've tested against a full-up Pershing II analog.

http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/app4/storm.html

Something else to keep in mind, the recent Juno/MSE test could have simulated a much longer range missile than the A to B range might indicate depending on the flight profile.

 

[bring_it_on]

Thanks. In BMD speak 1000 km would still be the upper limits of SRBM with MRBM extending out to 3000-3500km ranged weapons. I've read a small anti MRBM capability attributed to the MSE (can't seem to find it) but have not seen any testing extending to those ranges being made public. DF-21D has a range in the 1500-2000 km and DF-26 is claimed to have a 3000+ km range.

 

[sferrin]

Thanks. In BMD speak 1000 km would still be the upper limits of SRBM with MRBM extending out to 3000-3500km ranged weapons. I've read a small anti MRBM capability attributed to the MSE (can't seem to find it) but have not seen any testing extending to those ranges being made public. DF-21D has a range in the 1500-2000 km and DF-26 is claimed to have a 3000+ km range.

I've seen differing classifications out there. One said MRBMs go down to 1000km while 3000-3500km would be considered IRBMs. I would like to see them test a PAC-3 MSE against a full-range Pershing II analog, complete with maneuvering RV.

 

[bring_it_on]

I just use this (att.) from the MDA. Regardless, the MRBMs of interest are those beyond 1500 km like the DF-21D etc although there are even sub 500 km Anti ship BM's out there with Iran but I'd assume those are less problematic.

 

[sferrin]

I just use this (att.) from the MDA. Regardless, the MRBMs of interest are those beyond 1500 km like the DF-21D etc although there are even sub 500 km Anti ship BM's out there with Iran but I'd assume those are less problematic.

Note that it shows PAC-3 out to 3000km range targets.

 

[marauder2048]

But even the Block I doesn't cost half a million

Assuming it's possible, the per-unit cost of reworking ESSM Block I to Block II standard
could be under half a million.

Thanks! But someone has paid for those Block I stockpile .

I think the argument is that the Block I stockpile represents a sunk cost.
Assuming you can get reworked ESSM Block IIs for ~ $500K/each it's still cheaper per quadpack than a single PAC-3 MSE with a 50% reduction in APUC.

Granted, the two missiles aren't in the same class and the Navy really should have looked at PAC-3 MSE (with a booster) for SBT.
But I'm guessing that ESSM and SM-6's surface-to-surface modes are playing some role in convincing the Navy.

 

[bobbymike]

https://news.usni.org/2017/03/13/sets-up-debate-on-current-navy-platform

 

[bring_it_on]

Navy white paper on Accelerated ship building plan

The Navy recently sent Defense Secretary Jim Mattis an accelerated shipbuilding plan that would build an additional 23 ships, at a cost of $61.8 billion, over the future years defense plan beginning in fiscal year 2017, according to a white paper obtained by Inside Defense.

The service's force-structure assessment that was released in December called for the Navy to grow its fleet to 355 ships.

"Breaking from the historically budget-driven process, the Navy has completed an internal review that has attempted to answer a very different question -- 'How rapidly could the Navy increase its force size guided by operational requirements, industrial base capacity, and good stewardship of the taxpayers' money?'" acting Navy Secretary Sean Stackley wrote in a Feb. 9 letter to Mattis that accompanied the white paper. The letter and white paper have not been previously reported.

Stackley admits in the letter the Navy's proposal is "ambitious" and could be considered as a future plan to recover from a long period of "deficit investment."

The accelerated shipbuilding plan calls for an additional DDG-51 Flight IIA destroyer, four DDG-51 Flight IIIs, five Ship-to-Shore Connectors, one Columbia-class ballistic missile sub, one LPD-17 amphibious transport dock, two LX(R)s, one LHA Flight I amphibious assault ship, three John Lewis-class oilers, one ocean surveillance ship replacement, one tug and salvage replacement ship, two Expeditionary Fast Transports, and three Expeditionary Mobile Bases.

The plan also cuts one Littoral Combat Ship and calls for two small surface combatant ships to be built each year after LCS is complete.

"Exploratory analysis indicates that existing shipyards have sufficient production capacity to accept additional orders for ships already under construction," according to the white paper. "This applies to DDG-51, Small Surface Combatants, LPD-17, T-EPF and T-ESB classes in particular."

Virginia-class submarines and Ford-class aircraft carriers have additional shipyard and supplier constraints that may prohibit rapidly ramping up production rates in the near term, the white paper reads.

The service proposes building a Ford-class carrier every three-and-one-half years instead of in five-year increments beginning with CVN-80 and CVN-81.

"Delivery of CVNs 81, 82, and 83 would be accelerated by one, two, and five years, respectively," according to the white paper.

The Navy suggests building Virginia-class subs at a rate of two boats per year and three in years that would not impact Columbia-class sub manufacturing.

Additionally, the Navy proposes an accelerated procurement plan of $29.6 billion for 268 additional aircraft over the FYDP beginning in FY-17.

The service argues an increase in aircraft is needed to outfit the additional ships in the proposed acceleration plan.

"Aircraft production lines that have the greatest amount of unused capacity include F-35, F/A-18E/F, V-22 (both CMV-22 and MV-22), MQ-4C, E-2D, and KC-130J," according to the white paper.

Over the FYDP the Navy proposes purchasing an additional 24 CMV-22Bs, 29 MV-22Bs, four C-40As, 11 E-2Ds, 52 F/A-18Es, 56 F/A-18Fs, 21 F-35Bs, 26 F-35Cs, 14 KC-130Js, four MQ-4Cs, 28 P-8As, and four UC-12Ws.

https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/proposed-navy-shipbuilding-plan-adds-23-ships-five-years

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/04/10/preparing_for_2035_the_navys_role_in_shaping_the_future_111136.html

http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Global_Risks_2035_web_0922.pdf

 

[bobbymike]

https://news.usni.org/2017/04/25/25316

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-04/embracing-dark-battle

 

[bobbymike]

http://breakingdefense.com/2017/04/pacoms-harris-urges-more-subs-pgms-ships-at-hasc/?utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=51251013&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--Cu13_vhERJFNiQobHIXB0702plPjbgZfe_4AjHq5QMUNBsoqbx91Ybap3y6Tcw10jRDBV98IGDZ1_7e5ZL854dr_d2w&_hsmi=51251013

 

[bobbymike]

http://breakingdefense.com/2017/04/slash-ship-design-time-in-half-cno-says/

 

[pathology_doc]

http://breakingdefense.com/2017/04/slash-ship-design-time-in-half-cno-says/

Quality is necessary, but the best is the enemy of good enough. The big trouble is that IMO the US had eight years of being told it didn't need to be (or possibly even shouldn't be) a worldwide blue-water force and is now paying the price.

 

[Grey Havoc]

http://breakingdefense.com/2017/04/slash-ship-design-time-in-half-cno-says/

Quality is necessary, but the best is the enemy of good enough. The big trouble is that IMO the US had eight years of being told it didn't need to be (or possibly even shouldn't be) a worldwide blue-water force and is now paying the price.

You can say that again!

 

[Moose]

http://breakingdefense.com/2017/04/slash-ship-design-time-in-half-cno-says/

Quality is necessary, but the best is the enemy of good enough. The big trouble is that IMO the US had eight years of being told it didn't need to be (or possibly even shouldn't be) a worldwide blue-water force and is now paying the price.

The last 8 years saw more blue-water hulls ordered and construction begun than the previous 8. And everyone's favorite punching bag, LCS, comes from a lot further back than 8 years.

 

[Triton]

The big trouble is that IMO the US had eight years of being told it didn't need to be (or possibly even shouldn't be) a worldwide blue-water force and is now paying the price.

Who was the peer blue water competitor of the United States Navy when the decision was made that the next battlespace would be shallow coastal waters, aka littorals or green water, during the late 1990s and early 2000s? During the post-Cold War era, aka "New World Order" era, the future predictions were wrong. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, could decision makers have foreseen the arms build-up of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China? The problem is that instead of admitting that the future predictions were wrong and the world changed, you have asinine ideas like taking LCS and making it a frigate or guided-missile frigate. I don't know where you got the eight years from, it's been an issue since the George HW Bush Administration.

 

[sferrin]

The big trouble is that IMO the US had eight years of being told it didn't need to be (or possibly even shouldn't be) a worldwide blue-water force and is now paying the price.

Who was the peer blue water competitor of the United States Navy when the decision was made that the next battlespace would be shallow coastal waters, aka littorals or green water, during the late 1990s and early 2000s? During the post-Cold War era, aka "New World Order" era, the future predictions were wrong. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, could decision makers have foreseen the arms build-up of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China? The problem is that instead of admitting that the future prediction were wrong and the world changed, you have asinine ideas like taking LCS and making it a frigate or guided-missile frigate. I don't know where you got the eight years from, it's been an issue since the George HW Bush Administation.

It was pretty obvious to anybody paying attention what China's plans were when they bought the "casino" for a measly $20 million. And here we are.

 

[Triton]

It was pretty obvious to anybody paying attention what China's plans were when they bought the "casino" for a measly $20 million. And here we are.

No, it wasn't obvious. You seem to forget that Chinese companies also purchased Minsk (1995) and Kiev (1996) and operate them as tourist attractions to this day. Minsk serves as a naval museum in Jiangsu, China. Kiev serves as a theme park in Tianjin. Chinese intentions for Varyag [/i (1998) were the subject of dispute until the rebuilding began, so don't give me the line that "it was pretty obvious to anybody paying attention what China's plans were when they bought the 'casino.'"

People also seem to conveniently forget the views of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, acquisition chief John J Young, Jr., Senator John McCain, and Chairman of U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services Senator John Warner concerning Cold War-era weapons programs and the lack of peer adversaries argument during the George W Bush Administration years. It's much easier to place blame on Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and the Obama Administration for your selective recollections.

 

[sferrin]

No, it wasn't obvious. You seem to forget that Chinese companies also purchased Minsk (1995) and Kiev (1996) and operate them as tourist attractions to this day. Minsk serves as a naval museum in Jiangsu, China. Kiev serves as a theme park in Tianjin. Chinese intentions for Varyag [/i (1998) were the subject of dispute until the rebuilding began, so don't give me the line that "it was pretty obvious to anybody paying attention what China's plans were when they bought the 'casino.'"

Well *I* thought it was perfectly obvious. If you didn't I can't do anything about that.

People also seem to conveniently forget the views of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, acquisition chief John J Young, Jr., Senator John McCain, and Chairman of U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services Senator John Warner concerning Cold War-era weapons programs and the lack of peer adversaries argument during the George W Bush Administration years. It's much easier to place blame on Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and the Obama Administration for your selective recollections.

Who was it that canned two USAF generals who tried explaining the need of more F-22s because it didn't fit the narrative? Oh right, that was Bob Gates.

 

[bobbymike]

No, it wasn't obvious. You seem to forget that Chinese companies also purchased Minsk (1995) and Kiev (1996) and operate them as tourist attractions to this day. Minsk serves as a naval museum in Jiangsu, China. Kiev serves as a theme park in Tianjin. Chinese intentions for Varyag [/i (1998) were the subject of dispute until the rebuilding began, so don't give me the line that "it was pretty obvious to anybody paying attention what China's plans were when they bought the 'casino.'"

Well *I* thought it was perfectly obvious. If you didn't I can't do anything about that.

People also seem to conveniently forget the views of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, acquisition chief John J Young, Jr., Senator John McCain, and Chairman of U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services Senator John Warner concerning Cold War-era weapons programs and the lack of peer adversaries argument during the George W Bush Administration years. It's much easier to place blame on Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and the Obama Administration for your selective recollections.

Who was it that canned two USAF generals who tried explaining the need of more F-22s because it didn't fit the narrative? Oh right, that was Bob Gates.

I have consistently called out the George HW Bush administration on defense cuts ESPECIALLY the complete destruction/dismantlement of nuclear modernization. Can't remember how many times I was called a lunatic 'Cold Warrior' because of this.

 

[sferrin]

I have consistently called out the George HW Bush administration on defense cuts ESPECIALLY the complete destruction/dismantlement of nuclear modernization. Can't remember how many times I was called a lunatic 'Cold Warrior' because of this.

Oh those, "Cold War Relics®" were just so old fashioned. The world today has show how wise we were to unilaterally dismantle most of our nuclear forces.

 

[DrRansom]

Oh those, "Cold War Relics®" were just so old fashioned. The world today has show how wise we were to unilaterally dismantle most of our nuclear forces.

Consider tactical nuclear weapons, the US unilaterally divested of them and, in return, Russia retained a large arsenal. Today, the US has nothing to encourage any reduction of tactical weapons nor has enough for developing counter-force strike missions in North Korea. That unilateral reduction meant the US has no ways of negotiating a decrease or retaining a capability for developing threats.

As for development times, they have to come down for everything the US military produces. 20 year development cycles are completely unaffordable and have only produced a decaying military with prohibitively expensive new systems.

 

[NeilChapman]

Every time "someone" figured the threats were reducing, "they" were wrong. It's no use blaming a particular president or party. The case needs to be made, regularly, to the electorate.

The only solution that makes sense is for the US to "determine" that its economic and military power is the solution to continued stability.

That translates to strategic military technology investments with production on a "war footing".

Cyclical modernization,
vessels with shorter life spans or gutted and upgraded,
submarine quantities that meet tasking levels,
airframes being produced with variants planned on planned intervals (4 yrs?)
and a consistent budget that is 4-5% of GDP.

But that won't happen. So here we all are. Rehashing the same problem all over again.

 

[NeilChapman]

Speaking of a "war footing"...

http://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/trump-administration-ponders-demands-wartime-footing

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.scout.com/military/warrior/story/1681995-navy-prototypes-new-high-tech-torpedo-variant

 

[TomS]

Mk 48 is a submarine weapon (despite the Stingray picture they used to illustrate the article.)

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/military/sd-me-navy-witties-20170515-story.html

 

[bobbymike]

https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3724066/FutureNavyFinal-Docx-2.pdf

 

[bobbymike]

http://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Testimony_Sloman_May_18_FINAL.pdf

Amphibious ships are armed solely with self -defense weapons and are not considered surface combatants. By adding vertical launch systems (VLS) to these advanced combat vessels all of which are already constructed to the Navy’s rigorous warship survivability standards amphibious shipping could be armed with more capable defensive weaponry as well as offensive anti-ship and land attack missiles./quote]

 

[NeilChapman]

http://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Testimony_Sloman_May_18_FINAL.pdf

Amphibious ships are armed solely with self -defense weapons and are not considered surface combatants. By adding vertical launch systems (VLS) to these advanced combat vessels all of which are already constructed to the Navy’s rigorous warship survivability standards amphibious shipping could be armed with more capable defensive weaponry as well as offensive anti-ship and land attack missiles./quote]

duhhh....

Never made sense that amphibs didn't have offensive punch. Navy culture.

 

[Moose]

The LPDs were designed and built to accommodate a pair of 8-cell Mk41 VLS on the bow, but they weren't completed with VLS actually in place for cost reasons. Refitting the LPDs with VLS has always been on the table, it mainly comes down to when the Navy believes is the best time to spend the money

 

[lastdingo]

The only solution that makes sense is for the US to "determine" that its economic and military power is the solution to continued stability.

That translates to strategic military technology investments with production on a "war footing".

Cyclical modernization,
vessels with shorter life spans or gutted and upgraded,
submarine quantities that meet tasking levels,
airframes being produced with variants planned on planned intervals (4 yrs?)
and a consistent budget that is 4-5% of GDP.

I disagree, for several reasons.

The USN-specific reason is that there's no way the U.S. could NOT lose a naval arms race with PR China if the Chinese decided to become #1 naval power.
The U.S. has almost no shipyard capacity, and most of what it has are super-inefficient shipyards that have hardly had any customers other than the U.S. government for decades. They're perfectly non-competitive in regard to warship exports. Design, production, and working out debilitating teething problems of a new warship class takes much in excess of 10 years in the U.S..

China and South Korea are the shipyards of the world. The U.S. is mentioned under "others" in global ship production pie charts.
The U.S. ship production is smaller than Croatia's and Poland's. The U.S. is essentially a country without shipyard capacity to speak of, and thus unable to compete in a naval arms race with conventional designs. There's still enough steel production, but the establishment of productive shipyards would take longer than the Chinese would need to badly outnumber the USN.

To have 250 USN warships or 400, to have a USN with average ship age 15 years or 30 years matters little. The difference is as small as the Chinese maybe needing two or three more years to achieve a clear superiority.

Think of the proud Royal Navy battlefleet of 1890. Nothing of it was of much use by 1910.

There are ways to mitigate the shipyard situation, of course. They are NOT about building more warships and aircraft now, though.


And more specifically about the topic; USN warships need more ASW punch (especially a much better detection of silent subs with LFASS on all DDG) and the USN should learn to not lag behind missile technology so badly (something like SM-6 was feasible by the early 90's, same with ESSM Blk II, there's no modern SSM in USN service and the too few ASW missiles are embarrassing).
There was too much emphasis on bombing Third World shitholes with naval air and cruise missiles for too long.
The BMD craze didn't help either.

 

[sferrin]

The only solution that makes sense is for the US to "determine" that its economic and military power is the solution to continued stability.

That translates to strategic military technology investments with production on a "war footing".

Cyclical modernization,
vessels with shorter life spans or gutted and upgraded,
submarine quantities that meet tasking levels,
airframes being produced with variants planned on planned intervals (4 yrs?)
and a consistent budget that is 4-5% of GDP.

I disagree, for several reasons.

The USN-specific reason is that there's no way the U.S. could NOT lose a naval arms race with PR China if the Chinese decided to become #1 naval power.
The U.S. has almost no shipyard capacity, and most of what it has are super-inefficient shipyards that have hardly had any customers other than the U.S. government for decades. They're perfectly non-competitive in regard to warship exports. Design, production, and working out debilitating teething problems of a new warship class takes much in excess of 10 years in the U.S..

China and South Korea are the shipyards of the world. The U.S. is mentioned under "others" in global ship production pie charts.
The U.S. ship production is smaller than Croatia's and Poland's. The U.S. is essentially a country without shipyard capacity to speak of, and thus unable to compete in a naval arms race with conventional designs. There's still enough steel production, but the establishment of productive shipyards would take longer than the Chinese would need to badly outnumber the USN.

To have 250 USN warships or 400, to have a USN with average ship age 15 years or 30 years matters little. The difference is as small as the Chinese maybe needing two or three more years to achieve a clear superiority.

Think of the proud Royal Navy battlefleet of 1890. Nothing of it was of much use by 1910.

There are ways to mitigate the shipyard situation, of course. They are NOT about building more warships and aircraft now, though.


And more specifically about the topic; USN warships need more ASW punch (especially a much better detection of silent subs with LFASS on all DDG) and the USN should learn to not lag behind missile technology so badly (something like SM-6 was feasible by the early 90's, same with ESSM Blk II, there's no modern SSM in USN service and the too few ASW missiles are embarrassing).
There was too much emphasis on bombing Third World shitholes with naval air and cruise missiles for too long.
The BMD craze didn't help either.

Damn. I agree with almost everything here. I think the shipyard thing is even worse. Even if we had an administration who funded a greatly expanded capacity, such a thing takes years and the next guy at the helm (if history is any indicator) would just f--k it up. We'd have to do the politically impossible and "design in the US, build in South Korea or the US" to really grow the fleet.

 

[bobbymike]

The only solution that makes sense is for the US to "determine" that its economic and military power is the solution to continued stability.

That translates to strategic military technology investments with production on a "war footing".

Cyclical modernization,
vessels with shorter life spans or gutted and upgraded,
submarine quantities that meet tasking levels,
airframes being produced with variants planned on planned intervals (4 yrs?)
and a consistent budget that is 4-5% of GDP.

I disagree, for several reasons.

The USN-specific reason is that there's no way the U.S. could NOT lose a naval arms race with PR China if the Chinese decided to become #1 naval power.
The U.S. has almost no shipyard capacity, and most of what it has are super-inefficient shipyards that have hardly had any customers other than the U.S. government for decades. They're perfectly non-competitive in regard to warship exports. Design, production, and working out debilitating teething problems of a new warship class takes much in excess of 10 years in the U.S..

China and South Korea are the shipyards of the world. The U.S. is mentioned under "others" in global ship production pie charts.
The U.S. ship production is smaller than Croatia's and Poland's. The U.S. is essentially a country without shipyard capacity to speak of, and thus unable to compete in a naval arms race with conventional designs. There's still enough steel production, but the establishment of productive shipyards would take longer than the Chinese would need to badly outnumber the USN.

To have 250 USN warships or 400, to have a USN with average ship age 15 years or 30 years matters little. The difference is as small as the Chinese maybe needing two or three more years to achieve a clear superiority.

Think of the proud Royal Navy battlefleet of 1890. Nothing of it was of much use by 1910.

There are ways to mitigate the shipyard situation, of course. They are NOT about building more warships and aircraft now, though.


And more specifically about the topic; USN warships need more ASW punch (especially a much better detection of silent subs with LFASS on all DDG) and the USN should learn to not lag behind missile technology so badly (something like SM-6 was feasible by the early 90's, same with ESSM Blk II, there's no modern SSM in USN service and the too few ASW missiles are embarrassing).
There was too much emphasis on bombing Third World shitholes with naval air and cruise missiles for too long.
The BMD craze didn't help either.

Damn. I agree with almost everything here. I think the shipyard thing is even worse. Even if we had an administration who funded a greatly expanded capacity, such a thing takes years and the next guy at the helm (if history is any indicator) would just f--k it up. We'd have to do the politically impossible and "design in the US, build in South Korea or the US" to really grow the fleet.

And if the 'flag went up' in the South China Sea 2030-40 the US would probably have to strike first and very hard and take out a potentially much larger fleet in port. Instead of Pearl Harbor think 'Pearl River Delta'

 

[lastdingo]

"Design in US, build in South Korea" would risk a preventive attack on South Korea.
The U.S. might then still have naval superiority, but its deterrence would have failed, indeed it would have been perverted.


My approach is different;

• ARAPAHO V2.0. Containerised subsystems that can turn cargo ships into armed merchantmen (even surface raiders to find blockade runners).
• 
  Add ASW & AEW helicopters and you have a self-defending convoy. No FFG construction needed, no additional invasion ("amphibious") warships for $ 2 bn a piece needed.
• 
  Reorient CVBGs from land attack towards sea battle (subsonic + supersonic anti-ship missiles, long range anti-radar missiles!)* to close the gaps between practical area of operation of midair-refuelled land-based combat aviation).
• 
  Commence production of vastly more cost-efficient AIP SSKs (SSIs) for $ 400 million per copy in place of $ 2.6 bn SSNs.

This approach doesn't require much shipyard capacity (mostly for SSIs).
The naval superiority would be with whoever has access to more cargo ships, and that would be the U.S..

The USN would NEVER pursue such a strategy because armed services are bureaucracies, and bureaucracies pursue their self-interest. It takes a stern civilian political leadership to change the bureaucracies' course from pursuit of self-interest towards pursuit of national interest. Americans are unable to do this with their armed services because they have a naive respect for top bureaucrats whenever said top bureaucrats wear an uniform. Thus they waste an unfathomable fortune on pursuing the self-interest of a naval bureaucracy, for example: More hulls! More hulls! More hulls! Regardless of how ridiculous the prices have become.

The U.S. will lose a naval arms race if the Chinese want to win it.


*: My fig leaf of being on topic.
---------------------

An alternative would be a political strategy:

http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.de/2017/02/a-hypothetical-naval-treaty.html
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.de/2017/02/a-security-treaty-for-east-asia-north.html

Again, not something the USN would recommend because it's pursuing its self-interest.